Opinion
2:23-cv-00427-GMN-VCF
05-22-2023
CARLOS RUIZ, Plaintiff v. KHEILA BRICE, et al., Defendants
SCREENING ORDER
Gloria M. Navarro, Judge United States District Court
Pro se Plaintiff Carlos Ruiz (“Plaintiff”), who is incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), has submitted a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1-1 (“Complaint”)), an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1), and a motion seeking a copy of the Complaint (ECF No. 2). The matter of the filing fee will be temporarily deferred. The Court now screens Plaintiff's Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
In his motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court provide him with a copy of the Complaint. ECF No. 2. The Court grants Plaintiff's motion and orders the Clerk of Court to provide Plaintiff with a courtesy copy of the Complaint (ECF No. 1-1).
I. SCREENING STANDARD
Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a federal court must dismiss an incarcerated person's claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the Court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a Pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. See id.
Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may be dismissed sua sponte if that person's claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
In his Complaint, Plaintiff sues multiple Defendants for events that took place while he was incarcerated at Southern Desert Correctional Center (“SDCC”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) Plaintiff sues Defendants Khelia Brice, Currier, Jane Doe, and NDOC. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff brings two claims and seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Id. at 9.)
Although Plaintiff does not identify Jane Doe as a Defendant in the Complaint, the Court construes the allegations in the Complaint as treating her as a Defendant.
The Court dismisses Defendant NDOC, with prejudice, from this case as amendment would be futile. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the NDOC, a state agency, is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment); see also Stanley v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute, “does not abrogate state sovereign immunity for supplemental state law claims”).
Plaintiff alleges the following. In June 2022, Kheila Brice, the law librarian at SDCC, limited Plaintiff's access to the legal assistance that the law library provided, functionally blocking Plaintiff from the law library resources. (Id. at 4.) For example, when Plaintiff requested legal books, caselaw, or forms from the library, it would take 15-20 days to obtain the requested resources. (Id.) In addition, Brice did not answer many of Plaintiff's requests, which resulted in Plaintiff being unable to litigate his other cases. (Id.) Brice rarely visited Plaintiff's housing unit. (Id.) Over a span of eight months, Brice only visited Plaintiff's housing unit twice, and she did not meet with Plaintiff during those visits. (Id.) On other occasions Brice sent Plaintiff the wrong legal materials. (Id.) While Plaintiff was in administrative segregation, Brice withheld legal books, telling Plaintiff that he needed to send the law library the exact citations he needed so that she could provide photocopies to him. (Id.) This process adversely affected Plaintiff's ability to litigate his other cases. (Id.) For example, Plaintiff could not prepare for a trial and a motion for the appointment of counsel. (Id.) Plaintiff, however, does not state the subject matter or type of cases he could not properly litigate. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed a grievance against Brice for her inadequate services. (Id. at 5.) According to Plaintiff, Jane Doe and Currier “stifled” his grievance. (Id.) Plaintiff did not receive a response to his grievance for several months, and Currier then told Plaintiff that the grievance had been rejected “for lack of ‘gold receipt.'” (Id.) Currier also quoted inapplicable administrative regulations when stating that she denied the grievance. (Id.)
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings his first claim under the First, Fifth,and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, §§ 1, 8, and 10 of the Nevada Constitution. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff brings his second claim under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, §§ 8 and 10 of the Nevada Constitution. (Id. at 5.) For claim 1, the Court interprets Plaintiff's claim as a First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment denial of access to the courts claim. For claim 2, the Court interprets Plaintiff's claim as a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and dismisses his First Amendment claim without prejudice. The Court will address each claim in turn, along with Plaintiff's claims under the Nevada Constitution.
Plaintiff attempts to raise a Fifth Amendment claim in this case. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4.) However, a Fifth Amendment due process claim can only be made against the federal government, not state actors. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving persons of due process, while the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits deprivations without due process by the several States.”). Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim without prejudice.
Plaintiff attempts to raise a First Amendment claim in claim 2 (ECF No. 1-1 at 5); however, the substance of the claim relates to the rejection of Plaintiff's grievance against Brice-which the Court construes as a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim.
A. First and Fourteenth Amendment Denial of Access to Courts (Claim 1)
Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). To establish a violation of the right of access to the courts, a prisoner must establish that he or she has suffered and actual injury, a jurisdictional requirement that flows from the standing doctrine and may not be waived. Id. at 349. An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348. Delays in providing legal materials or assistance that result in actual injury are “not of constitutional significance” if “they are the product of prison regulations reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 362. The right of access to the courts is limited to non-frivolous direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus proceedings, and § 1983 actions. Id. at 353 n.3, 354-55.
With respect to non-frivolous direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus proceedings, and § 1983 actions, the plaintiff must allege what the underlying cause of action was and describe the official acts frustrating that litigation. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). If the plaintiff is alleging that his or her case was lost because of the official acts, the plaintiff must also “identify a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought.” Id. However, an injury caused by the negligent conduct of a prison official is not enough to implicate a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 330 (1986) (holding that “the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property” and that “in any given § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must still prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right; and depending on the right, merely negligent conduct may not be enough to state a claim”).
The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a colorable denial of access to the courts claim. While Plaintiff does claim that Brice blocked him from accessing the legal materials from the law library that he needed to litigate his other cases, Plaintiff does not allege what type of cases he could not litigate because of Brice's actions. Plaintiff only alleges he could not prepare for a trial and a motion for appointment of counsel without the requested legal items. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a colorable denial of access to the courts claim. The Court dismisses this claim without prejudice with leave to amend. If Plaintiff attempts to file an amended complaint, he must include the nature of the cases that he could not properly litigate, along with the acts of the prison official(s) frustrating the litigation.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process (Claim 2)
Prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a state's unpublished policy statements establishing a grievance procedure do not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest in the processing of appeals because there is no liberty interest entitling inmates to a specific grievance process).
The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a colorable Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants Currier and Jane Doe because they rejected his grievance. In his Complaint, Plaintiff argues that these Defendants “stifled” his grievance against Brice and ultimately denied it, but, based on the law, Plaintiff does not have a right to have prison officials process or investigate an inmate grievance in any specific way. As such, the Court dismisses this claim with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.
C. State Constitutional Claims (Claims 1 and 2)
In claim 1, Plaintiff claims that Brice violated Article I, §§ 1, 8, and 10 of the Nevada Constitution when she functionally blocked him from accessing the resources of the law library at SDCC. In claim 2, Plaintiff argues that Jane Doe and Currier violated Article I, §§ 8 and 10 of the Nevada Constitution when they improperly responded to his grievance against Brice.
1. Article I, § 1
In claim 1, Plaintiff contends that Brice violated Article I, § 1 of the Nevada Constitution, which recognizes “inalienable rights” including “enjoying and defending life and liberty; Acquiring, Possessing, and Protecting property and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness[.]” In claim 1, Plaintiff merely lists this provision of the Nevada Constitution in a conclusory fashion and does not provide sufficient allegations or underlying facts to give Brice fair notice to defend herself. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claim under Article I, § 1 of the Nevada Constitution without prejudice.
2. Article I, § 8
In both claim 1 and claim 2, Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants violated Article I, § 8 of the Nevada Constitution. The Due Process Clause of Article I, § 8 of the Nevada Constitution is coextensive with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wyman v. State, 217 P.3d 572, 578 (2009). However, for the same reasons that this case does not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it also does not implicate the Due Process Clause of Article I, § 8 of the Nevada Constitution. See supra Section II(B). Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims under Article I, § 8 of the Nevada Constitution without prejudice.
3. Article I, § 10
In both claim 1 and claim 2, Plaintiff states that the Defendants violated Article I, § 10 of the Nevada Constitution. However, Plaintiff does not state colorable claims for violations of Article I, § 10 of the Nevada Constitution. That provision concerns the right to petition the legislature for redress of grievances. The Complaint does not include any allegations concerning petitioning the legislature. The Court therefore dismisses these claims with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.
III. LEAVE TO AMEND
Although the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend, it does not grant Plaintiff leave to amend in any way that he sees fit. Plaintiff has leave to amend to allege additional true facts to show how prison officials denied him access to the courts in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court does not give Plaintiff leave to assert new claims.
If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he is advised that an amended complaint replaces the complaint, so the amended complaint must be complete in itself. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he fact that a party was named in the original complaint is irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the original”); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that for claims dismissed with prejudice, a plaintiff is not required to reallege such claims in a subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal). This means that the amended complaint must contain all facts and claims and identify all defendants that he intends to sue. He must file the amended complaint on this Court's approved prisoner-civil-rights form, and it must be entitled “First Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff must follow the instructions on the form. He need not and should not allege very many facts in the “nature of the case” section of the form. Rather, in each claim, he should allege facts sufficient to show what each defendant did to violate his civil rights. He must file the amended complaint within 30 days from the entry date of this order. If Plaintiff fails to file the amended complaint within 30 days from the entry date of this order, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ordered that a decision on the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is deferred.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court file the Complaint (ECF No. 1-1).
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's motion seeking a copy of the Complaint (ECF No. 2) is granted.
It is further ordered that Defendant NDOC is dismissed with prejudice from the case, as amendment would be futile.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court add Currier to the docket as a defendant.
It is further ordered that Defendants Jane Doe, Currier, and Brice are dismissed from the case without prejudice.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's First Amendment claim (claim 2) is dismissed without prejudice.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim (claim 1) is dismissed without prejudice.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment denial of access to the courts claim (claim 1) is dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (claim 2) is dismissed with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's claim under Article I, § 1 of the Nevada Constitution (claim 1) is dismissed without prejudice.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's claims under Article I, § 8 of the Nevada Constitution (claim 1 and claim 2) are dismissed without prejudice.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's claims under Article I, § 10 of the Nevada Constitution (claim 1 and claim 2) are dismissed with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.
It is further ordered that, if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies of his Complaint, as outlined in this order, Plaintiff will file the amended complaint within 30 days from the date of entry of this order.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court send Plaintiff the approved form for filing a § 1983 complaint, instructions for the same, and a copy of his original Complaint (ECF No. 1-1). If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he should use the approved form and he will write the words “First Amended” above the words “Civil Rights Complaint” in the caption.
It is further ordered that, if Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies outlined in this order, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice for failure to state a claim.