Summary
In Rondini, the Compensation Review Board held it lacked jurisdiction over appeals relating to Sec. 31-290a as the statute specifically provides "Any party aggrieved by the decision of the commissioner may appeal the decision to the appellate court."
Summary of this case from Deming v. StateOpinion
CASE NO. 1231 CRD-6-91-5
DECEMBER 4, 1992
The claimant was represented by Anthony O. Famiglietti, Esq., Famiglietti, Thompson, Vollario Mastrianni.
The respondent was represented by Paul H. D. Stoughton, Esq., Reid and Reige, P.C.
This petition for Review from the May 8, 1991 Decision of a Commissioner At Large acting for the Sixth District was heard March 13, 1992 before a Compensation Review Division Panel consisting of the then Commission Chairman, John Arcudi and Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Donald H. Doyle.
OPINION
The respondent employer seeks review of the May 8, 1991 ruling which concluded that the employer had violated Sec. 31-290a (a) by failing to permit claimant's return to work. Sec. 31-290a (a) provides "No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter."
Claimant sustained an injury October 28, 1987. Two Voluntary Agreements between the parties approved by the Sixth District January 4, 1988 and March 23, 1989 respectively recite the occurrence of a compensable injury with maximum medical improvement having been reached October 10, 1988; the last Agreement also awards specific benefits for ten (10%) percent permanent partial loss of use of the spine. Claimant attempted return to work in October, 1988 but was not allowed in the employer's premises despite a note from Dr. Melville Roberts indicating she could return to work. See Claimant's Exhibit A. Dr. Roberts had also imposed a 35 pound weight restriction. Claimant's Exhibit A and Respondent's Exhibit A1.
She again attempted to return to work in October, 1989 when Dr. A. F. Serbin, M.D. gave her a note October 23, 1989 stating, "Donna Rondini may return to regular work 10/30/89." Claimant's Exhibit C. A week after that note Dr. Serbin wrote a letter dated October 30, 1989 indicating his belief that it was in the best interest of the claimant to be able to return to work. Claimant's Exhibit B. But on November 15, 1989, Mr. Art Van Vleet, Vice President, Operations, wrote claimant that there was no suitable work available for her because placing her in her regular job would pose a risk of injury and was not in the claimant's best interest.
The trial commissioner concluded that the employer had violated Sec. 31-290a and awarded back pay, attorney's fees and interest. The employer's appeal contends: (1) the commissioner applied the wrong legal standard, (2) he improperly excluded certain evidence and (3) failed to find certain facts. In its brief the respondent made reference to an Award by Stipulation approved January 17, 1990 by the Sixth District. That Stipulation contained the following language:
The above consideration of FIFTEEN THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($15,000.00) settles on a full and final basis all claims in regards to the indemnity aspect to this claim, but does not settle or close out the medical portion.
It is further agreed by and between the parties hereto that the medical coverage will remain open. It is understood and agreed by the parties hereto that commencing January 1, 1990, and for each succeeding year the claimant, will be liable to assume the cost of the first FIVE HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($500.00) of any reasonable and authorized medical treatment associated with the alleged injuries she sustained as a result of her accident of October 27, 1987. In addition the Respondents agree to waive the FIVE HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($500.00) deductible if the claimant must undergo corrective spinal surgery as a result of her alleged injury dating back to October 27, 1987.
It is further agreed by and between the parties hereto that this payment shall constitute a full, final and complete settlement, accord and satisfaction of any claim for compensation past, present and future arising out of the alleged foregoing accident as well as any claim for compensation which may be due to anyone in case of the death of this Claimant, to the end that the payment of such sum shall constitute a complete satisfaction of all claims for indemnity benefits due or to become due at any time in favor of anybody on account of the claimed injury, or on account of any condition in any way resulting out of the said injury, or on account of the death of the Claimant.
It is further agreed by and between the parties that this Stipulation was not induced or entered into by fraud, accident, mistake or duress, and that none of the parties shall have any further claims under the Workers' Compensation Act, of the State of Connecticut, except any right granted by Section 31-293 of the Workers' Compensation Act.
It is understood and agreed that before the Claimant signed this Stipulation, she read the same or the same was explained to her and she understands that it is a full and final settlement for indemnity benefits, and that she will not and cannot in the future make any claim for indemnity benefits known or unknown at this time, or which may be developed and be claimed to be connected with the aforesaid injury.
The respondent contends that the above Stipulation bars the claimant's Sec. 31-290a claim as the Stipulation was an accord and satisfaction between the parties and bars all further claims under the Workers' Compensation Act. The claimant cries foul and argues that the Stipulation was never introduced into evidence before the trial commissioner, never mentioned in any of the proceedings before the trial commissioner, the respondent's reasons of appeal or amended reasons of appeal, nor did the respondent's motion to submit additional evidence include the Award by Stipulation. The claimant claims that her first notice of the respondent's intention to raise the Award by Stipulation as an accord and satisfaction was in the respondent's December 24, 1991 brief before this panel. The claimant argues, inter alia, that the Stipulation should not be considered as it was not part of the trial record. The claimant seems to dispute the existence of the Stipulation. We find this logic rather curious as the claimant and her counsel both signed the Stipulation. Further it seems that the Stipulation was a part of the district file and the trial commissioner took administrative notice of the district workers' compensation file. See April 5, 1991 Formal Hearing TR at 49.
In support of its position the claimant cites Daniele v. Angelo Monarca, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 25, 519 CRD-3-86 (1988), a case in which the CRD rejected respondents' claim that there had been a stipulation to limit the hearing to a determination of liability. However, in Daniele two stipulations were referred to in the Compensation Review Division's Opinion. The first was "a stipulated settlement approved February 11, 1982 by the Third District." That stipulation i.e., the approved stipulated settlement was quite clearly part of the record considered by the Compensation Review Division. However, the second reference to a "stipulation" was an alleged oral stipulation by the parties in which they purportedly agreed to limit the issues to be decided by the trial commissioner. That stipulation, i.e. the purported oral stipulation limiting issues was the stipulation which did not appear in the record before the trial commissioner. We thus fail to see why the existence of the Award by Stipulation and its contents are not properly before us.
We must next consider whether the Stipulation in the instant matter acts as a bar to the Sec. 31-290a claim of the claimant. The language in the instant Stipulation indicated that it was a "full, final and complete settlement, accord and satisfaction of any claim for compensation past, present and future . . . [and] shall constitute a complete satisfaction of a claims for indemnity benefits . . . It is further agreed by and between the parties . . . that none of the parties shall have any further claims under the Workers' Compensation Act, of the State of Connecticut, except any rights granted by Section 31-293 of the Workers' Compensation Act." It seems to us that the language contained in the instant Stipulation was plain and unambiguous. It clearly provided that the Stipulation settled all claims under the Workers' Compensation Act except for medical coverage and Sec. 31-293 claims.
It is also clear under our case law an Award by Stipulation is a binding award which, on its terms, bars a further claim for compensation unless Sec. 31-315, which allows for modification, is satisfied. See e.g. Welch v. Arthur A. Fogarty, Inc., 157 Conn. 538 (1969); Sugrue v. Champion, 128 Conn. 574 (1942); Wallace v. Lux Clock Co., 120 Conn. 280 (1935). Thus in order to modify a Stipulation one would have to show;
that the incapacity of an injured employee has increased, decreased or ceased, or that the measure of dependence on account of which the compensation is paid has changed, or that changed conditions of fact have arisen which necessitate a change of such agreement or award in order properly to carry out the spirit of this chapter. . . .
Sec. 31-315.
In this instance, neither side has alleged that any of the above conditions was met. The claimant merely asks us to construe the Stipulation so as to exclude her Sec. 31-290a claim from its reach and thus, not to allow the Stipulation to bar a later Sec. 31-290a award. Terms contained in stipulations are construed in the same way as terms in other written instruments. Sugrue, supra at 577, noted, "[I]t is a rule of interpretation that where particular recitals precede general words a release will be restricted to the matters particularly recited . . . This technical rule, however, is subordinate to the broad general rule of interpretation that the intention of the parties which the words of the instruments express, in the light of the circumstances existing at the time, shall prevail." (citations omitted) Id.
In the present case, the alleged discriminatory acts occurred prior to the date of the Stipulation at issue. Thus, conduct and actions which claimant contends violate Sec. 31-290a were events of which the claimant had knowledge at the time the Stipulation was entered into. Besides, claimant was then represented by counsel and is here represented by that same same counsel. Therefore, it cannot now be argued that the plain language of the Stipulation relinquishing "any further claims under the Workers' Compensation Act . . . except any rights granted by Section 31-293 . . ." fails to include rights under Sec. 31-290a which are clearly part of that Act.
This opinion until now has dealt only with the merits of the matter as presented by the arguments of the parties. We have done so as if the commissioner below and the Compensation Review Division/Board had jurisdiction to hear the matter. Sec. 31-290a was enacted in 1984, P.A. 84-300, S. 1, 2. That statute contained its own appeal provisions providing for an appeal from the Commissioner's decision to the Appellate Court. Sec. 31-301 it existed at the time of this appeal was enacted in 1979. Public Act 79-540, provided that any decision of a commissioner was appealable to the Compensation Review Division. The 1984 enactment was later than the 1979 legislation and in it the legislature chose to ignore the existing appeal mechanism in Chapter 568 matters. Instead it created a new and different appeal procedure for Sec. 31-290a claims. As the Compensation Review Division/Board appellate jurisdiction is entirely a creature of the statute, the CRD had no statutory jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
However the trial commissioner's jurisdiction also is a creature of statute. The commissioner's jurisdiction over the subject matter in this instance could only exist if the Award by Stipulation were modifiable under Sec. 31-315. We have previously determined that none of the conditions specified in that statute here exist. The Stipulation had erased all claims under the Workers Compensation Act except third party claims under Sec. 31-293. There thus existed no res over which the trial commissioner had jurisdiction. Because of this lack of jurisdiction, the commissioner had no power to issue a Sec. 31-290a award. As lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage in the proceedings, we may properly consider the point and do have the power so to rule.
Therefore the decision below is set aside and the appeal of the respondent is sustained. By ruling today that the Compensation Review Board lacks jurisdiction to hear and decide Sec. 31-290a matters we overrule our prior rulings in Anderson v. State of Connecticut, 9 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 153, 958 CRD-5-89-12 (1991) and Hill v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 8 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 98, 832 CRD-7-89-3 (1990) insofar as they are inconsistent with this ruling.
Commissioner Frank Verrilli and Donald H. Doyle concur.