Opinion
No. 2-317 / 01-1180
Filed October 16, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Gary D. McKenrick, Judge.
Prisoner appeals denial of her postconviction relief application. AFFIRMED.
Robert J. Phelps of Phelps Phelps, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Michael J. Walton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
When affirming on direct appeal Sabra Rogers' pleas and sentences for kidnapping in the second degree and robbery in the first degree, we preserved for potential postconviction proceedings her claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in advising her to plead before the court had ruled on her pretrial motions. See State v. Rogers, No. 97-1918 (Iowa Ct.App. Nov. 20, 1998). Rogers' postconviction application was denied by the district court, and she appeals.
Rogers' argument focuses on the potential defense of diminished responsibility and counsel's alleged failure to pursue that defense. We find the issue has been marginally preserved, at best. See Taylor v. State, 632 N.W.2d 891, 896-97 (Iowa 2001) ("The district court, other than in regard to collateral issues, has no authority to review questions outside those that existed at the time of the limited remand."); Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994) (finding a defendant must state the specific way in which counsel's performance was deficient and identify how competent representation probably would have changed the outcome). We will, nevertheless, address the merits of her claim.
For trial counsel to be deemed ineffective, her performance must have fallen below the normal range of competency, and the inadequate performance must have prejudiced Rogers' case. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed. 674, 693 (1984). Prejudice is shown by demonstrating a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Atwood, 602 N.W.2d 775, 784 (Iowa 1999). Based upon the record made during the postconviction proceedings, neither prong has been satisfied.
Trial counsel had investigated a potential diminished responsibility defense, which went to the issue of whether Rogers had the mental capacity to form the specific intent necessary for commission of the crimes charged, see State v. Douglas, 485 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Iowa 1992), and based on her investigation and consultation with an independent doctor, determined the defense had little chance of success. She nevertheless filed a notice of a diminished responsibility defense and an application for a court-appointed evaluator. Rogers was then presented with a plea offer which, after discussion with counsel, she accepted. We cannot say counsel was incompetent for failing to obtain a ruling on the evaluation request before Rogers entered her plea. See generally Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142-43 (Iowa 2001).
Rogers was charged with kidnapping in the first degree, an "A" felony, and two counts of robbery in the first degree.
Moreover, Rogers has failed to establish how she was prejudiced by counsel's failure to obtain a ruling on her request for a psychological evaluation. It appears Rogers is contending an evaluation would have revealed a mental impairment that either 1) sufficiently supported a diminished responsibility defense, such that there was a reasonable probability she would have rejected the plea agreement and proceeded to trial; or 2) created a reasonable probability she would have been found incompetent to render a knowing and voluntary plea. However, the record made during the postconviction proceedings, while revealing certain clinical diagnoses, did not contain evidence that Rogers was either incapable of forming specific intent during the commission of the crimes or not competent to enter a guilty plea.
Rogers has failed to establish that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain rulings on pending pretrial motions prior to her entry of a guilty plea. As such, the denial of her postconviction relief application must be affirmed.