Opinion
Civ. No. 04-3949 (RHK/JSM).
January 26, 2005
Steven E. Rousseau, Pro Se.
David Jordan-Huffman, Oppenheimer Wolff Donnelly LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
On March 9, 2004, Steven E. Rousseau, who is black, sued Goodwill/Easter Seals ("Goodwill") in this Court alleging discrimination based on race and mental illness in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That case was dismissed by Judge Michael J. Davis on August 24, 2004 and Rousseau's Motion to Amend his Complaint to add a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was denied. Rousseau has now sued Goodwill for a second time, again alleging that he was discriminated against because of his race. In the instant action, Rousseau alleges that Goodwill's actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Goodwill has moved to dismiss Rousseau's Complaint on the grounds that the instant action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and, in the alternative, that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below, Goodwill's Motion will be granted and the action dismissed.
BACKGROUND
For purposes of this Motion, the Court will accept the allegations in Rousseau's Complaint as true.
From August to September 2002, Rousseau was enrolled in an Automotive Skills Training Program provided by Goodwill (the "training program"). The training program lasted six weeks and was held on Mondays through Thursdays for three hours a day and on Fridays for one hour. Rousseau paid $1,425.00 to attend the training program. In September 2002, he graduated from the training program and received a Certificate of Completion. (Id. at 1-2.)
Rousseau alleges that the training program was not well-taught because there was a "lack of concern" for those enrolled in the program; according to Rousseau, this was because the majority of those enrolled in the program were black. He also contends that the job placement program associated with the training program was "a sham," and that he was not adequately assisted in finding a job because of his race. (Id. at 2.)
Rousseau alleges that two other specific instances of racial discrimination occurred in connection with the training program. First, he identifies a "black female student" named Denise A., who could not read at a sixth-grade level. (Id. at 3.) Despite having been unable to read any of the training program repair manuals, Denise A. was allowed to complete the training program. Of the fact that Denise A. completed the program without having read the repair manuals, Rousseau's Complaint states: "[t]his is a prime example how we were exploited as blacks." (Id.) According to Rousseau, he spoke with "white former students" of the training program and "they were taught well without being exploited because of race." (Id.) Second, Rousseau alleges that Gregg Hinz, the Program Placement Specialist, stated that Rousseau "was just looking for a handout" when Rousseau sought employment through the training program. (Id.) Rousseau contends that this statement was racially biased.
On March 9, 2004, Rousseau filed a Complaint against Goodwill in this Court alleging that Goodwill had violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("Rousseau I"). Goodwill filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and, in response, Rousseau filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint to add a claim of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. On August 24, 2004, Judge Davis denied Rousseau's Motion to Amend and granted Goodwill's Motion to Dismiss. Rousseau v. Goodwill/Easter Seals, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 5 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2004).
Rousseau filed the instant action on August 27, 2004 ("Rousseau II"), alleging, as he attempted to do through his Motion to Amend in Rousseau I, racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. With the exception of his allegations concerning Denise A. and his discussions with white former students of the training program, his allegations inRousseau II are the same as those in Rousseau I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 12(b)(6), all factual allegations must be accepted as true and every reasonable inference must be made in favor of the complainant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see Midwestern Mach., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 167 F.3d 439, 441 (8th Cir. 1999);Carney v. Houston, 33 F.3d 893, 894 (8th Cir. 1994). "[D]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) serves to eliminate actions which are fatally flawed in their legal premises and destined to fail, thereby sparing litigants the burden of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity." Young v. City of St. Charles, Mo., 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). A cause of action "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Sys., Inc., 298 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).ANALYSIS
Goodwill asserts that the dismissal of Rousseau I is res judicata as to the instant action. "Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action." Lane v. Peterson, 899 F.2d 737, 741 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5 (1979)). The doctrine "precludes the relitigation of a claim on grounds that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action." Id. (citation omitted). Relitigation of a claim is barred if three requirements are met: "(1) the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the prior judgment was a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the same cause of action and the same parties or their privies were involved in both cases." Id. at 742 (citation omitted).
Only the second and third requirements are at issue in this case. Rousseau contends that the judgment in Rousseau I was not a final judgment on the merits. It is well established, however, that "[t]he denial of a motion to amend a complaint in one action is a final judgment on the merits barring the same complaint in a later action." Prof'l Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. KPMG LLP, 345 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Such a denial "constitutes res judicata on the merits of the claims which were the subject of the proposed amended pleading." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Rousseau moved to amend his Complaint in Rousseau I to add a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Judge Davis denied his Motion. Thus, the judgment in Rousseau I was final and on the merits.
Rousseau does not dispute that the judgment in Rousseau I was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Rousseau also asserts that the instant action is not barred by res judicata because he alleges a claim with "additional merit" here. (Rousseau's Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) Therefore, the Court must determine whether Rousseau I and II involve the same cause of action. "[T]wo causes of action are the same for res judicata purposes" if the second claim "arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the prior claim." Lane, 899 F.2d at 742 (citations omitted). This "`transactional' approach to res judicata contemplates that there may be some variance in the proof required for claims that are nonetheless the `same claim.'" Id. at 743 (citing the Restatement (Second) of Judgments).
There is no dispute that the parties involved in Rousseau II are the same as those involved in Rousseau I.
It is clear that Rousseau I and II involve the same cause of action. The claims in each action arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts — namely, Rousseau's dissatisfaction with the training program. Specifically, in both Rousseau I andII, Rousseau alleges that Goodwill discriminated against him based on his race by not teaching the training program well and by failing to adequately assist him in his job search.
That Rousseau I involved a claim under Title VI is inapposite for two reasons. First, Rousseau moved to amend his Complaint inRousseau I to include a § 1981 claim and Judge Davis denied his Motion; as discussed above, Judge Davis's ruling is a judgment on the merits as to Rousseau's § 1981 claim. See Prof'l Mgmt., 345 F.3d at 1032. Second, even if Rousseau had not attempted to amend his Complaint in Rousseau I, his "reliance . . . on different substantive law and [a] new legal theor[y] does not preclude the operation of res judicata." Lane, 899 F.2d at 744. The Eighth Circuit adheres to the principle "that res judicata bars all claims that could have been advanced in support of a previously adjudicated cause of action." Mills v. Des Arc Convalescent Home, 872 F.2d 823, 826-27 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that "the prior judgment in [a] Title VII suit barred [a] section 1981 suit against the same parties or their privies"). Accordingly, the Court determines that Rousseau II alleges the same claim as that alleged in Rousseau I. Because all of the requirements of res judicata are met, the doctrine is a bar to the instant action and Rousseau's Complaint will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein IT IS ORDERED that Goodwill's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 6) is GRANTED and the Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.