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concluding that the plaintiff did "not allege how the lack of supervision caused D. Saenz' death. Accordingly, Saenz' Complaint lacks the necessary factual allegations to state a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise cause of action."
Summary of this case from Estate of Medina v. SamuelsOpinion
No. CIV 14–1005 JB/SMV.
04-30-2015
Peggy SAENZ, individually and as personal representative over the Estate of Peggy D. Saenz, deceased, Plaintiff, v. LOVINGTON MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Board of Education, Darin Manes, Superintendent, and Chris Brattain, High School Principal, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.
Max Houston Proctor, Hobbs, NM, Dick A. Blenden, Carlsbad, NM, for Plaintiff. Elizabeth L. German, Ethan D. Watson, Jason Michael Burnette, Shayne Huffman, German & Associates, LLC, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants.
Max Houston Proctor, Hobbs, NM, Dick A. Blenden, Carlsbad, NM, for Plaintiff.
Elizabeth L. German, Ethan D. Watson, Jason Michael Burnette, Shayne Huffman, German & Associates, LLC, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant's [sic] Motion to Dismiss and for Qualified Immunity, filed January 12, 2014 (Doc. 8)(“Motion”). The Court held a hearing on April 8, 2015. The primary issues are: (i) whether Plaintiff Peggy Saenz sufficiently alleges that the Defendants created the danger that harmed her daughter, Peggy D. Saenz (“D. Saenz”); (ii) whether the Defendants' conduct shocks the conscience; (iii) whether Saenz can maintain her failure to train or supervise cause of action without an underlying constitutional violation; (iv) whether Defendants Darin Manes and Chris Brattain violated a clearly established constitutional right; and (v) whether the Court should retain supplemental jurisdiction of Saenz' state law claims. Saenz fails to allege that the Defendants' affirmative conduct created a danger to D. Saenz or to allege that the Defendants' actions shock the conscience. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss her substantive due-process claim. A failure-to-train or supervise cause of action requires an underlying constitutional violation, and Saenz fails to allege how additional training or supervision would have prevented D. Saenz' death. Consequently, the Court will dismiss Saenz' failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise claim. Because Manes and Brattain did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, because the Court will dismiss all of Saenz' federal claims, it will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims and will dismiss them without prejudice to her filing them in state court. The Court will, thus, grant the Motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court takes its facts from the Complaint for Damages, filed November 5, 2014 (Doc. 1)(“Complaint”), as it must, under rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The case arises out of the death of a seventeen-year-old high-school student—D. Saenz—who was thrown from a vehicle that was traveling in Defendant Lovington Municipal School District's parking lot. See Complaint ¶ 3, at 2; id. ¶ 17, at 4.
D. Saenz was a high-school student at Lovington School District. See Complaint ¶ 3, at 2. Saenz is a resident of New Mexico and is the personal representative of D. Saenz' estate. See Complaint ¶ 4, at 2. The Lovington School District and Defendant Board of Education are organized under the State of New Mexico's laws, and the Lovington Board of Education, the citizens of Lovington, Lea County, New Mexico elects, operates the Lovington School District. See Complaint ¶ 5, at 2. The Lovington School District and its school facilities are within the State of New Mexico. See Complaint ¶ 9, at 3. Manes is the Lovington School District's superintendent and is contracted through the Board of Education to operate the school district. See Complaint ¶ 6, at 2. Manes was in charge of, among other things, operating the Lovington School District's buildings and premises, and ensuring that they were “operated in a safe and secure manner.” Complaint ¶ 11, at 3. Brattain is the principal at Lovington High School. See Complaint ¶ 7, at 2. Brattain “was to operate the Lovington High School buildings and its premises in a safe and secure manner.” Complaint ¶ 12, at 3.
The Defendants “did not operate ... the Lovington High School and its premises in a safe and secure manner for the benefit of the public and the students of Lovington High School.” Complaint ¶ 13, at 3. The Defendants “allowed the negligent operation and maintenance of the Lovington High School parking lot which created a dangerous condition.” Complaint ¶ 14, at 3–4. The Defendants “failed to supervise and control the Lovington High School parking lot which created a risk to the public and the students attending the high school.” Complaint ¶ 15, at 4. The Lovington School District and the Lovington Board of Education were responsible for “maintaining the safety of its school personnel and its students” at Lovington High School and the premises of Lovington High School's parking lot. Complaint ¶ 16, at 4.
On or about August 27, 2014, D. Saenz was thrown from a vehicle that was traveling in Lovington High School's parking lot. See Complaint ¶ 17, at 4. The parking lot was “without supervision and control of the Lovington Municipal School District, its' [sic] Board of Education, and its' [sic] employees.” Complaint ¶ 17, at 4. Before August 27, 2014, the Defendants knew that the parking lot was in a dangerous condition, yet they did not do anything “to prevent the dangerous condition created by the negligence of the school district and its employees.” Complaint ¶ 18, at 4–5. The Defendants ignored the dangerous condition and did nothing to prevent the August 27, 2014, accident. See Complaint ¶ 19, at 5. Students and citizens complained about the parking lot's dangerous condition, but the Defendants ignored the complaints and did not remedy the situation. See Complaint ¶ 25, at 6. Before August 27, 2014, Manes and Brattain informed the Lovington School District and the Lovington Board of Education “that a dangerous condition existed at the Lovington High School Parking lot.” Complaint ¶ 20, at 5. Lovington High School has video cameras that caught the accident on tape. See Complaint ¶ 21, at 5. At the time of the accident, the Defendants did not employ student resource officers, employees, or security officers to supervise the parking lot and secure the students' safety. See Complaint ¶ 22, at 5.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Saenz filed suit in federal court on November 5, 2014. She alleges four Counts. See Complaint ¶¶ 23–45, at 5–11. The first Count is titled: “Wrongful Death–Failure to Protect Life.” Complaint at 5. Saenz alleges that the Defendants failed to supervise and control the Lovington High School parking lot, which caused D. Saenz' death. See Complaint ¶ 24, at 6. She alleges that the Defendants knew of the dangerous condition and ignored complaints about it. See Complaint ¶¶ 25–26, at 6. Saenz contends that the Defendants' actions and inactions deprived D. Saenz' rights that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America protects. See Complaint ¶ 27, at 6. She also contends that the Defendants acted willfully and wantonly in violating D. Saenz' rights, and that they “had a duty to respond and eliminate the dangerous condition prior to the death of the Decedent.” Complaint ¶¶ 28–29, at 6.
Saenz' second Count is a state claim for the negligent “operation and maintenance of the Lovington High School building and its premises.” Complaint ¶¶ 30–33, at 7–8. Her third Count is for substantive due-process violations. See Complaint ¶¶ 34–39, at 8–9. She alleges that the Defendants “were obligated to supervise, protect, and oversee the Lovington High School parking lot under the circumstances.” Complaint ¶ 36, at 8. Saenz alleges that the Defendants' knowledge of the parking lot's dangerous condition and their decision to do nothing about it “is shocking to the conscience,” and constituted a “willful disregard of the dangerous condition of the Lovington High School Parking prior to the Decedent's death.” Complaint ¶¶ 37–39, at 8–9. Saenz' fourth Count is for deliberate indifference in training and supervising. See Complaint ¶¶ 40–45, at 9–11. She alleges that the Lovington School District and the Lovington Board of Education violated her federal and state constitutional rights “by failing to maintain sufficient supervision and control of its' employees to manage, supervise and control a dangerous instrumentality, that being the Lovington Municipal School's High School parking lot.” Complaint ¶ 41, at 9–10.
1. The Motion and Briefing.
The Defendants filed the Motion on January 12, 2015. The Defendants contend that the Lovington School District is not a proper party in the case, because only the Board of Education has the capacity to be sued. See Motion at 2, n. 2 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22–5–4(E)). The Defendants assert that Counts 1 and 3 are both substantive due-process claims. See Motion at 2, n. 3. The Defendants argue that Saenz fails to state a valid claim, because she fails to allege that a state actor harmed D. Saenz. See Motion at 2. They contend that Saenz' substantive due-process claims have several defects. See Motion at 2–3. First, they assert that they did not have a special relationship with D. Saenz that could trigger a constitutional duty to protect her from third parties' harmful acts. See Motion at 3. Second, the Defendants contend that Saenz fails to allege facts that they created the danger which led to D. Saenz' death and that Saenz has failed to allege facts showing that their failure to train employees rose to the level of deliberate indifference that is necessary to show a constitutional violation. See Motion at 3. The Defendants also argue that Saenz' claims against Manes and Brattain, in their official capacities, are duplicative of her claims against the Lovington School District. See Motion at 3. They maintain that the Court should dismiss Saenz' state law claims, because of sovereign immunity, and because the Complaint does not meet federal pleading standards. See Motion at 3. Finally, the Defendants argue that Manes and Brattain are entitled to qualified immunity. See Motion at 3.
The Defendants contend that a substantive due-process violation requires such egregious conduct that it shocks the conscience, and that Saenz' claim is based on the Defendants' failure to “supervise, train, and otherwise prevent the accident via safety policies and procedures.” Motion at 6. They contend that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States generally does not impose a duty to protect citizens from deprivations that private actors cause. See Motion at 6 (citing Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.1992)). The Defendants assert that there are two exceptions to this general rule: (i) the special-relationship exception; and (ii) the danger-creation exception. See Motion at 6–7. They argue that a special relationship usually arises when the state incarcerates or institutionalizes a person and that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that involuntary restraint is central to determining whether a custodial relationship triggers a duty to protect. See Motion at 7. The Defendants assert that, in Maldonado v. Josey, the Tenth Circuit considered whether New Mexico's compulsory school attendance creates a special relationship between students and school officials. See Motion at 7. They maintain that the Tenth Circuit held that, unlike incarceration or institutionalization, a school does not have sufficient custody over a student to create a special relationship. See Motion at 7–8. The Defendants argue that, because they lacked a special relationship with D. Saenz, they had no constitutional duty to protect her from third parties' harmful acts. See Motion at 8. They further argue that Saenz' allegation that they knew about the parking lot's dangerous conditions should not affect the Court's analysis, because foreseeability does not create an affirmative duty to protect. See Motion at 8 (citing Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I–89, 22 F.3d 991, 994 (10th Cir.1994)).
The Defendants also argue that Saenz fails to allege danger creation. See Motion at 8. They contend that a danger-creation claim requires reckless or intentional state action that shocks the conscience. See Motion at 8. The Defendants assert that negligence is insufficient to shock the conscience, and that an official's conduct must have “a high level of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm.” Motion at 9. They maintain that, even if Saenz satisfies the other danger-creation requirements, she has not pled sufficient facts showing that they acted recklessly and in conscious disregard of a risk, or that their conduct shocks the conscience. See Motion at 9. The Defendants argue that Saenz does not allege that they created a danger or increased D. Saenz' vulnerability to a danger. See Motion at 9. They contend that, although Saenz alleges that D. Saenz was thrown from a vehicle in the parking lot while school officials were not supervising the lot, Saenz does not show how their lack of supervision created a danger or increased D. Saenz' vulnerability to a danger. See Motion at 9. The Defendants assert that Saenz has not pled facts showing that they acted recklessly in conscious disregard to D. Saenz' constitutional rights, and that not supervising the parking lot was, at most, negligence. See Motion at 9–10. They also contend that they did not disregard D. Saenz' constitutional rights. See Motion at 10. The Defendants argue that their conduct does not shock the conscience and that Saenz' claim is one that would ordinarily be a state tort claim. See Motion at 10.
The Defendants maintain that Saenz fails to allege a failure-to-train cause of action. See Motion at 10. They assert that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failing to train requires notice that an official's action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and that the official consciously disregarded the risk. See Motion at 10. The Defendants contend that notice may be established by showing the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct or by showing that the violation is highly predictable. See Motion at 10. They argue that an official's failure to train must be so reckless or grossly negligent that the future misconduct is almost inevitable. See Motion at 10–11 (citing McDaniels v. McKinna, 96 Fed.Appx 575, 579 (10th Cir.2004)(unpublished)). The Defendants maintain that Saenz has not alleged that they were aware of the parking lot's problems, that the problems could have been avoided through training, that Manes or Brattain were responsible for providing training, or that the Lovington School District or the Lovington Board of Education had a policy against providing training. See Motion at 11. They also argue that, because none of D. Saenz' constitutional rights were violated, they did not have a duty to provide training. See Motion at 11. The Defendants contend that, because there was no underlying constitutional violation, the lack of training did not result in a constitutional violation. See Motion at 12. The Defendants argue that Manes and Brattain are entitled to qualified immunity. See Motion at 12. They maintain that D. Saenz did not suffer a constitutional violation and that, even if she did, the constitutional right could not have been clearly established. See Motion at 13.
The Defendants argue that Saenz has failed to plead a claim for which there is a waiver of the Defendants' sovereign immunity under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41–4–1 (“NMTCA”). Motion at 13. They assert that Saenz merely alleges that they acted negligently. See Motion at 13. The Defendants contend that Saenz' allegations do not fit within any of the NMTCA's exceptions. See Motion at 13–14. They argue that the NMTCA is not waived for negligent supervision and that Saenz' allegations do not amount to anything more than negligent supervision. See Motion at 14.
Saenz responded to the Motion on March 12, 2014 (Doc. 20)(“Response”). She argues that the Defendants have conceded that, before D. Saenz' death, they knew about the dangers in the parking lot. See Response at 3. She contends that Brattain made statements to the media that he knew about the dangerous conditions, and that he gave the Lovington School District and the Lovington Board of Education notice about the dangers. See Response at 3. Saenz maintains that the Complaint's allegations are sufficient to allege that the Defendants created a danger that caused D. Saenz' death. See Response at 3. She contends that the Defendants failed to train school employees after learning about the dangerous condition, which rose to the level of deliberate indifference to D. Saenz' constitutional rights. See Response at 3. Saenz contends that, because the Complaint alleges that the Defendants knew about the dangerous condition and failed to train employees, it sufficiently alleges a cause of action. See Response at 4. She maintains that she sufficiently alleges that the Defendants maintained policies that resulted in violating D. Saenz' rights. See Response at 4. Saenz refers to her allegations that the Defendants' “actions were a willfully and wonton and intentional, violation of the Decedents' Civil rights,” and to her allegation that the Defendants' “conduct was shocking to the conscious [sic] of the Court by their willful intentional disregard of the dangerous condition.” Response at 5.
Saenz concedes that the Defendants did not have a special relationship with D. Saenz, but argues that the danger-creation doctrine applies. See Response at 5–6. She contends that the Complaint sufficiently alleges the necessary elements to establish a creation-of-danger theory. See Response at 6–7. Saenz states: “What is the conduct, when viewed in total, shocks the conscience. Such conduct should be viewed with the intent of the Governmental Entity and the intent of the Individual Employee with use of the Governmental Entity.” Response at 7 (spacing altered for readability). Saenz asserts that a § 1983 action can be predicated on two forms of wrongful intent: (i) “an intent to harm”; or (ii) “an intent to place a person unreasonably at risk or [sic] harm.” Response at 7. She contends that the second form of intent refers to reckless conduct and that she has alleged sufficient reckless conduct. See Response at 7.
Concerning the shocks-the-conscience requirement, Saenz argues:
What can be more shocking to the conscience than a School District, Board, Principal, and Superintendent, entrusted with protecting the health, security, and life of a student in their school district, and Employees of the School District knowing that there was a dangerous condition that existed upon the premises, and intentionally, willfully, and wantonly disregarding the condition to the detriment of PEGGY D. SAENZ.
Response at 8. She asserts that the shock-the-conscience standard has not been firmly defined and that it depends on each case's facts, but that the Defendants' conduct is more egregious than the defendant-officer's conduct in Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir.2009), where, according to Saenz, the defendant-officer drove through an intersection without activating his overhead emergency lights and collided with another vehicle, killing its occupant. See Response at 8. Saenz contends that the Tenth Circuit held that, taking the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant-officer's conduct shocked the conscience. See Response at 8–9.
Saenz argues that the NMTCA waives sovereign immunity for the negligent operation or maintenance of, among other things, buildings and furnishings. See Response at 9 (N.M.Stat.Ann. § 41–4–6). She asserts that, while the waiver does not extend to negligent supervision cases, it applies if the negligent operation or maintenance creates a dangerous condition that threatens the public or a class of people who use the facilities. See Response at 10. Saenz contends that, in Upton v. Clovis Municipal School District, 2006–NMSC–040, 140 N.M. 205, 141 P.3d 1259, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that a school district's failure to follow its safety policies fell within the NMTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. See Response at 10. She asserts that she has alleged that the Defendants were negligent in the operation of the Lovington High School premises, which created a dangerous condition that threatened students. See Response at 10–11.
Saenz attaches to the Response a news article from the Hobbs News–Sun. See Associated Press, Family Files Lawsuit, Hobbs News–Sun (Nov. 7, 2014), filed March 12, 2015 (Doc. 20–1)(“Article”). The Article states that D. Saenz' family filed a lawsuit against the Defendants. See Article at 1. The Article states that, after the accident, Brattain told the Lovington Board of Education members that, at the beginning of the year, he and other school administrators attempted to direct the traffic in the congested parking lot. See Article at 1. The Article notes that the board members told Brattain that he could direct traffic at his own risk and that, if he were hit by a car, the school was not liable. See Article at 1. It further states that the board members were looking into proposals for the parking lot, including stop signs, speed bumps, and parking bumpers. See Article at 1. It states that the school district hired a school resource officer to help supervise the parking lot. See Article at 1.
The Defendants replied on March 26, 2015. See Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss and for Qualified Immunity, filed March 26, 2015 (Doc. 21)(“Reply”). They assert that Saenz fails to state what created the dangerous condition in the parking lot, state factual details about D. Saenz' death, or establish a nexus between the two. See Reply at 1. They maintain that Saenz has not alleged a constitutional violation and that the NMTCA does not waive the Defendants' sovereign immunity. See Reply at 1–2.
The Defendants argue that the Court should disregard the Article in ruling on the Motion. See Reply at 2. They assert that, while the Court may consider documents attached to the Complaint, incorporated into the Complaint by reference, or for which judicial notice is appropriate, none of those exceptions apply to the Article. See Reply at 2–3. The Defendants further contend that the Court should exclude Brattain's statements in the Article as double hearsay. See Reply at 3.
The Defendants maintain that Saenz fails to establish that they violated D. Saenz' constitutional rights. See Reply at 4. They contend that the danger-creation exception requires affirmative acts and that Saenz has not alleged any affirmative act on the Defendants' part which caused the danger. See Reply at 4. The Defendants argue that Saenz has alleged only omissions that created the harm. See Reply at 4–5. They also argue that Saenz has not alleged any action that shocks the conscience. See Reply at 5. They contend that the Complaint contains nothing more than legal conclusions. See Reply at 5. The Defendants argue that Saenz has alleged, at most, negligence. See Reply at 5–6. They assert that the shocks-the-conscience test is an objective one and that § 1983 actions should not replace traditional state tort law. See Reply at 6. The Defendants address Saenz' argument that the Tenth Circuit found that the defendant's conduct shocked the conscience in Green v. Post by arguing that the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant's conduct did not shock the conscience. See Reply at 7. The Defendants argue that, if an officer speeding through an intersection, without activating emergency lights, and killing another person does not shock the conscience, negligently supervising a parking lot also does not. See Reply at 7.
The Defendants maintain that Manes and Brattain are entitled to qualified immunity, because they did not violate D. Saenz' constitutional rights, and because neither the Supreme Court of the United States of America nor the Tenth Circuit has held that ordinary negligence can give rise to a constitutional violation. See Reply at 7–8. They assert that Upton v. Clovis Municipal School District and its progeny stand for the proposition that, if a public entity is aware of a dangerous condition on the property, that entity must provide adequate safety policies and procedures. See Reply at 8. The Defendants contend that Upton v. Clovis Municipal School District does not hold that negligent supervision waives sovereign immunity, but that a pattern of violence or negligently operating a facility may waive sovereign immunity, because it is more than failing to supervise. See Reply at 8–9. The Defendants maintain that there are no such facts in this case. See Reply at 9.
The Defendants argue that, in Espinoza v. Town of Taos, 1995–NMSC–070, 120 N.M. 680, 905 P.2d 718, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that § 41–4–6 did not waive a municipality's sovereign immunity for failing to supervise a playground's slide during a summer camp. See Reply at 9. The Defendants maintain that Saenz has not identified what created the parking lot's dangerous condition and that she alleges only conclusory allegations. See Reply at 9. They contend that § 41–4–6 requires a plaintiff to identify specific dangerous conditions that created a dangerous condition. See Reply at 9.
2. The April 8, 2015, Hearing.
LAW REGARDING LIABILITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Novak, 216 F.3d at 309).
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
Gold Res., 776 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1270).
See id.
Plaintiffs requested in footnote 11 of their response leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). The Tenth Circuit has affirmed the denial of a similar request made in a single sentence without a statement for grounds to amend. See id. at 1118–19. Accordingly, noting that no motion for leave to amend has been filed as required by local rule, the Court declines Plaintiffs' request. See D. Kan. Rule 15.1.