Opinion
23A-CT-343
05-15-2024
South Bend Community School Corporation, Appellant-Defendant v. Connie Grabowski, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Michael P. Palmer Benjamin S. Perry Barnes & Thornburg LLP South Bend, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Patrick F. O'Leary Elkhart, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the St. Joseph Circuit Court The Honorable John E. Broden, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 71C01-1702-CT-61
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Michael P. Palmer Benjamin S. Perry Barnes & Thornburg LLP South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Patrick F. O'Leary Elkhart, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mathias, Judge.
[¶1] Connie Grabowski filed a complaint in St. Joseph Circuit Court against the South Bend Community School Corporation and alleged wrongful termination in retaliation for expressing an intent to file a worker's compensation claim. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found in Grabowski's favor, awarding her damages in the amount of $600,000. The School Corporation appeals and raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following two:
1) Whether the trial court erred when it denied the School Corporation's Trial Rule 50(A) motions for judgment on the evidence, claiming that Grabowski did not present evidence to support the elements of her claim; and,
2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the School Corporation's motion for mistrial because of the length of the proceedings on the last day of trial.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] Grabowski was employed by the School Corporation as an elementary school teacher for twenty-two years. During the 2015-16 school year, she taught second grade at Wilson Primary Center. Second grade student S.J. was in Grabowski's class. S.J.'s mother, Monique Love, was also a teacher, and his maternal grandmother, Dawn Jones, was a twenty-year member of the School Corporation's Board of Trustees.
[¶4] In April 2016, S.J. told Love that Grabowski had told him to "shut his big fat mouth" and that he had "diarrhea of the mouth." Ex. Vol. p. 83. Thereafter, on Friday, April 22, Grabowski and Love met. Their meeting was also attended by Jones and the school's principal, Cheryl Batteast. During the meeting, Love expressed her concerns to Grabowski, and Grabowski denied making the statements that S.J. had reported to Love. The meeting also included a discussion concerning S.J.'s classroom behavior. At the conclusion of the meeting, Grabowski agreed to send home a behavioral log for S.J. each day and to call Love if S.J. disrupted her classroom.
[¶5] The following Monday, April 25, Grabowski told her students to line up in the hallway in two lines so that they could use the restroom. As Grabowski stepped away from the students, S.J. left the line and approached Grabowski on her right side. S.J. made contact with Grabowski, which caused her to trip and lose her balance. Grabowski extended her right arm toward the wall to break her impact as she was falling. Immediately after she fell, Grabowski heard multiple students exclaim that S.J. ran into her. S.J. replied that it was an accident. The incident was videotaped on the hallway surveillance video camera. Plaintiff's Ex. 6.
[¶6] Shortly thereafter, Grabowski told Principal Batteast about the hallway incident. Grabowski stated that she did not see what happened but that S.J. did not deny running into her. At Batteast's request, Grabowski completed the School Corporation's required Worker's Compensation Accident Report Form before she left school that day. Grabowski wrote that, as she was in the hallway near the restroom, S.J. "ran forcefully into [her]. [She] fell against the wall[,]" and she suffered pain in her right ankle, wrist, and thigh. Ex. Vol., p. 6.
The School Corporation's bylaws and policies provide that "accidents be reported and evaluated." Ex. Vol., Plaintiff's Ex. 5. And "[i]njured employees shall be referred to the Corporation's Worker's Compensation provider when it is open for business or local hospital emergency departments after business hours." Id. "The injured employee . . . shall complete a form, available in the office of the principal, that includes the date, time, and place of the incident, the names of the persons involved; the nature of the injury to the extent that it is known; and a description of all relevant circumstances." Id.
[¶7] Grabowski also completed S.J.'s behavior log before the end of that school day. Grabowski wrote that S.J. "ran forcefully into the teacher. I fell against the wall. I filed an accident report." Ex. Vol., p. 86. Later that evening, Grabowski sent an email to Batteast and requested to view the video footage of the incident so that she could determine if it was an accident. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 120.
[¶8] At approximately 8:00 a.m. the next morning, Love requested an emergency meeting to discuss S.J.'s April 25 behavior log. When Grabowski arrived at Batteast's office to view the videotape of the hallway incident, Love, Jones, and S.J. were seated in the office foyer. Grabowski watched the video with Jason Zook, who was the teacher's union representative, and Jo Ellen Talos, who was a School Corporation Human Resources representative. Batteast, Love, Jones, and S.J. watched it separately. The general consensus was that the incident was an accident. Zook and Batteast believed that Grabowski tripped over her own feet. Grabowski maintained that S.J. intentionally pushed her. Ex. Vol., Ex. H, p. 89; see also Tr. Vol. 3, p. 246.
[¶9] Talos and Grabowski discussed the video and corrective action. Talos told Grabowski she needed to reestablish trust with S.J. and Love, including correcting the behavioral log and accident report and writing an apology. Ex. Vol., pp. 91-93. Outside of Grabowski's presence, Love asked for a copy of Grabowski's worker's compensation accident form. A School Corporation employee gave a copy of Grabowski's confidential form to Love.
[¶10] Love filed an official complaint against Grabowski the next day on April 27. Ex. Vol., p. 67. Love believed that Grabowski had continually harassed her son and was retaliating against Love and S.J. due to the concerns Love had raised in their April 22 meeting. She also contacted a case worker at the NAACP and gave a copy of Grabowski's accident form to the case worker. Id. at 68. Two days later, School Corporation Human Resources Director Cheryl Greene told Grabowski that Love had alleged that Grabowski had bullied her son. Greene and Batteast met with Grabowski that day. Greene told Grabowski that Love had a copy Grabowski's accident form. The School Corporation later admitted that the form should have been kept confidential. On May 3, Greene notified Love that the School Corporation was "opening a full investigation into the allegations" that S.J. "has been bullied or mistreated." Id. at 75.
[¶11] Greene held a second meeting with Grabowski on May 4. Greene informed Grabowski that the School Corporation was placing her on administrative leave with pay. And Greene told Grabowski that she was not allowed on school property. Greene continued to investigate the matter, reviewing Grabowski's employee file, which included three other parent complaints from 2014 and 2016. Greene expressed concern to the School Corporation's Superintendent about a pattern of allegations of bullying and harassment.
[¶12] Greene completed her investigation at the end of May 2016 and determined that Grabowski's reported actions were "sufficiently grievous to by-pass progressive discipline steps." Id. at 112. But Greene also concluded that the School Corporation should continue to employ Grabowski if she agreed with or met certain conditions. Therefore, on June 14, Grabowski and her husband had a meeting with Greene, which was also attended by union representative Zook. Greene gave Grabowski a "Last Chance Agreement." Id. at 119. The agreement provided that Grabowski would lose five days of pay, that she would be transferred to another school to a position for which she was certified, that she would be required to complete certain professional development training, and that she would refrain from communicating with S.J. or Love. Id.
[¶13] Further, the agreement provided that if Grabowski failed "to comply with the expectation and directives in this agreement[,] . . . her teaching contract with [the School Corporation] [would] be recommended for immediate cancellation[.]" Id. at 15. Finally, the agreement required her to "take no action to contest or challenge the cancellation of her contract." Id. And Zook agreed that if Grabowski refused to sign the agreement, the School Corporation would likely terminate her employment. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 145. Grabowski also believed that the School Corporation would terminate her employment if she did not sign the agreement but refused to sign because she believed she would be admitting wrongdoing. Instead of signing the agreement, she resigned from her employment. Id. at 146.
[¶14] Grabowski filed a complaint against the School Corporation on February 15, 2017, which she later amended, and alleged in relevant part wrongful termination (or constructive discharge) in retaliation for expressing an intent to file a worker's compensation claim. Grabowski's jury trial on that claim commenced on January 10, 2023.
[¶15] Grabowski began presenting her evidence at approximately 3:00 p.m. on the first day of trial, and she continued to present evidence until approximately noon on the third day of trial. The School Corporation then moved for judgment on the evidence pursuant to Trial Rule 50(A). The trial court denied the motion, and, after a lunch break, the School Corporation began presenting evidence at approximately 1:30 p.m. on the third day of trial.
[¶16] At 5:00 p.m. on the third day, the trial court gave the jury a break and informed the parties that the court intended to complete the trial that day. At that time, the School Corporation moved for a mistrial and argued that the court was unfairly forcing it to present a significant portion of its case-in-chief to the jury well into the night. The trial court denied the motion and proceeded with trial, and the School Corporation presented evidence until approximately 10:00 p.m. After the School Corporation completed its presentation of evidence, it renewed its Trial Rule 50(A) motion, which the trial court denied.
[¶17] The jury reached a verdict at approximately 1:25 a.m. the next morning. It found in Grabowski's favor and awarded her $600,000 in damages. The School Corporation renewed its Trial Rule 50(A) motion for a third time, which the trial court denied.
[¶18] The School Corporation timely filed its notice of appeal and requested oral argument. We granted the motion and held oral argument in this case on April 22, 2024.
We extend our gratitude to our hosts, the St. Joseph County Courts and the St. Joseph County Bar Association. Our court appreciated their hospitality, and it was a pleasure to hold oral argument in Superior Courtroom 1. We also extend our gratitude to counsel for the quality of their written and oral arguments.
Standard of Review for Trial Rule 50(A) Motions
[¶19] Indiana Trial Rule 50(A) provides that "[w]here all or some of the issues in a case tried before a jury . . . are not supported by sufficient evidence . . ., the court shall withdraw such issues from the jury and enter judgment thereon...." A motion for judgment on the evidence challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Kelly v. Levandoski, 825 N.E.2d 850, 861 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. The trial court should enter judgment only if there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom to support an essential element of the non-movant's claim. Town of Highland v. Zerkel, 659 N.E.2d 1113, 1120 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995), trans. denied.
[¶20] Moreover,
if a defendant unsuccessfully moves for a judgment on the evidence at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, presents his own additional evidence thereafter, but renews his motion at the conclusion of all evidence, the motion is preserved in the traditional sense and is reviewed in light of only the evidence introduced during the plaintiff's case-in-chief. This explains why it is advantageous for the defendant to renew the motion. Where the defendant moves for judgment on the evidence at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, presents his own evidence thereafter, but fails to renew the motion at the conclusion of all evidence, the motion is not completely "waived," because renewal is not a requirement under Rule 50. However, the motion must be reviewed in light of all evidence presented during the trial, because any evidence offered by the defendant may cure an otherwise erroneous denial of his motion for judgment on the evidence. Appellate review of the motion essentially becomes review for sufficiency of the evidence.Farmers Elevator Co. of Oakville, Inc. v. Hamilton, 926 N.E.2d 68, 76 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), trans. denied.
[¶21] Here, the School Corporation moved for judgment on the evidence pursuant to Trial Rule 50(A) after Grabowski's case-in-chief and it renewed its motion after presenting its own evidence. In both the trial court and in this appeal, the School Corporation argued that Grabowski failed to prove the elements of her claim alleging retaliatory constructive discharge for filing her worker's compensation claim.
In her brief, Grabowski argues that the School Corporation waived the issues raised in this appeal because, in its brief, it did not recite the facts in accordance with the standard of review. But the School Corporation's alleged noncompliance has not impeded our consideration of the issues presented on appeal, and we therefore decline to apply the waiver doctrine here. Grabowski also claims that the School Corporation waived its argument that there was insufficient evidence that Grabowski's working conditions were intolerable because it failed to make that argument with reference to specific evidence when it moved for a Trial Rule 50 judgment on the evidence. The record does not support Grabowski's waiver argument. See Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 199-200, 211-12. The School Corporation adequately raised its challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on Grabowski's claim that she was constructively discharged.
[¶22] As we review and consider the School Corporation's claim that the jury's verdict is not supported by the evidence, we do so in light of these well-established principles of law: Juries play a critical, invaluable, and constitutionally protected role in our system of jurisprudence. See Purcell v. Old Nat'l Bank, 972 N.E.2d 835, 842 (Ind. 2021). For this reason, "a court is not free to engage in the fact-finder's function of weighing evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses to grant judgment on the evidence, where fair-minded [persons] may reasonably come to competing conclusions." Id. When, as in this case, the trial court denies a Rule 50(A) motion and declines to intervene, "it is not the province of this Court to do so unless the verdict is wholly unwarranted under the law and the evidence." Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Indiana Drywall &Acoustics, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 674, 685 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012), trans. denied.
On May 6, 2024, in Cosme et al. v. Clark et al., No. 24S-CT-159, Slip Op. at 7 (Ind. May 6, 2024), our supreme court clarified the standard a trial court should utilize for reviewing a Trial Rule 50(A) motion. Specifically, the court held:
Under Trial Rule 50(A), a movant may seek judgment on the evidence at the close of a plaintiff's case if all or some of the issues are "not supported by sufficient evidence." Ind. Trial Rule 50(A). In Purcell v. Old National Bank, we reaffirmed this standard for Rule 50(A) motions. 972 N.E.2d at 839. But Purcell left it unclear whether a court may weigh evidence or assess witness credibility in deciding whether "sufficient evidence" supports an issue.Today, we answer that question in the negative. When ruling on a Rule 50(A) motion, a judge may assess both the quantity and quality of the evidence presented by the nonmovant but may not weigh the conflicting evidence or assess witness credibility; these are factfinding functions within the jury's sole province. In this case, the trial court appropriately deferred to the jury as the fact-finder when it denied the School Corporation's Trial Rule 50(A) motions.
Grabowski's Frampton Claim
[¶23] In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 260 Ind. 249 (1973), our supreme court held that "[r]etaliatory discharge for filing a workmen's compensation claim is a wrongful, unconscionable act and should be actionable in a court of law." 297 N.E.2d at 428, 260 Ind. at 252. Our court extended the Frampton holding to claims alleging "constructive discharge" in Tony v. Elkhart County, 851 N.E.2d 1032 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) ("Tony I"). In that case, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff employee's claim that he had been constructively discharged for filing a worker's compensation claim. Id. at 1035. We reversed and held that, "when an employee is discharged, whether expressly or constructively, solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right, an exception to the general rule of at will employment is recognized and a cause of action exists in the employee as a result of the retaliatory discharge." See also Baker v. Tremco Inc., 917 N.E.2d 650, 655 (Ind. 2009) (agreeing that "a constructive retaliatory discharge falls within the ambit of the narrowly drawn public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine").
As a teacher, we presume that certain terms of Grabowski's employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement between the teacher's union and the School Corporation. Neither party entered evidence of this agreement into the record. For this reason, and given the parties' arguments at trial and on appeal, we assume that Grabowski was essentially an employee-at-will. See Purdy v. Wright Tree Service, Inc., 835 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005) (explaining that "if there is no definite or ascertainable term of employment, the employment is at-will, and the employer may discharge the employee at any time with or without cause").
I. Constructive Discharge
[¶24] First, the School Corporation argues that Grabowski failed to prove that she was constructively discharged and that her resignation was not voluntary. "A constructive discharge occurs when an employer purposefully creates working conditions [that] are so intolerable that an employee has no other option but to resign." Cripe, Inc. v. Clark, 834 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005). The "constructive discharge doctrine . . . transforms what is ostensibly a resignation into a firing[.]" Id.
[¶25] In Cripe, our court observed that "the adverse working conditions must be unusually 'aggravated' or amount to a 'continuous pattern' of negative treatment" before the conditions will be deemed intolerable. Id. (citing Haubry v. Snow, 106 Wash.App. 666, 31 P.3d 1186, 1192-93 (2001)).
The essence of the test is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the working conditions are so unusually adverse that a reasonable employee in plaintiff's position would have felt compelled to resign. Put another way, the standard by which a constructive discharge is generally determined is an objective one: whether a reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit.Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
[¶26] In Cripe, which was decided before Tony I, our court reversed the trial court's order denying the employer's motion to dismiss the employee's complaint for retaliatory discharge. Although our court concluded that a constructive retaliatory discharge does not "fit within the ambit of the narrowly-drawn exceptions to the employee-at-will doctrine[,]" we nevertheless considered whether the employee had pleaded sufficient facts to support his claim that he was constructively discharged. Id. at 733. Our court observed that
the averments contained in Clark's complaint are insufficient to allege that Cripe purposefully created a working condition so intolerable that Clark had no choice but to resign. See, e.g., Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the doctrine of constructive discharge is limited to egregious cases, such as, for example, where an employee is subjected to threats or repeated racist taunting), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1078, 121 S.Ct. 777, 148 L.Ed.2d 675 (2001). Rather, the allegations merely assert that Cripe refused to provide Clark-an installer and service technician of garage doors-with a safe vehicle and that, as a consequence, Clark resigned. Accordingly, the complaint in dispute fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.Id. at 736. Judge Robb dissented because she believed that "Indiana should recognize the doctrine of constructive discharge" and that the employee alleged sufficient facts to survive the employer's motion to dismiss. Id. at 736, 742 (Robb, J., dissenting).
Judge Robb observed that the employee pleaded facts that he was required to drive three unsafe vehicles which potentially could have subjected him to criminal liability. Id. at 741 (Robb, J., dissenting).
[¶27] Our court addressed the merits of the Tony I plaintiff's constructive discharge claim in Tony v. Elkhart County, 918 N.E.2d 363 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009) ("Tony II"). In that case, the employee plaintiff suffered a significant injury to his arm, and he filed a worker's compensation claim. 918 N.E.2d at 365. After his injury, the employee's supervisor began calling him derogatory names. Tony's supervisor and others also called him a "faker" and stated that his injury was "fake." Id. at 365-66. After Tony reached maximum medical improvement, Tony's doctor gave him weight restrictions on what he could lift occasionally and on a regular basis. Id. at 366. The doctor also told him to avoid repetitive use of his right upper arm, including that when driving a manual transmission vehicle, he could not shift more than 500 times per day. Id. When Tony's supervisor assigned him to use a truck for a project that would require him to shift the manual transmission more than 500 times per day, the employer ignored the doctor's restriction after claiming that Tony was not hurt that badly. Id. at 366. Over the next several months, after Tony's supervisor told him that if he was told to do something, he would do it, Tony performed tasks on the job that exceeded his medical restrictions. Id. After several months, Tony finally protested an assignment "grinding stumps" because it violated his restrictions. Id. His supervisor told him to continue performing the job. Tony continued to work while experiencing pain for approximately one week until he finally quit his employment. Id. at 366-67.
[¶28] Tony filed a complaint against his employer arguing constructive discharge in retaliation for filing his worker's compensation claims. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment and Tony appealed. Our court determined that Tony had presented sufficient evidence to proceed on his claim that he was constructively discharged. As we explained:
It is debatable whether Tony's claims of rude or boorish behavior by his superiors at the County with respect to calling him a "faker" and the like would by itself be sufficient to constitute a constructive discharge.... However, we clearly implied in Tony I that evidence an employer has knowingly or with deliberate indifference ordered an employee to perform work duties that violate medical restrictions, thus putting the employee at risk of physical harm, can constitute a constructive discharge. This is consistent with the view of the federal courts that knowingly subjecting an employee to an unreasonable risk of physical harm may constitute a constructive discharge. Here, Tony presented evidence that his superiors at the County knowingly, or at the very least with deliberate indifference, ordered him on more than one occasion to perform job duties that violated express medical restrictions imposed by Tony's doctors, and that those orders caused Tony severe pain. This goes beyond Tony merely being "overly sensitive" to "boorish" colleagues or supervisors.Id. at 370.
[¶29] Here, the School Corporation argues that Grabowski failed to prove that her work environment had become intolerable. See Chapin v. Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc., 621 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2010). And the School Corporation asserts that working conditions do not "become intolerable or unbearable merely because a 'prospect of discharge lurks in the background.'" Appellant's Br. at 24 (citing Chapin, 621 F.3d at 679).
[¶30] But the School Corporation asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. A reasonable jury could have determined that the School Corporation's demanded adjustments to Grabowski's working conditions were intolerable. Grabowski was "dressed down" by the School Corporation's human resource officers, she was separated from her students at the end of the school year and could not communicate with them, she was "kept in the dark . . . as to her employment status," she was marginalized because the School Corporation would not allow her to present her "side of the story," and she was presented with the Last Chance Agreement, which provided that she would likely be fired if she did not sign it. Appellee's Br. at 30. Grabowski argues that she resigned because her termination was "imminent anyway." Id.
[¶31] In addition, the School Corporation blatantly disregarded Grabowski's privacy rights and gave a copy of her confidential Worker's Compensation Accident Report form to Love, S.J.'s mother. The Corporation also suspended Grabowski's employment, albeit with pay, for the remainder of the school year and ordered her to stay away from school property because she reported that S.J. "forcefully" pushed her. Immediately after the incident, Grabowski's students said that S.J. pushed her, and Grabowski's characterization of the incident occurred before she was permitted to view the video recording of the incident.
[¶32] Over the course of her twenty-two-year tenure, the School Corporation had never reprimanded or disciplined Grabowski. Indeed, Grabowski had previously received accolades and awards for her outstanding and effective teaching performance.
[¶33] In its investigation, the School Corporation reviewed the sum total of four parent complaints over Grabowski's twenty-two year tenure, three of which did not result in any reprimand or discipline against Grabowski. Against this background, the School Corporation decided to bypass normal progressive discipline steps and presented her with the "Last Chance Agreement." The agreement provided that Grabowski would lose five days of pay, and she would be reassigned to another position in the district for which she was certified. In addition, Grabowski would have had to admit to unprofessional behavior if she had signed the agreement. Further, the agreement provided that if Grabowski failed "to comply with the expectation and directives in this agreement[,] . . . her teaching contract with [the School Corporation] [would] be recommended for immediate cancellation[.]" Ex. Vol., p. 15. Finally, the agreement required her to "take no action to contest or challenge the cancellation of her contract." Id.
[¶34] Perhaps this case presents a less straightforward claim of constructive discharge than in Tony II. It is much easier to conclude that an employee's working conditions are intolerable when the employee is asked to perform physical labor that the employer knows the employee cannot perform. Still, we are not persuaded by the School Corporation's argument that no reasonable jury could have concluded that the terms of the Last Chance Agreement would have made Grabowski's working conditions intolerable. The School Corporation's argument to the contrary is merely a request to reweigh the evidence.
II. Evidence of Retaliation
[¶35] Having concluded that the evidence supports the jury's verdict that Grabowski was constructively discharged, we turn to the School Corporation's claim that no reasonable jury could have concluded that she was discharged in retaliation for expressing intent to file a worker's compensation claim. Here, an employee must do more than show the filing of a worker's compensation claim and a discharge. Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1262 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002). "[T]he employee must present evidence that directly or indirectly implies the necessary inference of causation between the filing of a worker's compensation claim and the termination, such as proximity in time or evidence that the employer's asserted lawful reason for discharge is a pretext." Id. The School Corporation's argument is twofold: 1) that Grabowski did not present any evidence to establish that she intended to file a worker's compensation claim, and/or 2) that Grabowski did not present any evidence to prove the necessary inference of causation.
A. Intent to File a Worker's Compensation Claim
[¶36] The School Corporation argues that Grabowski's "Worker's Compensation Accident Report Form" is not evidence of intent to file a worker's compensation claim because it is a document used "for internal purposes only." Appellant's Br. at 31. And the form is used to document any injuries that occur on School Corporation premises regardless of whether the injury occurs to an employee, visitor, or student. Id. Further, Grabowski did not seek medical treatment for her injury, and she did not miss work because of the hallway incident. Id. at 32.
The School Corporation analogizes the evidence presented in this case to two cases from our federal district courts where the courts held that the employees failed to state Frampton claims where the employees suffered minor injuries and indicated that they either did not require medical attention or denied being injured on the job. See Appellant's Br. at 31 (citing Cleveland v. Maple Leaf Farms, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-305, 2012 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 79188 (N.D. Ind. June 7, 2012) (skinned elbow); Byerly v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-401-WTL-MJD, 2017 WL 3117013 (S.D. Ind. July 21, 2017)). However, the courts resolved the Frampton claims in those cases during summary judgment proceedings because the plaintiff employees did not designate any evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude that employees intended to file worker's compensation claims.
[¶37] In Frampton, our supreme court held that "an employee at will may be discharged without cause," but an exception to the general rule must be recognized "when an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right[.]" 297 N.E.2d at 428, 260 Ind. at 253. But the court did not specifically define how an employee-plaintiff exercises this statutorily conferred right. Post-Frampton, courts have held that filing a claim with the Board is not the only way an employee may exercise this statutorily conferred right because the Frampton Court's rationale is broad enough to extend to plaintiffs who have informed their employer of an intent to file a claim prior to being discharged. See, e.g., Stivers v. Stevens, 581 N.E.2d 1253, 1254 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991) (noting that discharging an employee "merely for suggesting she might file a claim" is actionable under Frampton). Consistent with our precedent, the trial court tendered an instruction informing the jurors that an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is "constructive discharge of an employee solely for asserting a worker's compensation claim." See Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 10.
[¶38] Here, the jury heard evidence that Grabowski suffered pain because of the collision in the hallway with S.J. Consistent with School Corporation policy, Grabowski completed the Worker's Compensation Accident Report Form. See Ex. Vol., p. 6. Notably, the School Corporation's form meets the notice requirements of a worker's compensation claim, which are enumerated in Indiana Code section 22-3-3-2. The form requires the employee's identifying information, the date and time of the accident, a description of the accident, where the accident occurred, the type of injury suffered, and any action taken after the accident. Ex. Vol. p. 6. And, following Grabowski's completion of the form, the School Corporation's conduct created intolerable working conditions for Grabowski. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Grabowski intended to file a worker's compensation claim at the time the School Corporation constructively discharged her. See Stivers, 581 N.E.2d at 1254. And we observe that when the School Corporation constructively discharged her, Grabowski had nearly two years remaining to file a formal claim with the Worker's Compensation Board. See Ind. Code § 22-3-3-3.
The School Corporation's Bylaws and Policies require injured employees to report injuries and advise that the "failure of an employee to comply with this mandate may result in disciplinary action." Ex. Vol., p. 5. The policies also dictated that "[i]njured employees shall be referred to the Corporation's Worker's Compensation provider when it is open for business or local hospital emergency departments after business hours." Id. In contravention of its policy, Grabowski was not referred to the Corporation's Worker's Compensation provider. However, she was sent to the School Nurse.
Indiana Code section 22-3-3-2 provides in pertinent part that the injured employee's written notice "shall state the name and address of the employee, the time, place, nature and cause of the injury or death, and shall be signed by the injured employee ...."
B. Causation
[¶39] We now turn to the School Corporation's argument concerning causation. Our court has observed that, to demonstrate the necessary inference of causation, an employee can provide evidence that the employer's asserted lawful reason for discharge is a pretext. Purdy v. Wright Tree Serv., Inc., 835 N.E.2d 209, 213 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. The employee can prove pretext by showing that the employer's stated reason for the termination has no basis in fact, is insufficient to warrant the termination, or is not the actual motivation for the discharge. Id. And a close temporal connection supports the inference of retaliatory intent. Markley Enters., Inc. v. Grover, 716 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). Causation is a fact-sensitive question. See e.g. Walters v. JS Aviation, Inc., 81 N.E.3d 1160, 1163 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017), trans. denied.
[¶40] The School Corporation argues that, from the evidence presented, the jury could only reasonably conclude that Grabowski was presented with the Last Chance Agreement for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons. The School Corporation cites the evidence concerning its investigation of Grabowski's interactions with S.J. and Love, and its review of parent complaints in her personnel file to support its argument. The Corporation presented evidence that Human Resources Director Greene believed that Grabowski's behavior violated school policy. Finally, the School Corporation argues that it presented evidence establishing that Love's complaint that Grabowski had bullied S.J. was the "impetus for the investigation" and not the fact that Grabowski had filed the worker's compensation accident report. Appellant's Br. at 38.
[¶41] But, once again, the School Corporation disregards the evidence most favorable to the jury verdict and asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Contrary to the School Corporation's arguments, the jury had sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that the School Corporation's stated reason for issuing the Last Chance Agreement, i.e., bullying S.J. and possibly other students, was pretext. First, Grabowski's personnel file included three other parent complaints, and the jury could reasonably infer that the number of complaints was insignificant given her twenty-two-year teaching history. Further, the School Corporation did not take any action against Grabowski at the time of those complaints, rendering the subsequent "revisiting" of those complaints questionably motivated. The School Corporation has never reprimanded or disciplined Grabowski in her twenty-two years, and in fact, the Corporation and Principal Batteast have recognized her for her effective and exceptional teaching.
[¶42] The jury could also reasonably conclude from the evidence presented that the School Corporation deliberately mischaracterized Grabowski's interactions with S.J. as bullying. Immediately after the collision between Grabowski and S.J., other students exclaimed that S.J. ran into Grabowski. The Worker's Compensation Accident Report Form and S.J.'s behavioral log stated that S.J. "forcefully" ran into Grabowski, but S.J. was never reprimanded or disciplined for the incident. Ex. Vol., pp. 6-7. And Grabowski acknowledged that S.J.'s behavior might have been accidental, which is why she wished to view the video of the incident to make that determination. Id. at 8.
[¶43] In her testimony at trial, Principal Batteast testified that it would not be unprofessional for a teacher to make an honest mistake "about what happened in an incident." Tr. Vol. 4. p. 94. Human Resources Director Greene agreed with that statement. Id. at 213. Yet, the School Corporation demanded that Grabowski admit that her "comments and actions concerning [S.J.] were determined to be unprofessional and inconsistent with [the School Corporation's] expectations of a teacher in providing a positive, productive, and nurturing educational environment for its students." Ex. Vol. p. 15. From this evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the School Corporation's stated reason for firing Grabowski was pretextual. See Lang v. Ill. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 361 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2004) ([A]n employer's sudden dissatisfaction with an employee's performance after that employee engaged in a protected activity may constitute circumstantial evidence of causation.).
[¶44] Importantly, there was also a close temporal connection between Grabowski's completion of the Worker's Compensation Accident Report form and her constructive discharge. Grabowski completed her form on April 25, and just days later, Love initiated her complaint against Grabowski after the School Corporation gave Love a copy of Grabowski's confidential form. Approximately one week later, and while Greene was still investigating Love's complaint, Grabowski was suspended with pay and ordered to remain off of school property. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Grabowski's submission of the Worker's Compensation Accident Report Form led to the School Corporation's decision to discipline Grabowski by presenting her with the Last Chance Agreement, which caused Grabowski's constructive discharge.
Before Grabowski was placed on administrative leave, another parent submitted a complaint claiming that Grabowski was not accommodating the student's hearing difficulty and embarrassed the student in front of the class. Ex. Vol. p. 108.
[¶45] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's denial of the School Corporation's Trial Rule 50(A) motions. Our court cannot disturb a jury verdict unless it is "wholly unwarranted under the law and the evidence." See Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 970 N.E.2d at 685 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012). And, as explained above, the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.
Motion for Mistrial
[¶46] The School Corporation moved for a mistrial after the trial court decided, over objection, to proceed with trial on the third day well beyond the normal business hours of the court. "The decision on a motion for mistrial lies within the discretion of the trial court. A mistrial is an extreme remedy and required only when no other method can rectify the situation." TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc. v. Moore, 936 N.E.2d 201, 213 (Ind. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). To prevail on appeal from the denial of a motion for mistrial, the moving party must demonstrate that it was placed in a position of grave peril to which the party should not have been subjected. City of Indianapolis v. Taylor, 707 N.E.2d 1047, 1058 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999), trans. denied.
[¶47] The trial in this case was scheduled for three days, and the third day of trial started late because of a tardy juror. The School Corporation began presenting its case-in-chief during the afternoon of the third day of trial. The School Corporation objected after the trial court told the parties that the court planned to finish the jury trial that day.
[¶48] The School Corporation directs our attention to the fact that, on the last day of trial, nine hours had elapsed between the jury's lunch and dinner breaks. The parties began their closing arguments at 11:12 p.m. and the jury deliberated for approximately two hours, issuing a verdict around 1:30 a.m. The School Corporation argues that it "presented its case in a rush to a jury who was, without a doubt, hungry and likely upset about having to stay late." Appellant's Br. at 40. Further, the School Corporation claims that the jurors likely placed the blame on the Corporation for keeping them at the courthouse for several hours past the close of the regular business day.
[¶49] But the School Corporation's arguments concerning the jurors' states of mind are speculative at best. It has not presented any evidence, or even argued, that the jurors were derelict in their duties. Importantly, the School Corporation did not present any evidence or argument that it was unable to present evidence to the jury due to time constraints. In other words, the School Corporation has not shown that it was placed in a position of grave peril.
[¶50] Given the trial court's ample discretion and the speculative nature of the School Corporation's claims, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for mistrial.
Conclusion
[¶51] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the School Corporation's Trial Rule 50(A) motions because sufficient evidence supported Grabowski's claim of wrongful termination in retaliation for expressing an intention to file a worker's compensation claim. The trial court also acted within its discretion when it denied the Corporation's motion for mistrial. We therefore affirm the jury's verdict in favor of Grabowski.
[¶52] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.