Opinion
No. CV-01-0809193 S
March 30, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This matter was tried to the court on February 24 and 25, 2004 and on March 2, 2004. Thereafter, the court heard closing arguments on March 23, 2004. After considering the evidence and the arguments of the parties, the court issues this memorandum of decision.
I. Background
In count one of his two-count complaint, dated July 3, 2001, the plaintiff, Cebert Rodney, d/b/a Fine Line Home Improvement (Rodney), claims that the defendants, Dwane and Claudette Jackson, breached their contract with him, under which they agreed to pay $20,000.00 for work done at their home, located at 51 Magnolia Street, in Hartford, Connecticut. Rodney claims that an unpaid balance remains due from the Jacksons. In addition, in count two, he seeks damages from the Jacksons, based on a claim of unjust enrichment, claiming that they have not paid for materials purchased and services rendered.
For ease of reference, Dwane Jackson will be referred to as "Jackson."
In their answer (#105), except for admitting that they own and reside at the home located at 51 Magnolia Street, the Jacksons pleaded that they do not have sufficient knowledge or information to respond to the allegations and have left Rodney to his proof.
II. Discussion
As discussed below, several of the issues in this matter turn on assessments of credibility. As the trier of fact, the court must resolve a credibility contest. See State v. Nowell, 262 Conn. 686, 695, 817 A.2d 76 (2003); Lacic v. Tomas, 78 Conn. App. 406, 409-10, 829 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 922, 835 A.2d 472 (2003). "The determination of a witness' credibility is the special function of the trial court." State v. Nowell, supra, 262 Conn. 695. "[I]t is the trier's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses and determine whether to accept some, all or none of a witness' testimony." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hoffer v. Swan Lake Ass'n, Inc., 66 Conn. App. 858, 861, 786 A.2d 436 (2001).
The court finds the following facts and credits the following evidence, except as noted. Overall, the court found Rodney's testimony to be credible. The Jacksons' home is over 6000 square feet in size and was built in 1930. Under the auspices of a City of Hartford (City) rehabilitation/home improvement program, Rodney and the Jacksons entered into a written contract for the work to be done at the Jacksons' home. See Exhibit 2, entitled Agreement For Housing Rehabilitation (contract). The contract was witnessed by Michael P. Jarvis, the City rehabilitation specialist involved in the project. The contract price was $20,000.00. The scope of the work was set forth in a set of written specifications, dated March 13, 2000 (Exhibit 1). The categories of work included masonry, siding, roofing, windows, exterior doors, and porches. See Exhibit 1. Prior to work commencing on the project, Rodney met with Jackson at Jackson's home in order to review the planned work.
Rodney timely commenced work on the project in May 2000. He removed and replaced the existing roof. He also did masonry, siding, and porch repairs, and replaced the rear door. He was unsure if the porch work was completed.
In early June 2000, a tarpaulin which Rodney had placed on the roof failed to prevent water from a rain storm from causing damage to the interior of the home and to the Jacksons' personal property located within it. As a result, they presented an insurance claim for the damage, for which they eventually received compensation. See Exhibit 12 (letter from Jacksons' insurance carrier). Jackson initially testified that the rain storm occurred on May 29, 2000; he subsequently changed his testimony by stating that it happened on June 5, 2000.
After Jarvis had inspected his work, Rodney submitted an invoice to the City's Department of Housing and Community Development, dated June 14, 2000, seeking partial payment for work done on the project, in the amount of $11,925.00. According to the invoice, payment was requested for roofing, chimney, porches, and doors. See Exhibit 3.
By letter dated June 29, 2000, the Jacksons complained to Rodney about the work being done on their home. See Exhibit 4. In this letter, the Jacksons described the water damage which had occurred. They noted that they "recorded all of this on videotape as it was occurring." See Exhibit 4. In addition, they asserted that Rodney was not abiding by the contract, (1) since he was not replacing all damaged shingles, (2) since a full week's work had not been done on the project after it began, and (3) since Rodney had made no effort to repair the damage to the inside of the home. They concluded their letter by stating, "We would like Fine Line Home Improvement to cease all work, repair and/or reimburse us for any damages and return clothing taken from our home for cleaning. Then and only then will we pay for any services rendered." See Exhibit 4. A copy of this letter was also forwarded to Jarvis.
Rodney responded by letter dated July 24, 2000, in which he disputed the Jacksons' assertions about his workmanship and about the manpower utilized on the job. See Exhibit 5. He expressed his willingness to repair the interior damage, under the condition that the City's rehabilitation specialist (Jarvis) assess the damage and create a list of what was to be addressed. According to Rodney's letter, Jarvis was pleased with the job which Rodney was doing. Rodney stated, "Mr. Jackson I hope after all repairs are completed there is no problem in you signing off so I can get paid." See Exhibit 5.
Jarvis did not testify at the trial. In their oral argument, the Jacksons contended that Rodney should have called Jarvis as a trial witness. This argument "overlook[s] General Statutes § 52-216c, which permits fact finders in civil actions to draw negative inferences from a party's failure to call a witness only under limited circumstances." (Emphasis in original.) Caprood v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 80 Conn. App. 338, 343, 835 A.2d 338 (2003). An adverse inference may be drawn in a civil action "from another party's failure to call a witness who has been proven to be available to testify." General Statute § 52-216c. Here, there was no proof offered to the court to the effect that Jarvis was available to testify. The court declines to draw any inference from the fact that Jarvis did not testify at the trial. See Caprood v. Atlanta Casualty Co., supra, 80 Conn. App. 338, 343-44.
The City's file concerning the approved loan to the Jacksons for the work on the project contains an undated partial payment authorization, signed by Jackson and by Jarvis, authorizing partial payment to Rodney, but limited to "Roof: only." See Exhibit 8. According to the testimony of Jon Labelle, a project manager for the City's Department of Housing and Community Development, such a document normally would be prepared after Jarvis had inspected the property. Apparently, as a result of the dispute between Rodney and the Jacksons, Jarvis did not process Rodney's requests for payment. In his testimony, Jackson stated that he signed Exhibit 8, the partial payment authorization, before any work was done on the roof in effect contending that he lied in signing it, since it states that the roofing was "completed to my satisfaction and in accordance to contract specifications." See Exhibit 8. Jackson's apparent willingness to make what he asserted was a false representation in writing undermines his credibility.
The loan was never made and Jackson withdrew his loan application in August 2003.
See discussion below of Exhibit 9, an undated, partially executed document, entitled "Final Payment Authorization And Relocation Certification."
According to Labelle, the City's file does not contain any correspondence reflecting that the contract between Rodney and the Jacksons was terminated. See Exhibit 2, p. 8, ¶ 20. For example, the City uses a standard form for such termination letters, but there is no such letter in the file.
It is undisputed that, after receiving the Jacksons' letter (Exhibit 4), Rodney was not permitted to continue to do work on the project. The Jacksons never acceded to Rodney's offer to return to the job. Rodney submitted a second requisition to the City, dated August 2, 2000, for an additional $2,500.00, for repair and replacement of siding. This document stated, "[r]equesting payment for work done at the above address [J]uly, 2000." See Exhibit 11. While the amount sought exceeded the amount for siding ($1,500.00) which was stated in the specifications, Exhibit 1, Rodney testified that his intent was to request payment for siding and for retainage.
Rodney did not replace the front door, and did not supply new windows. Rodney claims that he did $14,750.00 worth of work on the Jacksons' home and that he has received no payment. Jackson testified that he hired no other contractor to correct Rodney's work, although the contract afforded him the right to do so if the original contractor was terminated in accordance with its terms. See Exhibit 2, p. 9, ¶ 21(C).
The court is unpersuaded by Jackson's testimony, including his contentions that Rodney's work was worthless. For example, Jackson testified that his letter of June 29, 2000 (Exhibit 4) terminated the contract. His letter did not so state and did not conform to the procedure outlined in the contract for contract termination. Instead of terminating the contract in accordance with its terms, the Jacksons' letter requested Rodney to cease working on the project.
Paragraph 20 of the contract, p. 8, provides for a termination procedure. In the event that the contractor does not commence or pursue the work in accordance with the work schedule, or the contractor's work fails to conform to the specifications, or if any part of the work is defective, the owner may terminate the contract after providing the contractor with an opportunity to cure. It provides that "[t]he OWNER is to notify the CONTRACTOR, in writing, of his failure to commence, pursue or comply. Said notification is to allow the CONTRACTOR ten (10) days to correct said defects." See Exhibit 2, p. 20, ¶ 20(A). If the defects are not corrected within the ten-day period, the owner may then terminate the contract by sending to the contractor, via certified mail, a notice of termination; termination is effective as of the date of mailing. See Exhibit 2, p. 20, ¶ 20(B). The Jacksons did not afford to Rodney the contractually required opportunity to correct alleged defects in the work.
Jackson's credibility was undermined also by his testimony which contradicted his letter. Contrary to his letter, which states that he would pay Rodney for any services rendered if Rodney paid for the damages which resulted from the rain storm, and returned clothing which was to be cleaned, Jackson testified that he decided not to pay Rodney when he sent the letter.
Jackson also testified that, according to the specifications, the chimney should have been rebuilt. Photographs, see Exhibit L, show the chimney, with a stack rising somewhat above the rest of the brick chimney. According to Jackson, Rodney's work on the chimney was defective since, before his work, the bricks went up higher. No photograph was offered to show how the chimney looked before the work began.
The specifications, Exhibit 1, section 6, provide that the contractor was to "repoint" the chimney. This involved removing loose and crumbling mortar, cleaning affected areas, and repointing with a mortar mix. See Exhibit 1, section 6.
The rules concerning contract interpretation and enforcement are well settled. "A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction . . . [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract . . . Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Niehaus v. Cowles Business Media, Inc., 263 Conn. 178, 188, 819 A.2d 765 (2003). In ascertaining the common meaning of terms utilized in a contract where no definition is provided, our Supreme Court has looked to the dictionary definition, as found in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Webster's). See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 255 Conn. 295, 307, 765 A.2d 891 (2001); Moore v. Continental Casualty Co., 252 Conn. 405, 410-11, 746 A.2d 1252 (2000).
Here, while, as described above, the specifications do not define the term "repoint," they do explain the work that was to be done. Likewise, while Webster's does not define the word "repoint," it defines "pointing," in the most closely related context, as meaning, "the material (as mortar) used in pointing something (as a brick wall)." Webster's, p. 1751. There is nothing in the specification for this aspect of the work which indicates that the brickwork was to reach the very top of the chimney.
Jackson testified that the work on the chimney was defective also because flashing at its base is visible. Minor defects could have been set forth on a punchlist and corrected if Rodney had been advised thereof and permitted to return to the job. The Jacksons' letter to Rodney does not mention these claimed defects. Under the circumstances, the court finds that this aspect of Jackson's complaints about Rodney's work is unfounded.
In addition, Jackson testified that the re-roofing which Rodney provided was defective as well. Besides complaining about the details, such as painting, crooked lines, and visible flashing, he asserted that the roof had not been installed properly, resulting in loose and fallen shingles and leakage. The court is again unpersuaded.
Jackson stated that shingles began falling from the roof about two years ago, or approximately in February or March 2002, about six months after the return date in this action. However, the physical evidence offered to support this contention includes photographs showing fallen shingles from a small portion of the roof which Jackson stated were taken in the fall of 2003, about one and one half years after he claims to have noticed the condition, See Exhibit A. As noted above, when the interior leakage occurred after the rainstorm in 2000, Jackson videotaped the event. To the court, it is not credible that, after being sued by Rodney, Jackson would have failed to take timely photographs of the results of alleged poor workmanship by Rodney.
Jackson was uncertain as to when other photographs of the roof were taken. See Exhibit K.
Likewise unpersuasive are Exhibits G and H, photographs taken in the winter of 2003/2004, showing alleged interior water damage attributable to defective workmanship. The connection between these photographs and Rodney's work over three years earlier is attenuated. In addition, Jackson acknowledged that he presented no insurance claim for such damages.
Jackson's assertions that interior water damage occurred between June 2000 and June 2001, between June 2001 and June 2002, and between June 2002 and June 2003, are unpersuasive on two grounds. First no contemporary photographic evidence of it was presented. Second, it strains credulity to accept the proposition that such damage occurred, yet Jackson neither filed an insurance claim as a result of it nor took steps to have it repaired.
Jackson has had the benefit of the new roof installed by Rodney for the over-three-year period which elapsed since Rodney did work at the house. He made no warranty claim about the roof or about any other aspect of Rodney's work, either for defective workmanship or materials. See Exhibit 2, p. 10, ¶ 21(H). No contractor has repaired any of Rodney's work. Jackson's explanation, that he did not want to change anything until after the trial occurred, is not credible. Jackson and his family have resided at the home since before and after Rodney did the work. If the roofing work had been materially defective, it is probable that Jackson would have taken steps to correct it long ago and would have filed a counterclaim against Rodney. Other aspects of Rodney's work are discussed below.
Jackson's argument as to the historical nature of his residence is also unavailing. While the contract Exhibit 2, p. 3, ¶ 6, refers to the fact that "designated existing structures shall be rehabilitated in a manner consistent with their respective original architectural styles," the referenced "[g]uidelines for the rehabilitation work" "outlined in the pamphlet `Before You Remodel,'" were not presented to the court. See contract, Exhibit 2, ¶ 6, at p. 3.
A. Breach of Contract CT Page 5000
The contract, Exhibit 2, pp. 9-10, paragraph 21, provides for a procedure for the making of payments. Paragraph 21(A) states that the contractor may request progress payments as work is completed. An itemized bill must be presented. See Exhibit 2, ¶ 21(A). "Each itemized bill shall first be presented to the HDH to enable it to review the same and inspect the work covered thereby." See contract Exhibit 2, p. 9, ¶ 21(B). The contractor agreed that he would not submit any bills to the owner until the HDH certified that the work complied with the contract. See contract, Exhibit 2, p. 9, ¶ 21(B).
HDH means the City's Department of Housing and Community Development. See contract Exhibit 2, p. 3, ¶ 1(b).
Paragraph 21(D) provides, "[a]ll amounts due and payable by the OWNER to the CONTRACTOR of the work performed under this Agreement shall be payable within thirty (30) days from the date of authorization by the OWNER. OWNER shall be under no obligation to authorize any payment hereunder with respect to which the HDH has not provided the certification referred to in Paragraph (B) above." See contract, Exhibit 2, p. 10.
Thus, according to the parties' agreement, the provision of such certification was a condition precedent to the owner's contractual obligation to make payment. "`A condition precedent is a fact or event which the parties intend must exist or take place before there is a right to performance . . . A condition is distinguished from a promise in that it creates no right or duty in and of itself but is merely a limiting or modifying factor . . . If the condition is not fulfilled, the right to enforce the contract does not come into existence . . . Whether a provision in a contract is a condition the nonfufilment of which excuses performance depends upon the intent of the parties, to be ascertained from a fair and reasonable construction of the language used in the light of all the surrounding circumstances when they executed the contract.' (Citations omitted.) Lach v. Cahill, 138 Conn. 418, 421, 85 A.2d 481 (1951)." Blitz v. Subklew, 74 Conn. App. 183, 189, 810 A.2d 841 (2002).
In support of his contract argument, Rodney relies on Exhibits 8 and 9. The undated partial payment authorization, Exhibit 8, which was signed by Jackson and by Jarvis, was a certification as to the roof only. As discussed, Rodney's first bill, Exhibit 3, sought payment for other work, besides the roofing, including on the chimney, the porches, and the doors. The siding, which was the subject of Rodney's second bill, Exhibit 11, also was not addressed in the partial payment authorization.
As to Exhibit 9, it is entitled "Final Payment Authorization And Relocation Certification." Like Exhibit 8, it is undated. This document appears to bear Jackson's signature, although he disputed it. However, although there is a space for a "Witness Signature," it is unwitnessed. In addition, the statement below, "I/We have checked the work performed at the above residence and have found that all work has been satisfactorily completed in accordance with contract specifications," which is followed by a line for the signature of the City's Rehabilitation Specialist, is blank. Neither Jarvis nor anyone else on behalf of the City signed this document. Since Exhibit 9 is undated and is only partially executed, it lacks probative value.
Labelle confirmed that Rodney's bills were not submitted by Jarvis for payment. It is evident that, as to the roofing work, this resulted from receipt of Jackson's June 29, 2000 letter, Exhibit 4. Three other documents from the City's file on the project are dated in 2002, over one year and seven months after Rodney worked on the job. In Exhibit 6, a letter from HDH to Jackson, dated February 21, 2002, Jackson was asked whether the work had commenced or been completed. The letter states, "[s]ince we issued a Proceed letter to commence work on your property on May 8, 2000, we have not heard from you or the contractor." This statement was reiterated in another HDH letter, dated March 1, 2002. See Exhibit 7. A similar letter was sent to Rodney a few days later, on March 6, 2002. See Exhibit 15. Each of these letters were written by Carmen M. Garcia, not by Jarvis. Rather than demonstrate that Jarvis did not certify Rodney's roofing work, they reflect the writer's lack of familiarity with the work on the project which had occurred.
The City certified Rodney's roofing work. Under the circumstances, Rodney has met his burden to prove that the Jacksons' contractual obligation to pay for the roofing was triggered since he has established that, as to the roofing, the condition precedent to that obligation was fulfilled. Rodney substantially completed the roofing work required by the contract. As to that aspect of the job, Rodney has met his burden of proof on count one, his breach of contract claim. As discussed above, the Jacksons have not shown that they are entitled to any credit for defective roofing work. See Loveland v. Aymett's Auto Arcade, Inc., 121 Conn. 231, 237, 184 A. 376 (1936). Accordingly, judgment may enter for Rodney as to count one, for the principal sum of $10,000.00, the amount budgeted in the specifications for this contract item. See Exhibit 1, section 10. Rodney has not met his burden of proof as to fulfillment of the contractual condition precedent, certification by the City, as to other aspects of his work on the project.
Even if Rodney had not proved that the condition precedent was fulfilled, he would be entitled to recover for the value of the re-roofing, $10,000.00, under his second count, for unjust enrichment. See discussion below.
B. Unjust Enrichment
Count two of the complaint seeks recovery based on a claim of unjust enrichment. Here, as discussed, the absence of the City's certification precluded part of Rodney's breach of contract claim. Even though no remedy is available to him for breach of contract as to portions of his work, he may still recover for unjust enrichment, provided the required elements are met.
"The right of recovery for unjust enrichment is equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for the defendant to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of the plaintiff . . . Unjust enrichment is, consistent with the principles of equity, a broad and flexible remedy." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Polverati v. Peatt, 29 Conn. App. 191, 200, 614 A.2d 484, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 913, 617 A.2d 166 (1992). "Unjust enrichment is a legal doctrine to be applied when no remedy is available pursuant to contract." Ayotte Brothers Construction Co. v. Finney, 42 Conn. App. 578, 581, 680 A.2d 330 (1996). "The doctrine's three basic requirements are that (1) the defendant was benefited, (2) the defendant unjustly failed to pay the plaintiff for the benefits, and (3) the failure of payment was to the plaintiff's detriment . . . All the facts of each case must be examined to determine whether the circumstances render it just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, to apply the doctrine." (Citation omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 409, 766 A.2d 416 (2001).
"A plaintiff seeking damages under either a claim for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, or quantum meruit must establish that the defendant received a benefit . . ." Morgan Buildings Spas, Inc. v. Dean's Stoves Spas, 58 Conn. App. 560, 563, 753 A.2d 957 (2000). "In an unjust enrichment case, damages are ordinarily not the loss to the plaintiff, but the benefit to the defendant, for which the fact finder may rely on the plaintiff's contract price when the benefit is too difficult to determine." United Coastal Industries, Inc. v. Clearheart Construction Co., Inc., 71 Conn. App. 506, 515, 802 A.2d 901 (2002). "Ordinarily where one requests another to furnish articles or perform services in the usual course of the latter's business, a sufficient basis exists to render the former liable to the latter for their reasonable value. The basis of that liability is an inference that the person rendering the services expected to be paid for them and the other accepted them intending to pay for them." Clark v. Diefendorf, 109 Conn. 507, 510, 147 A. 33 (1929).
The Jacksons received the benefit of Rodney's work in the following other categories: masonry, an exterior door, and porch repair, and unjustly failed to pay for it, to Rodney's detriment. According to the specifications, Exhibit 1, section six, the parties agreed that the price for the chimney repair was $1,500.00. Rodney substantially completed this item and is entitled to be compensated for it. He did one-half of the work on the porches for a value of $1,250.00 and supplied one of the two exterior doors, at $500.00. See Exhibit 1, sections 17 and 14. The total of these items is $3,250.00. The court relies on the parties' arm's length agreement which established prices for these parts of the work; There is no other evidence of a different set of dollar values which ought to be applied.
While Jackson's complaints of defective workmanship also extend to the rear door, see Exhibit M, this photographic evidence does not clearly illustrate any material claimed defect as to this aspect of Rodney's work. While the photograph shows a wire near the door, it is unclear how this wire relates to Jackson's contentions. As discussed, Rodney was prevented, by the Jacksons' refusal to allow him to return to the job, from correcting any punch-list items relating to his work.
Jackson never undertook to repair any allegedly defective work, but has had the benefit of Rodney's efforts, such as utilizing the door for ingress and egress. While Jackson claimed that he will have to expend $20,000.00 to correct Rodney's work, this claim is unsupported, in view of Jackson's lack of credibility and the lack of other evidence to support the assertion. The court is unpersuaded that, more than three years and seven months after Rodney stopped working at the job, the Jacksons intend to incur any significant expense related to Rodney's work. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust to reduce the amounts to be awarded when Rodney was prevented from completing his work.
At trial, the court granted Rodney's motion in limine to preclude the Jacksons from calling a putative expert witness who had not been disclosed in accordance with Practice Book § 13-4. See transcript of the court's ruling on March 2, 2004.
In addition, as discussed above, Rodney performed cedar siding work, for which he claims $1,500.00, the amount set forth in the specifications. See Exhibit 1.
Jackson contends that Rodney's work on the cedar siding was defective and inadequate. This was a subject of his June 29, 2000 letter. See Exhibit 4. As support for this contention, Jackson presented photographic evidence. See Exhibit B. Again, this set of photographs was allegedly taken in the fall of 2003, more than three years after Rodney's work. As to other photographs, see Exhibit J, Jackson did not know when they were taken, except that it had to be after June 2001. According to Jackson, there was supposed to be paper placed under the siding; without it, the wind blows through the siding. Notwithstanding these claimed defects, Jackson has not had another contractor work on the siding. Review of the photographs indicates that the siding is unsightly.
In his argument, Rodney asserted that it was inconceivable that any contractor would have undertaken to repair all the cedar siding shingles which needed to be repaired for the budgeted amount. According to him, since the entire budget for the job was only $20,000.00, with one-half allocated to the roofing, as to the siding it was within the contractor's discretion to repair what was most defective, but not all of it, since it was not feasible to do so within the $1,500.00 budget for this item. He concedes that, as to the siding, the photographic evidence shows the need for other repairs.
Rodney's argument is contradicted by the terms of the specifications. As to the siding, Exhibit 1 provides that Rodney was, at the south, east, and west elevations, to "[r]emove any damaged/rotted cedar siding at the above elevations — prepare/replace any damaged substrate as required. See Exhibit 1, section 9. In addition, at the west elevation he was to remove improperly repaired siding and "prepare substrate to accept new siding." See Exhibit 1. The requirement of removal of "any damaged/rotten cedar siding" did not afford Rodney the discretion to deal only with that siding which was most defective and to leave the rest alone. It appears that Rodney agreed to do this aspect of the work at a price which he later found to be too low.
The value of Rodney's siding work is questionable in view of the poor overall appearance reflected in the photographic evidence. As to this portion of his work, Rodney has not proved the value of any benefit conferred. An award of damages may not be premised on speculation. See Card v. State, 57 Conn. App. 134, 138-40, 747 A.2d 32 (2000). The court therefore declines to include an amount for it in its damages award. Accordingly, Rodney has proved that he is entitled to an additional award of the principal amount of $3,250.00, for the other work he performed at the Jacksons' home.
3. Interest
Rodney also seeks an award of prejudgment interest. General Statute § 37-3a provides in relevant part that "interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions . . . as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable." "The allowance of prejudgment interest as an element of damages is an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court . . . The determination of whether or not interest is to be recognized as a proper element of damage, is one to be made in view of the demands of justice rather than through the application of an arbitrary rule." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rapin v. Nettleton, 50 Conn. App. 640, 651, 718 A.2d 509 (1998).
"The fact that this dispute is `hotly contested' does not impact on the trial court's determination that the defendant wrongfully detained the [plaintiff's] money." Solomon v. Hall-Brooke Foundation, Inc., 30 Conn. App. 136, 147, 619 A.2d 866 (1993). "[P]rejudgment interest is awarded in the discretion of the trial court to compensate the prevailing party for a delay in obtaining money that rightfully belongs to him." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Northrop v. Allstate Insurance Co., 247 Conn. 242, 254-55, 720 A.2d 879 (1998).
"A trial court must make two determinations when awarding compensatory interest under § 37-3a: (1) whether the party against whom interest is sought has wrongfully detained money due the other party; and (2) the date upon which the wrongful detention began in order to determine the time from which interest should be calculated." Maloney v. PCRE, LLC, 68 Conn. App. 727, 755, 793 A.2d 1118 (2002).
As discussed above, Rodney was entitled to be paid by the Jacksons long ago. They wrongfully detained money which was due to Rodney. Also as noted above, the contract provides that payment is due within 30 days of the owner's authorization. See contract, Exhibit 2, p. 10, ¶ 20(D). Payment should have occurred within 30 days after the City approved the roofing work. Allowing a reasonable time, another 30 days, for that approval process, Rodney was entitled to be paid sixty days from the submission of his first bill, Exhibit 3, which was dated June 14, 2000.
Accordingly, interest is awarded, commencing August 14, 2000. Pursuant to General Statute § 37-3a, and in its discretion, the court awards interest to Rodney, in the amount of $4,806.27, as a result of the Jacksons' wrongful delay in paying him.
The award of interest is calculated as follows. Ten per cent (10%) of $13,250.00 is $1,325.00. Interest accrues at $3.63 per day ($1,325.00 divided by 365 days per year equals $3.63). Rodney is entitled to an award of interest for the three years and 229 days which have elapsed between August 14, 2000 and the date of this memorandum of decision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, judgment may enter for the plaintiff, Cebert Rodney, d/b/a Fine Line Home Improvement, on count one, in the principal amount of $10,000.00. As to count two, judgment may enter in favor of the plaintiff, Cebert Rodney d/b/a Fine Line Home Improvement, in the principal amount of $3,250.00.
The total principal award is $13,250.00. Interest is awarded in the amount of $4,806.27, for a total judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $18,056.27.
It is so ordered.
BY THE COURT
ROBERT B. SHAPIRO JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT