Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-CV-853-WHA [WO]
11-18-2019
BENJAMIN ROGERS, #286 497, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN BALDWIN, et al., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging Defendants failure to protect him from an inmate assault. Plaintiff seeks, in part, preliminary injunctive relief which has been docketed as a motion for preliminary injunction. Doc. 1 at 4. Upon consideration of the motion the court concludes that it is due to be denied.
I. DISCUSSION
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy which should not be granted unless the movant clearly carries the burden of persuasion as to all prerequisites. All Care Nursing Service, Inc. v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp. Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989) (a preliminary injunction is issued only when "drastic relief" is necessary); Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975) (grant of preliminary injunction "is the exception rather than the rule," and movant must clearly carry the burden of persuasion). The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction "is within the sound discretion of the district court." Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002).
This court may grant a preliminary injunction only if Plaintiff demonstrates each of the following prerequisites: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will occur absent issuance of the injunction; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the potential damage the requested injunction may cause the non-moving parties; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id.; McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998); Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1185 (11th Cir. 1983); Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 1983). The moving party's failure to demonstrate a "substantial likelihood of success on the merits" may defeat the party's claim, regardless of the party's ability to establish any of the other elements. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that "the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper"). Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate he meets each of the prerequisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Issuing a preliminary injunction is, therefore, not warranted.
II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
1. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff (Doc. 1) be DENIED; and
2. This case be referred to the undersigned for additional proceedings.
It is
ORDERED that on or before December 2, 2019, Plaintiff may file an objection to the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which Plaintiff objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall "waive the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions" except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).
Done, this 18th day of November 2019.
/s/ Charles S. Coody
CHARLES S. COODY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE