Opinion
No. FA 0404004451S
September 26, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This decision dissolves the twenty-six-year marriage of Pina and Randy Ruotolo. The principal issues in this limited contested matter are the amount of alimony to be paid by the husband and the division of the parties' assets. Mrs. Rutotolo has asked for alimony of approximately $1,050 per week and 60% of the net value of the parties' assets. Her complaint also asks for an award of counsel fees. Although Mr. Ruotolo maintains that he has agreed to a 50-50 division of marital property, he asks the court to exclude premarital contributions to his deferred compensation in that division. He asks that the alimony order consider income that he claims his wife can begin receiving from assets awarded her. The parties appeared with counsel for trial on six days in April, May and June of this year, at which time each party testified, as did the following:
Lillian Williard, an actuary called by the defendant who testified about the value of the defendant's pension and KSOP plans with his employer; and
Andrew Kipperman, a certified public accountant called by the defendant who testified about the value of and the income and expenses generated by the rental properties owned by the parties and the financial implications of both parties' proposals for division of assets and of the defendant's alimony proposal.
After the evidence the court requested briefs on whether the court could consider the defendant's premarital contributions to his pension and KSOP in its award, directed the wife's attorney to submit an affidavit of fees, and instructed the husband's attorney to file a timely objection to or request for hearing on the wife's counsel fee claim. Both parties submitted the requested briefs, plaintiff's counsel filed an affidavit of her counsel fees, regarding which defendant duly requested an evidentiary hearing, held on portions of two days ending on September 14, 2006. The matter is now ready for decision.
The court has heard and carefully weighed all of the evidence according to the standards required by law. The court has scrutinized and evaluated the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. The court has carefully considered the parties' arguments and briefs and their proposed orders.
The parties were married on June 14, 1980, in New Haven, Connecticut. Both have lived in Connecticut for more than a year prior to the bringing of this action. Although they have had three children, none are under the age of 18. The parties have not received any state or municipal financial assistance. The marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably without hope of reconciliation. All statutory stays having expired, the court has jurisdiction over and authority to dissolve the marriage.
After getting married, the Ruotolos moved into a three-family home already owned by the husband on Chambers Street in New Haven. They later bought a second property on that street before selling both parcels in 1982 and buying 3.83 acres at 135 Sugarloaf Road in Guilford, on which they erected the present marital home occupying 3,120 square feet. That property is now worth between $650,000 and $684,000 and has first mortgage debt of $151,400. In the last ten years the parties have acquired three rental properties in New Haven at 848-850 Orange Street, 124 Everit Street, and 184-185 Lawrence Street in New Haven, which together have a collective gross value of approximately 1.9 million dollars and net value after deducting first mortgage debt of approximately 1.6 million dollars. Except for the first floor apartment at Everit Street, where Mr. Ruotolo now lives, all the apartments in the rental properties are occupied by paying tenants. The rental properties generated $102,225 in rental income in 2002, $107,427 in 2003, and $111,635 in 2004. The parties had taxable rental income in 2002 of $21,241, $19,151 in 2003, and $18,743 in 2004. The evidence at trial showed net monthly rental income of approximately $3,000 per month.
Since late 2005 Mrs. Ruotolo has managed the Lawrence Street property, on which her last financial affidavit claimed net rental income, after deducting mortgage, taxes, repairs, utilities, supplies and maintenance costs, of $169 per week. Mr. Ruotolo has been managing the Orange and Everit Street properties during that same time period, and he receives $1,221 weekly rental income from those properties, but his net rental income is more difficult to determine since he also lives at Everit Street and thus some of the expenses of that building are attributable to him as normal living expenses. In addition, much or all of an equity loan in the amount of $98,000 on the Everit Street property was not used for expenses related to that property. At the conclusion of trial the parties agreed to sell the Orange Street property. Both sides' proposed orders ask the court to award the Sugarloaf and Lawrence Street properties to the wife and the Everit Street house to the husband, and to divide the proceeds from the sale of Orange Street between the parties. (The parties have recently submitted a stipulation that the property did not sell when listed for three months at the asking price of $599,000.) Mr. Ruotolo intends to use his share of those proceeds to pay off the mortgage and equity line owed on the Everit Street property, and after doing so he will have approximately $95 net weekly rental income from that property as long as he continues to live there and does not rent out the first floor apartment.
When the parties married in 1980, they had known each other for about three years. Mrs. Ruotolo was 32 years old, and Mr. Ruotolo three years younger. She had immigrated to the United States from Italy eleven years earlier, and, her education limited to a high school degree, worked as a laboratory technician assistant in pharmacology at the Yale Medical School. After the marriage she continued there until sometime after the birth of their first child, when she began staying at home to care for the house and children. In the 1990s, she resumed working, between 20 and 30 hours a week, first as a caretaker for an elderly woman and then as a babysitter and nanny. She testified at trial that the children of her babysitting customers have grown older than when they needed constant supervision and that now she only baby-sits for those families on special occasions. She also testified that she regards herself as too old to continue doing that kind of work. She has not been looking for new employment during the dissolution proceeding because, she said, she has been so distracted and mentally distressed that she has been unable to focus or make any plans for her future. She testified that after the trial has concluded she will begin to do so.
At the time of the marriage, Mr. Ruotolo held a bachelor's degree from Rutgers University and had been working for three years at United Illuminating (UI), where he has stayed to this day. He has since also obtained a master's degree from the University of New Haven. He is now Director of Compensation at UI, earning a salary of approximately $118,000 gross per year, plus an annual (but not guaranteed) bonus of approximately $15,000. His weekly income from the salary is $2,272 gross and $1,698 net. He has a 401K KSOP plan there that is presently worth $278,376 and a pension that is now worth $424,676 and will pay him a monthly benefit of $4,880.81 on his normal retirement date on September 1, 2016. He offered evidence at trial showing that $29,000 of the KSOP and almost $56,000 of the present value of the pension were accumulated before the marriage. He also testified that his wife, if awarded portions of the pension and KSOP, could begin receiving income from the KSOP when she turns 59 1/2 without reducing the principal amount and from the pension immediately. In addition to regularly working 50 hours a week at UI and spending at least ten hours a week managing the parties' rental properties for the last ten years, he has been involved in numerous civic and community affairs — serving on the New Haven Board of Alderman for four years, eight years on the Guilford Board of Education, and also volunteering many hours for school parent-teacher organizations.
The majority of the testimony at trial focused on three issues: fault, the parties' respective roles in maintaining the rentals and the use of the rental income, and the parties' financial affairs since filing of the dissolution. The wife claims that the husband's neglect, abuse, and infidelity caused the marriage to break down, that she contributed significant time and labor to managing the rental properties, and that the husband violated the automatic orders by using joint assets for the parties' grown children since this proceeding began. She claimed at trial that Mr. Ruotolo frequently yelled and screamed at her, criticized and verbally degraded her, called her demeaning names, and humiliated her. She said that he was often "aggressive" toward her, which she explained as meaning that he would push, shove, or slap her, and that he wanted to be in control of everything. Although admitting that he sometimes was verbally excessive, the husband denied having any affairs, claimed that the wife physically and verbally abused him, and maintained that she also expended significant sums on their children after this action was filed.
The description of Mrs. Ruotolo by her counsel as a wife who had a traditional view of marriage is probably true. In many ways, Mrs. Ruotolo fulfilled the role of traditional "helpmeet." After the children were born, she stayed at home to care for them, to cook and maintain the home, and to provide succor to her husband. She supported his desire to participate in civic affairs that took him out of the home many evenings. Although Mr. Ruotolo probably did most of the work managing and maintaining the rental properties, spending at least ten hours each week doing so, worked more than 50 hours a week at UI, and spent many nights out of the house on civic affairs, Mrs. Ruotolo's efforts on the home front were the fabric and glue enabling him to do so. Each played critical roles in the parties' acquisition and maintenance of their marital estate.
The evidence on abuse and inconstancy is difficult to resolve. Mrs. Ruotolo testified at her deposition that the marriage had been bad and she had been unhappy from the very beginning. Mr. Ruotolo acknowledged that he sometimes "got verbal" and said things that he now regrets, but that his wife was jealous and controlling, would scream and yell at him, say nasty things to him, and scratch and bite him. He described them as having many arguments and testified that the marriage gradually broke down due to lack of communication. In view of each party's admissions, it is likely that Mr. Ruotolo bad-mouthed his wife too often, but the only persuasive evidence of physical abuse was an incident when Mrs. Ruotolo admitted hitting Mr. Ruotolo with a shower rod. Mrs. Ruotolo's claim that her husband passed a sexually transmitted disease to her would, if proven, have established that he had been unfaithful to her. Although the court recognizes that the trier of fact may accept a party's testimony without requiring supporting documentary or medical evidence, in this instance, in the face of Mr. Ruotolo's equally credible denial of that claim, that lack is fatal to this evidentiary claim. On the question of infidelity, then, the evidence is inconclusive.
The evidence did confirm, however, Mrs. Ruotolo's claim that her husband neglected her. In addition to his many hours out of the home on civic affairs, when at home he spent hours on the computer, often chatting on-line with men and women he had "met" there rather than spending time with his wife. In the last few years he often went out on weekends by himself sometimes meeting women other than his wife. The evidence is clear that by the year 2004 Mrs. Ruotolo no longer held Mr. Ruotolo's affection.
The court thus concludes that this marriage had long been in trouble. For many years both parties accepted a marriage with separate beds and bedrooms and increasingly separate lives. It seems likely that Mrs. Ruotolo made the best of what she regarded as a bad marriage because her role, as the caretaker of the children and homemaker, gave her little occasion to do otherwise, while Mr. Ruotolo was more active in pursuing not only civic affairs but companionship outside the home. His neglect of his wife is more likely a symptom of a marriage in distress than the cause of that distress — although the court can certainly understand how Mrs. Ruotolo, with her traditional views of marriage, would be humiliated and distressed when she saw the exhibit in which Mr. Ruotolo described how he much he valued his friendship with Joanne. Neither bears exclusive fault for the breakdown of the marriage although the court finds, on balance, the husband more responsible.
In their proposed orders both parties agree for the court to award the Sugarloaf and Lawrence Street properties to the wife and Everit Street to the husband; but they differ on how to divide the husband's deferred compensation, the proceeds from the sale of Orange Street, and the household furnishings in Sugarloaf. Mrs. Ruotolo seeks a fifty-fifty division of the total value of her husband's UI pension and KSOP plans, while Mr. Ruotolo asks the court to divide only the portion of those plans earned during the marriage and to allow him to retain the portion earned before then as not part of the marital estate. Both parties ask that the proceeds from the sale of Orange Street be divided to effectuate their respective overall proposals. Under the wife's proposal, she would receive the first $35,000 from the net proceeds to pay her credit card debt, legal fees, and real estate taxes and 70% of the balance. The husband has proposed that the net sale proceeds be distributed to effectuate a 50-50 division of marital assets (although he considers the marital assets not to include the premarital contributions to his pension and KSOP plan).
Although the husband insists that the court should only include the portion of his pension and KSOP plans accrued during the marriage as part of the marital estate, the law in this state has long been that property brought by a party to the marriage may be considered marital property. In Ricciuti v. Ricciuti, 74 Conn.App. 120, 810 A.2d 818 (2002), cert. denied 262 Conn. 946, 815 A.2d 676 (2003), the court upheld a trial court's decision to award a wife portion of a pension earned during 22 years in the military, three of which were before the marriage. The Appellate Court recently reaffirmed that ruling in Tracey v. Tracey, 97 Conn.App. 122 (2006), where the court held that the trial court "was within its discretion, as part of the overall equitable distribution of assets, to divide the defendant's 401(k) equally between the parties even if part of it had accrued prior to the marriage." Here, the wife's lack of deferred compensation benefits on her own part is due largely to the parties' mutual decision that she would stay at home and make her contributions to the marriage there. In view of her contributions to the marriage, her contribution to their ability to acquire their assets, the total value of the assets involved, the significant disparities in the parties' vocational skills and experience, their present and future earning abilities, the husband's significantly better ability to acquire additional capital assets, the other factors discussed above, and the proven facts of this case, in light of the statutory factors for division of property, the court finds it fair and equitable to award each party half of the net value of the parties' total assets, with certain offsets. For example, Mr. Ruotolo used marital assets to buy their son a new car and pay off one of their daughter's student loans, and half of that total should come out of his share of the assets and be paid to his wife, as should certain credit card debt of Mrs. Ruotolo.
The wife has asked for all the household furnishings in the marital home, but the court does not find that to be fair and equitable. The parties shall divide that property equally, as set forth in the orders below.
Mrs. Ruotolo also asks for alimony of $950 per week, 50% of the husband's annual bonus, and for her husband to pay half of the costs of her medical insurance until she qualifies for Medicare at age 65. Her last two financial affidavits listed weekly expenses totaling $1,039, but that amount only includes half the mortgage payment for Sugarloaf since the husband has been paying for the other half-adding the rest of the mortgage payment would increase those expenses to $1,196 per week. This amount includes her estimate of $100 per week for medical and dental insurance. Her affidavit lists net rental income from the Lawrence Street rental property of $169 per week as her only income, but the court finds, based on her work history and ability, that she also has an earning capacity of at least $480 gross per week. She has several years experience as a nanny and babysitter and the court did not find credible her testimony that she is too old to do this type of work. The court thus finds that she has a combined income and earning capacity of $649 per week gross and $575 per week net.
In 2004 that property generated $38,040 of rental income and taxable rental income of $5,226. Mrs. Ruotolo's last financial affidavit listed $731 per week in rents received, and weekly expenses of $450 for mortgage, insurance and taxes, $60 for repairs, $23 for utilities, and $36 for maintenance. Andrew Kipperman, the CPA called as an expert witness by the husband, testified that, based on his discussions with Mr. Ruotolo about the Lawrence Street property and Kipperman's own review of the parties' tax returns and an unsigned draft of a 2005 tax return provided to him by the plaintiff, he concluded that the property would generate $210 per week in rental income, but without any information about the underlying information on which Kipperman relied in coming to this conclusion the court does not find it credible. Based on the detail provided by Mrs. Ruotolo on her affidavit and the court's assessment of her credibility, the court find credible her financial affidavit's claim of net weeldy rental income of $169.
For alimony to fund the gap between her present income and earning capacity and the weekly expenses listed on her financial affidavit would require annual alimony of almost $35,000, an amount significantly less than the plaintiff's proposed orders. The difference is attributable to the court's finding of her earning capacity. The alimony statute, § 46b-81(b) of the General Statutes, provides that the court may consider, among other factors, "the estate and needs of each of the parties." Mrs. Ruotolo testified that she intends to continue living at the Sugarloaf property, with shelter expenses considerably higher than the husband's. Her desire to do so is certainly understandable, for the family home is comfortable and spacious and she has lived there for a number of years. Her "need" for shelter, however, is no greater than that of her husband. Both need safe, decent, affordable living environments consistent with their financial resources. On the other hand, in view of the husband's greater responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage, her desire to continue living in the home that the parties purchased and maintained with the fruits of both their labors is a reasonable one. The husband's decision to live in the first floor apartment at Everit Street, though resulting in lower housing costs than his wife's, also reduces his rental receipts by about $1,000 per month (an amount determined by comparing the weekly rent received listed on his financial affidavit with the rental receipts reported on the parties' 2004 federal income tax return). The husband's alimony proposal is to pay Mrs. Ruotolo $400 per week, 35% of his net annual bonus, and $35 per week toward medical insurance. He claims that she can also receive at least $757.42 per month from his pension immediately and an additional $125 per week from the KSOP when she turns 59 1/2. After considering all the evidence and information submitted here in light of the statutory factors for awards of alimony under § 46b-82, the court awards the wife alimony of $650 per week plus the cost of COBRA medical and dental benefits, which will cost $438.57 per month next year. As additional alimony, he shall pay her one-third of the gross amount of any bonus he receives each year.
According to the witness Lillian Williard, who works for the company that calculates and administers the UI pension plan and whose testimony the court found credible, Mrs. Ruotolo would be immediately eligible to begin receiving monthly payments from the portion of the pension awarded to her by a qualified domestic relations order. If Mrs. Ruotolo began taking payments from the pension plan now, however, her monthly payment will be less than if she waits to a later age to begin doing so. Williard prepared several charts depicting annual and monthly annuity income available to Mrs. Ruotolo under various scenarios. The monthly income figure referred to in the text above refers to payments that the wife would be eligible to begin receiving immediately if the court awarded her half of what the defendant's attorney referred to as the "marital share" of the pension — i.e., the portion earned during the marriage. As explained later in this decision, the court is not deducting the so-called "premarital" portion of the pension from its award. The court cannot determine how much more than $757.42 the wife would receive each month should she elect to begin receiving pension payments immediately.
Mr. Ruotolo testified that the KSOP plan would allow his wife to begin receiving income payments when she turns 59 1/2 without any reduction in the principal amount. He offered no documentary evidence to support this claim, and, in view of that lack and his interest in the outcome, the court declines to accept this testimony as credible. (If, however, she does begin to draw on the KSOP at that age without any reduction in the principal amount, that might be a basis for modification of alimony at that time.) As with the pension figures, the defendant's KSOP analysis was based on his proposal for his wife to receive a share only of the "marital portion" of the KSOP and not from any portion accrued before the marriage. Thus the court has no evidence about how much more than $125 per week the wife would be eligible to begin receiving at age 59 1/2 if plaintiff's testimony about her ability to do so without a reduction in principal is true.
Finally, the wife's complaint, though not her proposed orders, seeks an award of counsel fees. At the close of evidence her attorney filed an itemization of counsel fees, which she later followed with an affidavit as to such. Following the defendant's objection and request for hearing, the court heard argument from both sides on the question of counsel fees. Section 46b-62 of the General Statutes permits awards of counsel fees in family matters, but requires that the court consider the parties' "respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in section 46b-82." Moreover, the court must take care that its determination of this question does not substantially undermine its other financial orders.
In determining whether to award counsel fees the trial court must consider the total financial resources of the parties in light of the statutory criteria. The statutory criteria are to be applied in light of the following three broad principles: First, such awards should not be made merely because the obligor has demonstrated an ability to pay. Second, where both parties are financially able to pay their own fees and expenses, they should be permitted to do so. Third where, because of other orders, the potential obligee has ample liquid funds, an allowance of counsel fees is not justified. If, on the basis of the total financial resources of the parties, the trial court concludes that denying an award of counsel fees would not undermine its purpose in making its prior financial orders, the court should allow each party to pay his or her own counsel fees.
(Citations omitted; quotations omitted.) Miller v. Miller, 16 Conn.App. 412, 418, 547 A.2d 922 (1988). Both parties filed financial affidavits and testified about their financial situations. The evidence shows that, while the value of marital estate is not insignificant, most of it is currently tied up in real estate. Neither party will have significant liquid funds until and unless the Orange Street property is sold.
As our Supreme Court has recently noted, "Connecticut courts traditionally examine the factors enumerated in rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct in calculating a reasonable attorneys fee award." Simms v. Chaisson, 277 Conn. 319, 332 (2006), and this court has done so. After reviewing the counsel fee affidavit submitted by the wife's attorney, the court finds the hourly rate charged and the services rendered to be reasonable, and the amounts of time expended to be appropriate in light of the objectives of representation. Attorney Pellegrino conducted herself competently during the course of the proceeding. Her billing rate is reasonable for an attorney practicing matrimonial law in this judicial district.
Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides as follows:
"A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) The likelihood, if made known to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) The amount involved and the results obtained; (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent."
Based on the evidence offered, and after considering the parties' respective financial positions in light of the statutory factors set forth in § 46b-82, as elucidated by the court in Miller v. Miller, and the appropriate factors for assessing the reasonableness of counsel fees, the court will order that $30,000 from the proceeds of the sale of the Orange Street property be paid toward the wife's counsel fees, an award the court finds necessary in order not to undermine the court's other financial orders.
ORDERS
After considering all of the evidence and information presented in light of the statutory criteria for dissolving a marriage and entering orders regarding alimony, equitable distribution of property and division of debt, and award of counsel fees, together with applicable case law, the court hereby enters the following orders:
1. The marriage of the parties, having broken down irretrievably, is hereby dissolved.
2. Except as otherwise provided in these orders, each party (i) is awarded the property listed on its last financial affidavit and (ii) will be responsible for the debt listed on its financial affidavit and indemnify and hold the other harmless thereon.
3. The husband shall quitclaim his interest in the marital home and the Lawrence Street rental property to the wife. The wife shall quitclaim her interest in the Everit Street rental property to the husband. Each party shall be responsible for paying all existing debt on the properties awarded to that party and shall indemnify and hold the other harmless thereon.
4. The Orange Street property
a. The Orange Street property shall be sold in accordance with the parties' written stipulation approved by this court on June 8, 2006, which the court hereby incorporates by reference, with the following modifications.
b. Although the property did sell not at its original listing price, the property shall continue to be listed for sale at a reasonable price, and the court retains jurisdiction over the listing and sale of this property and disposition of funds from the sale.
c. Until the property is sold, the husband shall be responsible for managing and maintaining the property, collecting the rents, and paying all expenses on the property. He shall keep the rents received after the date of judgment in a separate account, and shall not expend funds from this account except to pay reasonable expenses for the property. He shall not incur any new debt on the property without written agreement of the wife or pursuant to court order. Each month he shall provide the wife with an itemized list of income received and expenses incurred on the property. When the property is sold, the funds in this account shall be divided equally between the parties. If reasonable expenses exceed rental income, the husband shall be reimbursed the difference if the net proceeds of sale exceed $371,774.
d. From net the proceeds of sale, the wife shall receive the sum of $67,936; she shall also receive one-half of any amount of the net proceeds that exceeds the sum of $371,77, less any amount by which reasonable expenses for the property exceeded rental income after the date of judgment. Net proceeds from sale of the property shall include the costs of sale, pay off of the mortgage, and capital gain and recapture taxes on the transaction as shown on defendant's exhibit MM. This award includes a contribution toward plaintiff's counsel fees in the amount of $30,000 and funds for plaintiff to pay off the Discover Card debt listed on her last financial affidavit.
5. One-half of the value of the husband's pension and 401K KSOP plans, valued as of the date of dissolution, shall be transferred to the wife by way of qualified domestic relations order. The plaintiff shall be responsible for preparing any orders necessary to effectuate the provisions of this paragraph, but the parties shall split equally the cost of preparation. The court retains jurisdiction over the provisions of this paragraph.
6. One-half of the Vion, New Alliance and Haliburton stock listed on the husband's financial affidavit shall be transferred to the wife, valued as of the date of dissolution.
7. Household furnishings and effects from the marital home shall be divided equally as follows. The parties shall first attempt to divide such property by agreement. If the parties are unable to agree on the division, they shall use mediation services from family services. If they still cannot agree, each party shall submit a list of the item in dispute to the court with a brief statement as to why each party claims each such item, and its approximate value, and the court shall award such property. The court retains jurisdiction to resolve any disputes regarding this process. Each party will have possession of their child's artwork for 6 months of each year.
8. Each party is awarded the bank accounts and motor vehicles listed on their respective financial affidavits and shall be responsible for all debt on such vehicles.
9. The husband shall transfer to the wife the security deposits he is holding for former or present tenants at the Lawrence Street property. If the amount he is specifically holding for security deposits is less than the amount of security deposits he received from those tenants plus the accrued statutory interest pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-21(i), he shall pay any balance from his own funds.
10. The husband shall pay periodic alimony of $650 per week and, within one month after receipt, one-third of the gross amount of any bonus he receives from his employer. He shall pay as additional alimony the monthly cost of COBRA medical and dental benefits for the wife until she is eligible to receive Medicare. If the wife obtains her own health insurance other than through COBRA, the husband shall continue to pay additional monthly alimony until the wife is eligible for Medicare toward the cost of that insurance up to the amount that his employer would charge for COBRA medical and dental benefits. Alimony will terminate on death of either party or the wife's remarriage. If the wife cohabits with another, as that term is defined by statute and has been construed by the courts, then alimony may be modified or terminated as the factual circumstances warrant. The husband shall maintain life insurance in the amount of $500,000 and name the wife as irrevocable beneficiary for as long as he has an alimony obligation.
11. The court will retain jurisdiction over post-secondary educational support expenses for the child Joseph until he turns age 23.
12. The defendant shall keep the parties' son Joseph on his health insurance so long as Joseph remains eligible for such coverage and it available to the defendant at a reasonable cost through his employment.