Opinion
3:21-cv-95-CAR-CHW
10-04-2022
JAMARCUS VONTREVOUS ROGERS, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER ARANGO, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION PROCEEDINGS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BEFORE THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Charles H. Weigle United States Magistrate Judge
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Officer Arango. (Doc. 11). Because Plaintiff Jamarcus Rogers failed to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing suit, it is RECOMMENDED that the Defendant's motion be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED without prejudice.
BACKGROUND AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
In this Section 1983 action, Plaintiff Rogers, a detainee at the Walton County Jail, complains that in July 2021, Defendant Arango, a jail classification officer, was able to view Plaintiff naked. Specifically, and as set out in detail in the Court's screening order, Plaintiff alleges that he was naked in bed - Plaintiff's underwear was drying elsewhere in his cell - when Defendant Arango approached and directed Plaintiff to put on his identification wristband. (Doc. 7, pp. 3-4). When Plaintiff wrapped himself in a bed sheet and attempted to obtain the wristband from a desk, Defendant Arango entered with a taser and directed Plaintiff instead to hand over the wristband. When Plaintiff declined and attempted to put on the wristband, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Arango “pushed me to the wall aggressively making the sheet fall,” thereby “exposing my naked body.” (Compl., Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Arango then made a comment about Plaintiff's genitalia. (Id., p. 6). As discussed in the Court's screening order, Plaintiff's allegations implicate a constitutional right to bodily privacy recognized by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993).
In part, Defendant Arango's pending motion to dismiss requests a resolution of this action on the basis that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief. (Doc. 11-2, pp. 2-3). In reviewing such requests, the Court must “accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint” and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Under this standard, Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to show that Defendant Arango acted with insufficient regard for Plaintiff's privacy right, and in a manner arguably intended to demean or humiliate Plaintiff. Defendant Arango has not yet provided any additional facts to aid in a case-by-case analysis. See Fortner, 983 F.2d at 1030 (“we continue to approach the scope of the privacy right on a case-by-case basis”). Moreover, the Defendant's argument is based on a reading of the allegations that fails to comply with Iqbal's standard - the Defendant simply asserts that he “had nothing to do with Plaintiff being unclothed,” and that any resulting nudity was “inadvertent[].” (Doc. 11-2, p. 3). Insofar as the Defendant requests a dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, it is recommended that the Defendant's motion to dismiss be denied.
For precisely the same reason, Plaintiff's request for a dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity should also be denied. See, e.g., Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (observing that “the defense of qualified immunity is typically addressed at the summary judgment stage”).
THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
The Defendant also moves for a dismissal on the ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, and as discussed below, a dismissal is warranted on this ground.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act or PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing an action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion in this context means proper exhaustion: prisoners must “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in a federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006). The exhaustion requirement is “designed to eliminate unwarranted federal-court interference with the administration of prisons” by “seek[ing] to afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th Cir. 2008).
The Eleventh Circuit's Turner opinion establishes a two-step process for courts to review motions to dismiss based upon a prisoner's failure to exhaust. A reviewing court first:
[L]ooks to the factual allegations in the defendant's motion to dismiss and those in the plaintiff's response, and if they conflict, takes the plaintiff's version of the facts as true. If, in that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it must be dismissed.Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082-83.
Second, if the complaint is not dismissed under step one, the court:
[P]roceeds to make specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion .... Once the court makes findings on the disputed issues of fact, it then decides whether under those findings the prisoner has exhausted his available administrative remedies.Id.
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
The grievance procedure applicable in this action was set out in an inmate handbook published by the Walton County Sheriff's Office, Detention Division. That procedure consists of two steps. First, inmates should file a written grievance fully describing the factual basis of any alleged incident, situation, or complaint. (Doc. 13, p. 5). Inmates are then to be provided with a formal, written response to their written grievances by a grievance deputy within fifteen days of submission of a written grievance. (Id.).
Second, after a prisoner receives a formal response to a written grievance, the Walton County grievance procedure contemplates that the prisoner should commence an appeal, within three days, by “provid[ing] written reasons on the grievance form,” and by returning that form as an appeal to a grievance deputy. (Id.).
EXHAUSTION ANALYSIS
Under Turner's two-step review process, this action is subject to a dismissal at both of Turner's steps of review based upon Plaintiff's failure to exhaust.
At Turner's first step, the Court must accept as true Plaintiff's allegations, made in his complaint, that he “wrote multiple grievances” and “even called PREA,” referring to the prison rape elimination act, “to make a complaint.” (Compl., Doc. 1, pp. 2, 6). These threadbare allegations give insufficient indication that Plaintiff attempted to complete the exhaustion process by filing an appeal. By failing to respond to the Defendant's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has provided few relevant grievance allegations for the Court to consider. Because the available allegations, even if accepted as true, do not show that Plaintiff completed both steps of the Walton County grievance process, a dismissal is proper under Turner's first step of review.
A dismissal is also appropriate under Turner's second step of review because the Defendant has submitted evidence confirming that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the second, appellate step of the Walton County grievance process. The Defendant's evidence shows that Plaintiff filed an initial, written grievance in August 2021, which mentions “officer Arango,” “sexual harassment,” and that Plaintiff felt “target[ed]” and “very uncomfortable when he is around me.” (Doc. 13, p. 6). Arguably, these allegations gave sufficient notice of the nature of Plaintiff's complaint against Defendant Arango. See Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2000) (“§ 1997e(a) requires, and all that it requires, is that the prisoner provide ... all of the information concerning his claims that he has or reasonably could obtain”).
The grievance additionally references an earlier “PREA statement” which the Defendant has not provided, seemingly because no written statement exists. See (Doc. 13, p. 7) (“I checked with investigations and they have never received a PREA complaint or statement from you”).
The record shows, however, that Plaintiff received a response to his written grievance, not filed until August 2, 2021, on the very next day, August 3, 2021. See (Doc. 13, p. 6-7). From that date, there is no indication that Plaintiff subsequently sought to file an appeal by writing grounds for an appeal on the grievance form, and by returning that form to jail authorities. Furthermore, the declaration of John Minton, the Walton County Grievance Coordinator, confirms to the Court that “[t]here was no appeal” from Plaintiff's initial, written grievance against Defendant Arango. (Minton Decl., Doc. 13, p. 2, ¶ 6). Accordingly, even if Plaintiff had provided allegations relating to a possible grievance appeal, the record would support the finding, at Turner's second step of review, that Plaintiff in fact filed no appeal and hence failed to exhaust.
In summary, therefore, because the Defendant is entitled to a dismissal for failure to exhaust at both of Turner's steps of review, it is recommended that the Defendant's motion to dismiss be granted.
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to commencing this lawsuit as required by the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), it is RECOMMENDED that the Defendant's motion to dismiss be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED without prejudice. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to the recommendations herein with the presiding District Judge WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED