Opinion
05-22-00819-CV
06-08-2023
BRANDY RUNYAN, Appellant v. JIMMY LEE HUSKEY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court Rockwall County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1-20-1335
Before Justices Pedersen, III, Garcia, and Kennedy
MEMORANDUM OPINION
NANCY KENNEDY JUSTICE
Appellant Brandy Runyan appeals a take-nothing judgment, rendered on a jury verdict, on her negligence claims arising from a motor-vehicle collision. In a single issue, Runyan asserts the jury's answer of "No" to the liability question was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex.R.App.P. 47.4.
Background
On April 25, 2020, at approximately 11 a.m., Runyan, driving a black Jaguar sedan with her son as a passenger, and Huskey, driving a white pickup truck, were involved in a motor-vehicle collision. The collision occurred in a street intersection that is controlled by a traffic signal light.
On October 26, 2020, Runyan filed suit against Huskey asserting claims of negligence and negligence per se, for alleged violations of sections 544.007 and 545.151 of the Transportation Code. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 544.007, 545.151. Huskey answered, generally denying Runyan's allegations.
Section 544.007 addresses traffic-control signals in general and requires an operator facing only a steady red signal to stop until the intersection may be entered safely. Tex. Transp. Code § 544.007(d). Section 545.151 addresses the subject of a vehicle approaching or entering intersections and requires an operator approaching an intersection to stop, yield, and grant immediate use of the intersection in obedience to an official traffic-control device. Id. § 545.151(a)(1)(A).
The case proceeded to a jury trial on the 8th and 9th days of August, 2022. Ten witnesses testified, including Runyan, Huskey, two eyewitnesses, the investigating police officer, Runyan's medical providers, and friends of Runyan who testified about their observations of changes in Runyan following the accident. In addition, Runyan's medical records and the police officer's crash report were admitted into evidence.
The police officer who arrived at the scene and completed a crash report did not witness the accident. In his report, he indicated neither Runyan nor her son were injured at the scene and that no emergency medical services were needed or called. He found the driver of Unit 1, Huskey, ran a red light and was the cause of the collision. He did not issue a citation to either driver.
One of the eyewitnesses testified he was interviewed by a police officer at the scene of the collision. He indicated he and his wife were behind the pickup truck and he saw the truck run a red light at the intersection where the collision occurred. He further indicated that he had a brief conversation with Runyan and Huskey to make sure everyone was okay. The witness's wife, the second eyewitness, testified she saw the white truck run the red light and hit the black car.
With respect to the cause of the collision, the following exchange occurred between Runyan's attorney and Huskey:
Q. You told the police at the scene of the collision your whole side of what happened; is that right?
A. I told him I didn't think the light was red.
Q. Okay. And you know that the police wrote a report of their investigation findings that they put in this police report?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you agree with the contents of the police report?
A. To some degree, yeah. He wasn't there.
Q. Okay. And tell us what you disagree with.
A. I don't think the light was red.
Q. And what's the basis for that belief?
A. Because the last time I looked at the light, it wasn't red.
Q. The last time you looked at the light?
A. Right before I went through the intersection.
Q. Okay. I'll show Exhibit 4. The police report says you ran a red light?
A. I see what the police report says, yes, sir.
Q. Do you agree with that?
A. I don't think it's accurate.
. . . .
Q. . . . But you say you don't know whether or not your light was red when you entered the intersection?
A. I don't think it was.
. . . .
Q. You said you don't know whether the wreck was your fault?
A. I don't think it was.
. . . .
Q. As you sit here today, do you think this collision was your fault?
A. No, sir.
On cross examination by his attorney, Huskey stated:
In my opinion, I looked at the light. When I looked at the light, it was green. I was headed through the intersection. It could have turned yellow, I don't know. I got through the intersection, and I caught a black blur on my left-hand side. I know that - - at that point she was going to hit me, and I also noticed the car beside it was still back at the light. She hit me. Yes, it spun around. She came to a stop. I tried to
move the truck. It wouldn't move, so I put it in park with the emergency brake and went and checked on them.
Runyan testified that, as she approached the intersection, her light was red. She stopped at the light and when it turned green, she paused for a few seconds and then entered the intersection. At that point, according to Runyan, Huskey came blasting through the intersection. Runyan admitted that she hit Huskey's truck first instead of him hitting her vehicle, and that the impact was to the rear wheel of the driver's side of Huskey's truck, which spun him around 180 degrees. She further indicated airbags were not deployed as a result of the accident.
With respect to injuries allegedly caused by the accident, Runyan claimed she suffered back and neck injuries. She admitted that she had reported to her medical providers that she had a history of back pain before the accident and that, shortly before this accident, she had been in another motor-vehicle collision in which her vehicle was "T-boned" by a vehicle traveling at a speed of 50 miles per hour. During cross examination, Huskey's attorney pointed out various inconsistencies between Runyan's medical records, her deposition testimony and trial testimony, including her claim of weight gain following the accident, her ability to exercise and her pain level.
After the parties rested and closed, the trial court read the court's charge to the jury. That charge included the following general negligence and negligence per se instructions:
"Negligence" means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.
The law forbids a driver approaching an intersection from failing to stop, yield, and grant immediate use of the intersection in obedience to an official traffic-control device. A failure to comply with this law is negligence in itself. [Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.151(a)(1)(A)]By a vote of 10 to 2, the jury answered Jury Question No. 1 "Did the negligence, if any, of Jimmy Lee Huskey cause the occurrence in question?" "No." Because the jury answered Question No. 1 "No," it did not answer Jury Question No. 2, the damages question. The trial court rendered a judgment on the jury's verdict. Runyan filed a motion for new trial. The record does not contain a ruling on the motion, so it appears it was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Runyan contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's answer to Question No. 1, the liability question.
To establish a lack of factually sufficient evidence, an appellant must demonstrate the finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence presented at trial. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001) (party attacking factual sufficiency of evidence supporting adverse finding on which it had burden of proof must demonstrate that finding is against great weight and preponderance of evidence). "The court of appeals must consider and weigh all of the evidence and can set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust." Id. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). The factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005). Jurors, as factfinders, "may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another." Id. As it is the jurors' role to resolve conflicts in the evidence, our review assumes that they did so in a manner consistent with their verdict. Id. at 820; Capcor at KirbyMain, L.L.C. v. Moody Nat'l Kirby Houston S, L.L.C., 509 S.W.3d 379, 384-85 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
To prevail on her negligence cause of action against Huskey, Runyan had to establish the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach. W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005). And to prevail on a theory of negligence per se, Runyan had to establish Huskey violated a statute or ordinance. See Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. 1979) (negligence per se is a tort concept whereby a legislatively imposed standard of conduct is adopted by the civil courts as defining the conduct of a reasonably prudent person).
As relevant here, the duty Runyan claims Huskey breached was the duty to stop, yield, and grant immediate use of the intersection in obedience to an official traffic-control device, as set forth in section 545.151(a)(1)(A) of the Transportation Code. The parties' dispute focused on how the collision occurred and who had the red light. Runyan and the eyewitnesses testified Huskey ran a red light, and the police officer adopted their account of the circumstances surrounding the accident. Huskey, on the other hand, testified the light was green when he entered the intersection. In addition, Runyan acknowledged that she hit Huskey's truck first instead of Huskey's truck hitting her vehicle. The jury's answer to Question No. 1 is in keeping with Huskey's testimony and may be supported by evidence of the collision point of impact.
Although Runyan presented evidence that was inconsistent with the jury's finding, the jury, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, could resolve conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony of any one witness as well as the conflicting testimony of different witnesses. See Schwartz v. Forest Pharm., Inc., 127 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). In the face of conflicting evidence, the jury may have believed Huskey and concluded that his light had not yet turned red when he entered the intersection. We conclude the jury's finding of no negligence was not so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it was clearly wrong and unjust. We therefore conclude the evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury's answer to Question No. 1. We overrule Runyan's sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee JIMMY LEE HUSKEY recover his costs of this appeal from appellant BRANDY RUNYAN.