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finding that the Court has the authority to order a time limit upon remand in a social security case
Summary of this case from Hinkley v. ColvinOpinion
Case No. 01-1088-JAR
September 18, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ADOPTING RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT
The Commissioner of Social Security denied Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under §§ 223 and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act ("Act"). Plaintiff sought review of the Administrative Law Judges's (ALJ) decision and the Honorable John Thomas Reid issued a Recommendation and Report (Doc. 21) which found that the case should be remanded pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judge Reid found that: at step two of the sequential evaluation process Plaintiff's mental impairments meet the de minimis standard and are "severe" within the meaning of the regulations and the Act; the step three findings are not subject to meaningful judicial review and must be remanded for the ALJ to set out specific findings whether Plaintiff's mental or physical impairments meet or equal a listing and to state his reasons for accepting or rejecting the evidence; the ALJ's credibility determination should be affirmed; and that remand is necessary for the ALJ to analyze all treating source opinions in accordance with the regulations and the standards contained in the Recommendation and Report. Judge Reid also found that because the case has been undergoing agency adjudication for over seven years and because the ALJ did not give proper consideration to the court's remand order after the first review, the Commissioner should be ordered to complete her proceedings on remand through and including a decision of the Appeals Council no later than four months after the date of the entry of judgment in this case, and the United States Attorney should be ordered to submit a report to this court regarding the Commissioner's compliance with this order within the same time frame. The matter is currently before the Court upon Defendant's Objection to the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. 22), and Plaintiff's Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 23).
The Recommendation and Report refers to the ALJ's decision at issue as "the second decision." Plaintiff constructively filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on February 13, 1995. The applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision (the first decision) on July 23, 1996 in which he found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review and Plaintiff filed an action for judicial review. The court found that the Commissioner erred and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's Recommendation and Report (the first review). On remand, the ALJ held hearings on January 31 and August 15, and issued a written decision on December 7, 2000 (the second decision). Thus, this Court's Memorandum and Order Adopting Recommendation and Report is the "second review."
The standards this Court must employ when reviewing objections to the recommendation and report are clear. Only those portions of the recommendation and report that have been specifically identified as objectionable will be reviewed. The review of those identified portions is de novo and the Court must "consider relevant evidence of record and not merely review the magistrate judge's recommendation."
See Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 2000); Gettings v. McKune, 88 F. Supp.2d 1205, 1211 (D.Kan. 2000).
See Griego v. Padilla, 64 F.3d 580, 584 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
The Defendant's only objection to the Recommendation and Report is to Judge Reid's order that the Defendant "complete her proceedings on remand through and including a decision of the Appeals Council no later than four months after the date of the entry of judgment in this case" and "that the United States Attorney be ordered to submit a report to this court regarding the Commissioner's compliance with this order no later than four months after the date of the entry of judgment in this case." Defendant argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to order a time-limited remand and subsequent report to the Court when remanding pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In support, the Defendant cites Smith v. Halter, Shalala v. Schaefer, Doughty v. Bowen, Heckler v. Day, and Huston v. Massanari.
246 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2001).
509 U.S. 292 (1993).
839 F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1988).
467 U.S. 104 (1984).
Case No. 98-1316-JTM (D.Kan. April 16, 2002).
In Heckler v. Day, the Supreme Court addressed the question of the validity of an injunction issued on behalf of a statewide class that requires the adjudication of all future disputed disability claims according to judicially established deadlines and to pay interim benefits in all cases of noncompliance with those deadlines. The Supreme Court ruled that federal courts cannot issue injunctions imposing deadlines with respect to future disability claims. The Supreme Court made it clear, however, that it was not precluding the proper use of injunctive relief to remedy individual violations of § 405(b). Thus, nothing in Heckler v. Day prohibits the relief set forth in Judge Reid's Recommendation and Report. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Doughty likewise does not prohibit the relief. In Doughty, the court was addressing the issue of whether a district court has sufficiently broad remedial powers under the legislative directives to direct payments of interim benefits when the individual has never been certified disabled and entitled to benefits. The court did not address the issue of deadlines for individual cases.
Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 105 (1984).
Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
Id. at 119, n. 33 (emphasis added).
See Barnett v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 17, 22 (2nd Cir. 1986) (finding that after Heckler v. Day, injunctive relief would still be an appropriate remedy for individual cases involving unreasonable delays, despite the fact that absolute periods of limitations applicable to all claims are now invalid); Crosby v. SSA, 796 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding that Day makes it clear that the determination of whether the right to a reasonably timely ALJ hearing and decision has been violated can be made only on a case-by-case basis); Guzzi v. Heckler, 617 F. Supp. 916, 917 (S.D.Fla. 1985) (finding that although the court cannot mandate across the board time limits by which the SSA must abide, it is within the court's power to direct the Office of Hearings and Appeals to give the plaintiff a de novo hearing within one hundred and twenty days from the date of the order); White v. Shalala, 1993 WL 498025, *1 (E.D.Pa. 1993) (holding that as to time-limited remands, injunctive relief is still an appropriate remedy for individual cases involving unreasonable delays); McClain v. Halter, 2001 W L 619177, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that where § 405(b) requires that administrative hearings be held within a reasonable time, imposing a time restriction on the Commissioner's determination on remand is a remedy flowing directly from the statute, merely guaranteeing the protections afforded by § 405(b)).
Doughty, 839 F.2d at 647.
The remaining cases cited by Defendant stand for the proposition that this Court loses jurisdiction when it remands the case pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). However, the issue before the Court is whether it has the authority to order a time-limit upon remand. The Court is not yet faced with the question of its jurisdiction to compel compliance with its order. Hopefully, the Defendant will comply with this Court's order and that issue will not arise. If it does, it will be addressed at that time. Other courts have suggested that the judgment may be vacated, that mandamus relief may be appropriate, or that the issue can be addressed by the claimant filing a new action. If this case does make it to a "third review," the Defendant's disregard for this Court's order will most likely be raised at that time. Plaintiff objects to the portions of the Recommendation and Report upholding the ALJ's credibility findings, the recommendations pertaining to Plaintiff's treating physicians, and the recommendation to remand for further proceedings rather than for payment of benefits. The Court has conducted a de novo review, considering the relevant evidence of record, and agrees with the Magistrate Judge's finding that the ALJ's credibility determination should be affirmed, and that remand is necessary for the ALJ to analyze all treating source opinions in accordance with the regulations and the standards contained in the Recommendation and Report.
See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705 (1979) (stating that "[w]hile the grant of injunctive relief makes the Secretary's duty to comply enforceable by contempt order, `[s]urely Congress did not intend § 205(g) to provide reluctant federal officials with a means of delay in the remote eventuality that they might not feel bound by the judgment of a federal court'") (citation omitted).
See Stoll v. Apfel, Case No. 99-1321-MLB (D.Kan. March 17, 2000) (holding that the remanded proceedings shall be completed through and including a decision of the Appeals Council, if any, no later than April 21, 2000, and if the deadline is not met, the court will issue a nunc pro tunc order vacating the order and awarding benefits without further notice); Richmond v. Chater, 94 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming decision where district judge entered a Rule 58 judgment then vacated that judgment to retain jurisdiction).
See Smith v. Halter, 246 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (8th Cir. 2001) (declining to address the propriety of mandamus relief where the claimant failed to seek such relief, but holding that the ruling did not prejudice the claimant from seeking a writ of mandamus in a subsequent action); See also, Mandamus, Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1361, To Compel Prompt Hearing In Appeal From Denial of Social Security Disability Benefits, 47 A.L.R. Fed. 929 (1980).
See Tucunango v. Sullivan, 810 F. Supp. 103, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (acknowledging the need for oversight and prior decisions finding the Secretary in contempt for failing to obey remand order, and noting that if plaintiff loses the protection of the court's power to assure that its prior mandate is effectuated, plaintiff would be compelled to file a new action to obtain interim relief and would have to refile if he did not prevail administratively).
Defendant's and Plaintiff's objections are overruled and the Court accepts the April 17, 2002 Recommendation and Report and adopts it as its own.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Objection to the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. 22) shall be OVERRULED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 23) shall be OVERRULED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that case be remanded pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings in accordance with this Memorandum and Order Adopting Recommendation and Report.
IT IS SO ORDERED.