Opinion
Case No. 12-cv-00353 NC
06-01-2012
ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ , Plaintiff, v. PACIFIC STEEL CASTING COMPANY, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND AND DENYING REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
Re: Dkt. No. 7
Plaintiff Rodriguez moves to remand this putative class action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and for reimbursement of the attorneys' fees and costs he incurred in connection with the motion and the removal of this action to federal court. The issue presented in the motion is whether Rodriguez's claims, which arise out of California law, are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The Court finds that Rodriguez's claims are not preempted by section 301, because the rights at issue arise exclusively out of state law and the resolution of the claims does not require an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, Rodriguez's motion to remand is GRANTED. Rodriguez's request for attorneys' fees is DENIED, as Rodriguez does not establish that Pacific lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. //
I. BACKGROUND
A. Rodriguez's claims against Pacific
Rodriguez, a citizen of Berkeley, California, was employed by Pacific from 1964 to 2010. Am. Compl. ¶ 18, Not. of Removal, Ex. B, Dkt. No. 1. Pacific is a steel company that operates in Berkeley, California. Id. ¶¶ 16, 22.
Rodriguez alleges that Pacific knowingly failed to provide to its workers meal and rest periods, facilities for preparing and consuming food and drink, and semi-monthly wage statements itemizing the total amount of compensation owed to each employee as required by California law. Id. ¶¶ 4, 28, 31.
On December 30, 2011, Rodriguez filed an amended complaint against Pacific on behalf of himself and other similarly situated Pacific employees ("plaintiffs") in the Superior Court of Alameda County. The amended complaint states the following six claims: (1) failure to provide meal and rest periods in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512, and Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) Order 1-2001 § 11; (2) failure to provide facilities for securing, heating, and consuming meals in violation of California Labor Code § 226.7(b) and IWC Order 1-2001 § 3(G); (3) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of California Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, and 1198, and IWC Order 1-2001 § 3(A); (4) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226 and 1174; (5) failure to pay wages on termination in violation of California Labor Code § 203; (6) unfair business practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200-17208. Id. ¶¶ 1, 21, 42-99.
B. Removal of the action
Pacific removed the action to this Court on January 23, 2012. Not. of Removal, Dkt. No. 1. Pacific argues that removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because the action is preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), as the resolution of Rodriguez's claims requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between plaintiffs' union and Pacific. Id. ¶ 13.
Pacific alleges that the LMRA applies to Rodriguez's claims because (1) Pacific is an employer within the meaning of the LMRA; (2) Glass, Molder, Pottery, Plastics, and Allied Workers International Union ("the union"), which allegedly represents plaintiffs, is a labor organization within the meaning of the LMRA; and (3) the terms of plaintiffs' employment with Pacific were governed by a CBA between the union and Pacific. Id. ¶¶ 15-17.
Pacific claims to have provided a meal period to plaintiffs within five hours of the commencement of their shift as required by California law but the union allegedly "requested that its [day shift] employees be allowed to take a later meal period if they choose." Id. ¶¶ 19, 20. Pacific agreed to orally modify the CBA governing the timing of plaintiffs' meal periods to accommodate the union's request. Id. Pacific argues that Rodriguez's claims are preempted by section 301 because the Court must review "the CBA, its oral modifications, and its history" to determine whether it failed to provide the requisite meal periods to plaintiffs as Rodriguez alleges.
C. Motion to remand
Rodriguez moves to remand the action to state court, arguing that his claims are not preempted by the LMRA because they arise out of "nonnegotiable California state law" and are independent of any CBA. Mot. at 7, Dkt. No. 7. Rodriguez argues that the complaint does not allege the existence of a CBA governing the timing of plaintiffs' meal breaks because no such agreement exists. Id. at 9. Rodriguez also moves for the attorneys' fees it incurred in connection with this motion and the removal of the action to this Court.
Pacific opposes the motion, arguing that Rodriguez's claims are preempted by the LMRA because they cannot be resolved without interpreting a CBA that governs the timing of plaintiffs' meal periods. Opp. at 5, Dkt. No. 20. Pacific argues Rodriguez's claims stem from the allegation that Pacific failed to provide a meal period to plaintiffs within five hours of the start of their shift as required by California law. Id. at 2-3. Pacific claims that it provided meal periods to plaintiffs but that the union asked Pacific to orally modify the CBA governing the timing of plaintiffs' meal periods to allow day-shift workers to take their meal period within 6.5 hours of the start of their shift, as opposed to within five hours of the start of their shift. Id. at 2. Pacific argues that "the CBA, its oral modifications, and the negotiations surrounding those oral modifications" will determine whether Pacific complied with its duty under California law to provide meal breaks to plaintiffs, which makes the need to interpret the CBA inherent to Rodriguez's claims. Id. at 3-4.
Pacific requests that the Court deny Rodriguez's request for attorneys' fees because "the basis for removal was objectively reasonable." Id. at 8.
D. Jurisdiction
This action was removed to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Not. of Remand ¶ 12. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Dkt. Nos. 10, 11.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A defendant may remove an action filed in state court to federal court if the federal court would have original subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Federal courts have original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To determine whether a claim arises under federal law, a court must apply the "well-pleaded complaint rule." Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under this rule, a claim arises under federal law "only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005).
The "complete preemption doctrine" is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1243. It applies "when the preemptive force of a statute is so strong that it 'completely preempt[s]' an area of state law." Valles, 410 F.3d at 1075 (citation omitted). When the complete preemption doctrine applies, "federal law displaces a plaintiff's state-law claim, no matter how carefully pleaded. " Id. (citation omitted).
A motion to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) "is the proper procedure for challenging removal." Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). In determining a motion to remand, the court must construe the removal statute "strictly" and must deny the motion if there is "any doubt about the right of removal." Id. "The presumption against removal means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Rodriguez's claims are not preempted by the LMRA
Section 301 of the LMRA vests jurisdiction in federal courts over "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce." Valles, 410 F.3d at 1075 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)). "Although the text of § 301 contains only a jurisdictional grant, the Supreme Court has interpreted it to compel the complete preemption of state law claims brought to enforce collective bargaining agreements." Id. (citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968)). "[A]lthough the language of § 301 is limited to [s]uits for violation of contracts, the Supreme Court has expanded § 301 preemption to include cases the resolution of which 'is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of [a collective bargaining agreement].'" Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985)). Accordingly, preemption based on section 301 is proper "even in some instances in which the plaintiffs have not alleged a breach of contract in their complaint, if the plaintiffs' claim is either grounded in the provisions of the labor contract or requires interpretation of it." Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007).
When no breach of contract is alleged in the complaint, courts are required to conduct a two-part inquiry to determine whether the claims in the complaint are preempted by section 301. Id. First, the court must ask "whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA." Id. If the answer is no, then the claim is preempted by 301. Id. If the answer is yes, then the court must ask whether the claim is "substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement." Id. (citations omitted). If the answer is yes, then the claim is preempted by 301; if the answer is no, then "the claim can proceed under state law." Id. at 1059-60.
As Rodriguez does not allege a breach of contract in the complaint, the court must conduct Burnside's two-part inquiry to determine whether Rodriguez's claims are preempted by section 301. Based on this inquiry, the Court finds that Rodriguez's claims are not preempted by section 301, as they arise out of state law and are not substantially dependent on analysis of a CBA.
1. The rights at issue were created by state law and not by a CBA
The first part of the Burnside test requires courts to ask "whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA." Id. at 1059. To determine the answer to this inquiry, courts must consider "the legal character of a claim, as independent of rights under the collective-bargaining agreement." Id. at 1060 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[R]eliance on the CBA as an aspect of a defense is not enough to inject[ ] a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the rights at issue here were created by state law and are independent from any rights or obligations created by a CBA. Both parties agree that Rodriguez's claims arise largely out of Pacific's alleged failure to provide plaintiffs with meal periods within five hours of the start of their shift as required by California Labor Code sections 512 and 226.7, and section 11 of Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) Order 1-2001. The complaint does not allege the existence of a CBA governing the timing of plaintiffs' meal periods; therefore, the claims in the complaint do not rely on the provisions of any CBA. The Ninth Circuit has held that when employees base their meal-period claim "on the protections afforded them by California state law, without any reference to expectations or duties created by the [CBA]," then the claim is not subject to preemption. Valles, 410 F.3d at 1082. Based on this holding, the Court finds that preemption under 301 is improper under the first part of the Burnside test, as the claims asserted by Rodriguez involve rights created exclusively by state law.
Pacific argues unconvincingly that this action is "completely preempted" by section 301 because the court must interpret the CBA to determine whether Pacific "complied with its duty to provide requisite meal breaks." Opp. at 4. Pacific's argument that it did, in fact, provide meal periods to plaintiffs as required by California law is a defense to Rodriguez's claims. The Ninth Circuit has held that relying on a CBA as an aspect of a defense to a state-law claim is insufficient to remove the claim to federal court under section 301. See Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that when a plaintiff's claim "is plainly based on state law, § 301 pre-emption is not mandated simply because the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense") (citation omitted). This is because "the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff's claim" as opposed to the nature of any defenses to that claim. Id.
2. Rodriguez's claims are not substantially dependent on the terms of a CBA
The second part of the Burnside test requires courts to ask whether the state-law claim at issue is substantially dependent on an analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059. To determine the answer to this inquiry, courts must decide whether the claim can be resolved without interpreting the CBA. Id. at 1060. When "the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is 'independent' of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes." Cramer, 255 F.3d at 690 (citation omitted). Thus, a state-law claim is preempted only if the court must interpret the CBA in resolving the claim. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060.
Here, Pacific has not met its burden to show that the interpretation of a CBA is required to resolve Rodriguez's claims. The main issue raised by Rodriguez's claims is whether Pacific complied with its obligation under California law to provide a meal period to plaintiffs within five hours of the start of their shift. Pacific contends that, to resolve this question, the court must interpret the terms of a CBA between the union and Pacific, because that agreement allegedly shows that, at the union's request, Pacific provided meal periods to plaintiffs 6.5 hours after the start of their shifts. This argument is unconvincing, because it assumes (1) that California employees and their unions have the right to negotiate and modify through agreement the timing of their meal periods, and (2) that the alleged CBA is valid. Pacific provides no authority to establish that either of these assumptions is valid, and the Court is unaware of any such authority.
On the other hand, decisions by the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme Court support Rodriguez's contention that the CBA at issue is unenforceable and therefore cannot be considered by the Court in resolving his claims.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a court may not consider a collective bargaining agreement "purporting to waive the right to meal periods" under California law, because such agreement would be unenforceable. Valles, 410 F.3d at 1082. This is because the right to meal periods under California law is "nonnegotiable," and section "301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law." Id. at 1076, 1082 (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, if plaintiffs actually agreed through their union to forgo a meal period within the first five hours of their shift as Pacific claims, then that agreement would be unenforceable because it would constitute a waiver of their right to a meal period within the first five hours of their shift. Accordingly, based on Valles, the Court cannot consider the CBA at issue to resolve Rodriguez's claims.
The California Supreme Court's analysis and interpretation of the California laws and regulations at issue supports the Ninth Circuit's holding in Valles. In Brinker Restaurant Corporation v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court stated that, with respect to employees working shifts longer than five hours, "an employer's obligation is to provide a first meal period after no more than five hours of work." 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315, 344 (Cal. 2012) (analyzing California Labor Code 512 and IWC Order 1-2001) (emphasis added). It also stated that, for employees working more than five hours, "first meal periods must start after no more than five hours." Id. (emphasis added). It follows from this statement that an employer is not permitted under California law to provide a first meal period to its workers after 6.5 hours of work, which is what Pacific claims to have done here.
As Pacific has not shown that the court must consider, or even that it may consider, the CBA at issue to resolve Rodriguez's claims, Rodriguez's claims are not preempted by section 301.
B. Good cause does not exist for awarding fees and costs to Rodriguez
Rodriguez moves for an order requiring Pacific to pay for the attorneys' fees and costs it incurred in connection with this motion and the removal of this action to this court, which total $9,775. Mot. at 9. Rodriguez argues that Pacific's removal of the action to this court was "frivolous." Id.
Pacific opposes the request, arguing conclusorily that "the basis for removal was objectively reasonable." Opp. at 8.
When the court grants a motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the "order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). "Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied." Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005).
The Court finds that Rodriguez has not established that Pacific lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal; accordingly, his request for fees and costs is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rodriguez's motion to remand is GRANTED and his request for attorneys' fees and costs is DENIED. This action is REMANDED to the Superior Court of Alameda County for all further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: June 1, 2012
/s/_________
Nathanael M. Cousins
United States Magistrate Judge