Opinion
No. C 03-04189 CRB.
June 22, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This ERISA lawsuit arises out of defendant Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company's denial of plaintiff's claim for life insurance benefits following the death of her father, Dana Pitman ("Mr. Pitman"). Now pending before the Court is defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative for summary judgment. After carefully considering the papers filed by the parties, and having had the benefit of oral argument, defendant's motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company ("Reliance") issued a group life insurance policy ("the Policy") to ATG Inc. ("ATG"), Mr. Pitman's former employer. The policy qualifies as an employee benefit plan that is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). The Policy provides that to be eligible for coverage (1) a person must be an "active, full-time employee" of the company, and (2) must complete the waiting period. Policy pp. 1.0, 4.0. The waiting period for non-union employees, such as Mr. Pitman, was 90 days of employment. Id. An individual's "effective date" is "the first of the Policy month coinciding with or next following completion of the Waiting Period." Id. at p. 1.0.
On May 17, 2000, ATG gave a written offer of employment to the Mr. Pitman, promising him that, in accordance with ATG's policy, upon completion of a 90-day probation period he would be eligible for the benefits provided by ATG to its employees, including life insurance. ATG also gave Mr. Pitman a copy of ATG's Employment Policy and a copy of a "Benefit Summary" describing the amount of the life insurance benefit. The Employment Policy states that after completion of the 90-day probationary period, "eligible employees will receive the benefits described in this handbook." Although the Benefit Summary states that "[c]omplete coverage information will be distributed in the form of booklets by Reliance Standard Life," Mr. Pitman never received such a booklet from Reliance.
Mr. Pitman began his employment with ATG on June 1, 2000. He continued working through August 30, 2000, and died the following day. While Mr. Pitman satisfied the 90-day waiting period on August 30, 2000, defendant contends his individual coverage would not have begun until September 1, 2000 — the first of the policy month following his completion of the waiting period. Unfortunately, Mr. Pitman died on August 31, 2000.
Plaintiff submitted a claim for benefits to Reliance following Mr. Pitman's death. Reliance denied the claim on November 17, 2000. The denial letter identified the pertinent policy provisions and provided the basis for denial of the claim. The letter explained that because Mr. Pitman died prior to the scheduled effective date of his coverage, he was not a member of the eligible class for the life insurance, and therefore no life insurance coverage was in effect on his behalf.
Plaintiff appealed the denial of the claim as required under ERISA, and on March 30, 2001, Reliance issued its final decision on the claim. The appeal denial letter once again set forth the terms of the policy regarding eligibility and when the coverage was to go into effect, and explained that there was no coverage owed under the terms of the policy. Plaintiff, having exhausted her administrative remedies, filed this lawsuit.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Defendant contends that this Court must review its denial of benefits under an abuse of discretion standard while plaintiff argues that defendant's denial of benefits is subject to de novo review.
"[A] denial of benefits challenged under [ERISA] § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Firestone Tire Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). When the plan confers discretion on the plan administrator to determine eligibility for benefits, courts review the denial of benefits for abuse of discretion. See id. "[T]he default is that the administrator has no discretion, and the administrator has to show that the plan gives it discretionary authority in order to get any judicial deference to its decision." Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
The ERISA plan at issue here clearly and unambiguously grants defendant full discretionary authority to determine whether a claimant is entitled to benefits. The plan provides:
Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company shall serve as the claims review fiduciary with respect to the insurance policy and the Plan. The claims review fiduciary has the discretionary authority to interpret the Plan and the insurance policy and to determine eligibility for benefits. Decisions by the claims review fiduciary shall be complete, final and binding on all parties.
Policy p. 11.0.
Plaintiff does not contend that the Policy does not confer discretionary authority upon defendant. Plaintiff instead argues that de novo review is required for three reasons: (1) Reliance failed to submit admissible evidence to show that the Plan gave it discretionary authority; (2) Reliance's self-interest caused a breach of fiduciary obligations; and (3) Reliance failed to provide Mr. Pitman with a summary plan description or the Policy containing the discretionary language as required by 29 U.S.C. sections 1022, 1024.
1. Admissibility of policy documents
Plaintiff first contends that the witness Reliance used to enter the policy documents into evidence, attorney Kevin McNamara, is not competent to authenticate any of the documents, including the Policy, attached to his declaration. Plaintiff further contends that Mr. McNamara is not a person through whom the exhibits could be admitted because he did not write the documents, sign the documents, use the documents, or see others do so, and does not claim that he did. This Court need not decide whether Mr. McNamara is competent to authenticate any of the documents, however, as Peter Sailor, a director with Reliance, filed a notarized declaration authenticating the documents. Accordingly, the policy documents are properly before this Court on defendant's motion.
2. Conflict of interest
Plaintiff also contends that de novo review is proper because defendant's self-interest caused a breach of fiduciary obligations, thereby "heightening" the abuse of discretion standard of review. See Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995). An apparent conflict of interest exists where a long-term disability policy is both funded and administered by the defendant. See Bendixen, 185 F.3d at 943. "Nevertheless, the presence of a conflict does not automatically remove the deference [courts] ordinarily accord to ERISA administrators who are authorized by the plan to interpret a plan's provisions." Id. "[O]nly a serious conflict would heighten scrutiny." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In Bendixen the court explained:
In order to establish a serious conflict, the beneficiary has the burden to come forward with "material, probative evidence, beyond the mere fact of the apparent conflict, tending to show that the fiduciary's self-interest caused a breach of the administrator's fiduciary obligations to the beneficiary." If the beneficiary cannot satisfy this burden, the district court should apply the traditional abuse of discretion review. If the beneficiary does satisfy the burden, the plan then bears the burden to show the conflict of interest did not affect the decision to deny benefits.Id. (quoting Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1323).
The Ninth Circuit has found "material, probative evidence" of a serious conflict of interest to consist of "inconsistencies in the plan administrator's reasons," Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 1997); Tremain v. Bell Indus., Inc., 196 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 1999), and a failure to provide the claimant with a full and fair review and the failure to follow plan procedures.See Friedrich v. Intel, 181 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999).
When an ERISA plan is actually an insurance policy issued and administered by the insurer, the insurer's "dual role as both the funding source and the administrator of the Plan," creates an inherent conflict of interest. Lang, 125 F.3d at 797. The plan at issue here is a Reliance insurance policy. Reliance is the funding source and makes the eligibility determinations. Policy p. 11.0. As such, Reliance has an apparent conflict of interest when it makes benefit eligibility determinations.
Since Reliance has an apparent conflict, the next question is whether plaintiff has come forward with material, probative evidence showing that Reliance acted upon that conflict. Plaintiff's conclusory statement that "Reliance undertook to conceal, and utterly disregarded, ATG's representations regarding the plan terms by denying plaintiff benefits and stating in the benefit denial, and to this Court, that plaintiff failed to present any proof of those representations," does not constitute "material, probative evidence, beyond the mere fact of the apparent conflict, tending to show that [Reliance's] self-interest caused a breach of [its] fiduciary obligations to the beneficiary." Bendixen, 185 F.3d at 943 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Reliance acted upon its apparent conflict; rather, the record reflects that Reliance denied plaintiff's claim on the ground that the decedent was not covered under the terms of the policy at the time of his death. Accordingly, there is no actual conflict present.
3. Failure to provide plan documents
Finally, plaintiff argues that de novo review is required because Reliance failed to provide Mr. Pitman with a summary description of the Policy or the Policy itself, the only documents that include the discretionary language. As support for this argument, she cites Bartlett v. Martin Marietta Operations Support, 38 F.3d 514 (10th Cir. 1994).
In Bartlett, the deceased employee was hired by the defendant's predecessor company, G.E. Operations Support ("GEOS"), in February of 1990. Id. at 515. In mid-1990, GEOS decided to change its benefits plan for employees to a cafeteria plan. Id. at 516. In the fall of 1990, as part of the change in the benefits plan, a presentation was given to employees, which described the flexible benefits program. Id. Employees were asked to make an individual election of benefits under the new plan, but at the time, there was no summary plan description identifying the qualifications for the benefits. Id. The employer merely provided the employees with a flex benefits workbook. Id.
Following Mr. Bartlett's death on January 17, 2001, the plaintiff made a demand on the life insurance policy. Id. The defendant denied the plaintiff's claim based on the summary plan description for the flex plan. Id. The defendant had not even printed the summary plan description, however, until over two months after Mr. Bartlett's death. Id.
The defendant subsequently conceded, and the Tenth Circuit held, that the district court properly decided to disregard the subsequent discretionary language of the summary plan description "because it had not been published and distributed until after Mr. Bartlett's death." Id. at 517. The court reasoned that Mr. Bartlett "could not be bound to terms of the policy of which he had no notice." Id. Accordingly, the court determined that the language of the plan workbook governed because it was the only document in existence at the time of Mr. Bartlett's death. Id. Because the plan workbook did not reserve discretionary authority to the plan administrator, the court held that a de novo review of the plan administrator's denial of death benefits was appropriate. Id. Bartlett does not require de novo review here. While Mr. Pitman arguably had no actual notice of all of the terms of the Policy, including the term reserving discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits, the Policy existed prior to his death, indeed, prior to his employment with ATG. InBartlett, in contrast, the plan workbook — which did not reserve discretionary authority — was the only documentation in existence at the time of Mr. Bartlett's death. Id. at 517; see also Nixon v. Life Ins. Co. Of North America, 130 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1295 (M.D. Ala. 2001) ("Bartlett stands for the proposition that subsequent modifications to an ERISA plan, through drafting of a summary-plan description, do not affect the terms of a written plan in existence when an employee's claim arose.").
Plaintiff's argument is, in essence, that de novo review is required because neither defendant nor ATG provided Mr. Pitman with a copy of the Policy or a summary plan description prior to his death. See 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a) (providing that a plan administrator shall provide a copy of a summary plan description to all plan participants); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (setting penalties for a plan administrator who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any information from a participant or beneficiary which an administrator is required to furnish). Plaintiff has not cited any case which makes such a broad ruling and the Court declines to do so here.
Defendant contends that de novo review is inappropriate because it was under no obligation to provide such plan documents to Mr. Pitman as ATG, rather than Reliance, was the plan administrator. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16) (stating that if an ERISA plan does not designate an administrator, the employer sponsoring the plan is the administrator). The Court has not reached this issue since it concludes that regardless of which entity was the administrator, a failure to provide the documents to Mr. Pitman does not require de novo review.
The discretionary language of the Policy controls. Defendant's denial of plaintiff's claim for benefits is subject to abuse of discretion review.
B. Applicable Law
Both parties agree that the Policy qualifies as an employee benefit plan that is governed by ERISA. Plaintiff contends, however, that California law is also applicable because the insurance policy specifically states that it shall be governed by California law. The Court is unpersuaded.
An employer and a benefit plan insurer cannot avoid ERISA regulation simply by stating that the policy is governed by the laws of a particular state. Pursuant to ERISA's preemption provision, section 514(a), a plaintiff may not pursue claims arising under state laws "insofar as [those laws] may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has noted that "the express pre-emption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive, and designed to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern." Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Greany v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that section 1144(a) "contains one of the broadest preemption clauses ever enacted by Congress"). "A state law `relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). "Even claims brought under state-law doctrines that do not explicitly refer to employee benefit plans are preempted when the claims arise from the administration of such plans directly or indirectly." Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1990).
Preemption applies to claims brought by "any employee or former employee . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). Moreover, "[i]t is undisputable that where the insurance company makes final claims decisions under a group insurance policy issued to an employee benefit plan, ERISA governs the relationship between the insurance company and the insured."McLaughlin v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 441 (N.D. Cal. 1984) overruled on other grounds by Aetna Casualty Sur. Co. v. C.D.J.T., Inc., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 13475 (9th Cir. Cal. May 30, 1995).
In light of ERISA's expansive preemptive provisions, ERISA preempts the application of California law to the present case.
B. Application of the Policy's Effective Date Provision
Plaintiff contends that the Policy's "effective date" provision does not apply for two reasons: (1) Reliance cannot enforce a policy provision that was never disclosed to Mr. Pitman, (2) Reliance was bound by ATG's representations.
1. Application of the policy provision
As is explained above, the record reflects that neither Reliance nor ATG ever provided Mr. Pitman with a copy of the Policy; instead, the only documents provided to Mr. Pitman were (1) the written offer of employment from ATG, and (2) the ATG employee handbook, which includes a "Benefit Summary." Neither document disclosed the effective date requirement.
a. Duty to disclose
Plaintiff contends that under California law, group benefit insurers cannot deny coverage on the basis of limitations on eligibility or benefits that were not disclosed to the employee. As discussed is above, however, California law is preempted by ERISA.
Plaintiff nonetheless contends that even under federal law, an ERISA plan may not enforce a qualification on eligibility or benefits that was never disclosed to the employee. See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (among other things, the summary plan description must contain "the plan's requirements respecting eligibility for participation and benefits" and "circumstances which may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial or loss of benefits"). Plaintiff argues that because the offer letter and the employee handbook — the only documents describing benefits that were provided to Mr. Pitman — did not disclose the additional eligibility requirement, namely, the effective date, Reliance cannot enforce such a provision.
Plaintiff again cites to Bartlett to support its argument. As the Court previously explained, Bartlett does not establish that under ERISA an insurer cannot enforce a policy provision that was never disclosed to a plan participant. Unlike the defendant in Bartlett, Reliance did not rely on a document created after Mr. Pitman had already died. Bartlett does not apply.
Plaintiff also relies on Feifer v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 306 F.3d 1202 (2nd Cir. 2002). In Feifer, the employees were provided with a brief description of their benefits in a "Program Summary," which failed to disclose that the insurer was entitled to offset worker's compensation and social security payments against an employee's long-term disability benefits. See id. at 1205. The defendant argued that this limitation, which was first reduced to writing after the plaintiffs became disabled, applied. The Second Circuit refused to allow the insurer to enforce this limitation because it was not contained in the Program Summary, which was the only document that existed at the time that described employee benefits. See id. at 1208. In other words, the court concluded that the Program Summary was the plan that applied. See id. at 1208-10.
Feifer does not apply to this case either. Reliance relied upon the Policy which existed at the time of Mr. Pitman's death to deny plaintiff's claim; Reliance did not rely on a document created after Mr. Pitman had already died. None of the cases cited by plaintiff supports the proposition that Reliance cannot enforce a policy provision that was never disclosed to Mr. Pitman. Rather, these cases hold that a plaintiff's claim for benefits cannot be denied based upon qualifications and limitations that did not exist at the time the claim arose.
b. Conflicting documents
Plaintiff further contends that where the documents provided to the employee indicate broader coverage than that provided by the master policy, the insurer is bound by the documents provided. Plaintiff argues that because the offer letter and the employee handbook indicate broader coverage than the Reliance policy, the offer letter and the employee handbook control.
Plaintiff cites Lancaster v. United States Shoe Corp., 934 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Cal. 1996), where the employer's summary plan description did not disclose any monetary or durational limits on extended convalescent care benefits, although the underlying policy did so. See id. at 1155-56. The court concluded that the plan administrator could not deny benefits on the ground that the employee had reached the policy limits where the summary and the underlying policy conflicted. See id. at 1156; see also Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1321(noting that where a summary plan description and a plan conflict in their descriptions of the circumstances which may result in a denial of benefits, the summary plan description controls over the plan).
Plaintiff's theory is as follows: the offer letter and Benefit Summary which ATG gave to Mr. Pitman are analogous to a summary plan description; the offer letter and the Benefit Summary conflict with the Policy; under Lancaster/Atwood, the offer letter and the Benefit Summary control; and based on the offer letter and the Benefit Summary plaintiff is entitled to benefits.
The offer letter and the Benefit Summary are not official plan documents, that is, a summary plan description, and thereforeLancaster/Atwood do not apply. The offer letter cannot constitute a summary plan description because it does not contain the information required of such a document under ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b). Among other things, the letter does not contain "the plan's requirements respecting eligibility for participation and benefits" or "circumstances which may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial or loss of benefits."Id.; see also Pisciotta v. Teledyne Ind., Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1330 (9th Cir. 1996) (Booklets which did not meet elements set forth in section 1022(b) did not qualify as a plan document). Similarly, the Benefit Summary included in the employee handbook does not contain the information required of a summary plan description. The document merely identifies the amount of benefits available under the Policy. In sum, neither the offer letter nor the Benefit Summary can be considered even a faulty summary plan description.
Reliance also contends that it did have an official summary plan description — contained in the Certificate Booklet — which did disclose the effective date requirement. The Certificate Booklet in the record, however, is dated September 9, 2002 and therefore was not in existence at the time of Mr. Pitman's death. Defendant alleges that the 2002 version is the only version that is available because it sent the earlier copies to ATG for distribution. While defendant contends in its reply memorandum that there are no differences between the 2002 version and the earlier version, defendant has failed to submit a declaration as to this fact. As a consequence of this failure there is no evidence as to what was contained in the Certificate Booklet in effect at the time of Mr. Pitman's death, or even that there was such a Booklet.
2. ATG's representations
Plaintiff contends that ATG's representations in the offer letter and the Benefit Summary regarding plan coverage are binding upon Reliance under California law. As previously discussed, however, ERISA completely preempts the application of California law.
Plaintiff also contends that ATG's statements are binding under federal law because Reliance admitted that ATG was the plan administrator. Plaintiff cites to Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1984) for the proposition that misleading employer representations preclude summary judgment. InBower, the issue before the court was whether the employees' medical insurance benefits had vested. See id. at 1223. The court found that the collective bargaining agreement was ambiguous as to when benefits vested. See id. Unable to resolve the lawsuit on the basis of the contractual language, the court looked to extrinsic evidence. See id. at 1223-24. After analyzing certain statements made by management that the insurance benefits were vested, the court held that the extrinsic evidence suggested an ambiguity in the contract. See id. at 1224-25. Therefore, the court concluded that summary judgment was improper. See id. at 1225.
Bower is inapposite. In Bower the issue was the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, not an ERISA plan. Under ERISA, communications that are not plan documents cannot furnish the bases for a promise under the plan. See Krishan v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 873 F.Supp. 345, 351 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (stating that "Bower does not stand for the proposition that courts should consider documents other than [official plan documents] in interpreting an ERISA employee welfare plan."). Moreover, in Bower the contract at issue — the collective bargaining agreement — did not unambiguously address the termination of benefits. Here, in contrast, the plan documents — the Policy — specifically provide for an individual's effective date. See Aldy v. Container Corp. Of America, 906 F.2d 660, 666 (11th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing Brower on the ground that in its case "there was a [summary plan description] which clearly functioned as the plan document required by ERISA.")
Plaintiff also cites to Lancaster for the proposition that a summary plan description created by an employer is binding on the insurer, even if it conflicts with the policy. As set forth above, however, none of the representations ATG allegedly made were contained in an official plan document, such as a summary plan description. Moreover, none of the other cases cited by plaintiff support the proposition that an insurer is bound by representations made by an employer in an offer letter or employee handbook.
Furthermore, the written offer of employment and the Benefit Summary provided to Mr. Pitman do not conflict with the Policy's effective date requirement. The letter merely states that Mr. Pitman would become "eligible" for coverage under the life insurance policy after completing a 90-day probationary period. The letter does not state that coverage is "effective" immediately after completing the 90-day period. The Benefit Summary does not contain any information regarding eligibility.
D. Abuse of Discretion Review
Having determined that the Policy governs plaintiff's application for benefits, the question is whether defendant abused its discretion in denying that application. The abuse of discretion standard is very broad, under which the decisions of plan administrators are to be overturned only in rare circumstances such as when "they render decisions without any explanation, or construe provisions of the plan in a way that clearly conflicts with the plain language of the plan." Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "[A]n administrator also abuses its discretion if it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact in making benefit determinations," or where "the decision is so patently arbitrary and unreasonable as to lack foundation in factual basis." Id. at 1473 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff argues that Reliance abused its discretion for three reasons: (1) Reliance was bound to consider the representations made by ATG, (2) the Policy language is ambiguous, and therefore should be construed in her favor, and (3) Mr. Pitman had a reasonable expectation of coverage. The Court has already rejected plaintiff's argument with respect to ATG's representations.
1. Policy Language
Plaintiff argues that the term "coinciding with or next following" means that coverage begins on the first of the month "during which" the employee completes the waiting period. Thus, she argues, since Mr. Pitman completed the waiting period on August 30, the effective date of his life insurance coverage was August 1 — the first day of the month coinciding with the month he completed the period. She points out that Reliance issued the group policy to ATG on August 19, 1999, but made the effective date August 1, 1999-the first month "coinciding with" issuance of the policy — rather than September 1, 1999 — the first of the month "following" issuance of the policy.
According to defendant, if completion of the waiting period "coincides with" the first of the month, coverage begins that month, but if the waiting period is completed after the first of the month, then the individual's coverage becomes effective on the first day of the next month. Defendant's interpretation is not unreasonable and does not conflict with the plain language of the Policy. See Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 F.3d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for Reliance to conclude that Mr. Pitman was not covered by the Policy at the time of his death.
2. Reasonable Expectation of Coverage
Finally, plaintiff argues that the Policy language is ambiguous and under the reasonable expectations doctrine "an ERISA benefits plan to be interpreted in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured." Lancaster, 934 F. Supp. at 1154. A prerequisite for application of the reasonable expectations doctrine is that the plan must be ambiguous or an exclusionary provision in the plan must not be sufficiently conspicuous."Id.
The doctrine, however, does not apply where, as here, the ERISA plan grants the fiduciary discretion to interpret the plan. See Winters, 49 F.3d at 553-54. The question is instead whether the fiduciary's interpretation of the plan was unreasonable. See id. at 553. Reliance's interpretation of the effective date was not unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
The Policy term regarding the effective date of coverage for individual employees governs plaintiff's claim. As Reliance's interpretation of that term was not an abuse of discretion, plaintiff's claims for life insurance benefits fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on all causes of action except the second cause of action for failure to provide a summary plan description. Defendant's motion for summary judgment cannot fairly be read as moving for judgment on such claim.
The Court notes that while plaintiff mentions discovery, or a lack thereof, in her opposition, her counsel did not move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) to continue the defendant's motion.
The parties shall appear at a case management conference at 8:30 a.m. on July 9, 2004 to discuss how to address the one claim remaining in this action.