Opinion
Civil No. 02-966 ADM/AJB
November 3, 2003
Daniel J. Bresnahan, Esq., Roseville, MN, on behalf of Plaintiff
John J. McDonald, Esq., and Susan K. Fitzke, Esq., Meagher Geer, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, appeared for and on behalf of Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 9] was filed with the Court on July 15, 2003. Defendants West Side Community Health Services ("West Side"), and Jose Carbajal ("Carbajal") (collectively, "Defendants"), move to dismiss Plaintiff Qiana Rueda's ("Rueda" or "Plaintiff') Title VII claim that alleges gender discrimination, hostile work environment sexual harassment, and retaliation. For the reasons explained below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
The parties agreed to submit the Motion on the briefs after a scheduling complication occurred on the oral argument date, October 8, 2003.
II. BACKGROUND
Because Defendants move for summary judgment, the facts are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
While Carbajal and Rueda's relationship was positive initially, it quickly deteriorated in the fall of 2000. Rueda Dep. at 40-41. Carbajal began discussing his concerns about Rueda's job performance with her during this period, specifically the number of personal phone calls that she received. Id. at 44-45. Carbajal claims additionally that Rueda had serious attendance and tardiness problems, and that she falsified her time records. Carbajal Aff. Ex. 1; Carbajal Dep. at 65-66. In contrast, Rueda states that she was never late or absent without permission, and that many of the phone calls were actually from patients who requested her personally. Rueda Dep. at 17, 37-39. She contends that Carbajal's time records for her hours are inaccurate. Rueda Aff. ¶ XI. She admits, though, to missing work to care for her sick children, and to help her sister when she had a baby. Rueda also acknowledges being absent due to car problems. She says further that she does not remember many of the instances when Carbajal claims she was absent or tardy. Rueda Dep. at 98-104.
Because of her alleged deficiencies, West Side gave Rueda a written warning on January 4, 2001, and placed her on a disciplinary action plan. The plan required Plaintiff to correct her attendance problems, and noted that she may face termination or suspension unless her performance improved. Carbajal Aff. Ex. 1. Rueda refused to sign the warning form because she felt that it was inaccurate. Rueda Dep. at 49-50.
While Rueda and Carbajal's relationship was decidedly poor by late 2000, it grew significantly worse after an incident that occurred on January 18, 2001. Plaintiff was scheduled for her annual performance review on January 18th, and was required to complete a self-evaluation beforehand. Carbajal also prepared a report for the meeting which was approved by his supervisors. Brehm Aff. ¶ 7. Rueda knew that she could not receive a raise unless she attended a performance review, which in turn could not be held until she completed a self-assessment. Carbajal gave Rueda an evaluation form on January 17th, which Rueda says she finished but forgot at home when she left for work on the 18th. Carbajal gave her a second form at around 3:00 p.m. on the 18th and instructed her to finish it that day, but Plaintiff'states that she was too busy and did not complete the assessment. Rueda Dep. at 53-56.
Because Rueda was on a disciplinary action plan at this time, based on company policy she would not have been eligible to receive a raise even if she attended the performance review. Brehm Aff. ¶ 8.
Plaintiff'states that Carbajal approached her at approximately 4:25 p.m. to meet for her review. Rueda says that she could not stay, however, because her shift ended at 4:30 p.m. and she needed to retrieve her children from daycare. After Rueda refused to participate in a review at this time, she alleges that Carbajal blocked her as she tried to exit the operators' station. Rueda shrugged past Carbajal to get around him, and says that he then followed her to another employee's cubicle and blocked her way a second time. While Carbajal eventually let Plaintiff pass and agreed to reschedule the review for 8:00 a.m. the following day, Plaintiff claims that the encounter frightened her. Id. at 58-65, 69. She also believes that Carbajal would not have treated a male this way.Id. at 147. Carbajal denies that he moved in front of Rueda or tried to block her way. Carbajal Dep. at 94-96.
Shortly after the incident, Plaintiff met with Sally Smith ("Smith"), Carbajal's superior and Clinic Operations Director at West Side, and reported it to her. Rueda Dep. at 78-79. Both Rueda and Carbajal completed incident reports which were included in Rueda's employee file.Id Plaintiff also reported the encounter to Mavis Brehm, ("Brehm"), who is the Executive Director of West Side. Rueda Aff. ¶ VIE. Rueda did not allege sexual harassment or gender discrimination at this time, and had not complained of such behavior in the past. Brehm Aff. ¶ 6; Rueda Dep. at 122, 124-26, 188; Smith Aff. ¶ 6.
Rueda later told Smith that she was not comfortable around Carbajal, and asked on numerous occasions if she could complete her performance review with someone else. Rueda Dep. at 92-94. In response, Smith agreed to attend the review, but said that Carbajal would also be present since no one else in a supervisory capacity had directly observed Rueda's performance. Id. at 94, 97; Carbajal Dep. at 109-10; Smith Aff. ¶ 5. Plaintiff'says that she refused to participate in any review process knowing that Carbajal would attend. Rueda Aff. ¶ VII. West Side also declined to rearrange office furniture, as Rueda requested, so that she no longer had to walk past Carbajal to get to her desk West Side claimed at the time that Plaintiffs proposal was not feasible, but Rueda contends that Defendants implemented her suggestion after her termination. Rueda Dep. at 82-86; Smith Aff. ¶ 12.
Plaintiff complains of other harassing behavior as well. She claims that Carbajal leaned over her to retrieve office supplies from her desk, and that she reported this to Brehm. Rueda Dep. at 87-90. While Rueda did not mention these events to management while employed at West Side, she now states that Carbajal also stared at female employees' chests when they wore low-cut tops, and that Carbajal often asked overly personal questions about her family. Id at 70-71, 87-88, 151.
West Side placed Rueda on a second disciplinary action plan on February 9, 2001, and suspended Plaintiff for one week without pay based on her continued absenteeism and falsification of time cards. The action plan required her to arrive at work on time, and stated that she could be terminated for any future unexcused absences. Carbajal Aff. Ex. 3. West Side states that it finally terminated Plaintiffs employment on March 7, 2001, because Plaintiff failed to comply with either disciplinary action plan. West Side also noted that Rueda continued to receive an excessive number of personal phone calls, and that she would not speak to Carbajal, her supervisor. Carbajal Aff. Ex. 4; Rueda Dep. at 116-17. Rueda contests these assertions. Rueda Aff. ¶¶ XIV, XVIII, XIX.
III. DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall issue "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ludwig v. Andersoa 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party may not "rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial."Krenik v. County of Le Sueur. 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995).
A. Defendant Carbajal's Title VII Liability
Under Title VII, employers cannot "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Defendants acknowledge that Title VII applies to West Side, but argue that Carbajal is not liable under Title VII as a matter of law because the statute does not contemplate individual liability. Rather, Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers only and does not apply to supervisors. Eighth Circuit case law supports this position, and has established that supervisors are not personally liable under Title VII.See Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Cent-Everly Comty. Sch. Dist. 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Spencer v. Ripley County State Bank. 123 F.3d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that supervisors do not face Title VII liability as individuals).
The term employer, as defined under Title VII, is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of such a person . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff includes Carbajal as a defendant and suggests that he faces Title VII liability as Plaintiffs supervisor. Compl. ¶ 2. However, because this assertion directly conflicts with the Eighth Circuit precedent described above, the Title VII claims asserted against Carbajal individually are dismissed with prejudice.
B. Burden Shifting Framework for Title VII Claims
Defendants next argue that Defendant West Side is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot establish prima facie claims for Title VII gender discrimination, hostile work environment sexual harassment or retaliation. The burden shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greea 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973), applies to all three claims. See also Floyd v. Mo. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 188 F.3d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying the framework to discrimination claims); O'Sullivan v. Minnesota. 191 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 1999) (gender discrimination); Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co., 31 F.3d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1994) (Title VII). Under this framework, the plaintiff employee must initially establish a prima facie case of discrimination. This creates a presumption that the employer acted unlawfully. The burden of production then shifts to the employer who must provide legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the employee's termination. If the defendant meets this requirement, the burden returns to the plaintiff to show that the employer's explanation is pretextual.Id However, the plaintiff cannot necessarily avoid summary judgment at this stage by simply establishing a prima facie case and showing that the employer's purported justification is false. Summary judgment may still be warranted if the evidence reveals some other non-discriminatory reason for the employer's action, or if the plaintiff only creates weak factual issues concerning pretext and additional, uncontroverted evidence shows that there was no discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). Plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion in showing discrimination throughout this analysis. Id. at 143.
C. Gender Discrimination
Starting with gender discrimination, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs action fails as a matter of law. To establish a claim for gender discrimination under Title VII, Plaintiff must outline a prima facie case by proving the following: 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) she was qualified for the position; 3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) this action occurred under circumstances which allow a court to infer unlawful discrimination. McLaugfalin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 510 (8th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff has not articulated a prima facie gender discrimination claim in this case. Plaintiff'satisfies elements one and three, as a woman whose job was terminated. Whether Plaintiff was qualified presents a closer question because Defendants provide ample evidence that Plaintiff had a history of absenteeism and insubordination. Plaintiff does not flatly deny Defendants' assertions. Instead, she states that she cannot remember many instances when she was allegedly absent or tardy, and adds that she did not "have a serious attendance problem . . . different from any other employee." Rueda Aff. ¶ XVIII (emphasis added); Rueda Dep. at 25-32. Even if Plaintiff can clear the "quaHfied" threshold with this marginal evidence, she has not shown that her termination resulted from gender discrimination. Plaintiff offers no evidence proving that West Side fired her because of her sex, or that they treated a similarly situated male employee differently. While Plaintiff'states that she was "singled out" because she "stood up for [her]self," these allegations do not establish illegal gender bias. Rueda Aff. ¶ XTV. Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a prima facie claim.
Even assuming that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case, Defendants give legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her employment. Plaintiff habitually arrived late and left early, missed work entirely, and received a large volume of personal calls. Defendants also allege that she falsified her time records. Brehm Aff. ¶ 9; Carbajal Aff. ¶¶ 5, 10, Exs. 1, 4; Smith Aff. ¶¶ 8-10. Her work performance did not improve after she was placed on multiple disciplinary action plans, and she refused to attend a performance review with Carbajal, her supervisor, as required by company policy. Carbajal Aff. Ex. 2; Smith Aff. ¶¶ 5, 10.
In response, Plaintiff provides little evidence these reasons were pretextual and that Plaintiffs sex was the true basis for her termination. Affidavits from Rueda and her co-workers reveal that Carbajal perhaps disciplined employees inconsistently, allowing some to violate rules but punishing others. Rueda Aff. ¶ XIV; see Delgado Aff, ¶¶ V, VII-VIII; Gonzalez Aff. ¶¶ V, VII-VIII. This disparate treatment seems unrelated to gender, however, because West Side's staff was approximately ninety-five percent female. Rueda Dep. at 157. While Carbajal may have unfairly singled out Rueda for discipline more frequently than other female employees, this does not show that West Side's rationale for firing Plaintiff was impermissibly based on gender. Additionally, though Rueda suggests that Carbajal would not have blocked her path during the January 18th incident had she been male, she does not adequately explain how this fact evidences discriminatory termination. Rueda Dep. at 147. Therefore, Carbajal's interaction with her on this particular occasion does not reveal pretext and Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion is granted
D. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
Defendants also contend that Plaintiff has not articulated a prima facie case for hostile work environment sexual harassment. To succeed in this claim under Title VII, Plaintiff must prove: 1) she is a member of a protected group; 2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; 3) a causal relationship between the harassment and her membership in the protected group; 4) the harassment affected a term or condition of her employment and; 5) "the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action." Meriwether v. Caraustar Packaging Co., 326 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (quotingJacob-Mua v. Veneman. 289 F.3d 517, 522 (8th Cir. 2002)).
Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment because she has not shown that the alleged harassment affected a term or condition of her employment, element four. To fulfill her burden under this element, Plaintiff must prove that the circumstances of her employment rose to the level of a hostile work environment, as viewed from both an objective and a subjective perspective. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). A hostile work environment is one that "is permeated with `discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Id at 21. Its existence is determined by the totality of the circumstances, which "may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it interferes with an employee's work performance." Id at 23; see Howard v. Burns Bros., 149 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir. 1998). Because Title VII is not intended to impose a "general civility code" in the workplace, isolated incidents are usually not actionable. Faragher v. City of Boca Ratoa 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (internal quotation omitted);see also Meriwether. 326 F.3d at 993. However, if sufficiently severe and extreme, individual occurrences can amount to harassment.See Hathaway v. Runyon. 132 F.3d 1214, 1223 (8th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiffs allegations, even taken as true, do not reveal a hostile work environment. Rueda's most serious allegations of harassment concern the January 18, 2001 incident where Carbajal blocked her way after she said that she could not complete her review that evening. However, though Carbajal's behavior, if true, may have been unnecessarily aggressive, it does not constitute Title Vn sexual harassment based on an objective standard. As noted in Faragher. single, isolated occurrences do not create a hostile work environment unless they are grossly inappropriate. See 524 U.S. at 788. Rueda was intimidated when Carbajal blocked her way and later felt uncomfortable being around him, but Carbajal did not attempt to make physical contact with her during the encounter. Rueda Dep. at 68-70, 75-76. Additionally, Rueda does not provide sufficient evidence showing that the incident was sexual in nature, or that it affected her work performance. While she refused to attend a performance review with Carbajal after January 18th, Rueda seemed hesitant to participate even before this date, as she had not completed the self-evaluation form required for the review. Id at 53-57. Her spotty attendance, tardiness, and abuse of phone privileges also predate that January 18th confrontation. Brehm Aff. ¶ 9; Carbajal Aff. ¶¶ 5, 10, Exs. 1, 4; Smith Aff. ¶¶ 8-10. Further, Rueda states that she and Carbajal had a preexisting personality conflict. Rueda Dep. at 119-20. Given the totality of the circumstances, Plaintiff has not proven that the incident, by itself, created a hostile working environment.
Rueda's other allegations of harassment similarly fail to establish a claim. She contends that Carbajal stared at female employees' breasts and asked her overly personal questions about her family, such as how her children were doing. However, she never reported this behavior or asked him to stop. Id. at 70-71. She also claims that Carbajal leaned over her to pick up office supplies on her desk, and that he stood behind her in the operator station, waiting to speak to her while she finished phone calls. Id. at 87-88, 151. Carbajal's actions, though perhaps irritating and insensitive, fall short of being the pervasive harassment required for a hostile work environment claim. See Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 933-34 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff did not establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim though defendant touched her hands, told her that he wanted a sexual relationship, asked plaintiff to draw a sexually suggestive planter, requested that she type a draft of beliefs of the "He-Men Women Hater's Club," and put up a poster depicting plaintiff as president of the "Man Hater's Club"). Because Plaintiff does not prove that the alleged sexual harassment affected a term or condition of her employment, she has not established a prima facie case. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.
D. Retaliation
Defendants' final argument in their Motion for Summary Judgment is that Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for retaliation. Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he [the employee] has opposed any practice made unlawful by this subchapter. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3a. To maintain a reprisal discrimination claim, Plaintiff must prove the following elements: 1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct; 2) she suffered an adverse employment action; 3) the adverse action was causally linked to the protected activity. See Kipp v. Mo. Highway Transp. Comm'a 280 F.3d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 2002); Kiel v. Select Artifacts. Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999). In proving causation, normally "more than a temporal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action is required to present a genuine factual issue on retaliation." Kiel 169 F.3d at 1136.
Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie claim. Plaintiff meets element one because reporting the alleged gender harassment she suffered during the January 18th incident is statutorily protected conduct. She also satisfies element two because she suffered adverse employment actions. She was suspended for a week, not given a raise, and eventually fired on March 7, 2001. However, Rueda never links these events to the discrimination and therefore does not prove element three. First, Plaintiff did not report any harassment until after January 18th. West Side was concerned about Plaintiffs poor work performance prior to this date, as evidenced from the verbal warnings Rueda received starting in the fall of 2000 and the disciplinary plan West Side initiated on January 4, 2001. Carbajal Aff. Ex. 1; Rueda Dep. at 44-45. Second, Plaintiff herself admits that she knows of no facts that connect her complaints about Carbajal to her suspension, lack of raise or termination. Rueda Dep. at 158. Third, while West Side terminated Plaintiffs employment less than two months after she reported Carbajal's behavior, timing alone usually does not prove causation. See Kiel 169 F.3d at 1136. Because Plaintiff provides scant evidence linking the adverse employment actions she faced to a protected activity, she does not establish a prima facie reprisal case.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff also contends that West Side did not rearrange the configuration of her office at her request, so that she would not have to walk by Carbajal. This refusal does not constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII, as it is not a material employment disadvantage such as a change in salary, benefits or responsibilities. See Williams v. City of Kansas City. Mo., 223 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiffs reliance on the Memorandum of Findings from the St. Paul Department of Human Rights, which finds probable cause that West Side violated St. Paul Human Rights Ordinance Section 183.10 by taking reprisal actions against her, does not satisfy her production burden for establishing a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim. The Court must make an independent assessment of Plaintiff's claims, and is not bound by the Department's findings. See Johnson v. Yellow Bird Freight Sys. Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that administrative findings regarding discrimination should be reviewed de novo by the trial court). See also Goldberg v. B. Green Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir. 1988) (granting summary judgment to employer in age discrimination case despite probable cause finding of discrimination by state human relations commission because employee failed to establish prima facie claim).
Even assuming that Rueda presents a prima facie claim, West Side provides legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons that justify her suspension, lack of raise, and termination. First, West Side suspended Plaintiff in February 2001 because her work performance problems continued and because she did not comply with the January 4, 2001 disciplinary plan. Carbajal Aff. Ex. 3. Second, Rueda was not eligible to receive a raise, regardless of her review, because she was on a disciplinary action plan that had started on January 4, 2001, before she reported harassment. Finally, West Side eventually terminated Rueda on March 7, 2001, because her absenteeism and insubordination continued, and because she violated the provisions of both discipline plans.Id. Ex. 4.
In response, Plaintiff offers little evidence proving that these reasons are pretextual. Rueda simply has not shown that West Side began treating her differently after she reported harassment. While she contends that Carbajal falsified her time records, and disagrees that she had attendance problems, West Side's concern about her behavior predates the January 18th incident. Carbajal Aff. Ex. 1; Rueda Dep. at 44-45. The pattern of conduct that led to a suspension, lack of raise, and termination began well before Rueda engaged in a protected activity.Id.: Brehm Aff. ¶ 9; Carbajal Aff. ¶¶ 5, 10, Exs. 1, 4; Smith Aff. ¶¶ 5, 8-10. The evidence strongly suggests that Defendants did not retaliate against her, and that their proffered reasons are legitimate and nondiscriminatory. See Clearwater v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 166. 231 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff had not demonstrated pretext where she had a history of poor work performance). Therefore, because Plaintiff fails to show that West Side's explanation for its employment decisions is pretextual, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for Rueda's retaliation claim is granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 9] is GRANTED and,
2. Plaintiffs Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.