Opinion
No. 04-16-00434-CR
05-10-2017
Steven ROBLES, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015CR1302
Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice AFFIRMED
Appellant Steven Robles was indicted for felony assault family violence by strangulation alleged to have occurred on December 7, 2014. On June 1, 2016, the trial court found Robles guilty and assessed punishment at ten years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, suspended and probated for a term of ten years, and a $1,500 fine. On appeal, Robles contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The case was tried to the bench on June 1, 2016. The State called two witnesses, San Antonio Police Officer Roman John Martinez and the victim, Sally Alba.
Officer Martinez testified that on December 7, 2014, he was dispatched for an assault in progress. When he arrived, Alba and her six-year-old daughter were visibly distressed and crying. Officer Martinez noted redness and swelling to Alba's neck and face. Alba relayed that Robles, her daughter's father, assaulted and choked Alba. Officer Martinez transported Alba and her daughter to the police department; pictures were taken and Alba provided a written statement to officers.
The State's next witness was Alba. She testified that she and Robles began dating in 2007 and their daughter was born in 2008. The relationship was "good sometimes, but it had its problems." When questioned further, Alba acknowledged several calls to the police for domestic violence throughout their relationship. She described Robles as very jealous from the beginning and the physical violence continued to worsen throughout their relationship.
Alba testified that on December 7th, she, Robles, and their daughter were at the apartment when she and Robles began arguing about Robles driving her 2012 Fiat. They began arguing and she told him that he needed to leave the apartment.
I told him he had to leave. I—we were in my room, so it was too close for me. I wanted to leave the room. But he didn't let me leave the room. He grabbed me. He threw me back and I hit my—the back against the floorboard like that. It didn't knock me out or anything. Like, I got up and I tried to leave again. He didn't let me leave. He threw me back down on the bed and got on top of me.Alba further described not being able to breathe when he applied the pressure to her throat and thinking "that [she] was going to die." Robles eventually stopped, got up, and left the apartment in Alba's second vehicle, a Pathfinder. Alba testified Robles was already out of the apartment when she called the police.
. . . .
He got on top of me, put all his weight on me. He put his hands around my neck, squeezing.
The State also presented Alba with several pictures; she identified and described the injuries she sustained during the assault. Specifically, Alba identified redness on her neck from when Robles "had his arms on my neck," redness on her cheek from Robles "pressing down on my face" with his forearm, and a swollen lip.
During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Alba regarding her return to San Antonio from Eagle Pass in the summer of 2014. Alba acknowledged several calls to police for domestic abuse during that time period. Reports were made, but she did not suffer any injuries during any of the prior incidents.
After the State rested, defense counsel called Sandra Alvarado, Robles's mother. Alvarado testified that during the summer of 2014, Alba moved back to San Antonio to live with Robles. Alvarado admitted she was very leery of Alba's return and the couple being reunited. Alvarado further detailed several calls to police regarding domestic abuse and one occasion when Alba attacked Robles in front of Alvarado.
The last witness called to testify was Appellant Steven Robles. Robles testified that after Alba picked him up at work around 6:00 p.m., they stopped at a gas station on the way home. Robles relayed their daughter was crying because Alba "wouldn't give her anything to eat and she hadn't eaten all day." When Robles confronted Alba, she began assaulting him.
Sally was not letting me leave. When I tried to leave the first time after she assaulted me, I was pinned up against the bedroom door at that time, and when I tried to leave and I tried to open the door she tried to keep me from leaving out the door. And I kind of, you know, kind of pushed her back with the force of my body back on the mattress . . . in order to leave the room.
. . . .
So when I left the room, she got back up, and she began assaulting me on my way to the front door.
. . . .
She was using her closed fists. She was hitting me with both hands.
Robles further testified that after he left the apartment, he stopped at the motel next door to the apartment complex; after explaining that he had been assaulted, Robles asked the receptionist to take pictures of his injuries. The pictures were marked and admitted into evidence. Robles further denied making any of the marks on Alba's face or neck.
Robles was adamant that he was not fighting with Alba. "There was just a question. It wasn't an argument."
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence after a bench trial, we apply the same Jackson v. Virginia standard that is applied in an appeal from a jury trial. See Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 319 (1979)). "We view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); accord Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). "This standard recognizes the trier of fact's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence . . . ." Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 860; accord Gear, 340 S.W.3d at 746. The reviewing court must also give deference to the factfinder's ability "'to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.'" Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). "Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction." Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). "[D]irect evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative." Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); accord Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
We may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Ortiz v. State, 933 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that in a bench trial the trial court acts as the finder of fact); Joseph v. State, 897 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (explaining in a bench trial, the trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses). We defer to the factfinder's responsibility to resolve any conflicts in the evidence fairly, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; King, 29 S.W.3d at 562. The factfinder alone decides whether to believe eyewitness testimony, and it resolves any conflicts in the evidence. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 15; Young v. State, 358 S.W.3d 790, 801 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref'd). In conducting a sufficiency review, "[w]e do not engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence, but only ensure that the [factfinder] reached a rational decision." Young, 358 S.W.3d at 801.
When the defendant raises a claim of self-defense, the defendant bears the burden of producing some evidence to support the claim. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). "Once the defendant produces such evidence, the State" has the burden of disproving the defense. Id. The burden of persuasion does not require the State to produce evidence; "rather it requires only that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. "When a [factfinder] finds the defendant guilty, [it implicitly finds] against the defensive theory." Id.
B. Arguments of the Parties
Robles contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because the eyewitness and photographic evidence indicated that Alba was the aggressor and Robles was justified in using self-defense.
The State counters the evidence supports that Robles pushed Alba onto the bed and put his hands around her neck applying pressure, causing her not to be able to breathe and causing her bodily injury.
C. Assault Family Violence by Strangulation
To prove assault family violence by strangulation, the State was required to prove that Robles "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury" to Alba, with whom he was in a relationship, by "impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of [Alba] by applying pressure to [Alba's] throat or neck." See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2015); Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
Robles does not deny that he and Alba were in a relationship as defined by Penal Code section 22.01(b)(2). Robles's complaint is based solely on whether the evidence supports that he assaulted Alba by strangulation.
D. Analysis
The trial court in this matter heard conflicting evidence—Alba testified Robles assaulted and strangled her and Robles testified Alba attacked him and that he was simply defending himself. In addition to the testimony, the trial court viewed several photographs offered by both the State and the defense. The State further offered the testimony of Officer Martinez who witnessed a very upset Alba immediately after the incident. Alba testified Robles placed his hands around her neck and that she was unable to breathe. See Marshall, 479 S.W.3d at 845 ("An impediment to normal breathing does not necessarily prevent breathing altogether because an impediment is merely a hindrance or obstruction.").
We remain mindful that the trial court, as the finder of fact, was the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; King, 29 S.W.3d at 562. Here, the trial court was free to believe Alba's account of the events and discount Robles's testimony. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; King, 29 S.W.3d at 562.
Based on the entire record, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found each of the essential elements of the charged offense, see Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 860, and that either Robles failed to meet his burden to produce evidence supporting—or the State met its burden to disprove—Robles's claim of self-defense, see Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594. See also Vise v. State, No. 04-14-00077-CR, 2015 WL 575160, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 11, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding a reasonable jury could infer defendant wrapped his hands around the victim's neck long enough and with enough pressure to make it difficult for the victim to breathe normally).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH