Opinion
No. CV 1-08-1424-JAT.
March 2, 2009
ORDER
Plaintiff Jarian Tarryl Roya, who is confined in the Deuel Vocational Institution in Tracy, California, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern District of California (Doc. # 1). In a September 23, 2008 Order, United States District Judge Phyllis Hamilton ordered the case transferred to the Fresno Division of this Court (Doc. # 4). This case was reassigned to the undersigned judge on November 25, 2008 (Doc. # 14). The Court will dismiss the Complaint and this action.
I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the action.See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) ( en banc). Plaintiff's Complaint will be dismissed without leave to amend because amendment will be futile.
II. Complaint
In his Complaint, Plaintiff names Judge Steffen Scott, defense attorney Mitchell Scott, and Stanislaus County as Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to a speedy trial his attorney sought and the judge granted a continuance in his criminal case. Plaintiff further claims that his defense attorney lied to the judge to obtain the continuance. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
III. Failure to State a Claim — Improper Defendants
A. Judge Steffen Scott
Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for damages for their judicial acts except when they are taken "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). An act is "judicial" when it is a function normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990).
This immunity attaches even if the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, Peirson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967), or of making grave errors of law or procedure. Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ammons v. Baldwin, 705 F.2d 1445, 1446-48 (11th Cir. 1983) (judge entitled to immunity from a claim that he verbally abused and humiliated plaintiff); Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 577-78 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, it is transparent that Plaintiff's complaint centers around acts for which Defendant Steffen Scott is entitled to judicial immunity. As a result, Steffen Scott will be dismissed.
B. Attorney Mitchell Scott
A prerequisite for any relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a showing that the defendant has acted under the color of state law. Whether an attorney representing a criminal defendant is a public defender, court-appointed counsel, or private counsel, he or she does not act under color of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981). Therefore, Plaintiff's civil rights claims against Scott must fail unless Plaintiff can set out facts showing a conspiracy between his counsel and state officials to deny him the right to adequate representation under the Sixth Amendment. However, to the extent he might be able to do so, Plaintiff's claim would be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994), because violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a criminal proceeding would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff's conviction. Accordingly, Mitchell Scott will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
C. Stanislaus County
Plaintiff has also named Stanislaus County on the face of his Complaint, but does not provide any facts to support his claim against it. A municipality may not be held liable unless its policy or custom caused the constitutional injury. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Thus, a municipality may not be sued solely because an injury was inflicted by one of its employees or agents. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Rather, the municipality is liable only when the execution of its policy or custom inflicts the constitutional injury. Id.; Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 868 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, a § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant "cannot succeed as a matter of law" unless the plaintiff: (1) contends that the municipal defendant maintains a policy or custom pertinent to the plaintiff's alleged injury; and (2) explains how such policy or custom caused the plaintiff's injury. Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of a municipal defendant pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)). Plaintiff has not alleged a policy or custom enacted by Stanislaus County that caused a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Therefore, Stanislaus County will also be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IV. Dismissal without Leave to Amend
Leave to amend need not be given if a complaint as amended is subject to dismissal. Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). Where amendment would be futile, there is no reason to prolong litigation by allowing further amendments. Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002); Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (futile amendments should not be permitted).
The Court finds that in light of Plaintiff claims against individuals who are absolutely immune from suit, any amendment would be futile. The Court will therefore dismiss the Complaint and this action without leave to amend.
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) The Complaint (Doc. # 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.
(2) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the dismissal for failure to state a claim counts as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).