Opinion
No. 7:0l-CV-126-R
March 14, 2002
ORDER
Came on this day to be considered Defendants' motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff's response thereto, and the Court finds and orders as follows:
Plaintiff is an inmate confined in the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Iowa Park, Texas. Defendants are officers at the Alfred Unit. Rudd claims that, on May 19, 2001 at approximately 10:40p.m., Defendants hand cuffed him, escorted him to a hallway and brutally beat him causing serious physical injury for the purpose of retaliating against him for his activities in filing grievances against Defendants. Complaint ¶ V. Plaintiff further claims that Defendants threatened to kill him "next time." Id. Upon preliminary screening, the Court determined that Plaintiff had alleged a set of facts that could form an arguable basis of liability wider 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the two named Defendants, Roger Holloway and Richard Williams. Process was issued and Defendants filed their answer.
State prisoners have a constitutional right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from unnecessary beatings by prison guards. See Oliver v. Collins, 904 F.2d 278. 281 (5th Cir. 1990); El'Amin v. Pearce, 750 F.2d 829, 832 (10th Cir. 1984); McKenzie v. State of Wis. Dep't of Corrections, 138 F.R.D. 554, 555 (E.D. Wis. 1991). Additionally, prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right such as seeking redress for perceived wrongs through a prison grievance process or through the courts. E.g. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 800 (1996); Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1975 (1986).
In the case at bar, Defendants seek summary judgment by arguing that they were not on duty at the time Plaintiff claims to have been attacked and, therefore, they could not have been involved in the alleged attack. In support of the motion, Defendant Roger Holloway has submitted his affidavit stating that he was not involved in a use of force incident with Plaintiff, that he was not assigned to work in administrative segregation where Plaintiff was housed on May 19, 2001 and that he worked the first shift and left the prison at 6:30 p.m. when his shift ended, four hours prior to Plaintiff's alleged assault. Defendants' Appendix to Motion for Summary Judgment, Appendice 2. The verified personnel records submitted by Defendants support Holloway's assertions that, on May 19, 2001, he worked in the high security area of the Allred Unit rather than administrative segregation where Plaintiff was confined and that he worked the first shift which ended at 6:30 p.m. Id. at Appendices 4-6. (Plaintiff claims to have been beaten at approximately 10:40p.m.). Similarly, Defendant Richard Williams has submitted an affidavit and verified personnel documents supporting his claim that he did not work and was not present at the Alfred Unit on May 19, 2001. Id. at Appendices 3-6.
In response to Defendants' motion Plaintiff claims that both Defendants are permanently assigned to work in administrative segregation, that Holloway has worked the second shift in administrative segregation for over two years and that Williams was present at the Alfred Unit on May 19, 2001 whether on duty or off. Plaintiff's Declaration in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment pp. 1-2. Plaintiff claims that the affidavits and records are false, fabricated and incorrect. Id. at pp. 2-3. In support of his arguments, Plaintiff has submitted affidavits of four fellow inmates. Jeremy Dean states that he witnessed the assault on Rudd by Defendants on May 19, 2001 at approximately 10:40 p.m. Id. at Appendice 2. Willie Pruitt states that he also witnessed the assault on Rudd. Id. at Appendice 2. Louis Estrada states that on May 19, 2001, at approximately 10:00 p.m., both Defendants were at the Allred Unit. Id. At Appendice 3. And finally, Charles Taylor states that, like Dean and Pruitt, he witnessed that attack on Rudd. Id. at Appendice 4.
Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings and evidence illustrate that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (c); Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986)). Substantive law provides that an issue is "material" if it involves a fact that right effect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994).
Summary judgment evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); Rosado v. Deters, 5 P.34 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1993). In addition, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant, but only when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts, thus creating an actual controversy. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cit. 1994) (en banc).
In making its determination on the motion, the Court looks at the full record including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits. Fed. K. Civ. P. 56(c); Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). However, "the [Court's] function is not f] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The movant's motion for summary judgment will be granted only if he meets his burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1992).
In the instant case, genuine issues of material fact remain with regard to Plaintiff's allegations that he was beaten by Defendants for retaliatory purposes.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.