Opinion
No. 4:19-cv-00256-JAJ-SBJ
2019-12-11
Susan ROWE, Christine M. Kleiber, Tammy D. Burden, Julie A. Schropp, and Stacey L. Good, Plaintiffs, v. Kimberly Kay REYNOLDS, in her official capacity as Governor State of Iowa, James M. Kurtenbach, in his official capacity with Iowa Department of Administrative Services; and the State of Iowa, Defendants.
Bruce H. Stoltze, Bruce H. Stoltze, Jr., John Quentin Stoltze, Stoltze & Stoltze, PLC, Christopher A. Kragnes, Kragnes & Associates PC, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs. Molly McConville Weber, Iowa Attorney General, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.
Bruce H. Stoltze, Bruce H. Stoltze, Jr., John Quentin Stoltze, Stoltze & Stoltze, PLC, Christopher A. Kragnes, Kragnes & Associates PC, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs.
Molly McConville Weber, Iowa Attorney General, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JOHN A. JARVEY, Chief Judge
This action to recover overtime wages pursuant to state and federal law is before the court on the plaintiff's September 13, 2019, Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 5] seeking judgment on the defendants' affirmative defense of sovereign immunity. The defendants filed their Resistance [Dkt. No. 9] on October 4, 2019, and the plaintiffs filed their Reply [Dkt. No. 10] on October 11, 2019. For the reasons stated below, the plaintiffs' September 13, 2019, Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 5] is GRANTED .
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Factual Background
The defendants have admitted all of the allegations in the plaintiffs' Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts In Support Of Partial Summary Judgment. See Defs.' Resp. To Pls.' Stmt. of Mat. Facts [Dkt. No. 9-1]. The defendants also have not asserted that any additional facts are material to the disposition of the pending motion. Thus, the following factual summary relies on the plaintiffs' statement of facts.
The parties agree that the plaintiffs are employed by the State of Iowa as registered nurses at the Woodward Resource Center, the Iowa Medical and Classification Center, and the Iowa State Penitentiary. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Iowa District Court for Polk County on June 29, 2019, alleging claims under IOWA CODE CH. 91A and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207. The plaintiffs seek class action status.
The defendants filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand on August 5, 2019, in the Iowa District Court for Polk County. The defendants admit that one of their affirmative defenses states, "Plaintiffs' individual and purported class and collective claims are barred to the extent Defendants are entitled to immunity, including sovereign immunity." On August 14, 2019, the defendants removed this action to this federal court. The court adds that the defendants refiled their Answer in this court on August 15, 2019.
B. Additional Procedural Background
The plaintiffs, all registered nurses employed by the State of Iowa, brought this action on their own behalf and on behalf of other similarly-situated current or former registered nurse employees of the defendants. The defendants are the governor of the State of Iowa and the director of the Iowa Department of Administrative Services, sued in their official capacities, and the State of Iowa. "A suit for damages against a state official in his official capacity is a suit against the State." Calzone v. Hawley , 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, all references to "the defendants," here, are references to the State of Iowa, and vice versa.
In Count I of their Complaint, the plaintiffs assert a federal-law claim pursuant to the FLSA, alleging that the defendants have failed to pay the named plaintiffs and the putative class overtime for their work that is properly to be paid under 29 U.S.C. § 207. In Count II, the plaintiffs assert a state-law claim pursuant to IOWA CODE CH. 91A, which is known as the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL), see IOWA CODE § 91A.1, alleging that the defendants have failed to pay the named plaintiffs and the putative class for overtime hours in violation of IOWA CODE § 91A.3.
The defendants removed this action to this federal court asserting federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a), based on the FLSA claim. The defendants also asserted on removal that this court has supplemental jurisdiction over the IWPCL claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
C. The Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
The plaintiffs seek partial summary judgment on the defendants' affirmative defense of sovereign immunity. They argue that the Iowa Supreme Court has held that the State of Iowa has waived its sovereign immunity to claims in state court under the IWPCL and the FLSA. They argue, further, that, in this case, the defendants waived sovereign immunity to the IWPCL claim in federal court, pursuant to Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia , 535 U.S. 613, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002), by removing this action to this federal court. They argue that the general principles set out in Lapides also apply to the FLSA claim, resulting in a waiver of sovereign immunity to that claim in federal court.
The defendants respond that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to federal FLSA claims against the state in federal court and that Lapides expressly applies only to state-law claims with respect to which the state has waived immunity from state-court proceedings. The defendants contend that, at least arguably, the Iowa Supreme Court found only that federal FLSA overtime claims can be brought in state court through the mechanism of an IWPCL claim. They argue that, if the Iowa Supreme Court went so far as to find a waiver to sue the state in state court on a federal FLSA claim, the Iowa Supreme Court should now "change course" and rule that there is no such waiver. The defendants also argue that, while the Iowa Supreme Court found an express consent to suit on IWPCL claims in Iowa courts, there is no such consent to suit—and no resulting waiver of sovereign immunity to suit—in federal courts.
In reply, the plaintiffs argue that it is well-established that IOWA CODE CH. 91A allows the State of Iowa to be sued in state court and that Lapides allows the state to be sued in federal court on such a claim upon removal, that is, by a waiver resulting from litigation conduct. The plaintiffs point out that, when the defendants removed this action to federal court, they passed up the opportunity to have the Iowa Supreme Court "change course" on its ruling that the state can be sued in state court on a federal FLSA claim. The plaintiffs reiterate that the State of Iowa's waiver of sovereign immunity to FLSA claims in state court also waives immunity to such claims in federal court when the state removes the action.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standards For Summary Judgment
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). It provides, further, that a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. Summary judgment decisions usually focus on whether the non-moving party has generated a genuine issue of material fact precluding entry of judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g. , Torgerson v. City of Rochester , 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). However, " ‘[w]here [as here] the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate." Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner , 779 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Cochrane , 124 F.3d 978, 981-82 (8th Cir. 1997) ).
B. Sovereign Immunity vs. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
This case involves questions of sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity, but the two are not coterminous. "The Eleventh Amendment provides that the ‘Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit ... commenced or prosecuted against one of the ... States’ by citizens of another State, U.S. Const., Amdt. 11, and (as interpreted) by its own citizens." Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia , 535 U.S. 613, 618, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002) (citing Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) ); Fryberger v. Univ. of Arkansas , 889 F.3d 471, 473 (8th Cir. 2018). Thus, Eleventh Amendment immunity is immunity of a State from suit in a federal court. Id.
Eleventh Amendment immunity is only " ‘one particular exemplification’ " of sovereign immunity, however. Church v. Missouri , 913 F.3d 736, 742 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Federal Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth. , 535 U.S. 743, 753, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002) ).
But "[s]tates also enjoy a broader sovereign immunity [than the Eleventh Amendment provides], which applies
against all private suits, whether in state or federal court." Beaulieu v. Vermont , 807 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 2015), citing Alden v. Maine , 527 U.S. 706, 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) ("We have ... sometimes referred to the States' immunity from suit as ‘Eleventh Amendment immunity.’ The phrase is convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment."). The Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment." Fed. Mar. Comm'n , 535 U.S. at 754, 122 S.Ct. 1864.
Church , 913 F.3d at 742. Thus, " ‘[s]overeign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent.’ " Id. (quoting Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart , 563 U.S. 247, 253, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 179 L.Ed.2d 675 (2011) ).
Both Eleventh Amendment immunity and broader sovereign immunity can be set aside or waived. Congress may require the state to waive general sovereign immunity as a condition for receiving federal funds, see Fryberger , 889 F.3d at 473, but such a waiver of general sovereign immunity is not at issue, here. What is at issue, here, is that " ‘[a] State ... may choose to waive its immunity in federal court at its pleasure.’ " Id. (quoting Sossamon v. Texas , 563 U.S. 277, 284, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011) ). However, "[c]ourts ‘give effect’ to a state's waiver of sovereign immunity ‘only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’ " Church , 913 F.3d at 743 (quoting Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney , 495 U.S. 299, 305, 110 S.Ct. 1868, 109 L.Ed.2d 264 (1990) ).
Congress can abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fryberger , 889 F.3d at 474, but, again, congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity is not at issue, here. What is at issue, here, is that Eleventh Amendment immunity can be waived by litigation conduct, for example, when a state removes a case to federal court. See Church , 913 F.3d at 742 (citing Lapides , 535 U.S. at 624, 122 S.Ct. 1640 ). Specifically, in Lapides , the Supreme Court "conclude[ed] a state may not remove a case to federal court and then attempt to assert immunity that would not have been available in state court." Kruger v. Nebraska , 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Lapides , 535 U.S. at 619-20, 122 S.Ct. 1640 ).
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained, however,
The Lapides court explained its holding was limited "to the context of state-law claims, in respect to which the State has explicitly waived immunity from state-court proceedings." [ Lapides , 535 U.S.] at 617–18, 122 S.Ct. 1640. The Lapides court's decision itself does not necessarily apply to federal claims or state claims in which the state has not waived immunity in state courts. See Id.
Kruger , 820 F.3d at 301. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has asserted, " ‘[n]either logic nor precedent supports the proposition that a state waives its general state sovereign immunity by removing an action from state court to federal court.’ " Church , 913 F.3d at 742-43 (quoting Beaulieu , 807 F.3d at 486 ). Thus, a State's removal of a case to federal court waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity "from suit in federal court with respect to any state law claims for which the state had waived immunity in state court," but removal "does not necessarily mean [the State] waived [its] other immunities [such as] sovereign immunity from state law claims for which the state has not waived immunity." Kruger , 820 F.3d at 301.
C. Discussion
The motion presently before the court involves the viability of a defense of sovereign immunity (including Eleventh Amendment immunity) to both the plaintiffs' state-law and federal-law overtime wage claims after the defendants removed the action to this federal court. The court finds it appropriate to begin its discussion with the state-law claim.
1. The IWPCL claim
The court concludes that, as to the IWPCL claim, the situation is precisely the one in which the Supreme Court held in Lapides that there was a waiver of both general sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity on removal. 535 U.S. at 619-20, 624, 122 S.Ct. 1640 ; see also Church , 913 F.3d at 742 ; Kruger , 820 F.3d at 301. Indeed, the defendants concede that, in Anthony v. State , 632 N.W.2d 897 (Iowa 2001), and Raper v. State , 688 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 2004), the Iowa Supreme Court decided that the State of Iowa waived its sovereign immunity to suit on IWPCL claims in Iowa state courts. See Raper , 688 N.W.2d at 54 (" ‘Sections 91A.8 and 91A.10(3) [of the Iowa Code] provide an express consent to sue in the Iowa courts for purposes of recovering any compensation thus owed.’ " (quoting Anthony , 632 N.W.2d at 902, with emphasis added in Raper )); see also Church , 913 F.3d at 743 (explaining that a waiver of sovereign immunity is shown by " ‘the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’ " (quoting Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. , 495 U.S. at 305, 110 S.Ct. 1868 )).
Nevertheless, just as in Lapides , the defendants are attempting to assert immunity to the IWPCL claim on removal that would not have been available in state court. 535 U.S. at 619-20, 122 S.Ct. 1640 ; Kruger , 820 F.3d at 301. The United States Supreme Court made clear, however, that, in the context of state-law claims, with respect to which the State has explicitly waived immunity from state-court proceedings, removal likewise waives immunity from federal-court proceedings. Id. at 619-20, 624, 122 S.Ct. 1640 ; Kruger , 820 F.3d at 301. Thus, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs are entitled to partial summary judgment on the defendants' sovereign immunity defense to the IWPCL claim. Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC , 779 F.3d at 861 (explaining that summary judgment is particularly appropriate when the questions at issue are primarily legal rather than factual).
2. The FLSA claim
The analysis is slightly more complicated as to the State's assertion of sovereign immunity (including Eleventh Amendment immunity) to the plaintiffs' federal FLSA claim, although it begins with the same question of whether the State has expressly waived sovereign immunity to suit in state court on such claims. The defendants' reading of Anthony and Raper as holding only that the state may be sued in state court for FLSA overtime remuneration through the mechanism of an IWPCL claim is not wholly unreasonable, but it does overlook parts of those decisions.
First, in Anthony , the Iowa Supreme Court was "convinced that the statutory scheme [in the IWPCL and administrative regulations] for deriving pay plans has been implemented in a manner that includes FLSA overtime remuneration as compensation owed by an employer." 632 N.W.2d at 902. This language could be read, as the defendants contend, to allow FLSA overtime remuneration through the mechanism of an IWPCL claim. Subsequently, however, in Raper , the Iowa Supreme Court cited this portion of Anthony and explained, "In other words, we have already determined the State waived its sovereign immunity by expressly consenting to be sued in state court for FLSA overtime remuneration." Raper , 688 N.W.2d at 54 ; see also Kennedy v. State , 688 N.W.2d 473, 481 (Iowa 2004) ("We also determined [in Raper ] the State waived its sovereign immunity to be sued in state court for FLSA violations." (citing Raper , 688 N.W.2d at 54 )). Contrary to the defendants' contention, here, there is no doubt or ambiguity about the Iowa Supreme Court's conclusion that the State has waived its sovereign immunity to suits in state court for FLSA overtime compensation, and the State has presented no basis for the Iowa Supreme Court to "change course" now.
Even though the State has waived sovereign immunity to FLSA claims in state court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has "held Congress lacks Fourteenth Amendment power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity for lawsuits seeking unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)." O'Sullivan v. Minnesota , 191 F.3d 965, 968 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Raper v. Iowa , 115 F.3d 623, 624 (8th Cir. 1997) ). Thus, the next question is whether the State can remove an action to federal court and assert Eleventh Amendment immunity to FLSA claims, where it has expressly waived sovereign immunity to FLSA claims in state court. After all, under Lapides , the State could not do so for state-law claims on which it has waived sovereign immunity in state court.
The Raper litigation addressed by the Iowa Supreme Court was initiated in federal court, but it was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Raper , 115 F.3d at 623 (citing Raper v. Iowa , 940 F. Supp. 1421, 1423-27 (S.D. Iowa 1996) ); Raper , 688 N.W.2d at 34 (citing Raper v. Iowa , 940 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (S.D. Iowa 1996) ).
The State is correct that, in Lapides , the United States Supreme Court limited its holding " ‘to the context of state-law claims, in respect to which the State has explicitly waived immunity from state-court proceedings.’ " Kruger , 820 F.3d at 301 (quoting Lapides , 535 U.S. at 617–18, 122 S.Ct. 1640 ). That is not the end of the matter, however. In Lapides , the plaintiff, a state university professor, brought both state law and § 1983 claims against the state of Georgia. 535 U.S. at 616, 122 S.Ct. 1640. The Court considered "whether ‘a state waive[s] its Eleventh Amendment immunity by its affirmative litigation conduct when it removes a case to federal court....’ " Id. at 617, 122 S.Ct. 1640 (quoting Pet. for Cert. (i)). The Court explained,
It has become clear that we must limit our answer to the context of state-law claims, in respect to which the State has explicitly waived immunity from state-court proceedings. That is because Lapides' only federal claim against the State arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that claim seeks only monetary damages, and we have held that a State is not a "person" against whom a § 1983 claim for money damages might be asserted. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Compare Tr. of Oral Arg. 57–58 (asserting that complaint also sought declaratory judgment on the federal claim), with complaint, App. 9–19 (failing, implicitly or explicitly, to seek any such relief). Hence this case does not present a valid federal claim against the State. Nor need we address the scope of waiver by removal in a situation where
the State's underlying sovereign immunity from suit has not been waived or abrogated in state court.
Lapides , 535 U.S. at 617–18, 122 S.Ct. 1640. Thus, the Court's holding was not limited because the only circumstances in which its holding could apply were where a state has waived sovereign immunity to a state-law claim in state court. Rather, those were the only circumstances squarely before the Court.
Importantly, the Court's reasoning in Lapides applies just as strongly to a federal claim—specifically, an FLSA claim—for which the state has waived its sovereign immunity in state court as it does to state-law claims on which the state has waived sovereign immunity in state court. That reasoning was the following:
It would seem anomalous or inconsistent for a State both (1) to invoke federal jurisdiction, thereby contending that the "Judicial power of the United States" extends to the case at hand, and (2) to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, thereby denying that the "Judicial power of the United States" extends to the case at hand. And a Constitution that permitted States to follow their litigation interests by freely asserting both claims in the same case could generate seriously unfair results. Thus, it is not surprising that more than a century ago this Court indicated that a State's voluntary appearance in federal court amounted to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Clark v. Barnard , 108 U.S. 436, 447, 2 S.Ct. 878, 27 L.Ed. 780 (1883) (State's "voluntary appearance" in federal court as an intervenor avoids Eleventh Amendment inquiry). The Court subsequently held, in the context of a bankruptcy claim, that a State "waives any immunity ... respecting the adjudication of" a "claim" that it voluntarily files in federal court. Gardner v. New Jersey , 329 U.S. 565, 574, 67 S.Ct. 467, 91 L.Ed. 504 (1947). And the Court has made clear in general that "where a State voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment." Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. , 200 U.S. 273, 284, 26 S.Ct. 252, 50 L.Ed. 477 (1906) (emphasis added). The Court has long accepted this statement of the law as valid, often citing with approval the cases embodying that principle. See, e.g. , College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. , 527 U.S. 666, 681, n. 3, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (citing Gardner ); Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Mo. , 411 U.S. 279, 294, and n. 10, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in result) (citing Clark ); Petty v. Tennessee–Missouri Bridge Comm'n , 359 U.S. 275, 276, 79 S.Ct. 785, 3 L.Ed.2d 804 (1959) (citing Clark ).
In this case, the State was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in the original state-court proceedings. But the State then voluntarily agreed to remove the case to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) ; Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Martin , 178 U.S. 245, 248, 20 S.Ct. 854, 44 L.Ed. 1055 (1900) (removal requires the consent of all defendants). In doing so, it voluntarily invoked the federal court's jurisdiction. And unless we are to abandon the general principle just stated, or unless there is something special about removal or about this case, the general legal principle requiring waiver ought to apply.
We see no reason to abandon the general principle.
Lapides , 535 U.S. at 619–20, 122 S.Ct. 1640 (emphasis added). As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized, this reasoning is "broad" in contrast to Lapides ' "narrow holding." Stroud v. McIntosh , 722 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2013). As that court explained,
Most circuit courts seem to agree that the Lapides Court's reasoning should apply in cases involving federal law claims as well as those involving state law claims. That is, the source of a plaintiff's claim against a state (state law or federal law) is irrelevant to whether a state waives its immunity against that claim by removing to federal court. See Lombardo v. Penn., Dep't of Pub. Welfare , 540 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir.2008) (applying Lapides's reasoning to a state's removal of a federal claim); Embury v. King , 361 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir.2004) ("Nothing in the reasoning of Lapides supports limiting the waiver ... to state law claims only."); Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp. , 302 F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir.2002) (applying Lapides's reasoning to hold that the state waived immunity by removing a federal claim); see also Bergemann v. R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. , 665 F.3d 336, 340–42 (1st Cir.2011) (distinguishing Lapides in the context of a removed federal law claim without reference to Lapides's application only to removed state law claims); Stewart v. North Carolina , 393 F.3d 484, 490 (4th Cir.2005) (same).
Stroud , 722 F.3d at 1300. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Lapides , went so far as to hold "that a State defendant that removes a case to federal court waives its immunity from suit on all federal-law claims in the case, including those claims that Congress failed to apply to the States through unequivocal and valid abrogation of their Eleventh Amendment immunity." Walden v. Nevada , 2019 WL 5199557 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added); see also Stroud , 722 F.3d at 1300 (citing decisions of the Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals as also so holding).
This court need not go so far as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In this case, Iowa has waived sovereign immunity to FLSA claims in state court, precisely paralleling the circumstances as to state-law claims in Lapides . See Stroud , 722 F.3d at 1300 (citing decisions of the First, Fourth, and D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals as holding that a state does not waive sovereign immunity by removing a case, if the state has not waived its immunity in its own courts). This fact distinguishes both Kruger and Beaulieu v. Vermont , 807 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 2015), on which the defendants rely, here. Kruger involved a federal § 1983 claim which would not lie against the state or state employees in their official capacities, not a federal FLSA claim as to which the state had waived sovereign immunity in state court. 820 F.3d at 301. In Beaulieu , the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that Vermont's statutory reference to coverage of some of its employees under the FLSA "sa[id] nothing about how that obligation may be enforced against it," so that "[i]t does not constitute an implicit, much less an explicit waiver of its sovereign immunity from private suit." 807 F.3d at 484-85. Thus, neither case involved a federal claim on which the state had waived sovereign immunity in state court, as Iowa has waived sovereign immunity to FLSA claims in state court.
This court finds no reason—and the defendants have offered none—why removal of federal claims on which a state has waived sovereign immunity to suit in state court should not result in the same waiver of immunity that would apply to suit in federal court on state-law claims for which a state has waived its sovereign immunity to suit in state court. Thus, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs are entitled to partial summary judgment on the defendants' sovereign immunity defense to the FLSA claim. Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC , 779 F.3d at 861 (explaining that summary judgment is particularly appropriate when the questions at issue are primarily legal rather than factual).
III. CONCLUSION
The court concludes that by removing this action to this federal court, the defendants, the State of Iowa and state officials sued in their official capacities, have waived their affirmative defense of sovereign immunity to both the plaintiffs' IWPCL and FLSA claims. This is so, because the state waived its sovereign immunity to both claims in state court, and it would now be anomalous or inconsistent to allow the state to assert immunity to such claims in federal court.
Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiffs' September 13, 2019, Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 5] is GRANTED .