Opinion
No. 05-10-00691-CR
Opinion Filed November 14, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F-0858919-Y.
Before Justices MORRIS, O'NEILL, and FILLMORE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Keith Asbry Rose of murder and sentenced him to seventy-five years' imprisonment. In a single issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm. Background On August 5, 2008, appellant claimed he was asleep in his apartment when his mother, Mary Rose, returned from the grocery store. They had a brief conversation, and he went back to sleep. He thought his mother stayed to hang pictures in his apartment. He was later awakened by a noise he described as sounding like someone falling off a stool. He never heard Mary scream or cry out. When he went to the kitchen, he found Mary laying "in a big ol' puddle of blood," and he tried to help her. Because Mary had recently been released from the hospital after a heart attack, he assumed she suffered another one or that she suffered a stroke. He called 9-1-1 and help arrived shortly thereafter. He sat outside the apartment complex and waited for officers to arrive. Before officers arrived, Michael McDaniel, the landlord, showed up to collect the rent. McDaniel noticed appellant had blood on his hands and blood spattered on his shirt. When McDaniel asked appellant what was going on, appellant said Mary had died. McDaniel said appellant was "extremely calm" when he answered. Officer Jason Chatman responded to the 9-1-1 call. He also noted appellant was covered in blood, specifically on his face, shirt, and hands. He also observed cuts on appellant's hand that appeared to be teeth marks. Officer Chatman testified appellant did not seem irritated and complied with officers' instructions. When Officer Chatman asked appellant what happened, appellant said Mary had a stroke and fell down. Detective Dan Town investigated the crime scene. He testified nothing at the scene indicated a break in. The front door had minor damage, but it had been painted over indicating it was older damage. He described the areas in the kitchen with blood spatter, which included the kitchen sink, the walls, the counter, the lower cabinets, the pantry, the table, and the floor. There were blood smears between the refrigerator and the pantry. He also noted blood spatter on a curtain hanging over the pantry. Blood was "everywhere." He testified the amount of blood at the scene was inconsistent with a fall. Detective Town found a hammer on the kitchen table, but later determined it was not involved in the crime. The medical examiner confirmed a hammer did not cause any of Mary's injuries. Detective Town also photographed bloody footprints that were consistent with a pair of flip flops found inside the apartment. Blood was also found on appellant's bed where he claimed to have taken his nap. Finally, Detective Town observed blood spatter on appellant's feet and face. He further observed caked blood under appellant's fingernails. Appellant was arrested and charged with intentionally and knowingly causing the death of his mother by striking and strangulating her with his hands, a deadly weapon. The jury convicted him and sentenced him to seventy-five years' confinement. This appeal followed. Discussion Appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to establish he caused Mary's death. Further, he argues even if the State proved he caused her death, it did not prove he intended to cause her death or that death was reasonably certain to occur from his conduct. The State responds that based on the overwhelming circumstantial evidence, a rational jury could find appellant intentionally and knowingly caused Mary's death. In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences, a rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the factfinder to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. at 319. An appellate court will not reassess credibility because the factfinder is the sole judge of witness's credibility and the weight to be given the testimony. Id. Under the indictment, the State had to prove appellant intentionally and knowingly cased the death of Mary by striking and strangulating her with his hands, a deadly weapon. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2011) (defining murder); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (West 2011) (defining deadly weapon). Intent is most often proven through the circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime, and the jury may infer the requisite intent from the defendant's conduct, including his acts and words. Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Sholars v. State, 312 S.W.3d 694, 703 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd). Here, Chris Peoples, appellant's neighbor, testified he heard a "constant thud" coming from the floor or the walls of appellant's apartment on the day in question. He said it sounded like a headboard hitting the wall, and it lasted for approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes. The noise would stop for about ten seconds and then begin again. He admitted he did not hear any screaming or any other noise at the time. He recalled hearing the thudding at 2:20 p.m. Appellant testified he was home napping during this time. Thus, the jury heard testimony from appellant that he was in his apartment during the time of the "constant thud." Appellant argues the thudding was consistent with hanging pictures, which would explain the noise and the hammer found on the kitchen table. However, the jury was free to disregard this explanation. See Litaker v. State, 784 S.W.2d 739, 745-46 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, pet. ref'd) (concluding jury was free to disbelieve defendant's version of events given the circumstantial evidence). In fact, the jury heard and saw evidence indicating appellant walked around the apartment leaving bloody footprints and laid down on his bed, where he left blood on the sheets, after Mary was beaten. The jury could rationally infer appellant spent time thinking about an explanation for her death. Moreover, given the fact nothing indicated the hammer was used in the attack, the jury could have believed appellant subsequently put it on the table to make his story more plausible. Dr. Janice Townsend-Parch, a medical examiner, explained Mary's extensive injuries to the jury. She described numerous lacerations to Mary's eyebrow and eyelid area. Another laceration extended across the bridge of the nose, which was broken. She had lacerations on her lips, bruising on both sides of her tongue, and marks on the inside of her mouth from her teeth. Dr. Townsend-Parch testified bruising was more extensive on the left eye, which could indicate someone hitting Mary with a right hand. The right side of her face had generalized bruising and the scalp itself suffered bruising. She agreed the injuries to the back of Mary's head could be consistent with someone's head being pounded against a floor. During her internal examination, Dr. Townsend-Parch found damage to Mary's throat and thyroid membrane, which indicated possible strangulation. She also discovered that Mary's cerebrospinal fluid was bloody, which is not normal. She testified, "It's something we see in people who have sustained jarring, they may not have actual visible injuries of the brain, but the CSF gets bloody." Based on the extensive injuries, Dr. Townsend-Parch concluded the cause of death was "homicidal violence, including blunt force head and neck injuries, . . . and an element of strangulation may have contributed to her death." She agreed such injuries were inconsistent with a fall, but could be consistent with someone beaten with a hand. She agreed a hand could be a deadly weapon. She further testified that Mary had no physical indications of suffering a heart attack or stroke. Thus, the jury was free to disbelieve appellant's story that Mary had a heart attack and fell from the chair. See Litaker, 784 S.W.2d at 745-46. While appellant argues the State's case was entirely circumstantial, such evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is unnecessary for every fact to point directly and independently to appellant's guilt; rather, it is sufficient if the finding of guilt is supported by the cumulative force of all the incriminating evidence. Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Given the extent of Mary's injuries, the amount of blood spatter and pools of blood at the crime scene, appellant's admitted presence at the scene, appellant's calm demeanor during the 9-1-1 call, the blood spatter on his clothing, and the injuries on his hands, the jury could infer appellant caused and intended to cause Mary's death. See, e.g., Litaker, 784 S.W.2d at 745-46 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, pet. ref'd) (concluding evidence was sufficient to support murder conviction when witnesses saw defendant at the scene, defendant's blood and hair were recovered from the scene, his teeth matched bite marks on the body, and other circumstantial evidence linked him to the crime); see also Conner, 67 S.W.3d at 197 (jury may infer the requisite intent from the defendant's conduct and wounds inflicted on the victim). Thus, the cumulative force of the incriminating evidence against appellant supports his conviction. Accordingly, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's sole issue is overruled. Conclusion Having overruled appellant's sole issue, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The State introduced the 9-1-1 tape into evidence.