Opinion
November 14, 1952.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County, Marshall C. Wiseheart, J.
Robert M. Haverfield, Miami, for appellant.
Sanford M. Swerdlin, Miami, for appellee.
October 4, 1951, Katherine Rooney, a single woman, filed her bill of complaint in the Circuit Court naming John William Teske as defendant and charged him as being the father of her child, born out of wedlock. The bill prayed that defendant be determined to be the father of her child and that he be required to contribute to its support and maintenance as required by Chapter 26949, Acts of 1951, F.S.A. § 742-011 et seq. A ne exeat was issued for defendant in response to which he appeared and posted bond to abide the decree of the Court. A motion to dismiss the bill of complaint was granted and the plaintiff appealed.
The point for determination is whether or not appellant may bring a proceeding under Chapter 26949, Acts of 1951, to determine the paternity of and require support for her child, it having been born October 28, 1949, prior to June 11, 1951, the effective date of said Act.
The chancellor answered this question in the negative on the theory, (1) that the child in question was not born in the State of Florida, (2) that the child was born approximately two years prior to the effective date of the Act, and (3) Chapter 26949 is not retroactive.
We think it makes no difference whether the accouchement took place in Florida or Massachusetts as the record discloses, or that it took place two years before the effective date of the Act. Chapter 26949 was a complete revision of the law on the subject. It repealed and replaced Sections 742.01-742.05, F.S.A. governing the same subject matter. See Section 9, Chapter 26949. The title of the act and its purpose supports this conclusion. The act also provides that the proceeding may be brought in "the county in which the woman resides or of the county in which the alleged father resides." These and other prerequisites were met. The paternity proven, the statute provides for monthly payments to support the child and vests jurisdiction in the court to enlarge or decrease such payments as circumstances may dictate.
Read in its entirety, there is no escaping the conclusion that the act was designed to require the father of a bastard child, when its paternity is established, to contribute to its support, and whether born before or after the effective date of the act, is not material. As to paternity and support, the act shows on its face that it was intended to be retroactive as well as prospective in effect. It has not an element that could be said to characterize it as an ex post facto law which has been held by State and Federal Courts to apply only to criminal Acts. Surf Club v. Tatem Surf Club, 151 Fla. 406, 10 So.2d 554; Ellis v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 51 Cal.App.2d 753, 125 P.2d 521; State ex rel. Jones v. Nolte, 350 Mo. 271, 165 S.W.2d 632; Ambrosia Brewing Co. v. Bowles, Em.App., 147 F.2d 550, 553.
In addition to this, the act conforms with every impulse of right, justice and decency. Even the birds, the dumb animals and the savages are imbued with an instinctive sense of responsibility to provide for their young while they are unable to provide for themselves. That is all the act in question does and the reason is that the ill-fated mother and the equally ill-fated offspring may not become a charge on the public. There is no better settled principle of public policy than that it is the duty of every man to provide food and raiment for his own, and the purpose of the statute was to spell out this principle and apply it to all of his own even though they be bastards. It imposed no responsibility that was not already in good conscience incumbent on the father of a bastard.
It follows that the judgment appealed from must be and is hereby reversed.
Reversed.
SEBRING, C.J., and THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.