Opinion
C075705
12-22-2016
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF NONPROFIT HOUSING, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 34201280001355CUWMGDS)
Prior to the recent changes in redevelopment law, redevelopment agencies were required to set aside 20 percent of their tax revenues for low-income housing. However, the City of Industry's (City) redevelopment agency was authorized by statute to transfer it's 20 percent set-aside to the Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles (Housing Authority) rather than using the set-aside for low income housing within the city, because the City was incorporated for the purpose of promoting business and industry, and has no residentially-zoned property within its boundaries. In exchange for making the transfer to Housing Authority, City was allowed to adopt a general plan housing element that did not make the necessary provision for City's share of regional housing.
Changes in the redevelopment law dismantled redevelopment agencies and redirected their revenues. The 20 percent set-aside that once funded low-income housing is no longer allowed to be spent for that purpose, but must be preserved to fund core governmental services. Payments from the revenues that previously funded redevelopment agencies are now limited to payments on enforceable obligations as defined by statute. The question posed by this case is whether City's 20 percent set-aside that was once transferred to the Housing Authority, qualifies as an enforceable obligation payable to the Housing Authority. Specifically, petitioner argues that once City adopted a noncomplying housing element, the payments to Housing Authority became an enforceable obligation for the duration of the noncomplying housing element.
The trial court determined that the set-aside is not an enforceable obligation. We agree.
BACKGROUND
A. Redevelopment Law
The Legislature authorized the formation of redevelopment agencies after the Second World War for the purpose of revitalizing blighted communities. (California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 245-246 (California Redevelopment Association).) Redevelopment agencies did not levy taxes, but instead relied for funding on tax increment financing, i.e., the increased property tax revenue that resulted from the increase in value created by redevelopment in the redevelopment project area. (Id. at p. 246.) "Under this method, those public entities entitled to receive property tax revenue in a redevelopment project area (the cities, counties, special districts, and school districts containing territory in the area) [were] allocated a portion [of property taxes] based on the assessed value of the property prior to the effective date of the redevelopment plan. Any tax revenue in excess of that amount—the tax increment created by the increased value of project area property—[went] to the redevelopment agency for repayment of debt incurred to finance the project." (Id. at pp. 246-247.)
California cities sometimes misused used tax increment financing to subsidize their own economic development by diverting property tax revenues from other taxing entities. (California Redevelopment Association, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 247.) Redevelopment became a powerful tool for taking property tax funds from another agency. (Ibid.) Tax increment financing provided redevelopment agencies a financial advantage over school districts and other local taxing agencies. (Id. at p. 248.) One measure the Legislature took to address concerns over tax increment financing was to require 20 percent of the tax increment revenue to be deposited in a fund for the provision of low and moderate-income housing. (Id. at pp. 247-248; Health & Saf. Code, §§ 33334.2, 33334.3, 33334.6.)
Further statutory references to sections of an undesignated code are to the Health and Safety Code. --------
In 2011, in response to a fiscal emergency, the Legislature passed legislation to dissolve redevelopment agencies and transfer control of their assets to successor agencies. (California Redevelopment Association, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 250-251.) "[T]ax increment revenues that would have gone to redevelopment agencies must be deposited in a local trust fund each county is required to create and administer. (§§ 34170.5, subd. (b), 34182, subd. (c)(1).) All amounts necessary to satisfy administrative costs, pass-through payments, and enforceable obligations will be allocated for those purposes, while any excess will be deemed property tax revenue and distributed in the same fashion as balances and assets. (§§ 34172, subd. (d), 34183, subd. (a).)" (Id. at p. 251.) The legislation was enacted by Statutes 2011, First Extraordinary Session 2011-2012, chapters 5-6, and will hereafter be referred to as Assembly Bill 1X 26. (Id. at p. 241.)
While successor agencies must pay enforceable obligations, they may no longer make deposits to the low- and moderate-income housing fund. (§§ 34163, subd. (c)(4), 34177.) Assembly Bill 1X 26 requires successor agencies to obtain approval for payments of enforceable obligations, and provides a process for such approval. The successor agency is required to submit a Recognized Obligation Payment Schedule (ROPS) to the Department of Finance (Department), which approves or disapproves the items in the ROPS. (§ 34177, subd. (a).)
B. Law Regarding City's Housing
The City is a charter city. Every city in California must have a general plan, and the general plan for every charter city must contain a housing element. (Gov. Code, §§ 65300, 65302.) The housing element must contain "an identification and analysis of existing and projected housing needs and a statement of goals, policies, quantified objectives, financial resources, and scheduled programs for the preservation, improvement, and development of housing" and must also contain "a quantification of the [city's] existing and projected housing needs for all income levels" that "shall include the [city's] share of the regional housing need . . . ." (Gov. Code, § 65583.)
As of January 1, 1992, City had no residentially zoned land within its boundaries. This led to litigation over the adequacy of City's general plan. The litigation resulted in the enactment in 1992 of Government Code section 65584.3, which provides in pertinent part that City "may elect to adopt a housing element that makes no provision for new housing or the share of regional housing needs . . . for the current and subsequent revisions of the housing element . . . for the period of time that 20 percent of all tax increment revenue accruing from all redevelopment projects, and required to be set aside for low- and moderate-income housing pursuant to Section 33334.2 of the Health and Safety Code, is annually transferred to the Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles."
City and its redevelopment agency entered into an agreement with Housing Authority expressly for the purpose of effectuating the provisions of Government Code section 65584.3 (the 1992 Agreement). Pursuant to the 1992 Agreement, City's redevelopment agency agreed to transfer to Housing Authority 20 percent of all tax increment revenue at the end of each fiscal year commencing with fiscal year 1992-1993. The agreement provided that it was "subject to and consistent with" the provisions of Government Code section 65584.3.
C. Factual and Procedural Background
City adopted a housing element for the period 2008-2013 which made no allocation for regional housing, in reliance on the provisions of Government Code section 65584.3, which exempted it from providing for housing as long as it transferred to Housing Authority the 20 percent of tax increment revenue required to be set aside under the redevelopment law. In February 2012, the law dissolving redevelopment agencies and restricting the payment of revenues to enforceable obligations of the former redevelopment agencies went into effect.
City's successor agency determined that the 20 percent tax increment revenue for fiscal years 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 were enforceable obligations pursuant to Assembly Bill 1X 26, and placed the payments as items 26 and 27 on the ROPS, which was then submitted to the Department for approval. The successor agency determined that the transfer amount for fiscal year 2011-2012 was $18,755,000, and the transfer amount for fiscal year 2012-2013 was $19,130,100. Department refused to approve the payments, determining that neither amount should have been included on the ROPS because they were not enforceable obligations.
The Southern California Association of Nonprofit Housing (Petitioner) is an organization that supports the production, preservation, and management of affordable low- to moderate-income housing. It filed this petition and complaint for writ of mandate and declaratory relief. It sought, in pertinent part, to compel the successor agency to pay items 26 and 27 on the ROPS to Housing Authority, and to compel Department to approve and authorize items 26 and 27 on the ROPS.
The trial court concluded that successor agencies are authorized to make payments only for "enforceable obligations" as defined in section 34171, subdivision (d)(1). As is relevant here, that subdivision allows payments for preexisting obligations imposed by law (Id., subd. (d)(1)(C)), or pursuant to a legally binding and enforceable agreement or contract. (Id., subd. (d)(1)(E).) The trial court concluded that Government Code section 65584.3 did not impose payment by law, and the 1992 Agreement was not legally binding and enforceable as to the payments for either fiscal year, because both the statute and the agreement were premised on a legally-required set-aside of redevelopment agency tax increment revenues, and when those revenues were no longer required to be set aside, there was no longer an enforceable obligation. The trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate and the request for declaratory relief.
DISCUSSION
Assembly Bill 1X 26 provides that successor agencies are required to make payments due for enforceable obligations. (§ 34177.) Section 34171, subdivision (d)(1) defines enforceable obligations. The statute defines enforceable obligations as the repayment of bonds and loans, payments required by federal or state law, judgments or settlements, legally binding and enforceable contracts, contracts necessary for the administration of the successor agency, and amounts borrowed from or owing to the Low and Moderate Income Housing Fund that were deferred as of the effective date of the dissolution law. Petitioner argues the payments to Housing Authority are enforceable obligations because they are: (1) obligations imposed by law and (2) payments required under a legally binding contract.
Petitioner argues the intent of Assembly Bill 1X 26 was to preclude redevelopment agencies from undertaking new activities and incurring new debt, not to preclude successor agencies from fulfilling preexisting obligations. It is true that one of the purposes of Assembly Bill 1X 26 was to preclude redevelopment agencies from incurring new debt. Assembly Bill 1X 26 provided, "It is the intent of the Legislature to . . . [¶] . . . [b]ar existing redevelopment agencies from incurring new obligations, prior to their dissolution." (Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011-2012, ch. 5, §1.)
But, Assembly Bill 1X 26 was also intended to take the approximately $5 billion in tax increment revenue from redevelopment agencies, and make it available for cities, counties, special districts, and school and community college districts, after payments were made on indebtedness incurred by the redevelopment agency prior to its dissolution. (Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011-2012, ch. 5, § 1.) "This part is intended to preserve, to the maximum extent possible, the revenues and assets of redevelopment agencies so that those assets and revenues that are not needed to pay for enforceable obligations may be used by local governments to fund core governmental services including police and fire protection services and schools. It is the intent of the Legislature that redevelopment agencies take no actions that would further deplete the corpus of the agencies' funds regardless of their original source. All provisions of this part shall be construed as broadly as possible to support this intent and to restrict the expenditure of funds to the fullest extent possible." (§ 34167, subd (a).) The Legislature made clear that "all provisions of the Community Redevelopment Law that depend on the allocation of tax increment to redevelopment agencies . . . shall be inoperative." (§ 34189, subd. (a).)
For this reason, the Legislature limited the payments allowed by the successor entities to administrative costs, pass-through payments, and enforceable obligations. (§ 34183, subd. (a)(1).) Only enforceable obligations are relevant here, and they are defined in section 34171, subdivision (d)(1). Thus, the only pertinent question is whether the payments are an enforceable obligation as defined by law.
I
Government Code Section 65584.3 Does Not Impose an Enforceable Obligation
A. Statutory Language
Petitioner argues that the language of Government Code section 65584.3 imposes a legal obligation on City to transfer funds to Housing Authority for the entire period of the housing element, once it elects to avail itself of the housing exemption. However, the plain language of the statute does not lend itself to this interpretation. Rather, the statute provides that City may elect to adopt the housing element waiver "for the period of time" that it pays Housing Authority 20 percent of revenues that have: (1) accrued from all redevelopment projects and (2) are required to be set aside pursuant to section 33334.2. The statue describes both how long City may take advantage of the waiver, and what the transferred funds must consist of. "For the period of time" the payments are transferred describes how long City may elect the housing element waiver. What the payments must consist of is 20 percent of the tax increment revenue that has accrued and is required to be set aside pursuant to section 33334.2. Had no amount accrued, City could no longer have taken advantage of the waiver. By the same token, once the accrued amount was no longer required by section 33334.2 to be set aside, City could no longer take advantage of the waiver.
As the trial court found, Government Code section 65584.3 did not impose any legal obligation to make payments. The only legal obligation was imposed by the housing element law on City to provide housing within City's boundaries. "Government Code section 65584.3 permitted, but did not require, the City to elect to fulfill [its obligation to provide for housing within its boundaries] by making an annual payment of 20% of redevelopment agency tax increment revenues to the Housing Authority. The City was under no legal obligation to make that election, but could have chosen (and could choose at any time) to fulfill its housing obligation by providing for housing in the Housing Element of its General Plan. Thus, the annual payments to the Housing Authority . . . were not themselves an 'obligation imposed by state law', but an option the City selected."
Not only does Government Code section 65584.3 not require the payments to be made the entire period of the housing element, the statutory scheme does not prevent City from revising its housing element before the existing housing element has expired. Government Code section 65588 provides that a local government review its housing element "as frequently as appropriate," but no less than the schedule set forth in Government Code section 65588. Accordingly, after the changes to the redevelopment law eliminating redevelopment agencies and redirecting their revenues, City could have and should have revised its housing element.
Petitioner argues that the premise of the trial court's ruling was that Assembly Bill 1X 26 eliminated the source of funding for City's payments under Government Code section 65584.3, and therefore eliminated the statutory and contractual obligation to make the payments. Petitioner argues Assembly Bill 1X 26 did not eliminate tax increment revenue, but only named it something else--former tax increment revenue. Petitioner points to section 34182, which authorizes the county auditor-controller to calculate the property tax revenues that would have been allocated to the redevelopment agency had the redevelopment agency not been dissolved. These amounts are then deemed property tax revenues, which are deposited into the Redevelopment Property Tax Trust Fund. (§ 34182, subd. (c)(1).) The money in the Redevelopment Property Tax Trust Fund is used, inter alia, to pay the former redevelopment agency's enforceable obligations. (§ 34182, subd. (c)(2).) Therefore, petitioner argues, the funds have merely been reclassified, not eliminated.
However, the trial court did not find that the funds had been eliminated. Rather, it concluded that "[b]oth Government Code section 65584.3 and the 1992 written agreement . . . were premised on the existence of a legally-required set aside of 20% of redevelopment agency tax increment revenues under Health and Safety Code section 33334.2." It was the legal requirement to set aside 20 percent of tax increment revenue, not the tax increment revenue itself, that was eliminated. Thus, as the trial court explained, "[t]he foundational premise underlying the payments to the Housing Authority . . . ceased to exist with the passage of [Assembly Bill 1X] 26."
Citing Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53 (Palermo), petitioner argues Government Code section 65584.3 incorporated section 33334.2 in the form in which it existed at the time of the reference, not as subsequently modified. We disagree.
In Palermo, the plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with a Japanese national under the Alien Land Act, which allowed agreements that were made in accordance with " 'any treaty now existing' " between the United States and Japan. (Palmero, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 55.) When the treaty with Japan was later abrogated, the plaintiff sought to invalidate the lease. (Id. at pp. 56-57.) The court held the lease was still valid because the reference in the Alien Land Act ("any treaty now existing") was to the treaty as it existed when the act was passed. (Palmero, at p. 60.) The court stated a principle of statutory law: "where a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute, regulation, or ordinance, such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and that the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary." (Id. at pp. 58-59.)
However, "the Palermo rule is not to be applied in a vacuum. The determining factor is legislative intent. (In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 816.) The Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and the plain meaning of the language governs." (People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1505.) Here, unlike Palermo, Government Code section 65584.3 did not purport to adopt section 33334.2 as "now existing." Instead, Government Code section 65584.3 used the term "for the period of time," which we conclude indicated that if section 33334.2 no longer required a 20 percent set-aside for low- and moderate-income housing, City could no longer transfer the funds in lieu of satisfying its housing element. There is no indication that the Legislature intended to incorporate section 33334.2 so as to give City a pass on the sufficiency of the housing element of its general plan even after the termination of the redevelopment agencies and the redirection of their revenue stream.
Petitioner argues that Assembly Bill 1X 26 did not modify, amend, or repeal Government Code section 65584.3. We agree. Government Code section 65584.3 provides, in part, that City may elect to adopt a housing element that makes no provision for new housing or its share of regional housing "for the period of time that 20 percent of all tax increment revenue accruing from all redevelopment projects, and required to be set aside for low- and moderate-income housing pursuant to Section 33334.2 of the Health and Safety Code, is annually transferred to the Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles." Since Assembly Bill 1X 26 did not modify, amend, or repeal Government Code section 65584.3, City must now have a housing element that makes provision for new housing and its share of regional housing needs as determined pursuant to Government Code section 65584.
B. Legislative History
Petitioner would have us examine the legislative history of Government Code section 65584.3, which it claims "makes clear" that the legislation imposed an obligation to transfer funds to Housing Authority for the entire period of the housing element. This argument falls short for several reasons.
First, some of the documents petitioner cites are not acceptable evidence of legislative intent. Petitioner offers a letter from City to the bill's author, a "Background Information Request" from the Assembly Committee on Housing and Community Development, a letter from the bill's author to the chairman of the Assembly Rules Committee, two Republican analyses of the bill, and two enrolled bill reports. Only the enrolled bill reports may properly be considered. We do not consider letters from the bill's author or other interested persons unless such references reiterate legislative discussions leading up to the bill's passage, or were communicated to the Legislature as a whole. (San Diego Housing Com. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1, 16; Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 37.) We also do not consider analyses prepared for members of partisan caucuses, as these are not reliable indicators of the legislative intent of the whole body. (Runyon v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2010) 48 Cal.4th 760, 771, fn. 6.)
Second, in all but one case, the material simply does not support the point petitioner is trying to make. Petitioner's argument is that the legislative history shows that the intent of the Legislature in passing Government Code section 65584.3, was that City would be required to transfer 20 percent of its redevelopment agency's tax increment revenue for the entire period of an adopted housing element. The only offered item of legislative history that comes close to supporting this argument is the enrolled bill report of the Governor's Office of Planning and Research. That document stated that the bill "would authorize the City . . . to adopt a housing element which makes no provision for new housing or for meeting its share of the regional housing needs. During the five year effective date of that housing element, the local entity would be required to annually transfer its redevelopment agency's LMI [(Low- and Moderate-Income)] housing fund to the Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles."
This document stated that the requirement to pay Housing Authority runs "[d]uring the five year effective date" of the housing element. However, the required payment consisted of the redevelopment agency's low- and moderate-income housing fund. The document does not discuss or even contemplate what would happen if the law no longer required a low- and moderate-income housing fund, and no longer allowed redevelopment agencies or their successors to spend their revenues for low and moderate-income housing. Thus, this document is not determinative.
Finally, the primary reason the legislative history is not determinative is that the statute is not ambiguous, and we resort to legislative history to construe a statute only if its terms are ambiguous. (City of Sacramento v. Public Employees' Retirement System (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 786, 795.) "An ambiguity arises only if '. . . there [is] more than one construction in issue which is semantically permissible, i.e., more than one usage which makes sense of the statutory language given the context and applicable rules of usage.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Government Code section 65584.3 provides that City "may elect to adopt a housing element" that does not comply with the law "for the period of time that 20 percent of all tax increment revenue accruing from all redevelopment projects, and required to be set aside for low- and moderate-income housing pursuant to Section 33334.2 . . . is annually transferred to the Housing Authority . . . ." The provision makes clear that City's right to elect a noncompliant housing element is dependent on its payment of accrued tax increment revenue that is required to be set aside pursuant to section 33334.2. The clear implication is that if tax increment revenue is no longer required to be set aside pursuant to section 33334.2, City may no longer elect the payment in lieu of a housing element in compliance with statute. What Government Code section 65584.3 does not say is that once City has elected a noncomplying housing element, it must make payment of section 33334.2 funds to Housing Authority for the duration of the housing element, even though payments under section 33334.2 have been terminated for all redevelopment agencies (or successors thereto). There is no semantically permissible construction that would lend such an interpretation.
C. Administrative Deference
Petitioner argues we should interpret Government Code section 65584.3 as requiring City to pay Housing Authority the set-aside funds for the duration of the housing element because "responsible agencies" have consistently interpreted it in that fashion. Even if the agencies charged with implementing and administering the housing element law have consistently interpreted Government Code section 65584.3 as imposing on City an obligation to transfer the specified funds to Housing Authority for the duration of the adopted housing element, such an interpretation is of no consequence in the present situation (i.e., the termination of redevelopment agencies and the resulting termination of the requirement to set aside 20 percent of tax increment revenue for low- to moderate-income housing), which none of these agencies has encountered before now.
Petitioner points to the fact that even after the passage of Assembly Bill 1X 26, the Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD), which is charged with enforcing the housing element law, expressed its understanding that City was obligated to transfer the funds until the next update of the housing element. Petitioner argues that HCD's interpretation of the statute should be accorded considerable deference.
The deference we accord an administrative interpretation lies along a continuum. (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equaliztion (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7 (Yamaha Corp.).) We distinguish between quasi-legislative rules, which are entitled to a strong presumption of regularity, and an agency's interpretation of a statute, which is due lesser judicial deference. (Capen v. Shewry (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 378, 392.) "Unlike quasi-legislative rules, an agency's interpretation does not implicate the exercise of a delegated lawmaking power; instead, it represents the agency's view of the statute's legal meaning and effect, questions lying within the constitutional domain of the courts. But because the agency will often be interpreting a statute within its administrative jurisdiction, it may possess special familiarity with satellite legal and regulatory issues. It is this 'expertise,' expressed as an interpretation . . . that is the source of the presumptive value of the agency's views. An important corollary of agency interpretations, however, is their diminished power to bind. Because an interpretation is an agency's legal opinion, however 'expert,' rather than the exercise of a delegated legislative power to make law, it commands a commensurably lesser degree of judicial deference." (Yamaha Corp., at p. 11.)
In this case no quasi-legislative rule is involved, and the interpretation of Government Code section 65584.3 does not require any particular administrative expertise. Therefore, we are not obligated to defer to HCD's interpretation. In any event, " 'The ultimate interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power . . . conferred upon the courts by the Constitution and, in the absence of a constitutional provision, cannot be exercised by any other body.' " (Yamaha Corp., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 7.)
II
The 1992 Agreement Does Not Legally Bind City to Make
Continuing Payments
The 1992 Agreement was executed expressly for the purpose of implementing Government Code section 65584.3. Therefore, both Government Code section 65584.3 and the 1992 Agreement "were premised on the existence of a legally-required set aside of 20% of redevelopment agency tax increment revenues under Health and Safety Code section 33334.2." The foundational premise of the payments ceased to exist with the passage of Assembly Bill 1X 26. As a result, there is no longer a basis upon which Government Code section 65584.3 or the 1992 Agreement may operate, and the 1992 Agreement is no longer binding.
Petitioner argues City's obligation to pay Housing Authority 20 percent of its redevelopment tax increment revenue under the 1992 Agreement was unconditional. This is untrue. Even petitioner implicitly concedes by seeking increment funds only for the duration of the 2008 housing element, that no further transfer payments are allowed by Assembly Bill 1X 26. Thus, the 1992 Agreement does not impose an unconditional obligation that is unconnected to statutory law.
Petitioner argues the 1992 Agreement constituted a pledge of revenues, authorized by Government Code section 65584.3. Assembly Bill 1X 26 states: "It is the intent of this part that pledges of revenues associated with enforceable obligations of the former redevelopment agencies are to be honored." (§ 34175, subd. (a).) However, the payments here are not a pledge as defined by Assembly Bill 1X 26. "As used in this part, to 'pledge or encumber' means to make a commitment of, by the grant of a lien on and a security interest in, an agency's revenues or assets, whether by resolution, indenture, trust agreement, loan agreement, lease, installment sale agreement, reimbursement agreement, mortgage, deed of trust, pledge agreement, or similar agreement in which the pledge is provided for or created." (§ 34162, subd. (a)(6), italics added.) Because the Housing Authority had no lien or security interest in the redevelopment agency's revenues or assets, the 1992 Agreement was not a pledge under the statute.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
/s/_________
Blease, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Nicholson, J. /s/_________
Murray, J.