Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1401, Section "A" (3).
March 30, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively to Strike (Rec. Doc. 5) filed by defendant Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs. Plaintiff, Kim Roublow, opposes the motion. The motion, set for hearing on November 17, 2004, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ms. Kim Roublow was an employee of the Veterans Administration Medical Center in New Orleans at all times relevant to this matter. See Complaint ¶ 2. Ms. Roublow filed an equal employment opportunity (EEO) discrimination complaint, in which she alleged claims of discrimination, disparate treatment and reprisal. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support, Attachments 1 and 2. After exhausting her administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the present action alleging four separate causes of action: (1) discrimination; (2) retaliation; (3) improper training; (4) and damages arising from a permanent, partial disability that resulted from injuries that would not have occurred "but for" Plaintiff's non-promotion. In response to Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Strike seeking to have portions of the complaint struck, amended, or, as a final result, dismissed for failure to state her claims in the manner required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). See Defendant's Memorandum in Support, p. 1.
Additionally, Defendant moves to dismiss Ms. Roublow's claim regarding her permanent and partial disability on the basis that she is relegated to the remedy provided by the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA). Id. at n. 7, p. 7. Inexplicably, Defendant moved to dismiss this claim in a footnote on the last page of its memorandum. Nonetheless, as Plaintiff addressed the footnote in her response and Defendant more fully briefed its position in a reply memorandum, the Court will address the matter. Accordingly, the following will consider Defendant's Rule 8 complaints and the more substantive Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss under separate subject headings.
LAW I. Motion to Strike or Amend in Accordance with FRCP 8
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 establishes the general pleading requirement of a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader's entitlement to relief. FRCP 8(a). Specifically, Section (e)(1) states that the pleadings shall be "simple, concise, and direct." When a pleading does not comply with Rule 8, the court, on its own initiative or in response to a motion, may strike portions of the pleading that are unnecessary, immaterial, or redundant. FRCP 12(f). The Fifth Circuit has noted that the underlying purpose of Rule 8 is to "eliminate prolixity in pleading and to achieve brevity, simplicity, and clarity." Gordon v. Green, 602 F. 2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1979). Although brevity is desirable in pleading, it does not rank in importance with the right and duty of a litigant to present her demands through counsel of her own choosing and in a style and form of expression that represents an attorney's honest effort to present claims according to his own notions of their merits. Atwood v. Humble Oil Refining Co., 243 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1957).
In Gordon, the court faced hundreds of pages of long, verbose, and confusing complaints; coupled with hundreds of pages of exhibits. Id. at 744. While the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the appellate court commented that the district court should have dismissed the complaints with leave to amend for violations of Rule 8. Id. at 745. The court further noted that district courts are given great leeway in determining compliance with Rule 8, and that hundreds of pages of verbose and scandalous pleadings violate Rule 8. Id. While Gordon clearly illustrates that countless pages of pleadings are not plain, simple, concise, or direct, this standard may also apply to complaints of shorter length. For instance, in Bennett v. Schmidt, the court stated that, "twelve pages of gibberish are no better than 240, so it may be appropriate to dismiss a short complaint under Rule 8 because it is not 'plain.'" 153 F. 3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998).
In the present situation, however, while Plaintiff's complaint may contain some needless language, defense counsel was able to identify the nature of Plaintiff's complaint and her claims. Thus, the complaint has caused no confusion to Defendant regarding the nature of the complaint and what it alleges. Furthermore, Plaintiff's complaint is only eight pages in length and consists of 60 numbered paragraphs. Although the Complaint is rather unconventional in its style, the facts contained in the allegation are neither irrelevant nor repetitive. Accordingly, Defendant's motion, as it pertains to the requirements of FRCP 8, is DENIED.
II. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Personal Injury Claim
Ms. Roublow also alleges that she suffered a partial/permanent disability as a result of lifting heavy equipment at work. Plaintiff alleges that she would not have been required to lift such heavy equipment "but for" the discrimination and/or retaliation she suffered. See Complaint ¶ 59. Defendant moves to dismiss this claim, alleging that Plaintiff's sole recovery is under FECA. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, this Court must take the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and may not dismiss the complaint unless it appears clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to relief. Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, NA, 369 F.3d 833, 839 (5th Cir. 2004). However, conclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions of fact will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992).
The basic statutory requirements for eligibility for FECA compensation consist of the following: (1) The injured party must be a federal employee; (2) the injury sustained by the employee must result while in the performance of her duty, unless the injury or death is (a) caused by a wilful misconduct of the employee; (b) caused by the employee's intention to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another; or (c) caused by intoxication of the injured employee. 5 U.S.C. § 8102(2) 1976; Avasthi v. U.S., 608 F. 2d 1059, 1060 (5th Cir. 1979). Insofar as a plaintiff's suit for work-related injuries is brought directly against a federal employer, FECA provides the exclusive remedy. Bennett v. Barnett, 210 F. 3d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 2000). The Secretary of Labor has exclusive jurisdiction over FECA claims. Id.
In Bennett v. Barnett, the Fifth Circuit considered a plaintiff's claim in light of FECA coverage and the limitations that FECA places on a claimant's right to sue the Government in tort for personal injuries. 210 F. 3d 272 (5th Cir. 2000). Bennett, a postal worker, asserted a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, battery and false imprisonment when her supervisor had to forcibly remove Bennett from an interview room against her will during the interview of another postal worker. Id. at 274. The court noted that employees may not bring FTCA claims that arise out of federal employment relationships until they have submitted the claim to the Secretary of Labor for a determination of FECA coverage. Id. at 277.
In the present matter, it is uncontested that Ms. Roublow was a federal employee and that she sustained her alleged injuries while performing her job duties. Accordingly, FECA provides the exclusive remedy for her claim of partial/permanent disability. As the matter of back pay has not been adequately briefed by either party, the Court renders no opinion as to whether FECA preempts Ms. Roublow's claims for back pay. Accordingly, as this Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to consider Ms. Roublow's claims as they relate to her personal injuries suffered on the job, those claims are, therefore, DISMISSED without prejudice. Any claims relating to back pay shall remain before this Court.
Accordingly;IT IS ORDERED that defendant Anthony J. Principi's Motion to Dismiss or Alternative to Strike is DENIED with respect Plaintiff's alleged violation of FRCP 8 governing pleading requirements and GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's claim for compensation regarding her alleged partial/permanent disability.