Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-0055, SECTION "R" (1).
June 19, 2003.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of defendant, St. Tammany Parish Fire Department, to alter and amend the Court's Order denying defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment Regarding The Consent Decree. In that Order, the Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 does not bar plaintiffs from introducing a consent decree that defendant entered into with the U.S. Department of Justice in 1980. For the following reasons, the Court denies defendant's motion.
I. Background
This is a Title VII discrimination case in which plaintiff, Debra Rice Safford, asserts that defendant did not hire her on account of her gender and age. Safford first applied for a full-time firefighter position in May 2000. She applied a second time in August 2001. She alleges that on both occasions, defendant passed over her application in favor of younger, less-qualified men.
In 1980, twenty years before Safford filed her first application, defendant entered into a consent decree with the U.S. Department of Justice. The consent decree obliged defendant to make greater efforts to hire women and minorities and to report to the government on its progress. (Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C, Consent Decree.) In 1999, defendant tried to obtain a release from the consent decree. Diana Aucoin, an administrative employee who was on the fire department's hiring and interview committee, coordinated defendant's efforts. When asked whether a supervisor requested that the coordinate this project or whether she took it up on her own initiative, Aucoin replied, "Many of the fire districts, especially since New Orleans had been released, were being released. So I was asked that we try and get released. . . ." (Pls.' Opp to Def.'s Mot to Reconsider, Ex. B, Dep. of Diana Aucoin, at 37-38.)
In early September 1999, Debra Rhyce, one of the department's two female firefighters, resigned amid complaints of discrimination. On September 21, 1999, Aucoin reported to the U.S. Department of Justice that "[t]he only activity we have had in our employees since [July 7, 1999] is to have one firefighter resign and the fire chief retire after 31 years of service last month." (Pls.' Opp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. L.) Aucoin did not report that the firefighter who resigned was one of the department's two females, and that she resigned complaining of discrimination. Aucoin testified that either Charles Abney, her immediate supervisor, or Albert Lee, the Acting Fire Chief, reviewed her September 1999 report to the Department of Justice. Abney denies having reviewed Aucoin's report.
On April 4, 2000, Aucoin sent a second report to the Department of Justice. This report included an "employee roster," which indicated that the department employed two female firefighters in December 1999. In fact, the department had only one female firefighter in December 1999, as Rhyce had resigned several months before. Aucoin testified that the payroll roster, and not the employee roster, is "the most accurately kept" record of who is employed by the department. (Dep. of Aucoin, at 10-11.) She testified that she sent the employee roster to the Department of Justice, and not the payroll list, because she believed that Rhyce "was coming back." (Dep. of Aucoin, at 31.) She forwarded a copy of the April 2000 report to defendant's attorney, Patrick Berrigan. Defendant was ultimately released from the consent decree in May 2000, the same month that it rejected Safford's first employment application.
Defendant moved the Court to exclude the consent decree from evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. In its Order and Reasons entered on April 14, 2003, the Court stated:
It is at least arguable that the fire department made false and misleading statements to the Department of Justice in the course of seeking release from the consent decree. These statements, which were made in September 1999 and April 2000, are highly probative of defendant's intent to discriminate against women in May 2000, when it denied Safford's employment action.Safford v. St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection District No. 1, 2003 WL 1873907, *4 (E.D.La. 2003). The Court ultimately concluded that the danger of prejudice, confusion and delay does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the consent decree. Id. Defendant moves the Court to reconsider this decision.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a "motion for reconsideration" in those exact terms, the Fifth Circuit has held that a motion to reconsider a pretrial motion is akin to a motion under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment. See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990); Kirklin v. U.S. Gov't, 2001 WL 1334991 (E.D.La. 2001). A motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) must be filed within ten days of entry of judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). The Court entered its order which defendant moves to amend on April 14, 2003. Defendant filed this motion on April 24, 2003, which is within the ten-day period. A district court has considerable discretion to grant or to deny a motion under Rule 59(e). See Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993). Reconsideration of a prior order, however, is an extraordinary remedy that should be used only sparingly. See Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 1998 WL 43217, *2 (E.D.La. 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 1999); Bardwell v. George G. Sharp, Inc., 1995 WL 517120, *1 (E.D.La. 1995). The court must "strike the proper balance between the need for finality and the need to render a just decision on the basis of all the facts." Bohlin, 6 F.3d at 355. In this district, courts maintain that a moving party must satisfy at least one of the following criteria to prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion: (1) the motion is necessary to correct a manifest error of fact or law; (2) the movant presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) the motion is necessary in order to prevent manifest injustice; and (4) the motion is justified by an intervening change in the controlling law. See Fidelity Deposit Co. of Md. v. Omni Bank, 1999 WL 970526, *3 (E.D.La. 1999); Jupiter v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 1999 WL 796218, *1 (E.D.La. 1999); Burma Navigation Corp. v. M/V Reliant Seahorse, 1998 WL 781587, *1 (E.D.La. 1998); Fields, 1998 WL 43217, *2.
B. Analysis
Perhaps the most notable aspect of defendant's motion is that defendant does not assert that it ever informed the Department of Justice that Rhyce had resigned. Rhyce, one of the department's two female firefighters, resigned in September 1999 complaining of discrimination. Defendant failed to mention this in its September 1999 report to the Department of Justice. (Pls.' Opp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. L.) Defendant also failed to mention this in its April 2000 report. ( Id.) Instead, defendant represented to the Department of Justice that it had two female firefighters when, in fact, it had only one. In its Order and Reasons, the Court found that these false and misleading statements, which were made in September 1999 and April 2000, are highly probative of defendant's intent to discriminate against women in May 2000. Safford, 2003 WL 1873907, at *4.
Defendant does not dispute that it made false or misleading statements to the Department of Justice. Instead, defendant asserts that the false statements were inadvertent. Defendant asserts that Aucoin "was simply a clerical employee" and "was not in a position of authority or rank." (Def.'s Mot. to Alter and Amend, at 3.) Aucoin, however, was much more than "simply a clerical employee." She was the administrative assistant to the fire chief, and she was involved in "everything." (Dep. of Aucoin, at 9-10.) Most notably, Aucoin was on the hiring and interviewing committee. ( Id. at 67-69.)
Even if the Court were to assume that Aucoin was a clerical employee who had no discriminatory intent, Aucoin did not act alone. First, a supervisor requested that she undertake efforts to obtain release from the decree. ( Id. at 37-38.) Second, Aucoin testified that either her direct supervisor, Charles Abney, or by Acting Fire Chief Lee reviewed the September 1999 report. ( Id. at 24.) Abney denies having reviewed Aucoin's report. (Def.'s Supp. Memo. in Support of Mot. to Alter and Amend, Ex. G, Dep. of Charles Abney, at 63-64.) Defendant has not produced a similar denial from Albert Lee. Third, Aucoin sent a copy of the April 2000 report to defendant's attorney, Patrick Berrigan. (Dep. of Aucoin, at 49-50.) It is therefore arguable that at least Lee and Berrigan were on notice that the fire department was reporting false and misleading information to the Department of Justice in an attempt to obtain release from the consent decree. Yet these individuals did nothing to correct the inaccurate information.
The fact remains that the department obtained release from the consent decree by sending false and misleading information to the Department of Justice. Defendant offers an excuse for the factual inaccuracies in the reports. The jury can consider defendant's excuse when it hears the evidence. Defendant's proffered excuse is insufficient to make evidence of the consent decree episode inadmissible.
The consent decree episode is clearly relevant to defendant's discriminatory intent in May 2000, when it rejected Safford's employment application. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 403. The Court found, and it continues to find, that the evidence pertaining to defendant's efforts to seek release from the consent decree has probative value. The Court does not find that concerns about undue prejudice and confusion of the issues substantially outweigh the probative value of this evidence. The jury should be provided the opportunity to consider this evidence together with defendant's explanation. Accordingly, the Court denies defendant's motion for reconsideration.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendant's motion.