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dismissing complaint seeking review of garnishment of disability benefit payments for child support based on Rooker-Feldman doctrine
Summary of this case from Mapp v. San Diego Cnty.Opinion
No. C 02-5981 JSW.
June 17, 2003.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING ACTION FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Now before the Court is pro se plaintiff Harold Rucker's ("Rucker's") Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, and 1986. Having carefully reviewed Rucker's papers and considered his arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES Rucker's application to proceed in forma pauperis and DISMISSES Rucker's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because a federal district court has no authority to review final decisions of a state court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Rucker alleges that defendant County of Santa Clara, State of California ("Santa Clara County") and defendant Billie Ann Rucker, Rucker's ex-wife, violated his due process rights by issuing an invalid garnishment against his disability benefit payments for back child support owed to Santa Clara County. On March 18, 1983, Santa Clara County obtained a default child support order against Rucker in the amount of $125.00 per month per child (totaling $250.00 per month) commencing January 27, 1979. Between 1983 and 2001, Rucker failed to comply with the child support order and fell into arrears.
On September 4, 2001, the Santa Clara County Superior Court ordered garnishment of Rucker's disability benefit payments in the amount of $250 per month. Pursuant to California Family Code section 5246, Rucker filed a Claim of Exemption and a Request for Hearing Regarding Wage and Earnings Assignment. On March 28, 2002, the Santa Clara County Superior Court denied Rucker's Claim of Exemption. On December 31, 2002, Rucker filed this action for injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, and 1986, together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis.
ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Is Denied.
The court properly grants leave to proceed in forma pauperis when a plaintiff has demonstrated poverty and presents a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(A), (B)(ii). Under the federal in forma pauperis statute, the court may authorize commencement of an action without prepayment of the $150.00 filing fee required by the clerk of the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), 1915(a). To proceed in forma pauperis, the plaintiff must file an affidavit of poverty, stating in good faith that he is unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
Rucker has made a sufficient showing that he is unable to pay the costs of this lawsuit. In his affidavit of poverty submitted in support of this application to proceed in forma pauperis, Rucker declares that he was not employed at the time of this application. Rucker also declares a monthly income of $748.42, which consists solely of disability benefit payments and is less than his total monthly expenses for food, housing, utilities, and outstanding debts. However, because the Court has found that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Rucker's claims, the Court DENIES Rucker leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
II. Action Is Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, do not have subject matter jurisdiction to review errors allegedly committed by state courts. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) ("The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original."); D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) ("[A] United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings."). Instead, the proper court to obtain review of a final state court decision is the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies even when the state court judgment is not made by the highest state court, Dubinka v. Judges of the Super. Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1994); Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986); and when a plaintiff's challenge to the state court's actions involves federal constitutional issues. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court's jurisdiction to hear a particular constitutional challenge depends on whether the constitutional claim is "inextricably intertwined" with the state court's ruling in a state court action. Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 221 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16). If the constitutional claim presented to a district court is inextricably intertwined with the state court's decision, then the district court essentially is being called upon to review the state court decision. Id. The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if the relief requested requires "`a mere revision of the errors and irregularities, or of the legality and correctness' of the state court judgment, not the `investigation of a new case arising upon new facts.'" MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1987).
Rucker calls upon this Court to review the legality of the Santa Clara County Superior Court's order issuing a garnishment against his disability benefit payments. Rucker's constitutional challenges to the Santa Clara County Court's decision require review of the state court's decision rather than an investigation of new factual issues. Rucker challenges his original child support order on jurisdictional grounds, disputes his total child support arrearages, and alleges that Santa Clara County's garnishment order against his disability benefits payments is invalid. Thus, Rucker's claims are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court's ruling. See Feldman 460 U.S. at 284-85; Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 221.
This Court is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from exercising appellate review over state court decisions. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482. Accordingly, this Court must DISMISS Rucker's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3) (a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the parties "or otherwise" at any time); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (holding that when a court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its only remaining function is to declare that fact and dismiss the action).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Rucker's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and DISMISSES Rucker's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.