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In Romer, we held that Pueblo County "was acting as a subordinate state agency" when it made social service expenditures.
Summary of this case from Bd. of Cty. v. Colorado HlthOpinion
No. 96SC626
April 6, 1998 Opinion modified, and as modified, Petition for Rehearing DENIED April 27, 1998
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
JUDGMENT REVERSED
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, Paul Farley, Deputy Attorney General, Wade Livingston, First Assistant Attorney General, State Services Section, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioners.
Wm. David Lytle, Special Assistant County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, Terry A. Hart, Clifford J. Hofmann, Jr., Pueblo, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.
In Board of County Commissioners v. Romer, 931 P.2d 504 (Colo.App. 1996), we granted certiorari to decide a single question: Does a county department of social services have standing to compel the State Department of Human Services to reduce statewide social services expenditures? We hold that it does not.
Our order set forth the following question: "Whether a Board of County Commissioners has standing to sue the Governor and the Department of Human Services to obtain a reduction in social services expenditures."
In Romer, the court of appeals, concluding that the county has exclusive control over its own budgetary and financial matters and that current state expenditures would result in a deficit, determined that the county "has statutory authority to seek judicial review of the Department's actions." Id. at 508-09. Because we see no such legislative grant of authority to counties of an express right to seek judicial review of the actions of a superior state agency, we disagree. We hold that a county does not have standing to obtain judicial review of the actions of the state department, a superior agency, in order to reduce social services expenditures. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
I. Factual and Legal History
The petitioners before us are trial defendants Roy Romer, Governor of the State of Colorado; the Department of Human Services; Barbara McDonnell, the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services; and the State Board of Human Services and its members in their official capacity (collectively, the "Department"). The plaintiff in the trial court and the respondent before us is the Pueblo County Board of County Commissioners (County). Before discussing the facts of this case, we briefly review Colorado public assistance law.
The pleadings set forth Bruce D. Bass, Dr. Carole Custer, Shirley M. Baty, Cami Learned, Shirl McGuire-Beldin, and Youlon D. Savage as members of the State Board of Human Services. We also note that, initially, the Department was identified as the Department of Social Services. However, effective July 1, 1994, the General Assembly restructured and redesignated the Department of Social Services as the Department of Human Services. The Social Service Code, 26-1-101 to -128, 11B C.R.S. (1989), was redesignated as the Human Services Code, 26-1-101 to -201, 11B C.R.S. (1995). In doing so, the General Assembly expressly provided that no suit, action, or other proceeding commenced prior to the effective date of the statutory changes against the newly created Department of Human Services or its officers "shall abate by reason of the transfer of duties and functions from the [Department of Social Services] to the department of human services." 26-1-105.5(7), 8 C.R.S. (1997). See Board of County Comm'rs v. Romer, 931 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo.App. 1996).
A. Colorado Public Assistance Law
Under the Colorado Human Services Code, 26-1-101 to -201, 8 C.R.S. (1997) (Human Services Code), the costs of our state public assistance programs are shared by the federal government, the county, and the state. See Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 697 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo. 1985). State and county agencies have "funding responsibility together with general state control over public assistance programs," Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 697 P.2d at 5, which include medical assistance, adult foster care programs, child welfare services, programs for the aging, and programs established pursuant to the Colorado Medical Assistance Act. See 26-1-109, 8 C.R.S. (1997).
For an overview of the history of public assistance programs in Colorado, see Colorado Department of Social Services v. Board of County Commissioners, 697 P.2d 1, 5-9 (Colo. 1985).
Under current law, eighty percent of the overall program and administrative costs of public assistance are paid by the federal government and the state; the remaining twenty percent are paid by the county. See 26-1-122(1)(d), (3)(b), (4)(b), 8 C.R.S. (1997); Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 697 P.2d at 6. The funds representing the county's twenty percent contribution are collected from the proceeds of an ad valorem tax levied on property located within the county. See 26-1-125, 8 C.R.S. (1997); Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 697 P.2d at 7. The county's contribution to the costs of public assistance programs results from the social services mill levy, the proceeds of which are maintained in a county social services fund. See 26-1-123, 8 C.R.S. (1997).
A county's share of the program costs varies from program to program. For example, the state bears the entire cost of Old Age Pension payments, see Colo. Const. art XXIV; Low Income Energy Assistance Program costs are financed entirely by the federal government, see 26-2-122.5, 8 C.R.S. (1997); while the county pays five percent of the program costs of the aid to the needy, disabled home care, and adult foster care programs, see 26-1-122(4)(e), 8 C.R.S. (1997).
As might be expected in a state of urban as well as rural and agricultural centers, the funding burden for these statewide programs does not operate equally among the various counties. Some counties have residents with greater social services needs than others, while some counties have taxable property with much greater value than other counties. As a result, some counties must impose taxes at a higher mill levy than their sister counties in order to generate sufficient funds to pay their share of administrative and program costs. See 26-1-123, 26-1-125, and 26-1-126, 8 C.R.S. (1997).
Addressing this inequality, the General Assembly created a county contingency fund (Contingency Fund) to provide additional state funds to counties with relatively greater social services needs but a relatively lower assessed value of taxable property. See 26-1-126. In essence, as is relevant to Pueblo County and the case before us, the contingency fund statute, section 26-1-126, provides that if Pueblo County imposes a property tax of 3.0 or greater mill levy and the proceeds of such a tax do not generate sufficient funds to pay the county's obligations as set forth in section 26-1-122, 8 C.R.S. (1997), or, generally, the twenty percent share of administration and public assistance program costs, the county is eligible for payments from the Contingency Fund. See 26-1-126(2); Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 697 P.2d at 8. Under the funding scheme of the Contingency Fund, however, the state is only obligated to advance fifty percent of the difference between the county's obligation and monies raised by the social services mill levy (the shortfall). See 26-1-126(3), 8 C.R.S. (1997). In effect, then, this funding scheme requires the county itself to match, dollar-for-dollar, any payments made out of the Contingency Fund. See Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 697 P.2d at 21-23. Hence, any shortfall is covered by both other county funds as well as any Contingency Fund advancements.
In Colorado Department of Social Services, we examined the legislative history and earlier amendments to our Human Services Code and held that by establishing the Contingency Fund, the General Assembly intended to obligate the state to pay each county for fifty percent of any shortfall. Justice Kirshbaum, writing for a unanimous court, opined that: "By replacing the word `may' with `shall,' the General Assembly indicated an intent to make mandatory the advancement of funds to qualifying counties. The references . . . to the [State] Department's responsibility for funding eighty percent of public assistance programs subject to funds made available for that purpose, indicates that the contingency fund provision requires additional funding." Id. at 22. However, while our interpretation of the plain language of the Contingency Fund Statute in that case was sound, the General Assembly amended that statute.
We emphasize that in Colorado Department of Social Services, we were not called upon to address, nor did we decide, the issue of standing. Therefore, its precedential value should not be read or assumed to resolve the question of standing, which was then not before us. Cf. Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 (1984) ("[w]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us."); Indian Oasis-Baboquirari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 40 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1996), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 109 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 1997) ("It is well settled . . . that the exercise of jurisdiction in a case is not precedent for the existence of jurisdiction."); Glidden v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 808 F.2d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1986) ("when a court resolves a case on the merits without discussing its jurisdiction to act, it does not establish a precedent requiring similar treatment of other cases once the jurisdictional problem has come to light.").
Finding disfavor with a result that obligated the state to make unlimited appropriations to the Contingency Fund to cover county shortfalls, the General Assembly responded by amending the Human Services Code, enacting House Bill No. 1376 on June 11, 1985 (the Act). See 1985 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 58 at 289-90. The Act consisted of three principal provisions. The first provision enacted section 2-4-215, 1 C.R.S. (1997). Section 2-4-215 served to clarify the rules of statutory construction by making it clear that legislation passed by one session of the General Assembly cannot bind any future legislative session to appropriate any sums of money. The second provision of the Act added section 26-1-126.5, 8 C.R.S. (1997), to the Human Services Code. Section 26-1-126.5, in effect, amended the contingency fund statute or section 26-1-126 by emphasizing that the existence of the Contingency Fund does not "result in any state liability for amounts not appropriated" to that fund and by expressly stating that the General Assembly has complete discretion to "determine annually the level of funding" in the Contingency Fund. 26-1-126.5. Finally, the third provision of the Act added a new subsection, section 26-1-126(5), 8 C.R.S. (1997), to the contingency fund statute. Section 26-1-126(5) provides, in pertinent part:
Section 2-4-215 provides:
(1) The general assembly finds and declares, pursuant to the constitution of the state of Colorado, that each general assembly is a separate entity, and the acts of one general assembly are not binding on future general assemblies. Accordingly, no legislation passed by one general assembly requiring an appropriation shall bind future general assemblies.
(2) Furthermore, the general assembly finds and declares that when a statute provides for the proration of amounts in the event appropriations are insufficient, the general assembly has not committed itself to any particular level of funding, does not create any rights in the ultimate recipients of such funding or in any political subdivision or agency which administers such funds, and clearly intends that the level of funding under such a statute is in the full and complete discretion of the general assembly.
If state and county appropriations are insufficient to meet the administrative and program costs of public assistance and the administrative costs of medical assistance and food stamps, then the executive director of the department of social services and the state board of social services shall act pursuant to sections 26-1-121 (1) (c) and 26-1-122 (5) to reduce the rate of expenditures so that it matches the available funds.
In this fashion, the legislature acted to alter the result that would otherwise follow from our decision in Colorado Department of Social Services. See 26-1-126.5.
B. Stipulated Facts
The facts of this dispute are based, in substantial part, upon a joint stipulation of facts filed before the trial court. This case involves State fiscal years 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991. During those years, the General Assembly did not appropriate sufficient money to the Contingency Fund so as to allow the County to meet its social services obligation or its twenty percent share burden. Accordingly, the County received $1,612,187 less from the Contingency Fund than necessary to meet its social services obligations. Because it received less money from the Contingency Fund than it expected, the County social services fund showed a deficit for each of the fiscal years in question, amounting to a total of $1,612,187.
We also note that under the supplemental funding scheme of the Contingency Fund, see 26-1-126(3), the state requires the County to match each dollar advanced by the state. Thus, because it must also contribute one-half of the amount of its projected shortfall, the County will suffer a deficit regardless of the amount appropriated by the General Assembly to the Contingency Fund.
The County sought administrative relief from its social services deficits in the form of a reduction in statewide expenditures for social services pursuant to section 26-1-126(5). When state officials refused to voluntarily reduce statewide social services budget expenditures that were legislatively approved and appropriated, the County initiated judicial proceedings against the Department.
C. Proceedings Below
On May 6, 1991, the County filed a complaint in the Denver District Court. Citing the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), section 24-4-106(4) and (4.5), the County sought a declaratory judgment that the Department's failure to reduce the rate of statewide social services expenditures was "arbitrary and capricious, [and] a denial of the statutory rights" of the County. In its prayer, the County asked the trial court to issue an order directing the Department "to reduce the rate of statewide social services expenditure" and to "reimburse Pueblo County for its current social services deficit."
For purposes of this opinion, all references to the "Department" shall include the Department of Social Services and its successor agency, the Department of Human Services. See note 2 supra.
On June 6, 1991, the County commenced a second law suit by filing a complaint in the Pueblo County District Court. That complaint named the Department as defendants and asked the Pueblo court to "enjoin" any efforts by defendants to compel the County to pay its social services fund deficit with county funds. In its complaint, the County asserted that sections 26-1-121(1)(c), 26-1-122(5), and 26-1-126(5), 8 C.R.S. (1997), imposed certain duties upon the Department and established statutory legal rights in each county, that is, the power "to reduce the rate of statewide social services expenditure."
Sometime thereafter, the Pueblo County District Court case was transferred to the Denver District Court (trial court) and the two cases were consolidated. No administrative record of the questioned Department action or inaction was ever filed with the trial court. On April 15, 1994, however, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
We observe that the County's claims with respect to fiscal years 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990 may be time barred due to the County's failure to timely file a civil action within thirty days of the agency action or inaction. See 24-4-106(4), 7 C.R.S. (1997); Buzick v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n of Colorado, 849 P.2d 869, 870 (Colo.App. 1992) (complaint for judicial review of decision of administrative review board must be filed within thirty days of final agency action). Here, however, there was no jurisdictional challenge below. In any event, that is not the case with regard to the County Board's subsection 5 claim pertaining to fiscal year 1991. Hence, for purposes of this proceeding, we assume that the claim was timely filed.
In its answer to the complaints, the Department asserted a counterclaim against the County. The counterclaim, however, was dismissed at the request and agreement of the parties.
The trial court granted the Department's motion and dismissed the County's complaint. Relying on Board of County Commissioners v. Merit System Council, 662 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Colo.App. 1982), the trial court ruled that the County is subordinate to the Department, a "superior state agency," and, therefore, does "not have standing to challenge the actions" of the Department. On April 4, 1995, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Department.
On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the County had standing and reversed. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Romer, 931 P.2d 504 (Colo.App. 1996). The court of appeals noted that the County administers its county services budget and has "exclusive authority over all budgetary and financial matters of Pueblo County." Id. at 509. The court of appeals found that the County social services fund "experienced a short-fall that adversely affected the general financial well-being of the county." Id. at 508. Despite concluding the County is subordinate to the Department, the court of appeals held that "under the facts of this case the [County] has statutory authority to seek judicial review of the Department's actions." The court reasoned that because the Department's actions adversely affected the County's general financial well-being, under APA section 24-4-106(4), 10A C.R.S. (1986), the County has standing because it was adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action. See id. at 508-10. The court of appeals, therefore, held that the County has standing and could compel the Department to comply with its statutory duties under section 26-1-126(5), 8 C.R.S. (1997).
II. Standing: Constitutional and Prudential Components
"The question of standing involves a consideration of whether a plaintiff has asserted a legal basis on which a claim for relief can be predicated." Board of County Comm'rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assoc., 830 P.2d 1045, 1052 (Colo. 1992). Standing therefore is that concept of justiciability that is concerned with whether a particular person may raise legal arguments or claims. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (no justiciable controversy is presented when there is no standing to maintain the action).
A. Constitutional Considerations
As we have previously held, the constitutional requirements for standing, and hence, exercise of the judicial power of government, are set forth in the two-step test announced in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977). The Wimberly test of standing is satisfied if: (1) the plaintiff was injured in fact; and (2) that injury was to a legal right protected by statutory provisions which allegedly have been violated. See Wimberly, 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. The existence of standing necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of our courts depends upon a showing that the action complained of has caused or threatens to cause injury to an interest protected by law. See Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 516 (Colo. 1985).
The first step, the injury in fact requirement, "is derived from the state constitutional limitation on judicial power requiring the presence of an actual controversy, which is demonstrated by a real injury." Douglas County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Public Util. Comm'n, 829 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Colo. 1992) (citing Colo. Const. art. VI, 1; Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1323). The second step requires that a plaintiff show that its interest is derived from a recognized legal interest, such as a statute, creating a legally cognizable interest that is concrete and particularized. See Douglas County, 829 P.2d at 1309.
B. Prudential Considerations
Our standing inquiry, however, involves both "constitutional and judge-made prudential considerations." Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317, 1324 (Colo. 1989) (citing Lamm, 700 P.2d at 515-16)). In addition to the two-part standing test set out in Wimberly, prudential considerations follow the "general rule that counties do not have standing to obtain judicial review of a decision of a superior state agency." Id. (citing Lamm v. Barber, 192 Colo. 511, 519, 565 P.2d 538, 544 (1977)).
This judge-made prudential rule exists so that courts do not unnecessarily intrude into matters which are more properly committed to resolution in another branch of government. See Maurer, 797 P.2d at 1323 ("[W]e have concluded that absent contrary statutory authority, disputes between a subordinate and a superior state agency are properly to be resolved within the executive branch without resort to judicial review."). This is particularly apparent in a dispute between two executive agencies involving intra-agency relationships. That is, standing does not exist unless, of course, the legislature has exercised its prerogative to grant to the subsidiary agency by "an express statutory right" the ability to sue a superior agency. See Martin v. District Court, 191 Colo. 107, 109, 550 P.2d 864, 866 (1976). The rule of Martin, in essence, represents our considered judgment of twenty years, as evinced in our precedent, see Martin, 191 Colo. at 109, 550 P.2d at 866; Barber, 192 Colo. at 519, 565 P.2d at 544; Maurer, 797 P.2d at 1323; Douglas County, 829 P.2d at 1309-10, that we leave to the General Assembly the answer to the question that controls our deliberations today: whether we acknowledge the right to judicial review as an attribute of any subordinate agency. Thus, without a plain and unmistakable expression of such intent by the legislature, the judiciary will not expand the rights of a subordinate agency to include the right to obtain judicial review of the actions of a superior agency. In other words, without an express statutory right to secure judicial intervention, we assume that any intra-agency dispute is better saved for determination through the political, and not judicial, process.
In that regard, we find wisdom in our precedent and practice that defers to the political process the protection of an alleged right or interest that may not be properly determined here but left to our sister branches of government. Hence, until the General Assembly speaks otherwise, the intra-agency dispute is not one suitable for resolution by the courts and, prudently, is not justiciable. We recognize in our judge-made rule, of course, that where the General Assembly expressly provides that a subordinate agency may seek judicial review of the actions of a superior state agency, standing does exist. This is so where a statute explicitly confers a right upon a subordinate agency to seek judicial review of the superior agency decision. See Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1323; Martin, 191 Colo. at 109, 550 P.2d at 866. In Maurer, we highlighted that both tests apply to the standing analysis where a subordinate agency sues the state:
The rule of Martin is a specialized one that operates to preclude standing in certain instances where we have concluded that absent contrary statutory authority, disputes between a subordinate and a superior state agency are properly to be resolved within the executive branch without resort to judicial review. However, in order to establish standing, a plaintiff must still demonstrate that she satisfies the requirements of the general standing analysis developed in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977).
Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1323. Therefore, in a case like the one before us, involving a subordinate agency seeking review of the action of a superior agency, we apply both tests for standing: the two-part inquiry as enunciated in Wimberly, and the rule of Martin.
III. Applying the Rule of Martin
In bringing the present claim, the County relies primarily on section 26-1-126(5) and section 24-4-106(4) of the APA. In addition, the court of appeals relied upon the county's general statutory attribute of "exclusive authority" over all its budgetary and financial matters, see Romer, 931 P.2d at 509, but did not offer any language of express grant to support its result. As explained further below, these statutes simply do not evince an express legislative grant to the County of a right to seek review of adverse Department decisions.
A. Section 26-1-126(5)
The Department seeks reversal of the court of appeals' judgment upholding the county's standing to seek judicial review asserting that, as a subordinate agency, the county is without power to obtain judicial review. We agree.
In Martin, 191 Colo. at 109, 550 P.2d at 866, we held that "[i]n the absence of an express statutory right, a subordinate state agency (the county board) lacks standing or any other legal authority to obtain judicial review of an action of a superior state agency." Id. (emphasis added). We have continued to follow this standing test for subordinate agencies in our subsequent cases. See, e.g., Douglas County, 829 P.2d at 1309-10; Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1320-23; City and County of Denver v. Brockhurst Boys Ranch, Inc., 195 Colo. 22, 27, 575 P.2d 843, 846 (1978).
1. The County is a "subordinate agency"
In the present case, the County was acting as a subordinate state agency. The Colorado Human Services Code, 26-1-101 to -201, 8 C.R.S. (1997), is unmistakably clear in pointing out that a county board is an agent of the state when it makes expenditures for social services. Section 26-1-118(1), 8 C.R.S. (1997), states in relevant part: "The count[ies] . . . shall serve as agents of the state department and shall be charged with the administration of public assistance and welfare and related activities in the respective counties in accordance with the rules and regulations of the state department." (Emphasis added.)
In support of this view that counties are, with respect to actions related to their social services budgets, subordinate agents of the state, we note that a county may not adopt a social services budget until it has been submitted to the state for review, see 26-1-124, and the county social services fund must be administered in accordance with state rules, see 26-1-123. Indeed, in the extreme case where a county has failed to comply with state rules regarding social services, the state may terminate all financial assistance to the county and directly administer the social services programs of the county. See 26-1-109(4)(b), (c), 8 C.R.S. (1997). Moreover, our cases have consistently held that a county board, when acting in its capacity as the county board of social services, is a subordinate agency of the Department. See Brockhurst Boys Ranch, 195 Colo. at 27, 575 P.2d at 846; Martin, 191 Colo. at 109, 550 P.2d at 865; Board of County Comm'rs v. State Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 442, 528 P.2d 244, 247-48 (1974). We recently reiterated that result in Romer v. Board of County Commissioners for County of Weld, 897 P.2d 779 (Colo. 1995) (county social services program functions as agent of state) and State v. Board of County Commissioners of Mesa County, 897 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1995) (same). Here, because the County was both making expenditures for social services and was acting in its capacity as the county board of social services, the County was a subordinate agency to the Department.
2. The absence of express authority
As a subordinate agency of the state, the County may seek judicial review of the Department's action only if the General Assembly so provided by express statutory authorization. See Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1320; Martin, 191 Colo. at 109, 550 P.2d at 866. Upon examining the relevant statute, see 26-1-126(5), 8 C.R.S. (1997), we conclude that the General Assembly has not granted express authority to the County to sue the Department. Section 26-1-126(5) provides:
Each county eligible for county contingency funds pursuant to this section shall only be responsible for an amount equal to the county's pro rata share of the general assembly's appropriation to the county contingency fund. If state and county appropriations are insufficient to meet the administrative and program costs of public assistance and the administrative costs of medical assistance and food stamps, then the executive director of the department of human services, the executive director of the department of health care policy and financing, and the state board of human services shall act pursuant to sections 26-1-121(1)(c) and 26-1-122(5) to reduce the rate of expenditure so that it matches the available funds.
Section 26-1-122(5), 8 C.R.S. (1997), provides:
(5) If in any fiscal year the annual appropriation by the general assembly for the state's share, together with any available federal funds for any income maintenance or social services program, or the administration of either, is not sufficient to advance to the counties the full eighty percent share of costs, said program or the administration thereof shall be temporarily reduced by the state board, so that all available state and federal funds shall continue to constitute eighty percent of the costs.
Section 26-1-121(c), 8 C.R.S. (1997), provides:
(c) When the executive director determines that adequate appropriations for the payment of the costs described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) have not been made and that an overexpenditure of an appropriation will occur based upon the state department's estimates, the state board may take actions consistent with state and federal law to bring the rate of expenditure into line with available funds. The general assembly declares that case load and utilization based on medical necessity are legitimate reasons for supplemental funding.
Section 26-1-121(1)(a), 8 C.R.S. (1997), provides:
(1)(a) For carrying out the duties and obligations of the state department and county departments under the provisions of this title and for matching such federal funds as may be available for public assistance and welfare activities in the state, including but not limited to assistance payments, food stamps (except the value of food stamp coupons), social services, medical assistance, child welfare services, rehabilitation, programs for the aging and for veterans, and related activities, the general assembly, in accordance with the constitution and laws of the state of Colorado, shall make adequate appropriations for the payment of such costs pursuant to the budget prepared by the executive director.
Section 26-1-122(5), 8 C.R.S. (1997), provides:
(5) If in any fiscal year the annual appropriation by the general assembly for the state's share, together with any available federal funds for any income maintenance or social services program, or the administration of either, is not sufficient to advance to the counties the full eighty percent share of costs, said program or the administration thereof shall be temporarily reduced by the state board, so that all available state and federal funds shall continue to constitute eighty percent of the costs.
Section 26-1-121(c), 8 C.R.S. (1997), provides:
(c) When the executive director determines that adequate appropriations for the payment of the costs described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) have not been made and that an overexpenditure of an appropriation will occur based upon the state department's estimates, the state board may take actions consistent with state and federal law to bring the rate of expenditure into line with available funds. The general assembly declares that case load and utilization based on medical necessity are legitimate reasons for supplemental funding.
Section 26-1-121(1)(a), 8 C.R.S. (1997), provides:
(1)(a) For carrying out the duties and obligations of the state department and county departments under the provisions of this title and for matching such federal funds as may be available for public assistance and welfare activities in the state, including but not limited to assistance payments, food stamps (except the value of food stamp coupons), social services, medical assistance, child welfare services, rehabilitation, programs for the aging and for veterans, and related activities, the general assembly, in accordance with the constitution and laws of the state of Colorado, shall make adequate appropriations for the payment of such costs pursuant to the budget prepared by the executive director.
Nowhere in the statute is it evident that the legislature has expressly conferred on counties, or any other subordinate state agency, standing to sue the Department.
In further support, we contrast the present case with Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1317. In that case, we assumed that the Property Tax Administrator of the State of Colorado (the Administrator) was a subordinate state agency to the Board of Assessment Appeals (the Board), and concluded that the relevant statute in that case authorized the Administrator to sue the Board. See id. at 1321. Unlike section 26-1-126(5), however, the statute at issue in Maurer explicitly allowed the respondent to seek judicial review of the Board's decisions. Section 39-2-117(6), 16B C.R.S. (1988 Supp.), provided:
If the decision of the board is against the respondent, the respondent, upon the recommendation of the board that it is a matter of statewide concern and within thirty days after such decision, may petition the district court of the county in which the property is located for judicial review pursuant to section 24-4-106, [10A] C.R.S. [1988].
Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1321 (emphasis added). After we concluded that the Administrator was a proper respondent, we logically held that the statute expressly allowed the Administrator to seek judicial review in "the district court" of the Board's decision. See id. at 1322-23.
In contrast with the statute at issue in Maurer, however, here, section 26-1-126(5) is strikingly different. Section 26-1-126(5) authorizes the executive director and state board to "reduce the rate of expenditures so that it matches the available funds" when "state and county appropriations are insufficient" to meet social services program costs. Unlike section 39-2-117(6), in Maurer, which stated that the respondent agency "may petition the district court," section 26-1-126(5) does not even mention judicial review, nor does it address any recourse in the event the Department does not act accordingly. Succinctly, subsection (5) simply does not provide the county with a right to seek judicial review in district court. Cf. Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1321. This is not an error of omission, but a statement of legislative intent. The General Assembly has created such a right elsewhere in our Human Services Code and did so by the use of unmistakable language. See 26-1-120 (providing "[a] county board shall have the right to obtain judicial review of a decision of the merit system council concerning the county directly in accordance with section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973") (emphasis added); see also Douglas County 829 P.2d at 1308 (statute at issue provided that "each party to the action or proceeding before the commission shall have the right to appear in the review proceedings") (emphasis added). We find no such language in section 26-1-126(5).
We therefore conclude that, under Martin and related case law, section 26-1-126(5) does not expressly grant a right to file suit. The County's reliance on subsection 5 for standing to seek judicial review of the Department's decision is misplaced.
B. Section 24-4-106(4) of the APA
The County also contends that section 24-4-106(4) of the APA provides standing to compel the Department to reduce the statewide rate of social services expenditures. Section 24-4-106(4) provides that:
[A]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action may commence an action for judicial review in the district court within thirty days after such agency action becomes effective; but, if such agency action occurs in relation to any hearing pursuant to section 24-4-105 [adjudicatory determinations], then the person must also have been a party to such agency hearing. A proceeding for such review may be brought against the agency by its official title, individuals who comprise the agency, or any person representing the agency or acting on its behalf in the matter sought to be reviewed. The complaint shall state the facts upon which the plaintiff bases the claim that he has been adversely affected or aggrieved, the reasons entitling him to relief and the relief which he seeks. . . . Each agency conducting a rule-making proceeding shall maintain a docket listing the name, address, and telephone number of every person who has participated in a rule-making proceeding by written statement, or by oral comment at a hearing. Any person who commences suit for judicial review of the rule shall notify each person on the agency's docket of the fact that a suit has been commenced. The notice shall be sent by first-class certified mail within ten days after filing of the action and shall be accompanied by a copy of the complaint for judicial review bearing the action number of the case. Thereafter, service of process, responsive pleadings, and other matters of procedure shall be controlled by the Colorado rules of civil procedure.
(Emphasis added.) Section 24-4-106(4), however, like subsection 5 above, does not evince a legislative grant to the County of a legal right to seek judicial review of State Department decisions.
Initially, we observe that the APA does not create substantive legal rights on which a claim for relief can be based. That is, such substantive legal rights must exist either by statutory language, by the agency's rules and regulations, or by some constitutional command. Our interpretation of our APA is consistent with that of the United States Supreme Court in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977), which concluded that the federal APA did not confer substantive jurisdiction: "We thus conclude that the APA does not afford an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action." See also Alabama Cellular Serv., Inc. v. Sizemore, 565 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala. 1990) (quoting Alabama APA section 41-22-2(e): "This chapter is not meant to alter the substantive rights of any person or agency. Its impact is limited to procedural rights with the expectation that better substantive results will be achieved in the everyday conduct of state government by improving the process by which those results are attained."); Rowell v. State, 494 S.E.2d 5, 6 (Ga.App. 1997) (In enacting the APA, the legislature specifically provided that the APA did not `create any substantive rights' and denoted its requirements as procedural); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Perry, 434 S.E.2d 22, 25 (W.Va. 1993) (APA does not create substantive rights, as such rights must exist either by statutory language creating agency hearing, by agency's rules regulations or by some constitutional command); Frank E. Cooper, State Administrative Law 536 (1965) (Revised Model State Act "has in effect been construed to open the doors to judicial review only in cases where some other statute confers a right to appeal."); see generally C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 3568 (1975) (rejecting APA jurisdiction).
Section 24-4-106(4) of the APA, therefore, does not create a legally protected right so as to confer upon the County standing to seek judicial review. Rather, section 24-4-106(4) simply addresses the procedures of review available once it is properly established that the dispute is justiciable pursuant to some other statutory grant.
Additionally, the County contends that because the APA defines a "person" who may seek judicial review to include counties, 24-4-102(12), 7 C.R.S. (1997), this legislative enactment grants a county a substantive right to bring an action under the APA. We disagree.
Board of County Commissioners of Dolores County v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 470 P.2d 861 (1970), is illustrative. There, a county sought review of actions by the State Board of Equalization and the Tax Commission. The county argued it had standing because of its statutory authority to sue and be sued. We rejected this argument and explained:
The right "to sue" relates to the county's function as a body corporate and can only be exercised within the framework of the specific powers granted counties and boards of county commissioners. Such does not grant a general power to sue in any and all situations.
Id. at 126, 470 P.2d at 863 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Here, similarly, we conclude that the provision of the APA that includes counties within the definition of "person" was not intended to confer substantive rights upon counties to sue the State.
We are cognizant of our decision in Douglas County Board of Commissioners v. Public Utilities Commission, 829 P.2d 1303 (Colo. 1992). That case, however, is distinguishable. There, the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado (PUC) granted the Public Service Company of Colorado's (PSCo) application to upgrade an electric transmission line that runs through Douglas County. PSCo's request was made pursuant to the public utilities exception statute, see 30-28-127, 12A C.R.S. (1986), which authorizes the PUC to order improvements to public utility equipment (including power lines), although the improvement derogates from a county's adopted land use plan:
After the adoption of a plan, all extensions, betterments, or additions to buildings, structures, or plant or other equipment of any public utility shall only be made in conformity with such plan unless, after public hearing first had, the public utilities commission orders that such extensions, betterments, or additions to buildings, structures, or plant or other equipment are reasonable and that extensions, betterments, or additions may be made even though they conflict with the adopted plan.
30-28-127, 12A C.R.S. (1986). In granting PSCo's application, the PUC found that the deviation from the county land use plan reasonable:
The PUC also found that the factors considered in phase two of the hearing — land use, noise, property values, and aesthetics — did not adversely affect the overall reasonableness of the transmission line upgrade. Addressing phase three, the health impacts of the upgrade, the PUC concluded that, as of the time of the decision, "no known or apparent adverse health effects existed resulting from electric and magnetic fields from low level overhead power transmission lines," and, therefore, these considerations did not justify disapproval of the reasonable request to upgrade the line. Finally, again citing the policy of prudent avoidance, the Commission engaged in balancing the costs of burying the power line against the benefits of burial and concluded that burial was not warranted.
Douglas County Bd. of Comm'rs, 829 P.2d at 1306.
On appeal, the district court determined, among other things, that the Douglas County Board of Commissioners (Douglas County) had standing to request judicial review of the action of the PUC. Id. at 1304. On certiorari to this Court, we upheld the district court's decision on standing, reasoning that "section 40-6-115(1), when read in conjunction with section 24-4-106(4), confers statutory authority for the county to seek review." Id. at 1310 (emphasis added). Section 24-4-106(4) is the identical APA provision under which the County brought the present action. Section 40-6-115(1) provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he [public utilities] commission and each party to the action or proceeding before the commission shall have the right to appear in the review proceedings." (Emphasis added.) We therefore interpreted section 40-6-115(1), when read together with section 24-4-106(4), to evince a legislative intent to allow parties who appeared at the PUC proceeding to initiate an appeal. Id. at 1308.
In contrast, here, we are aware of no identifiable statutory provision that evinces a legislative intent to provide a county that has not raised its 20% share of social services funding to judicially compel the Department to lower statewide expenditures. Section 26-1-126(5) does refer to a duty. However, as previously explained, subsection 5 fails the Martin standing test because it does not provide by express statutory authorization that the County may seek judicial review of the Department's action or inaction. While the statute at issue in Douglas County Bd. of Comm'rs, 829 P.2d at 1306, expressly authorized "the right to appear in the review proceedings," subsection 5 contains no such express authorization. Therefore, the County does not have standing to sue the Department even when reading sections 26-1-126(5) and 24-4-106(4) together.
We note that the consequence of the court of appeals' holding is at odds with our earlier decisions delimiting a subordinate state agency's power to challenge the decisions of the superior state entity. Under the court of appeals' holding, anytime a statute imposes a duty on a state agency and that duty, when properly carried out, creates a benefit for a subordinate state agency, the subordinate state agency would have standing to sue the state. Thus, whenever the subordinate state agency decides that it is not receiving the benefit to which it is entitled, the subordinate state agency can summon the superior state agency into court. Such a result is contrary to our earlier case law and judge-made prudential consideration which narrowly circumscribed the situations in which a subordinate state agency could challenge state action in state court. Moreover, the court of appeals' opinion opens the door for the judiciary to become the arbiter of disputes between superior and subordinate executive agencies. Our prior cases properly recognized that the judiciary should review intra-executive disputes only when the legislature specifically placed the judiciary in that position. Consequently, we should continue to follow the policy that, unless the legislature specifically provides otherwise, the proper forum for intra-executive dispute resolution is the executive branch itself.
C. The Purposes Context Nullify Damages Claims
Finally, we observe that it is doubtful that the General Assembly intended that a section 26-1-126(5) damages claim would be enforced by a county. The legislative context of its adoption leads us to conclude that neither section 26-1-126(5), nor section 24-4-106(4) explicitly confers a substantive legal right on the County to sue for monetary damages to cover its $1,612,187 deficit. A fair reading of the plain language of the Act under which subsection 5 was adopted militates against any such conclusion for at least two reasons. First, in section 26-1-126.5, the General Assembly made it patently clear that it had full discretion not to appropriate funds for the Contingency Fund and that such exercise of legislative prerogative did not create "any state liability for amounts not appropriated" by the State. See 26-1-126.5. Second, section 2-4-215, instructs that legislation passed by one session of the General Assembly cannot bind any future legislative session to appropriate any sums of money. The essence of that Act was to allow the state to avoid any financial obligations or "liability" to the counties, a result contrary to that sought by the County.
Moreover, any reading of the statute to require monetary damages would lead to an absurd result in light of section 26-1-126.5 and section 2-4-215. See Board of County Comm'rs v. IBM Credit Corp., 888 P.2d 250, 252 (Colo. 1995) (statutes should be construed to avoid rather than to enhance absurd consequences). It would be absurd to read into the Contingency Fund statute a county right to compel an appropriation of funds by the General Assembly in the name of a money damages award. To do so would render a complete nullity of the General Assembly's explicit language in section 26-1-126.5 that it "specifically rejects . . . any implication . . . [that] would result in any state liability" and that it has complete discretion to determine the level of funding in the Contingency Fund. Such a reading would be contrary to the legislative intent that pursuant to section 2-4-215, subsequent sessions of the General Assembly are not compelled to make appropriations based on legislation passed by previous sessions. See IBM Credit Corp., 888 P.2d at 252. Accordingly, we reject the County's claim for monetary damages as contrary to the General Assembly's most clearly stated public policy when it adopted section 26-1-126(5) under the Act. See McClellan v. Meyer, 900 P.2d 24, 30 (Colo. 1995) ("It is presumed that the General Assembly intends a just and reasonable result when it enacts a statute, and a construction which leads to an absurd result will not be followed.").
Consequently, in reliance upon the same plain language, the County is without standing to hold the Department liable and to obtain monetary damages to cover its $1,612,187 deficit. Any deficits actually incurred, therefore, may best be characterized as damnum absque injuria, a wrong for which the law affords no remedy.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that the County is a subordinate agency of the Department. We further conclude that under the rule of Martin, the General Assembly did not confer to the county explicit authority to seek judicial review of the Department's action under any reading of section 26-1-126(5) and section 24-4-106(4). We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that the County is without standing to compel a reduction in duly authorized statewide expenditures. Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the court of appeals with directions that it reinstate the judgment of the Denver District Court dismissing the County's case and ruling in favor of the defendants.
JUSTICE KOURLIS dissents. JUSTICE MARTINEZ dissents. CHIEF JUSTICE VOLLACK does not participate.