Opinion
Argued March 5, 1981
August 9, 1982.
Unemployment compensation — Scope of appellate review — Voluntary termination of employment.
1. On an appeal of a decision by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania must examine the testimony in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the Board rendered its decision. [209]
2. When an employee resigns or quits her employment, absent any action by the employer, the termination amounts to voluntarily leaving work and renders the employee ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. [210]
3. When an employee, shortly after leaving work, is instructed by the employer not to return, when the record reveals conflicting evidence concerning the employee's intentions on returning to work, and when there is not competent evidence to support a conclusion that, as a matter of law, the employee's actions amounted to a voluntary termination of employment, she is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. [211-12]
Argued March 5, 1981, before President Judge CRUMLISH, JR. and Judges BLATT and CRAIG. Reargued March 2, 1982, before President Judge CRUMLISH, JR. and Judges ROGERS, BLATT, CRAIG, MacPHAIL and DOYLE.
Appeal, No. 716 C.D. 1980, from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the case of In Re: Claim of Rocky Ryan, No. B-181301.
Application to the Office of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits. Application denied. Applicant appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Appeal denied. Applicant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Reversed and remanded.
Marian Benton, with her Stephen F. Gold, and Edward Sparkman, for petitioner.
Charles Hasson, Associate Counsel, with him Steven R. Marcuse, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Wagner, Chief Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, and Harvey Bartle, III, Attorney General, for respondent.
Rocky Ryan appeals an Unemployment Compensation Board of Review decision denying benefits for voluntarily terminating her employment without cause of necessitous and compelling nature. We reverse.
See Section 402(b)(1) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P. S. § 802(b)(1).
Employed as an apartment manager for the Gulphwyn Corporation, Ryan walked off the job after a quarrel with her parents, who were also her employer. Ryan filed an application for benefits, and informed the Office of Employment Security that she was unemployed because of mental stress caused by working for her parents. The referee and Board affirmed the denial of benefits, and found that she had voluntarily terminated employment without a necessitous or compelling reason.
Ryan argues here that, after their verbal altercation, she not only expressed an intention to return but that several hours later her father informed her not to return to work, that she was consequently discharged, and therefore did not voluntarily terminate her employment.
While the question of voluntarily leaving work is one of law properly subject to our review and determination, resolution of this legal question normally depends upon not only the testimony given below but the facts found by the Board. Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 39 Pa. Commw. 170, 394 A.2d 1329 (1978). Although questions of credibility are left for the Board's resolution, we must examine the testimony in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the Board rendered its decision. Helsel v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 54 Pa. Commw. 320, 421 A.2d 496 (1980).
Here, the Board examined the testimony, weighed its credibility, and concluded that Ryan left her employment when continuing work was available with no prospects of alternative employment. We disagree.
Where an employee resigns or quits her employment, absent any action by the employer, the law is clear that the termination amounts to voluntarily leaving work. Sweigart v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 47 Pa. Commw. 421, 408 A.2d 561 (1979). The general principle followed in these cases is that an employee who is absent from work without authorization and without taking steps to preserve the relationship by telling the employer if and when he may return may be held to have voluntarily quit. Metzger v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 28 Pa. Commw. 571, 368 A.2d 1384 (1977). However, the majority of these disputes have resulted from either unreasonable or inordinately long absence periods. We must therefore examine each matter in light of the facts and in view of the law, and determine whether the employee's actions amount to an outright termination or are tantamount to either an abandonment or resignation of employment.
See, e.g., Simpson v, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 39 Pa. Commw. 246, 395 A.2d 309 (1978) (eleven days); Firmstone v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 29 Pa. Commw. 158, 370 A.2d 749 (1977) (two days); or Hutt v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 28 Pa. Commw. 57, 367 A.2d 390 (1976) (four days).
Here, although the record reveals conflicting testimony concerning Ryan's intentions on returning to work, the testimony is very clear that she was shortly thereafter instructed by her father not to return to work.
In response to a question concerning why she walked out of her office that day, Ryan responded:
AE: There was an argument in the office and I picked up my handbag and it was about the third day in a row that there had been an argument and I might add that it is a family business, my father and my mother work in the office also and I was having a lot of problems, my son is in a mental institution and at that time I was having a lot of problems with him, and I was in the process of getting him into the institute and just every day I walked in and every day my mother would argue with me about something else and I was just under a lot of pressure and I picked up my handbag and said I would be back and I walked out of the office and about two or three hours later my father called me up and said, you are not very happy here and we are not very happy with you here and so you might as well forget it for now, some such thing as that I don't remember. (Emphasis added.)
In response to the same question, her employer-father replied:
AE: I was in my office which is away from the rest of the office and I heard some screaming and I walked out and my wife told me that Rocky had left and I asked her what happened and it was a personal matter, it had nothing to do with the business, we were extremely busy at that point which we haven't been all year, we were fortunate enough to get a new project, and I was very angry and I decided that I didn't want her back.
QR: Did she indicate that she would be back?
AE: She didn't indicate to anyone that she would be back. (Emphasis added.)
Consequently, the supporting circumstances outside of the initial incident leave us with no competent evidence to support a conclusion that, as a matter of law, her actions amounted to a voluntary termination of her employment. We thus conclude that she was discharged by her father. Because her father presented no evidence on the issue of whether the discharge was predicated on willful misconduct, we must reverse and remand for the computation of benefits. See Wing v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, ___ Pa. ___, 436 A.2d 179 (1981).
Since the question of whether Ryan intended to return to work is most important to a finding of voluntary termination, we are curiously struck by the adverse testimony of the employer's representative, her father, who by his own admission was in another part of the office and had no personal knowledge of the incident surrounding Ryan's actions.
ORDER
The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review decision, No. B-181301 dated February 25, 1980, is hereby reversed and the matter is remanded to the Board for a computation of benefits consistent with this Opinion.
Judge MENCER did not participate in the decision in this case.
Judge MacPHAIL dissents.