Opinion
Record No. 1555-94-4
Decided: March 7, 1995
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
William H. Schladt (Ward, Klein Miller, on brief), for appellant.
Craig A. Brown (Ashcraft Gerel, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Koontz, Fitzpatrick and Senior Judge Duff
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
The Workers' Compensation Commission awarded Catherine Anne Schultz (claimant) benefits based upon a determination that she had an occupational disease, carpal tunnel syndrome. The sole issue on appeal is whether claimant's condition is a compensable occupational disease or a noncompensable cumulative trauma injury resulting from repetitive motion. Finding no error, we affirm the commission.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Claimant worked for Safeway, Inc. (employer) for sixteen years as a food clerk and cashier. Her job duties included scanning and bagging groceries and stocking shelves, and claimant often flexed her wrists when performing these duties. In 1991, claimant experienced some numbness and tingling in her hands. She was unable to work from December 1991 to October 1992 due to an unrelated injury and suffered no symptoms during that time.
In May 1993, claimant sought treatment from Dr. John McConnell, who noted that claimant had "paresthesias in the median nerve distribution of both hands" and a positive Phalen's test, and diagnosed her condition as bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome caused by her employment. Dr. McConnell performed release surgeries on claimant's hands in July 1993. In a January 18, 1994 note, Dr. McConnell reiterated his opinion that claimant's condition was "a direct result of her work activities" and concluded that she suffered from a disease as defined by Black's Law Dictionary.
The full commission found that claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome was an occupational disease and not a cumulative trauma injury resulting from repetitive motion: "[T]he opinion expressed by Dr. McConnell is his own and is sufficient to establish that the claimant's condition is a disease."
In Merillat Indus., Inc. v. Parks, 246 Va. 429, 436 S.E.2d 600 (1993), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the Workers' Compensation Act "requires that the condition for which compensation is sought as an occupational disease must first qualify as a disease." Id. at 432, 436 S.E.2d at 601. This Court defined "disease" as:
any deviation from or interruption of the normal structure or function of any part, organ, or system (or combination thereof) of the body that is manifested by a characteristic set of symptoms and signs and whose etiology, pathology, and prognosis may be known or unknown.
Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 17 Va. App. 499, 503, 438 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1993). "[T]he word 'disease' has a well-established meaning, and . . . no significant disparity exists among the definitions of that term promulgated by various authorities." Commonwealth, Dep't of State Police v. Haga, 18 Va. App. 162, 165, 442 S.E.2d 424, 426 (1994).
"Upon appellate review, the findings of fact made by the Workers' Compensation Commission will be upheld when supported by credible evidence." Id. at 166, 442 S.E.2d at 426. In the instant case, sufficient credible evidence supports the commission's finding that claimant's condition was a compensable occupational disease. The claimant's doctor concluded that her carpal tunnel syndrome was a disease using a definition consistent with the definition of "disease" approved in Piedmont. His conclusion was based upon his observation that claimant suffered "paresthesias in the median nerve distribution of both hands" and her positive Phalen's test. The mere fact that claimant's condition resulted from repetitive motion in her employment is not dispositive. Indeed, claimant's situation is similar to that in Piedmont, in which this Court approved the award of benefits to a claimant who suffered from de Quervain's disease.
Accordingly, the commission's decision is affirmed.
Affirmed.