Opinion
Case No. 01-6354-CJV-UNGARO-BENAGES
February 5, 2002
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 3, 2001.
THE COURT has considered the Motion, the pertinent portions of the record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. On May 10, 2001, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint alleging three counts of discrimination and retaliation. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges the County denied him the same contract rights it affords to non-white employees and his right to free speech by demoting him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges the County discriminated against him because of his race, national origin and in retaliation when he was demoted from Field Training Supervisor to sergeant, and from sergeant to police officer in violation of Title VII. Count III alleges the same facts in Count II and also that the County took this action because of his marital status in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
BACKGROUND
The following material facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmovant herein.
The Court notes that pursuant to Local Rule 7.5, all facts stated in Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts that Plaintiff has not specifically controverted are deemed undisputed for the purposes of this Motion.
Plaintiff Bryan Rudy, a white, non-Hispanic male, was hired by the Miami-Dade Police Department ("Department") in 1984 as a police officer. Pla.'s Depo. at 9. He was promoted to Corporal in July 1992, Sergeant in September 1993, and Police Field Training Sergeant in March 1994. Id.
A. "Collars For Dollars" Scandal
In July 1997, The Miami Herald ("the Herald") ran a series of articles entitled "Collars for Dollars." Def.'s Ex. 1. The articles accused several County and City of Miami police officers of inflating their overtime pay by listing themselves and their friends as witnesses to driving under the influence ("DUI") arrests even though they did little or nothing significant during the arrest process. The scheme involved arrests that took place primarily on the midnight shift. Once on the witness list, the officers would be subpoenaed to appear in court during normal business hours, entitling them to a minimum of two hours of overtime pay each time they were called. Id. Plaintiff and his wife Catherine Jimenez Rudy, also a County police officer, were named in the articles. Id.; Pla's Depo. at 39-42.
B. County Investigation
Miami-Dade Police Department Director Carlos Alvarez ("Director Alvarez" or "Alvarez")) filed a formal complaint based on the Herald's allegations with the Department's internal affairs section. Pla.'s Depo. at 52. Internal affairs conducted an investigation of approximately sixty-seven officers, including formal interviews of the officers involved, review of dozens of DUI cases, and consultation with the State Attorney's Office. Id.; Alvarez Depo. at 31. The investigation resulted in recommendations for the discipline of over thirty officers, including Plaintiff and his wife. Def.'s Ex. 3. The Panel found there was "clear evidence that Sergeant Rudy failed to exercise supervisory control or caused excessive staffing to participate in the processing of nine different DUI cases. These nine separate omissions and commissions caused excessive overtime to be expended in the prosecution of all nine cases reviewed." Def.'s Ex. 2, March 27, 1998 Memorandum from Disposition Panel Chairperson to Major Robert Parker at 7.
Director Alvarez testified that he did not request that anyone in particular be investigated, but rather that the Miami Lakes District be investigated for a pattern of overtime abuse. Alvarez Depo. at 25.
After internal affairs sustains or discharges charges, the cases are turned over to the officers' supervisors to draft a Disciplinary Action Report ("DAR") and recommendation as to discipline. Pla.'s Depo. at 32. In Plaintiffs case, Lieutenant Margo White (black female) and Lieutenant James Dautel (white male) drafted his DAR. Id. at 33. After the supervisor writes out the DAR, the director issues the discipline. Id. at 34-35.
Plaintiff believes White's supervisors told her how to draft his DAR. Pla.'s Depo. at 33-34. Plaintiff, however, does not allege that she said anything offensive to him and he did not explain how she was influenced. Id. The Court will not further address this conclusory and unsupported allegation.
On April 29, 1998, Director Alvarez demoted Plaintiff from sergeant to police officer for the violations enumerated in the DAB. signed by Plaintiff on April 24, 1998. Id. at 9, 54. According to Director Alvarez, Plaintiff was disciplined because there were nine cases sustained against him. Alvarez Depo. at 19. Plaintiff stated that of the officers investigated, he probably was accused of the highest number of incidents and charges in his DAR. Pla's Depo. at 56-57.
Major Parker and Captain Robert Otero decided Sergeant Derek Tillman, a black male, would replace Plaintiff as Field Training Supervisor. Parker's Depo. at 27; Otero's Depo. at 39, 46. A vacancy for this position was not posted and Tillman was not interviewed prior to being given the assignment. Tiliman Depo. at 17-20. According to Otero, Tillman was placed in the position because "he was available, had a history of training in that area and was very well qualified." Otero Depo. at 39. Plaintiff believes race was a factor because Tillman was not interviewed for the position and Plaintiff was more qualified. Pla.'s Depo. at 98, 120, 122.
Of the persons disciplined, nine (four Hispanic and five white) received records of counseling, fourteen received written reprimands (seven Hispanic, six white, and one black), and ten received suspensions (seven Hispanic, two white and one other). Five persons were reduced to the rank of officer, one Hispanic corporal and four white sergeants, including Rudy and his wife. Valdes Affidavit ¶ 5; Pla.'s Depo. at 92. Catherine Rudy's demotion was later reduced to a ten-day suspension as part of a settlement. Pla's Depo. at 90-91. Sergeant Beenken's (white male) demotion was rescinded in connection with his retirement. Id. at 91. As a result, only three persons were ultimately demoted, Plaintiff, Sergeant Gregory Horton (white male), and Corporal David Jaramillo (Hispanic male). Id. at 92; Def.'s Ex. 3.
According to Edmundo Valdes, the Commander of the Personnel Management Bureau for the Miami-Dade Police Department, the level of discipline for each officer was based on the number of sustained allegations of past misconduct, the seriousness of the offences, the nature of the employee's duties and the officer's past record. Valdes Affidavit ¶ 5. Alvarez testified that "a determination was made that if you were not a sergeant at the time [of the scandal] . . . a demotion would be inappropriate." Alvarez Depo. at 26.
C. Decision to Demote Plaintiff from Sergeant to Police Officer by an Independent Hearing Examiner and the County Manager
Plaintiff appealed his demotion from sergeant to police officer to an independent hearing examiner assigned by the American Arbitration Association in accordance with Section 2-47 of the County Code. Pla.'s Depo. at 35-36, 58-59; Def.'s Ex. 5. The examiner, Evan J. Langbein, conducted an adversary administrative proceeding. Def's Ex. 6 American Arbitration Association Hearing Examiner's Report ("AAA Report") dated May 12, 1999 at 1-2. The County had the burden to prove each of the charges against Plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 10; Pla.'s Depo. at 59. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, the County's witnesses were subject to cross-examination, and Plaintiff was given the opportunity to testify and present his own witnesses. Def.'s Ex. 6 at 1; Pla's Depo. at 60. The hearing took four days. Def's Ex. 6. After the hearing, the examiner received a copy of the transcript and issued a report and recommendation on May 12, 1999. Id. at 2. The examiner found that Plaintiff had violated County rules and recommended that his demotion be sustained. Id. at 10-13. He wrote:
The Hearing Examiner concludes from the credible evidence adduced by the County that the Employee either knew or should have known that he and others named on police documents of the nine (9) arrests at issue were unnecessary and irrelevant witnesses to the DUI arrests made. The employee either acted in bad faith by collecting unnecessary overtime pay in certain cases or allowed other police officers under his supervision and control to receive excessive amounts of overtime compensation.Id. at 13.
The hearing examiner's report and the entire record of the hearing were forwarded to the County Manager for review and a final decision. Pla's Depo. at 36, 63; Def.'s Ex. 7, July 14, 1999 Letter from County Manager Merrett R. Stierheim to Bryan Rudy. Based on that report and the record, the County Manager decided to uphold Plaintiffs demotion. Def's Ex. 7. Plaintiff does not assert that either the hearing examiner or the County manager were prejudiced against because of his race, national origin, or marital status. Pla's Depo. at 37-38, 64-65.
In accordance with § 2-47.1 of the County Code, Plaintiff had the right to appeal the Manager's decision to the appellate division of the state circuit court. Def.'s Ex. 10. He chose not to appeal. Pla.'s Depo. at 65.
D. Decision to Demote Plaintiff from Field Training Sergeant to Sergeant Upheld by Binding Arbitration
In August and October 1997, Plaintiff filed two grievances with the County regarding changes in his shift and assignments as a result of the "Collars for Dollars" investigation. Pla.'s Depo. at 67-69; Def's Exs. 11-12. He complained that the Department violated the collective bargaining agreement with his union, the Police Benevolent Association ("PBA"), by depriving him of his assignment as a Field Training Supervisor and taking him off the midnight shift. Pla.'s Depo. at 69. The Department denied the grievances, and the PBA took them to final and binding arbitration with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Id. The arbitration was selected jointly by the County and the PBA in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association. Def.'s Ex. 13 at 1. At the arbitration hearing held on July 16, 1998, Plaintiffs counsel called witness, including Plaintiff, cross-examined the County's witness and presented evidence. Pla.'s Depo. at 71-72. On October 29, 1998, the arbitrator issued an opinion rejecting Plaintiffs and the PBA's contentions that Defendant violated the collective bargaining agreement when it changed Plaintiffs assignments and shifts, and concluded that the Department acted within its managerial authority and for legitimate reasons. Id. at 72. Neither Plaintiff nor the PBA took any action to vacate the award. Id. at 71, 73-74. Plaintiff offers no evidence that the arbitrator was prejudiced against him because of his race, national origin, marital status or protected activity. Id. at 71, 72.
Plaintiff also filed two charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and one charge with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Id. at 74. On September 19, 2000, the EEOC issued a letter of determination finding "reasonable cause to believe a violation of [Title VII] has occurred" with respect to Plaintiffs demotion from Field Training Supervisor to Uniform Patrol Sergeant. Pla.'s Depo. at 85; Pla.'s Ex. 7.
In the charge filed October 8, 1997 with the EEOC, Plaintiff complained about race discrimination that took place on September 6, 1997, when he was demoted from Field Training Supervisor to sergeant. Pla.'s Depo. 74. In March or April 1999, Plaintiff filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC after he was passed over for a promotion to lieutenant. Id. at 77.
E. Disparate Treatment
Plaintiff claims he was discriminated against because of the many officers on the midnight shift "who did the same thing," the County only investigated and demoted white male and female sergeants. Pla.'s Depo. at 101-03. Plaintiff specifically points to Pablo Lima and Sergeant Juan Franqui, two allegedly similarly situated sergeants. Id. at 37. According to Plaintiff, Lima was on his and Sergeant Horton's witness lists for DUI arrests. Id. at 101. Although Plaintiff and Sergeant Horton had charges sustained against them, the charges against Lima were only sustained on Plaintiffs cases. Unlike Plaintiff and Horton, Lima was not demoted. The total number of incidents sustained against Lima, however, was less than the number of allegations sustained against Plaintiff. Id. at 81.
Lima was not a sergeant during the entire time frame investigated by the County.
None of the allegations against Franqui was sustained. Pla.'s Depo. at 82.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that if he had not married Catherine Rudy, another Miami-Dade police officer, he would not have been investigated and neither he nor his wife would have been demoted. Pla.'s Resp. at 14.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is authorized only when the moving party meets its burden of demonstrating that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The Adickes Court explained that when assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the court should view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157; Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551, 553 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Adickes).
The party opposing the motion may not simply rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings; after the moving party has met its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir. 1989).
If the record presents factual issues, the Court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5th Cir. 1981). Summary judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the inferences that should be drawn from these facts. See Lighting Fixture Elec. Supply Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir. 1969). If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts then the Court should deny summary judgment. See Impossible Electronic Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Sys., Inc., 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) ("[T]he dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.").
Moreover, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not respond to it with evidence unless and until the movant has properly supported the motion with sufficient evidence. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160. The moving party must demonstrate that the facts underlying all the relevant legal questions raised by the pleadings or otherwise are not in dispute, or else summary judgment will be denied notwithstanding that the non-moving party has introduced no evidence whatsoever. See Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 611-12 (5th Cir. 1967). The Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Title VII prohibits discrimination in hiring, discharge, and promotion in employment on the basis of race, sex, or national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and prohibits retaliation against an employee who engages in protected activity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. Fla. Stat. § 760.10 (2001).
In order to prevail on a claim for discrimination, a Plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that the defendant acted with "discriminatory intent." See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Richardson v. Leeds Police Dep't, 71 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff can prove discriminatory intent through either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990). Direct evidence is "evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence of discrimination without inference or presumption." Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581-82 (11th Cir. 1989)). "Direct evidence relates to actions or statements of an employer reflecting a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or retaliation complained of by the employee." Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1555 (11th Cir. 1990)). "For statements of discriminatory intent to constitute direct evidence of discrimination, they must be made by a person involved in the challenged decision." Trotter v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 91 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276-77 (1989)). See e.g., Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 873-74 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding direct evidence of racial discrimination when a plant manager stated that he would not hire blacks because "half of them weren't worth a shit").
Although Plaintiff claims he has produced direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the Court disagrees. In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that Captain Robert Otero said to him in the parking lot of the Miami Lakes District station, "I file too many grievances, not only am I going to lose the battle but the war." Pla.'s Depo. at 15-18. According to Plaintiff, Captain Otero was referring to his hostile work environment grievance filed on July 29, 1997. Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, this statement is not a blatant and unambiguous discriminatory remark from which discrimination can be found without the aid of an inference. Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.2d 1257, 67 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding statements did not constitute direct evidence of race and sex discrimination because of the differing inferences that could be drawn from them). Furthermore, although Plaintiff alleges Captain Otero was involved in Plaintiffs disciplinary action report, Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that Otero was a person involved in the decisions to demote Plaintiff. Trotter, 91 F.3d at 1453-54.
Additionally, in his Response Memorandum, Plaintiff argues the chart showing only white sergeants have been demoted since 1997 is direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Pla.'s Ex. 1. The Court does not agree. The chart does not "prove the existence of discrimination without inference or presumption." Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1997). Likewise, Plaintiffs assertion that similarly situated Hispanic sergeants were involved in the same conduct, but not investigated or demoted is not direct evidence. Pla.'s Response in Opposition to Motion at 4 ("Pla's Resp."). This is circumstantial evidence and will be addressed below.
To succeed in proving intentional discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Florida's Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a discriminatory animus towards him (2) an alteration in the terms and conditions of his employment by the employer, and (3) a causal link between the two. Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1246 (11th Cir. 1998)). Similarly, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) statutorily protected expression, (2) adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the two. Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, 922 F.2d 1515, 1524 (11th Cir. 1991). To prove causation in the retaliation context, a plaintiff needs to show "that the protected activity and the adverse action are not completely unrelated." Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Intern., 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994).
The legal standards which govern Plaintiffs Title VII claims also govern his claims under § 1983 and the Florida Civil Rights Act, which arise out of the same facts. See Cross v. State of Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1508 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that when § 1983 is used as a parallel remedy for violation of Title VII, the elements of the two causes of action are the same); Florida Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bryant, 586 So.2d 1205, 1209 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1991).
In this case, there is no question that the Plaintiffs demotions altered the terms and conditions of his employment. Although the Court has reservations about Plaintiffs disparate treatment evidence, it is unnecessary to address this issue because even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that Director Alvarez, Major Parker and Captain Otero (collectively "supervisors") harbored a discriminatory animus towards him, the causal link between the animus and his demotions is broken by the decisions of the independent hearing examiner, the County Manager, and the arbitrator. See Stimpson, 186 F.3d at 1331.
Plaintiff argues that he would not have been singled out for demotion if the Defendant had investigated the practice of listing witnesses and not limited its investigation to the acts of a few white sergeants. Pla.'s Resp. at 17. Additionally, Plaintiff contends he would not have been investigated and neither he nor his wife would have been demoted if they were not married. Id. at 14. Pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Stimpson. the motivations of Plaintiffs supervisors in determining the scope of the "Collars for Dollars" investigation and enforcing the County's polices with respect to listing witnesses on DUI arrests are not determinative. "When the biased recommender and the actual decisionmaker are not the same person or persons, a plaintiff may not benefit from the inference of causation that would arise from their common identity. Instead, the plaintiff must prove that the discriminatory animus behind the recommendation, and not the underlying employee misconduct identified in the recommendation, was an actual cause of the other party's decision to terminate the employee." Stimpson, 186 F.3d at 1331 (citing Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1248).
Additionally, Plaintiff relies on the "cat's paw" theory to prove the discriminatory animus affected the hearing examiner's, the County Manager's and the arbitrator's decisions to change his assignment and shift, and demote him. "The cat's paw theory provides that causation may be established if the plaintiff shows that the decisionmaker followed the biased recommendation without independently investigating the complaint against the employee." Stimpson, 186 F.3d at 1332. In this regard, Plaintiff claims that because Director Alvarez only authorized investigations of white sergeants, and the hearing officer, County Manager, and arbitrator were a mere conduit to place the discriminatory animus into effect. Pla's Resp. at 18.
Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that Director Alvarez only investigated white sergeants.
Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the hearing examiner, the County Manager, or the arbitrator were "a cat's paw" for the allegedly biased recommendations of Plaintiff's supervisors. Although his supervisors had the power to discipline and demote Plaintiff, once Plaintiff appealed, the supervisors' decisions became a mere recommendation and the hearing officer, the County Manager and the arbitrator were the ultimate and sole decisionmakers. See Hodges v. Miami-Dade County, Case No. 98-0971-CIV-JORDAN (S.D. Fla. March 29, 2000). On each appeal of his demotions, the hearing examiner and the arbitrator held an evidentiary hearing, and Plaintiff presented witnesses and evidence in support of his claim that he did not engage in misconduct. Based on the evidence presented, the hearing examiner recommended to the County Manager that Plaintiff's demotion be sustained and the arbitrator determined that the County did not violate the PBA's collective bargaining unit by changing Plaintiff's shift and assignment. Even assuming that the arbitrator, hearing examiner and County Manager knew of Plaintiff's EEOC complaints or of his marital status, Plaintiff has failed to show that the alleged discriminatory animus behind his supervisors' recommendations, and not his own misconduct, was the actual cause of the decisions to discipline and demote him. Id.; Ezell Robinson v. Miami-Dade County, Case No. 91-3574-CIV-KING (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2001); Howard v. Miami-Dade County, Case No. 99-1760-CIV-HUCK (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2001). For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the County's decisions to demote him were a pretext for race, national origin or marital discrimination, and has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
Lastly, Plaintiff contends the EEOC's Letter of Determination is admissible as a "finding of fact by the EEOC that the Defendant demoted the Plaintiff because of unlawful violation" and should weigh "heavily in the Plaintiffs favor." Pla's Resp. at 19-20. Plaintiffs argument is unavailing. The "district court must make the admissibility determination on an individual basis, considering the evidence's probative value and the danger of unfair prejudice." Lathem v. Department of Children and Youth Servs., 172 F.3d 786, 791-92 (11th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the Court considers whether the report "contains legal conclusions in addition to its factual content." Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 649 (11th Cir. 1990).
The Letter of Determination sought to be introduced as evidence in this action consists of six paragraphs. The first and second paragraphs briefly address the charge and the procedural requirements for the filing of the charge. The third and fourth paragraphs address the issue of racial discrimination alleged in this action. The last two paragraphs outline the procedures in the event settlement through the conciliation process is not forthcoming. The conclusions of the EEOC contained in paragraphs three and four read as follows:
The record of evidence failed to show incidents whereby Charging Party failed to follow departmental procedures. In fact, Charging Party had an exemplary record with the Department until the transfer of Major Parker, whom is Black, to the Miami Lakes District where he worked. Records show Major Parker failed to follow standard operating procedures when he removed Charging Party from the position of Field Training Supervisor and had him replaced with a less Senior Black Sergeant, who he had handpicked himself
I have determined that the evidence obtained during the investigation establishes there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the statute has occurred.
Pla.'s Ex. 7. The Court finds this letter is conclusory and, therefore, has little probative value. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(8). The letter does not outline the evidence upon which it relies for its conclusions that "there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the statute has occurred." In this regard, the letter does not cite to any specific evidentiary basis to support its findings or conclusion. Furthermore, the record on which the letter relies was not made available to the Court. See Lee v. Executive Airlines, 31 F. Supp.2d 1355, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1998). "Absent providing any details or otherwise describe `the evidence' relied upon, the Letter of Determination possesses minimal probative value." Id. (citations omitted).
Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiff's representations, the EEOC did not make a finding of fact that the Defendant demoted Plaintiff because of his race. Rather, the EEOC investigator concluded "there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the statute has occurred." Pla's Ex. 7, Letter of Determination at 1. This finding of "reasonable cause" is materially different than Plaintiff's interpretation.
Finally, without any evidentiary basis for the legal conclusions, it would be difficult for a jury to evaluate the evidence in their role as finders of fact. It is possible that a jury would attach undue weight to the "authoritative and personalized conclusions of the EEOC inspector, thus creating unfair prejudice." Lee, 31 F. Supp.2d at 1358 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court finds that the letter should also be excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 403. Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that the Letter of Determination is admissible as "extensive evidence of discrimination." Pla's Resp. at 20.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the independent hearing examiner's, County Manager's and arbitrator's decisions to demote him or change his shift and assignment were a pretext for race, national origin or marital discrimination or in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the County's motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff's claims in Counts I, II, and III is GRANTED.