Opinion
1:22-cv-1468 DAD DB PS
09-20-2023
ELIAS C. RUIZ, Plaintiff, v. TOMAS J. ARAGON, in his official capacity, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
DEBORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Elias C. Ruiz is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred to the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pending before the court are defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f). For the reasons stated below, defendants' motions to dismiss are granted and plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action in the Freson Division on November 14, 2022, by filing a complaint and paying the applicable filing fee. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint alleges that plaintiff has been employed by defendant Turlock Unified School District (“TUSD”) since August 16, 2010. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 2.(Id.) Pursuant to the mandate employees who were “not fully vaccinated, or for whom vaccine status [was] unknown or documentation [was] not provided” would be “considered unvaccinated.” (Id.) “Plaintiff declined to state his COVID-19 vaccination status.” (Id.)
Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court's CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.
Also named as defendants in the complaint are Director of California Department of Public Health, Tomas J. Aragon, and David Lattig, TUSD Superintendent of Human Resources. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 1.)
Pursuant to these allegations the complaint asserts causes of action for an Equal Protection violation, disability discrimination, religious discrimination, violation of California Labor Code sections, invasion of privacy, stalking, the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and vicarious liability. (Id. at 2-14.) On December 29, 2022, defendants CDPH and Thomas J. Aragon filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on January 9, 2023. (ECF No. 23.) Defendants CDHP and Aragon filed a reply on January 19, 2023. (ECF No. 26.) On January 27, 2023, defendants TUSD and David Lattig filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 29.) On September 13, 2023, this action was reassigned to the Sacramento Division pursuant to Local Rule 120. (ECF No. 39.)
STANDARDS
I. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to raise the defense, by motion, that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of an entire action or of specific claims alleged in the action. “A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the allegations of the complaint or may be made as a ‘speaking motion' attacking the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979).
When a party brings a facial attack to subject matter jurisdiction, that party contends that the allegations of jurisdiction contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a Rule 12(b)(1) motion of this type, the plaintiff is entitled to safeguards similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is made. See Sea Vessel Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345, 347 (11th Cir. 1994); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1990). The factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true, and the motion is granted only if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2003); Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1157 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, district courts “may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment” when resolving a facial attack. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039.
When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, no presumption of truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations. Thornhill Publ'g Co., 594 F.2d at 733. “[T]he district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, plaintiff has the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction does in fact exist. Thornhill Publ'g Co., 594 F.2d at 733.
II. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). In general, pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). However, the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
III. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions to Strike Pursuant to Rule 12(f)
A motion to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) allows a court to strike “from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial[.]” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft, Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)), rev don other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 114 (1994); see also Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983).
A motion to strike is well-taken when “it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of litigation.” LeDuc v. Kentucky Central Life Ins. Co., 814 F.Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Impertinent allegations are those that are not responsive or relevant to issues involved in the action and which could not be admitted as evidence in the litigation. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527. “Scandalous” within the meaning of Rule 12(f) includes allegations that cast a cruelly derogatory light on a party or other person. Talbot v. Robert Mathews Distributing Co., 961 F.2d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 1992).
Ultimately, whether to grant a motion to strike applying these standards lies within the sound discretion of the district court. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527; see also California Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1032-33 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Rule 12(f) motions are generally viewed with disfavor and not ordinarily granted. Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F.Supp. 1450, 1478 (C.D. Cal. 1996). A motion to strike should therefore not be granted unless it is absolutely clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the litigation. Lilley v. Charren, 936 F.Supp. 708, 713 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
ANALYSIS
I. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
Review of the parties' briefing finds that defendants' motions to dismiss should be granted for several reasons.
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
In general, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state, absent the state's affirmative waiver of its immunity or congressional abrogation of that immunity. Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-99 (1984); Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003); Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dep't of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its agencies for all types of relief, absent unequivocal consent by the state.”).
To be a valid waiver of sovereign immunity, a state's consent to suit must be “unequivocally expressed in the statutory text.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996); see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99; Yakama Indian Nation, 176 F.3d at 1245. “[T]here can be no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language.” United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659 (1947). Courts must “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver,” Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999), and waivers “must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign and not enlarged beyond what the [statutory] language requires.” United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) (citations, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). “To sustain a claim that the Government is liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims.” Lane, 518 U.S. at 192.
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[t]he State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court, and the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Brown v. California Dept. of Corrections, 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999)).
“[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from hearing claims by a citizen against dependent instrumentalities of the state.” Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, the complaint seeks “money damages” against the California Department of Public Health and its director Tomas J. Aragon. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 1-2.) CDPH and its officers are immune from suits for money damages pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. See Aids Healthcare Foundation v. Belshe, No. CV97-3235, 1998 WL 1157405, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 1998). Thus, it does not appear that plaintiff can obtain money damages from defendants CDPH and Tomas J. Aragon.
B. Rule 8
Based on the sparse facts recounted above plaintiff's complaint asserts eight causes of action. However, those causes of action frequently fail to contain allegations addressing which defendant or defendants the claim is asserted against and what were the wrongful actions of the defendant or defendants. Instead, the causes of action simply “reallege[] and restate[]” the factual allegations noted above.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claims and must allege facts that state the elements of each claim plainly and succinctly. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of ‘further factual enhancements.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff's claims. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649.
Here, the complaint fails to allege facts that state the elements of each claim plainly and succinctly.
C. Equal Protection
The complaint alleges that the defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the “CDPH Mandate was illogical and cannot withstand strict scrutiny or even a rational basis test because naturally immune individuals . . . have at least as good or better immunity to the virus that causes COVID-19[.]” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 3.) “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001).
To state a viable claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff “must plead intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent.” Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff's protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)).
Here, the complaint does contain any allegations that a defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff based on plaintiff's protected status.
D. Disability Discrimination
The complaint also alleges “disability discrimination” pursuant to the “Americans with Disabilities Act.” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 4.) “Congress enacted the ADA ‘to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.'” Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2)). Pursuant to the ADA:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
“A person is ‘regarded as' having a disability ‘if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.'” Scott v. Napolitano, 717 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1086 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)). Here, the complaint fails to allege that a defendant discriminated against plaintiff or subjected plaintiff to a prohibited action.
In this regard, the complaint alleges that the “COVID-19 surveillance testing policy regarded workers with a previous antibody test for COVID-19 as immunodeficient.” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 5.) However, “[s]ince its detection in late 2019, the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) has metamorphosized into the deadliest worldwide pandemic since the 1918 outbreak of Spanish flu.” Brox v. Hole, 590 F.Supp.3d 359, 363 (D. Mass. 2022). The pandemic “has caused the deaths of over six million persons worldwide[.]” (Id.) As of December 22, 2020, in California alone there had “been nearly 1.9 million cases and nearly 23,000 deaths.” Disbar Corporation v. Newsom, 508 F.Supp.3d 747, 750 (E.D. Cal. 2020). The Supreme Court has recognized that “[s]temming the spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a compelling state interest[.]” Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S.Ct. 63, 67 (U.S. 2020).
Here, the complaint fails to explain how the mandate at issue was in any way discriminatory, constituted an adverse employment action, or was in any way unlawful. See generally Klaassen v. Trustees of Indiana University, 7 F.4th 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2021) (“These plaintiffs just need to wear masks and be tested, requirements that are not constitutionally problematic.”); Burcham v. City of Los Angeles, 562 F.Supp.3d 694, 704 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (“Plaintiffs fail to state a claim that the City's weekly testing requirement violates the Fourth Amendment”); Troogstad v. City of Chicago, 571 F.Supp.3d 901, 910 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (“Because the exigencies of the current pandemic justify the degree of intrusion at issue here, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Defendants' vaccine and testing policies infringe a fundamental constitutional right.”); Valdez v. Grisham, 559 F.Supp.3d 1161 (D. N.M. 2021) (“federal courts have consistently held that vaccine mandates do not implicate a fundamental right”). “‘[T]he ADA does not provide a blanket exemption to people with disabilities from complying with legitimate safety requirements necessary for safe operations.'” Warner v. Delano, Case No. 21-cv-05666 HSG, 2021 WL 5507160, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2021) (quoting DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, The Department of Justice Warns of Inaccurate Flyers and Postings Regarding the Use of Face Masks and the Americans with Disabilities Act, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-warns-inaccurate-flyers-and-postings-regarding-use-face-masks-and (last accessed May 5, 2022)).
E. First Amendment
The complaint alleges that plaintiff requested “a reasonable religious accommodation that would have allowed him to continue working without being subjected to” the mandate. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 6.) TUSD denied that request, thereby “discriminating against Plaintiff's desire to freely exercise his religious belief” in violation of the First Amendment. (Id.)
“The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which has been made applicable to the States by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[.]'” Employment Div., Oregon Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990) (citing U.S. Const. amend. 1) (internal citation omitted). To show a violation of the First Amendment a complaint must establish there was “a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice[.]” Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). The burden must have impacted a central religious belief or practice, one that is “mandated by [plaintiff's] faith.” Freeman v. Arparo, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997).
Here, the complaint fails to contain the necessary factual allegations to support a First Amendment claim.
F. Exhaustion
As noted above, the complaint makes repeated reference to alleged employment discrimination. “Title VII exists in large part ‘to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.'” Clemens v. Centurylink Inc., 874 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). To this end, “Title VII forbids certain employers from ‘discriminating] against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'” Campbell v. Hawaii Department of Education, 892 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
“In order to bring a Title VII claim in district court, a plaintiff must first exhaust her administrative remedies.” Sommatino v. U.S., 255 F.3d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff exhausts their “administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC or an equivalent state agency, like the DFEH, and receiving a right-to-sue letter.” Scott v. Gino Morena Enterprises, LLC, 888 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2018). The court only has jurisdiction over “charges of discrimination that are like or reasonably related to the allegations made in the EEOC charge, or that fall within the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Deppe v. United Airlines, 217 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). “We ‘consider [a] plaintiff's civil claims to be reasonably related to allegations in the charge to the extent that those claims are consistent with the plaintiff's original theory of the case.'” Freeman v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Here, the complaint does not allege that plaintiff exhausted any administrative remedies.
II. Leave to Amend
The undersigned has carefully considered whether plaintiff could amend the complaint to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall be freely given, the court does not have to allow futile amendments).
Here, the undersigned cannot yet say that it appears beyond doubt that leave to amend would be futile. Plaintiff's complaint will therefore be dismissed, and plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that if plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. Those facts must be sufficient to push the claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible[.]” Id. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Plaintiff is also reminded that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make an amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that any amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to prior pleadings. The amended complaint will supersede the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Thus, in an amended complaint, just as if it were the initial complaint filed in the case, each defendant must be listed in the caption and identified in the body of the complaint, and each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. Any amended complaint which plaintiff may elect to file must also include concise but complete factual allegations describing the conduct and events which underlie plaintiff's claims.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' December 29, 2022 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 19) is granted;
2. Defendants' January 27, 2023 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 29) is granted;
3. The complaint filed November 14, 2022 (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend;
4. Within twenty-eight days from the date of this order, an amended complaint shall be filed that cures the defects noted in this order and complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the case number assigned to this action and must be titled “Amended Complaint”; and
Alternatively, if plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action plaintiff may file a notice of voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5. Plaintiff is cautioned that the failure to comply with this order in a timely manner may result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.