Opinion
CA 3:99-CV-988-R
August 17, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER U S DISTRICT CLERKS OFFICE
Plaintiff Karen Rogers ("Rogers") filed suit against Defendant Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. ("Bell") on April 30, 1999 alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et. seq. ("FMLA"). Rogers also alleges that Bell terminated Rogers in retaliation for Rogers's attempt to secure leave under the FMLA. Now before the Court is Bell's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed March 7, 2000). For the following reasons, Bell's motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
On November 20, 1997, Rogers was involved in an automobile accident in which another larger vehicle rear-ended Rogers while Rogers was stopped at an entrance ramp to a freeway. Rogers was transported by ambulance to an emergency room at a nearby hospital where she was diagnosed with back and neck injury and told to stay off of work for two days. On November 21, 1997, Rogers was examined by her physician, Dr. Basil Bernstein, who declined to sign any forms stating that Rogers should not work due to her medical condition. However, Rogers did not return to work for another 15 days, allegedly due to her injuries but without any medical documentation indicating a medical need to do so. After Rogers returned to work subsequent to her 15 day absence, Bell terminated Rogers as an AWOL quit pursuant to Bell's internal employment policies.
On December 8, 1997, three days after being terminated from Bell and 19 days after her accident, Rogers saw Dr. Clarence Brooks for a medical examination of Rogers's injuries sustained in the accident. Dr. Brooks filled out the disability form and noted his impression that Rogers was unable to work following her car accident. Dr. Brooks made this determination on the basis of Rogers's verbal representations as to her conditions and not on the basis of any medical testing.
On April 30, 1999, Rogers filed the present action, alleging that Bell wrongfully terminated Rogers in violation of the FMLA and that Bell terminated Rogers in retaliation for Rogers's attempt to secure FMLA leave. On March 7, 2000, Bell filed the Motion for Summary Judgment now before the Court. The Court will now demonstrate why Bell's motion must be granted.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitle to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party through the motion for summary judgment and evidence on file show the court that there is no genuine material fact issues. Once the movant makes this showing, the nonmoving party must then direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trail. The court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If the nonmoving party does not show sufficient evidence to establish the existence of an element essential to her case then the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
B. FMLA
Congress enacted the FMLA in order "to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 260 (b)(2). Accordingly, the FMLA entitles an eligible employee to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period "[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(D). The Code of Federal Regulations provides guidance on what is a serious health condition. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (1997). Under the regulations, "a serious health condition entitling an employee to FMLA leave means an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves either inpatient care or continuing treatment by a health care provider." Fisher v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 866, 869 (E.D.Tex. 1998).
There is no dispute that Plaintiff is eligible for FMLA leave.
In the case at hand, Rogers cannot establish that she suffered from a serious health condition under the FMLA. In Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 1997). the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of the employer in an action pursuant to the FMLA. The plaintiff in Price suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome, claiming that her condition rose to the level of a "serious health condition" under the FMLA. Id The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that Price's doctor "placed Price on modified work duties for a two week period. . . ." Id. at 335. In his deposition testimony. Price's doctor stated that Price "had a 'mild to moderate impairment,' for which he prescribed conservative treatment. He acknowledged that '[i]n more severe cases,. . . [he] might consider taking her off work altogether.''' Id On this basis, the Fifth Circuit found that Price's carpal tunnel syndrome did not qualify as a "serious medical condition" under the FMLA. Id
The Price decision warrants granting summary judgment in this case. In his deposition testimony, Dr. Bernstein testified that he did not believe that Rogers's condition was severe enough to warrant keeping her off of work. Specifically, the Court notes the following deposition testimony:
Q: This entry from December 2, 1997 indicates that Ms. Rogers had a disability form to be filled out.
A: Correct.
Q: Did you fill that out?
A: No.
Q:Why not?
A: I didn't feel she was disabled.
Bernstein depo. p. 37 11.13-20. In other words, Rogers's physician did not feel Rogers was disabled and thus did not sign the requisite disability forms. Therefore, Rogers has not established a serious health condition so as to qualify her for FMLA leave.
To counter Dr. Bernstein's testimony, Rogers points to the deposition testimony of Dr. Brooks that Rogers did suffer from a serious health condition under the FMLA. Dr. Brooks's opinion on this matter is wholly unpersuasive for purposes of assessing Bell's liability under the FMLA because Dr. Brooks examined Rogers after Rogers was terminated and long after the accident had taken place. Additionally, Dr. Brooks's deposition testimony indicates that Dr. Brooks based his conclusion that Rogers suffered from a serious health condition solely on the basis of Rogers's verbal representations to him rather than from objective tests. From Bell's perspective, Rogers missed work without having medical documentation to justify it. Had Rogers simply obtained documentation from Dr. Brooks at the outset, perhaps the Court would have been presented with a triable issue of fact. That not being the case, the Court must grant summary judgment in favor of Bell.
C. Retaliation
Rogers also claims that Bell terminated her employment in retaliation for Rogers's efforts to obtain FMLA leave. In analyzing claims for retaliation under the FMLA, the Fifth Circuit has adopted the three-part burden-shifting framework under McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972). "The three-part burden-shifting scheme places the onus on the plaintiff alleging retaliatory discharge to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that:(1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer discharged her; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the discharge." Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., Inc., 179 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999). Rogers's retaliation claim fails under the McDonnell Douglas framework because the Court has already found that Rogers did not suffer from a "serious health condition" and, therefore, was not entitled to FMLA leave. In other words, Bell terminated Rogers because of Rogers's unexcused absences from work, not because Rogers sought FMLA leave. Thus, Bell's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Rogers's retaliation claim as well.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Bell's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. it is so ORDERED.