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In Rowe v. Lilly, 2000 WL 1677710, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), the court rejected the very argument that the plaintiff makes here. Like the plaintiff in this action, the Rowe plaintiffs argued that they had exhausted their administrative remedies as required by the PLRA by filing Notices of Claim under the New York State Finance Law. The court rejected their argument reasoning that "a Notice of Claim is not an administrative remedy; it is simply, as its name implies, a notice of claim that the party intends to bring.
Summary of this case from Fegans v. JohnsonOpinion
99 Civ. 4317 (JSM).
November 8, 2000.
OPINION and ORDER
The sole question presented by this motion to dismiss is whether prisoners suing for money damages for injuries sustained when they were seriously burned "while working under longstanding dangerous conditions in the kitchen at Sing Sing Correctional Facility," (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 2), must exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs claim that exhaustion is not required because the prison grievance procedures cannot award them the money damages that they seek in this action. While that argument has surface appeal, it has been rejected by the majority of judges in this District. See. e.g., Cuoco v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 98 Civ. 9009, 2000 WL 347155, at *6.7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2000); Petit v. Bender, 99 Civ. 0969, 2000 WL 303280, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2000); Castillo v. Buday, 85 F. Supp.2d 309, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Lee v. Artuz, 96 Civ. 8604, 2000 WL 231083, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2000) ; Santiago v. Meinsen, 89 F. Supp.2d 435, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). But see Polite v. Barbarin, 96 Civ. 6818, 1998 WL 146687, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1998).
The issue was comprehensively addressed in Chief Judge Mukasey's opinion in Beeson v. Fishkill Correctional Facility, 28 F. Supp.2d 884, 892-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), and no useful purpose would be served by repeating that analysis here. Suffice it to say that I agree with Chief Judge Mukasey that the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires a prisoner to exhaust available administrative remedies before commencing federal litigation, even though the action seeks money damages and that remedy is not available in an administrative proceeding. As Judge Rakoff observed in Royster v. United States, 91 F. Supp.2d 626, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2000):
[R]equiring that prisoners first seek review through administrative process even when their requested remedy is damages serves the beneficial purpose not only of administrative review of allegedly unlawful conduct but also of creating an administrative record that may be useful to a court.
Plaintiffs argue that the recent opinion written by Judge Straub in Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2000), holding that a prisoner asserting an excessive force claim is not required to exhaust administrative remedies, requires a similar result here. However, Judge Straub carefully distinguished an excessive force case from one dealing with prison conditions, noting:
While 1997e(a) filters through administrative grievance procedures "prison conditions" claims that may be frivolous as to subject matter, the text, structure, purpose, and legislative history of the PLRA provide ample justification for not treating excessive force or assault claims in the same manner.Id. at 106.
Here, Plaintiffs' statement of the case, as quoted above, makes clear that they are challenging "long-standing dangerous conditions at Sing Sing Correctional Facility." This is precisely the type of claim that Judge Straub distinguished from excessive force claims in holding that such claims were not subject to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. Thus, the opinion in Nussle does not in any way cast doubt on the continued validity of Chief Judge Mukasey's opinion in Beeson.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that they have exhausted their administrative remedies, as required by the PLRA, by filing Notices of Claim under the New York State Finance Law. However, a Notice of Claim is not an administrative remedy; it is simply, as its name implies, a notice of a claim that the party intends to bring. Such Notice is not a substitute for a grievance filed pursuant to New York State's Inmate Grievance Program.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York November 8, 2000 JOHN S. MARTIN, JR., U.S.D.J.
For Plaintiffs: William J. Rold, New York, NY.
For defendants: Bruce A. Brown, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, NY.