Opinion
No. 8:20-cv-00954-DCC-JDA
07-06-2020
Donald Rouse, Plaintiff, v. Dana Nessel, Michelle Doerr-Tibbits, Dean Alan, Peter J. Maceroni, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Donald Rouse ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, files this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on March 6, 2020. [Doc. 1.] After conducting a review of the Complaint, the undersigned issued a Report to the assigned district judge on March 20, 2020, recommending summary dismissal on the basis that the Court lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiff had not established standing to bring this action. [Doc. 9.] By Order dated June 30, 2020, the Honorable Donald C. Coggins, Jr., declined to adopt the undersigned's Report and Recommendation, finding that "at this procedural posture, it appears Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to conclude that he may have standing to pursue this claim." [Doc. 14 at 2.] Judge Coggins recommitted the case to the undersigned for further evaluation and possible service of process, but noted that "the Magistrate Judge may wish to consider whether venue is proper in this District, whether any Defendant is entitled to judicial or other immunity, or whether the statute of limitations is applicable to any of Plaintiff's claims." [Id.]
Accordingly, having again reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned concludes that, even assuming Plaintiff has alleged facts to establish standing to pursue his claims, this action should be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process for the reasons explained below.
BACKGROUND
This action arises from Plaintiff's claim that he was arrested in 2015 pursuant to a warrant based on a Michigan state criminal statute, MCL 750.165(1) , (the "Michigan statute") for failure to pay child support. [Doc. 1 at 3-4.] Plaintiff files this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to "protect and vindicate fundamental constitutional rights." [Id. at 2.] He requests prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. [Id.]
The Michigan statute provides:
If the court orders an individual to pay support for the individual's former or current spouse, or for a child of the individual, and the individual does not pay the support in the amount or at the time stated in the order, the individual is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both.Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.165(1).
Plaintiff names four Defendants in this action: (1) Dana Nessel, the Attorney General of the State of Michigan; (2) Michelle Doerr-Tibbits, the criminal finance division officer of the Attorney General's Office for the State of Michigan; (3) Dean Alan, an Assistant Prosecutor for Macomb County, Michigan; and (4) Peter J. Maceroni, a Circuit Court Judge for Macomb County, Michigan. [Id. at 1.]
Plaintiff alleges that he has lived in South Carolina from 2003 through the present and that he lived in Tennessee from 1992 to 2003. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff alleges he was arrested on May 29, 2015, at his home in Honea Path, South Carolina, by Sheriff Deputy Ken Smith based on a warrant issued by the State of Michigan Attorney General's Office. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges the warrant was issued in January 2008 for Tennessee and not South Carolina. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he did not flee from Michigan and that Michigan had no authority under the Constitution to demand his arrest and return. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he was "illegally incarcerated without proper notice, hearing, opportunity to defend or be represented by counsel and without jurisdiction." [Id.] Plaintiff alleges Michigan did not have personal jurisdiction over him and that he had no contacts with Michigan. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges he was not served in or domiciled in Michigan and that all of the paperwork from the clerk of court's office listed his address in Tennessee. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges there was no probable cause to support issuance of the warrant. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff alleges that the laws of Michigan apply only within that State and to citizens of that State. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges the warrant states that he violated the Michigan statute. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges the Michigan statute does not apply unless the individual ordered to pay child support appeared in, or received notice by personal service of, the action in which the support order was issued. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that, under the Michigan statute, prosecutors are required to show that the defendant had either appeared in court or received notice by personal service of the proceeding in which the order was issued and, where a prosecutor fails to present evidence of such, the district court abuses its discretion in binding over the defendant for trial. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges the Michigan statute is unconstitutional and is an ex post facto law. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges the warrant was based on an order of judgment entered in September 2001. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges he had no knowledge of the 2001 order of judgment for which the warrant was issued and that the order of judgment is void. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that, even if the order of judgment was valid on its face, it was issued without judicial review by a non-judicial third party in violation of Michigan law and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he had no knowledge that a warrant had been issued. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that in September 2019 he obtained knowledge that a clerk of court file existed and that he obtained copies of the case file. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges he contacted the two courts listed on the warrant and neither one had knowledge of the warrant. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff alleges Defendants refused to give him the name of the person who signed the warrant or tell him which court issued the warrant. [Id.]
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts a single count in his Complaint, alleging a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subjected him to the deprivation of his rights under the Constitution, in violation of due process, without notice and opportunity to be heard, and without lawful authority. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of Defendants' actions, he has suffered mental anguish, emotional distress, physical injury, and loss of revenue. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff asks that the Court (1) "declare the Defendants' policy violates the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution"; (2) permanently enjoin the challenged policy and its application to Plaintiff; (3) order the disclosure of any files or databases containing information about Plaintiff; and (4) award Plaintiff reasonable attorney fees, costs, and expenses. [Id. at 5-6.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that a plaintiff has standing, that subject matter jurisdiction exists, and that a case is not frivolous. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) ("Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision."); Mills v. Greenville Cty., 586 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 (D.S.C. 2008); Cornelius v. Howell, No. 3:06-cv-3387-MBS-BM, 2007 WL 397449, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2007) (noting that the payment of the full filing fee does not excuse the court from determining sua sponte that there is a valid basis for jurisdiction), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2007 WL 4952430 (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2007).
This Court is not conducting an initial review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 or 1915A because Plaintiff is a non-prisoner litigant and has paid the filing fee.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but the Court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review a complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove her case as an evidentiary matter in her pleadings, the Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his civil rights, and he sues each Defendant in his or her official capacity. [Doc. 1 at 3.] The allegations in the Complaint are difficult to decipher. In sum, however, Plaintiff appears to argue that Defendants unlawfully issued a warrant for his arrest for failing to pay child support based on the Michigan statute. [Id.] Although Plaintiff alleges he was arrested on May 29, 2015, at his home in South Carolina by Deputy Sheriff Ken Smith [id.], he does not sue Deputy Smith in this action, and he does not allege that the any named Defendant personally arrested him. Instead, he appears to challenge only the issuance of the arrest warrant. Out of an abundance of caution, the undersigned liberally construes the Complaint as asserting a claim for false arrest and a claim for malicious prosecution. Despite Plaintiff's allegations, however, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief.
As noted, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff may be asserting claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible against Defendants.
As noted, Plaintiff names four Defendants in this action—Dana Nessel, the Attorney General for the State of Michigan; Michelle Doerr-Tibbits, an officer in the Michigan Attorney General's Office; Dean Alan, an assistant prosecutor in Macomb County, Michigan; and Peter J. Maceroni, a Macomb County circuit court judge. [Doc. 1 at 2-3.]
Plaintiff makes no factual allegations against Defendant Alan, but simply lists him in the caption of his Complaint. Accordingly, Defendant Alan is entitled to summary dismissal from this action because Plaintiff provides no factual allegations against him to assert a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed."); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (explaining a complaint is subject to summary dismissal where no factual allegations against the named defendants are found within the body of the pleading). In the absence of substantive allegations of wrongdoing against these Defendants, there is nothing from which this Court can liberally construe any type of plausible cause of action arising from the Complaint against them. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting statute allowing dismissal of in forma pauperis claims encompasses complaints that are either legally or factually baseless); Weller, 901 F.2d at 389 n.2 (noting dismissal is proper where there were no allegations to support claim).
Further, Plaintiff's cursory allegations against the remaining Defendants fail to state any cognizable claim against them. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Nessel is "responsible for creating, adopting, implementing, and enforcing the challenged policy." [Id. at 2.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Doerr-Tibbits faxed the warrant from the State of Michigan Attorney General's office to the State of Tennessee. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Maceroni is "responsible for issuing and signing court orders." [Id. at 3.] Such cursory allegations are insufficient to state a plausible constitutional violation under § 1983 against these named Defendant. Accordingly, in addition to the other reasons explained herein, each Defendant is entitled to dismissal from this action because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that the Defendant was personally involved in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
False Arrest
"Section 1983 actions premised on alleged false arrest and/or false imprisonment are analyzed as unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment." Staten v. S.C. Prob. Dep't, No. 4:09-cv-2034-RBH-TER, 2010 WL 3879544, at *4 (D.S.C. July 27, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 3879537 (D.S.C. Sept. 28, 2010); see also Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that claims of false arrest and false imprisonment "are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment"). "To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a Plaintiff must establish 1) that there was an arrest; and 2) that the arrest was made without probable cause." Magwood v. Streetman, No. 2:15-cv-1600-RMG-BM, 2016 WL 5334678, at *8 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 5339579 (D.S.C. Sept. 22, 2016). A plaintiff also must show that the defendants were the ones responsible for him being arrested without probable cause. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support a plausible claim for false arrest. Critically, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that Defendants were the ones who falsely arrested Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiff identifies Deputy Smith as the one who arrested him, although Plaintiff does not sue that individual in this action. Further, "there can be no claim for false arrest where a person is arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant." Dorn v. Town of Prosperity, 375 F. App'x 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant, and he has filed a copy of the arrest warrant [Doc. 11-1 at 1]. Because Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant, his claim for false arrest is without merit. See, e.g., Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that, under § 1983, "a public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant"); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181-82 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining that, when arresting official makes the arrest with a facially valid warrant, it is not false arrest).
It appears that Plaintiff was arrested in South Carolina pursuant to an arrest warrant issued on May 29, 2015, by the Honorable Susan Gilliam Gladden. [Doc. 11-1 at 1.] The undersigned notes that Plaintiff has also attached to his Complaint a copy of another warrant for Plaintiff's arrest, issued in the State of Michigan by Defendant Maceroni and dated October 4, 2002. [Doc. 1-1 at 17.] Although the allegations in the Complaint are unclear, Plaintiff appears to challenge the Michigan warrant in this action. The undersigned notes that the South Carolina warrant appears to have been issued and executed based on the Michigan warrant. Regardless, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts related to his arrest and prosecution arising from either warrant to state a claim for relief.
Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution also fails. "To prevail on a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant initiated or maintained a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding terminated in the plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was not supported by probable cause; and (4) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding." Snider v. Seung Lee, 584 F.3d 193, 202 (4th Cir. 2009) (Stamp, J., concurring); see also Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260-62 (4th Cir. 2000) (observing that a "malicious prosecution" claim under § 1983 is properly understood as a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates the common law malicious prosecution tort elements except for malice).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that Defendants "seized [him] pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings [have] terminated in [his] favor." Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The law is clear that "until a conviction [is] set aside or charges finally dismissed without the possibility of revival, a § 1983 claim [cannot] be pursued based on allegations of unlawful circumstances surrounding the criminal prosecution." Mitchell v. Miller, No. 4:19-cv-01668-CMC-TER, 2019 WL 6120050, at *3 (D.S.C. July 19, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3711977 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2019), aff'd, 780 F. App'x 73 (4th Cir. 2019). Because the Complaint does not allege that criminal proceedings have terminated in Plaintiff's favor, the Complaint does not state a claim for malicious prosecution. Norris v. Poole, No. 8:10-cv-750-JFA-BHH, 2010 WL 1903970, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 19, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 1903971 (D.S.C. May 11, 2010). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution should be dismissed.
Plaintiff's false arrest claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Plaintiff's claim for false arrest also appears to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. "[T]he statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007). Although § 1983 provides a federal cause of action, the Court must look to the law of the State, which provides for personal-injury torts, in which the cause of action arose in determining the length of the statute of limitations. Id. at 387. "The applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in South Carolina is three years." Cash v. Horn, No. 7:16-cv-3654-MGL-PJG, 2018 WL 1747945, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 15, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 1748289 (D.S.C. Apr. 11, 2018).
To the extent the Court should apply Michigan law, the result would be the same. "[T]he appropriate statute of limitations to be borrowed for § 1983 actions arising in Michigan is the state's three-year limitations period for personal injury claims." Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 714 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Miller v. Lincoln Park Police Dep't, No. 18-cv-11284, 2019 WL 3420140, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 24, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3412899 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2019).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested on May 29, 2015, in South Carolina, pursuant to a warrant issued that same day. [Docs. 1 at 3; 11-1 at 1.] Therefore, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's false arrest claim began to run on May 29, 2015, and expired three years later on May 29, 2018. Plaintiff filed the instant case on March 6, 2020, well beyond the applicable three-year statute of limitations for false arrest. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine.
Further, the Complaint as a whole is subject to summary dismissal as Plaintiff's claims are barred in this Court under the Younger abstention doctrine. The crux of this action appears to be a challenge to Defendants' issuance of an arrest warrant under the Michigan statute for Plaintiff's purported failure to pay child support. For his relief, Plaintiff seeks to permanently enjoin the "policy" and its application to Plaintiff. The challenged "policy" appears to be the Michigan statute authorizing the prosecution of individuals who fail to pay child support. As such, Plaintiff appears to seek an injunction preventing Defendants from prosecuting him under the Michigan statute.
The undersigned notes Plaintiff also alleges that, as a result of Defendants' actions, he was "illegally incarcerated without proper notice, hearing, opportunity to defend or be represented by counsel and without jurisdiction." [Doc. 1 at 3.] Plaintiff does not allege that he is presently incarcerated. Also, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is challenging his incarceration. However, to the extent Plaintiff is contesting his incarceration, Plaintiff cannot obtain his "freedom" or release from incarceration in this civil rights action. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 (stating that "habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983"); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus).
As noted, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and injunctive relief against Defendants, and he does not appear to seek money damages in this action. However, to the extent that Plaintiff's Complaint seeks money damages, such a claim is subject to summary dismissal because all of the named Defendants are entitled to immunity from a suit for money damages. See Koon v. Lynch, No. 4:15-cv-2107-DCN, 2015 WL 4771881, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 12, 2015), aff'd, 627 F. App'x 227 (4th Cir. 2015) ("Plaintiff wisely does not seek monetary damages from Defendants, as such a claim would be barred by various immunity doctrines."). Any claim for money damages against Defendant Maceroni fails because "[i]t has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions." Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985). Likewise, any claim for money damages against Defendants Nassel, Doerr-Tibbets, and Alan also fails because "prosecutors are absolutely immune from damages liability when they act as advocates for the State." Savage v. Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-32 (1976).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff's claims related to any pending state court criminal action, whether in South Carolina or in Michigan, are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. The Complaint appears to assert that any pending state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff violate his constitutional rights. Granting Plaintiff's requested relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff appears to be involved in ongoing state court criminal proceedings related to his failure to pay child support, which the Michigan statute makes a felony offense. Because Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations related to that pending criminal action, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted "that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights." Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court criminal proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, 'whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'") (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can adequately litigate his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings.
Indeed, "the extraordinary injunctive relief requested by [P]laintiff violates the comity that a federal court must afford to state judges in the exercise of their official duties." Bryant-Bunch v. Northampton Cty., No. 2:05-cv-34-D(2), 2006 WL 8438547, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006). In O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), the Supreme Court confronted a similar situation as the one in this case. The plaintiffs in O'Shea filed a § 1983 claim against state officials, including a county magistrate and a state circuit judge, for depriving the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights through a pattern of alleged practices including unconstitutional bond setting, sentencing, and jury fee practices in criminal cases. Id. at 492. The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief barring those practices. Id. The Supreme Court held that the action should be dismissed because no "actual case or controversy" existed, and, alternatively, that the requested injunctive relief violated the abstention principles underlying Younger. Id. at 499-504. The Court explained:
What [plaintiffs] seek is an injunction aimed at controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events that might take place in the course of future state criminal trials. The order the Court of Appeals thought should be available if [plaintiffs] proved their allegations would be operative only where permissible state prosecutions are pending against one or more of the beneficiaries of the injunction. Apparently the order would contemplate interruption of state proceedings to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance by petitioners. This seems to us nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings which would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger v. Harris, supra, and related cases sought to prevent.Id. at 500.
A federal court should not intervene to establish the basis for future intervention that would be so intrusive and unworkable.
Like the requested relief in O'Shea, the requested relief here "would necessarily impose continuing obligations of compliance [and] the question arises of how compliance might be enforced if [the plaintiff] were to charge that [the order] had been disobeyed." Id. at 501; see also Suggs v. Brannon, 804 F.2d 274, 278-79 (4th Cir. 1986) (relying on O'Shea to uphold the district court's dismissal of a request for injunctive relief, including an order prohibiting state courts from fixing excessive bail). As such, this Court should abstain from granting Plaintiff's requested injunctive relief. Further, "[t]he same principles compelling abstention as to the requested injunctive relief also apply to [Plaintiff's] request for declaratory relief against [Defendants]." Bryant-Bunch, 2006 WL 8438547, at *1-2 (citing Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (abstaining under Younger from granting a declaratory judgment because "where an injunction would be impermissible under [Younger abstention] principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as well")). Thus, if this action were not subject to dismissal on other bases, the undersigned would recommend that this Court abstain from hearing this action.
As noted, Plaintiff appears to challenge Defendants' issuance of an arrest warrant pursuant to the Michigan statute for Plaintiff's purported failure to pay child support. However, to the extent Plaintiff's Complaint is an attempt to have this Court review any Michigan family court order regarding his child support obligations, this Court would lack subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. "[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow and focused, confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cty., 827 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine assesses only whether "the process for appealing a state court judgment to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) [(2018)] has been sidetracked by an action filed in district court specifically to review that state court judgment." Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246, 251 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff's claims appear to be independent of the family court's order—which Plaintiff has attached to his Complaint—to the extent the Complaint is an invitation for the District Court to review and reject the state court judgment regarding his child support obligations, it must be dismissed.
Venue is not proper in this District.
Finally, even if Plaintiff's Complaint were not subject to dismissal for the reasons explained above, the undersigned would recommend that this action be dismissed as this Court is not the proper venue to entertain Plaintiff's claims. As noted, federal district courts are vested with the inherent power to control and protect the administration of court proceedings. White v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 1175, 1177 (4th Cir. 1986). As such, this Court has the power to consider sua sponte whether venue is proper. Harmon v. Sussex Cty., No. 4:17-cv-2931-RBH-TER, 2017 WL 6506396, at *1 (D.S.C. Nov. 13, 2017) (citing Jensen v. Klayman, 115 F. App'x 634, 635-36 (4th Cir. 2004), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 6498165 (D.S.C. Dec. 19, 2017).
The undersigned finds that venue is not proper in this judicial district, but properly lies in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Thus, this case should be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (requiring that a case filed in an improper venue must be dismissed, or, if it is in the interest of justice, transferred to a district in which it could have been brought). "When a plaintiff files an action in the wrong venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) directs courts to 'dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case' to the proper venue." Levi v. Harris Teeter, LLC, No. 4:16-cv-1083-RBH-TER, 2016 WL 4942057, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 4911047 (D.S.C. Sept. 15, 2016). The choice to transfer or dismiss a case afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 1406 lies within the sound discretion of the district court. See Quinn v. Watson, 145 F. App'x 799, 800 (4th Cir. 2005). A court may raise the issue of defective venue sua sponte. Morris v. Randolph Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 17-cv-00258-B, 2017 WL 3587317, at *2 (S.D. Ala. June 19, 2017) (citing Lipofsky v. N.Y. State Workers Comp. Bd., 861 F.2d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating "a district court may raise on its own motion an issue of defective venue or lack of personal jurisdiction")), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 3585338 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 18, 2017).
The Complaint asserts that venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because "Defendants are located in this judicial district and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this district." [Doc. 1 at 2 (emphasis omitted).] Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, this Court is not the proper venue because all four Defendants appear to be citizens and residents of Michigan. Further, Plaintiff appears to allege that a prosecutor and a judge in Macomb County, Michigan, are responsible for the warrant and orders of which he complains. The undersigned notes that Macomb County, Michigan, is located in the United States Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. As such, it appears that venue for this action properly lies in the Eastern District of Michigan and not in this District.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of the forgoing, the undersigned recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process or, in the alternative, transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
The undersigned notes that any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint would be futile for the reasons stated herein. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015). In light of the allegations in the Complaint, the undersigned finds that no set of facts can support Plaintiff's asserted claim for relief. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his Complaint.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge July 6, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).