Opinion
CA CR 09-93
Opinion Delivered October 21, 2009
Appeal from the Scott County Circuit Court, [CR2008-5], Honorable Elizabeth Danielson, Judge, Affirmed.
The only issue on appeal in this case is whether the circuit court erred by denying appellant Ansley Rodriguez-Bonilla's motion to suppress. Appellant was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in declining to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. We find no error and affirm appellant's conviction.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Joseph Deer testified that at about 9:30 in the morning on January 14, 2008, he and Officer Terry Staggs were heading eastbound on State Highway 80 West in Scott County when they saw a blue Mustang with a white racing stripe heading westbound driving very close to the yellow line. He testified that he could not see the driver because the windows were tinted. Officer Deer turned his car around and caught up to the Mustang, which he observed go left of the center line by two or three feet several times in an area where there were curves. He stated that it is a violation to cross left of center in a curve, so he initiated a traffic stop of the Mustang.
Officer Deer testified that he approached the car; made contact with appellant, the driver; and explained to appellant why he had pulled him over. He said appellant told him that he was sorry and gave an excuse for going left of center, to which Officer Deer responded that it was "okay." Officer Deer then asked appellant for his license, proof of insurance, and registration. Officer Deer testified that appellant was fumbling about and acting very nervous and that his speech quivered. He asked appellant where he was going, and appellant said he was going to a friend's in Oklahoma to "do a bed liner of some sort." However, appellant could not name the friend and did not know where the friend lived.
Officer Deer then asked appellant to exit the vehicle. He asked appellant why he was so nervous, and appellant said that he did not like police. Officer Deer asked if appellant had any guns, knives, drugs, or anything he was not supposed to have inside the vehicle, to which appellant responded, "No." Officer Deer then asked appellant if they could look inside his car. Appellant said he did not care. Officer Deer testified that he then read a consent-to-search form to appellant, asked him if he understood it, told him to read it if he wanted to, and obtained appellant's signature on the form.
During a search of appellant's vehicle, Officer Staggs discovered a hot drink with a loose lid and something spilled on the console and in the seat. When Officer Staggs took the lid off of the drink, he saw two "heat-sealed triangled plastic bags" that had been torn open floating inside the drink. Officer Deer asked appellant what was in the drink; appellant avoided the question; and Officer Deer read appellant his Miranda rights. After asking if appellant understood his rights, he again asked what was in the drink and appellant said it was methamphetamine. Appellant explained that he was swerving because he was taking the bags out of his pocket, tearing them open, and trying to get them into the drink when he saw police behind him.
At the suppression hearing, appellant argued that probable cause did not exist for the officer to reverse his car on the highway and pursue appellant. He contended that the officers pursued him because he looked "Spanish." The circuit court found that the officers had probable cause to stop appellant's car. Appellant was later convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine. He appeals his conviction.
Appellant contends on appeal that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress because a reasonable suspicion did not exist to continue to detain him after the verbal warning was issued. While not expressed as a point on appeal, appellant also argues that the officers had no probable cause to stop him.
In our review of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress, we make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances, review findings of historical facts for clear error, and determine whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, while giving due weight to inferences drawn by the trial court. Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406, 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003). We will reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress only if the ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Medlock v. State, 79 Ark. App. 447, 89 S.W.3d 357 (2002). Finally, we give due deference to the trial court's findings in the resolution of evidentiary conflicts and determinations of credibility. Id.
We turn first to appellant's stated point on appeal: the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress because a reasonable suspicion did not exist to continue to detain him after the verbal warning was issued. Appellant did not make this argument to the circuit court. We therefore will not address it here. See Dowty v. State, 363 Ark. 1, 210 S.W.3d 850 (2005) (holding court will not address arguments, even constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal).
The argument appellant did make in the circuit court, and which he mentions in his brief on appeal, is that the officers lacked probable cause to stop his car. In order for a police officer to make a traffic stop, he must have probable cause to believe that the vehicle has violated a traffic law. Yarbrough v. State, 370 Ark. 31, 38, 257 S.W.3d 50, 56 (2007). Appellant argued that the officers turned around on the highway and began following appellant because he was Hispanic. He claimed that he had not committed a traffic offense before the officers turned around and therefore that there was no legitimate reason for them to turn around on the highway and follow him. Appellant's argument, even if true, is not legally relevant. What is important is whether the officers had probable cause to believe appellant violated a traffic law before they pulled him over.
Officer Staggs testified that he initiated a traffic stop because he saw appellant's car cross the center yellow line several times almost completely into the other lane and that it is a violation to cross left of center in a curve. Appellant did not argue below, and he does not argue here, that he did not cross the yellow line several times while the officers were following him or that doing so is not a violation of the law. Further, issues of credibility are for the circuit court to resolve. Medlock, supra. We hold that the traffic stop was lawful because the officers had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred when appellant crossed the center line and veered into the opposite lane of traffic. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress.
BAKER and BROWN, JJ., agree.