Opinion
No. 2 CA-CV 2017-0161
04-25-2018
DANIEL ALEXANDER RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner/Appellant, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; CHARLES RYAN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondents/Appellees.
COUNSEL Daniel Alexander Rodriguez, Florence In Propria Persona Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General By Daniel P. Schaack, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix Counsel for Respondents/Appellees
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
No. S1100CV201700056
The Honorable Dwight P. Callahan, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Daniel Alexander Rodriguez, Florence
In Propria Persona Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
By Daniel P. Schaack, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix
Counsel for Respondents/Appellees
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Judge Brearcliffe concurred. ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge:
¶1 Daniel Rodriguez, an inmate in the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), appeals from the superior court's ruling in a special action. In that ruling, the court denied relief for Rodriguez's claim that ADOC had denied him due process in a prison disciplinary hearing by precluding him from introducing a certain witness statement from another inmate's separate proceeding. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Henceforth, "ADOC" refers collectively to appellees including both the department and director, Charles Ryan.
Factual and Procedural History
¶2 In July 2016, Rodriguez was involved in an incident in which a number of inmates threw an unknown hot liquid on a correctional officer causing second-degree burns. At his disciplinary hearing, Rodriguez sought to admit a certain witness-statement form from another inmate's separate proceeding because, as Rodriguez claims, it contained statements exculpating him. The hearing officer denied the request telling Rodriguez "he was only entitled to evidence in [his own] disciplinary case, not another inmate's case." The hearing officer found Rodriguez guilty and imposed several penalties, including forfeiture of his earned-release credits.
¶3 Rodriguez petitioned for special action in the superior court arguing the hearing officer's ruling on the witness-statement forms had been "arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion, thereby violating [his] right to due process" under the United States and Arizona Constitutions. The superior court accepted jurisdiction but denied relief, finding ADOC had provided Rodriguez with due process, affording him "summaries of the reports, the exact nature of the allegations and an opportunity [to] seek additional evidence from the witnesses through written questions." Rodriguez appealed; we have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(1).
The superior court also denied Rodriguez's claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Rodriguez does not assert this claim on appeal and, therefore, we do not consider it further. See Vortex Corp. v. Denkewicz, 235 Ariz. 551, ¶ 16 (App. 2014) (reviewing court will not address issues raised below but not argued in opening brief).
Bifurcated Review
¶4 "[W]hen a special action initiated in superior court is subsequently appealed, . . . the appellate court must conduct a bifurcated review." Bilagody v. Thorneycroft, 125 Ariz. 88, 92 (App. 1979). First, we must determine whether the superior court acted within its discretion by assuming special action jurisdiction, and second, we review its determination on the merits. Id. We review the decision to grant review for an abuse of discretion. See id.
¶5 The superior court may accept special action jurisdiction when an inferior "tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction and there is no [right of] appeal . . . [or other] plain, speedy and adequate remedy." A.R.S. § 12-2001; see Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 1(a), (b). Questions that may be raised in a special action are limited, but include "[w]hether a determination was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion." Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 3(c). Here, Rodriguez had no remedy by direct appeal. See Rose v. Ariz. Dep't of Corr., 167 Ariz. 116, 118-21 (App. 1991) (no right to judicial review of inmate disciplinary decisions). Also, he challenged whether the hearing officer's determination was "arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion." Although the superior court's ruling did not expressly state the grounds upon which it accepted special action jurisdiction, the record supports the court's determination; thus, it did not abuse its discretion by granting review. See Bilagody, 125 Ariz. at 92.
Procedural Due Process
¶6 Rodriguez complains the hearing officer denied him procedural due process by precluding him from presenting exculpatory evidence in the form of witness statements produced for another inmate's individual hearing. We review constitutional questions de novo, but defer to the fact-finder on factual determinations unless clearly erroneous. See KPNX-TV Channel 12 v. Stephens, 236 Ariz. 367, ¶ 7 (App. 2014).
¶7 Inmates retain due-process rights within prison-disciplinary proceedings. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 564 (1974). However, because such proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, an inmate's procedural rights are not as robust in the disciplinary setting and must be balanced against "institutional safety [and] correctional goals." Id. at 566. Accordingly, "[p]rison officials must have the necessary discretion . . . to limit access to other inmates to collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence." Id. Further, the Supreme Court recommended in Wolff, and ADOC policy then required, a hearing officer to "document the reason for the exclusion of any witness." Ariz. Dep't of Corr., Department Order Manual 803.07: Disciplinary Hearings, § 1.8.7.5 (June 7, 2014); see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566 ("it would be useful for the [trier] to state its reason for refusing to call a witness, whether it be for irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards presented in individual cases"). Under ADOC policy, the hearing officer may preclude a witness if he determines such examination might subject the witness to a risk of reprisal, threaten the security or order of the institution, or would simply be irrelevant, immaterial, or repetitive. Disciplinary Hearings, § 1.8.7.5.
Department orders do not specify that preclusion of a witness statement is subject to the same requirements as exclusion of a live witness. See Disciplinary Hearings, §§ 1.8.7.1 to 1.8.7.9. Without making any such determination, we treat preclusion of a witness statement as such for the limited purpose of this case.
¶8 Here, the hearing officer documented neither that he precluded the written witness statement nor his reason for doing so. Instead, the hearing officer denied Rodriguez's request telling him "he was only entitled to evidence in [his own] disciplinary case, not another inmate's case." We need not determine, however, whether the hearing officer's decision to preclude the witness statements on this basis or his failure to make a record was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion because Rodriguez cannot show prejudice. Cf. County of La Paz v. Yakima Compost Co., 224 Ariz. 590, ¶ 12 (App. 2010) (due process error not reversible absent prejudice).
¶9 Rather than exculpate Rodriguez, the precluded witness statement bore no relevance to his culpability. Rodriguez argued below that another inmate had admitted to being "the one that threw the unknown hot liquid," thereby "provid[ing] clear evidence of who committed [the] offense." But as ADOC observes, the offense was jointly perpetrated by numerous inmates. Thus, clear evidence that another inmate threw hot liquid on the correctional officer in no way exculpates Rodriguez. Because Rodriguez cannot show prejudice, we determine that, even if the hearing officer's reasons for precluding the written statements or his failure to make a record were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, such error was surely harmless. See id. Accordingly, the superior court did not err when it denied relief.
Rodriguez also argues that procedural due process guarantees him the right to present evidence as opposed to the mere opportunity to do so, apparently suggesting his right is absolute. This distinction, however, is not meaningful because the right to present any piece of evidence depends on whether its proponent demonstrates it is admissible. Cf. State v. Foshay, 239 Ariz. 271, ¶ 36 (App. 2016) (evidence presented by defendant must generally comply with rules of evidence).
Finally, Rodriguez asserts the "some evidence" standard established in Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), cannot form a basis to affirm the hearing officer's finding of guilt because his challenge rests on his procedural right to present evidence, not the sufficiency of the evidence against him. Rodriguez, however, apparently does not recognize he must not only show that error occurred, but also that such error prejudiced him. See State v. Dunlap, 187 Ariz. 441, 451 (App. 1996) (error must affect outcome of case). Here, ADOC invokes Hill's "some evidence" standard to argue prejudice did not occur.
Disposition
¶10 For the foregoing reasons we affirm the decision of the superior court.