Opinion
3-03-CV-285-P.
June 9, 2003.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an order of the District Court in implementation thereof, the subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as evidenced by his signature thereto, are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
Darwin M. Robinson filed this action on February 10, 2003, with the payment of the $150.00 filing fee. He denominated his pleadings as "An Application for Habeas Corpus Relief". On February 18, 2003, the District Court referred the case to the undersigned magistrate judge for report and recommendation.
By letter dated February 26, 2003 (See Exhibit 1 attached), the magistrate judge informed Robinson that his pleadings did not appear to state a cognizable basis for habeas corpus. He was directed to file a brief citing any cases which held that the claims raised in his February 10, 2003, filing came within the court's habeas corpus jurisdiction. The court also informed him of his obligation to effect service on the United States.
On March 11, 2003, Robinson filed a pleading which he denominated as "Response to Request for Brief Joined With An Amended Application for Habeas Corpus Relief". The pleading fails to identify any case authority with respect to this court's habeas corpus jurisdiction.
By letter dated March 14, 2003 (See Exhibit 2 attached), the magistrate judge informed him that the claims raised did not allege a cognizable basis for habeas corpus relief The letter further reminded him of his obligation to effect service on the United States as set out in the earlier letter.
On April 3, 2003, Robinson filed a pleading which he denominated as "Response to Request for Brief Joined With An Amended Application for Habeas Corpus Relief". Again no authority for exercise of this court's habeas corpus jurisdiction was provided.
On April 14, 2003, the United States filed its Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment. On April 28, 2003, Robinson filed his pleading denominated as "Response to Request for Brief Joined With An Amended Application for Habeas Corpus Relief". In this pleading he alleged that habeas corpus was available to him under the Administrative Procedures Act and 26 U.S.C. § 7422. Construing the April 28, 2003, pleading as a response to its motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment the government filed a reply on May 5, 2003.
On May 20, 2003, Robinson filed an additional pleading denominated as "An Amended Application for Habeas Corpus Relief Joined With A Motion to Amend and Transfer". He seeks a transfer of this action to Washington, D.C.
In its motion to dismiss the government moves to dismiss this action on the basis that Robinson has failed to properly serve the United States. See Government's brief at page 10, Part D. The records before the court demonstrate that this argument is meritorious. The United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas has never been served. See Rule 4(i)(1)(A). Further, Robinson's certificates of service do not contain return receipts showing that the mailed pleadings were received by the persons to whom they were addressed or such persons' designees.
Robinson has filed multiple certificates of service, purporting to show that he has served the United States. See Certificate of Service filed on February 14, 2003, Certificates of Service attached to Robinson's April 3, 2003, filing, Certificate of Service filed on April 28, 2003, Certificate of Service attached to Robinson's April 28, 2003, filing, and Certificates of Service attached to Robinson's May 20, 2003, filing.
Improper service may be a basis for dismissal of a complaint. However, when a pleading alleges a colorable basis for relief over which a court has subject matter jurisdiction courts frequently defer consideration of a motion to dismiss to allow the claimant/plaintiff to properly effect service. In this instance it is clear that Robinson's claims are wholly frivolous and do not state cognizable claims for relief. Therefore, the court should dismiss his claims under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6). The magistrate judge is of the opinion that the court need not reach the government's alternative motion for summary judgment.
The gravamen of all of Robinson's pleadings is that the I.R.S. improperly determined that he owes additional sums for income taxes incurred in calendar years 1993, 1994 and 1995.
Technically speaking Robinson's "An Amended Application for Habeas Corpus Relief Joined With A Motion to Transfer" supersedes his previously filed pleadings. However, the magistrate judge has considered each one of his filed pleadings to determine if any states cognizable claims for relief.
A review of each of the government's arguments for dismissal and the cases cited in support thereof demonstrates that each is meritorious and constitutes a proper basis for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6). See United States's brief filed on April 14, 2003, at pages A and B, pages 3-7. Robinson's pleadings filed subsequent to April 14, 2003, do not in any way contest the substance of these grounds for dismissal.
Although Robinson is apparently a lay person, he has not pursued this action through good faith or due to a mere lack of understanding. Rather he has pursued this action in the face of instructions from the court and is apparently intent on applying his own view of the Constitution and the laws of the United States and his own perception of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Succinctly stated his asserted claims are wholly frivolous.
Robinson certainly is not the first person who has wished to impose his own interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code or the United States Constitution as they relate to income taxes due from persons who have derived income from wages and other sources. His is certainly not the first action to seek to advance distorted and inaccurate interpretations of federal tax law, nor is it likely to be the last.
E.g. See United States v. Montgomery, 778 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1985); Lonsdale v. United States, 9191 F.2d 1440, 1447-8 (10th Cir. 1990).
In nearly every situation in which a case is referred to a magistrate judge for recommendation it is appropriate to address in some detail the claims alleged and the rationale for disposition. However, in the present case, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1415 (5th Cir. 1984) is particularly appropriate wherein the court noted inter alia:
"We perceive no need to refute [baseless] arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that these arguments have colorable merit. . . . An appeal that lacks merit is not always — or often — frivolous. However, we are not obliged to suffer in silence the filing of baseless, insupportable appeals presenting no colorable claims of error and designed only to delay, obstruct, or incapacitate the operations of the courts or any other governmental authority. . . . The government should not be put to the trouble of responding to such spurious arguments, nor this court to the trouble of `adjudicating' this meritless appeal."RECOMMENDATION:
Although Crain dealt with an appeal from the Tax Court, the observations made in the opinion are equally applicable to frivolous actions filed in federal district courts.
For the foregoing reasons it is recommended that the District Court enter its order granting the government's motion to dismiss and its judgment dismissing Robinson's action with prejudice.
NOTICE
In the event that you wish to object to this recommendation, you are hereby notified that you must file your written objections within ten days after being served with a copy of this recommendation. Pursuant to Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), a party's failure to file written objections to these proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law within such ten-day period may bar ade novo determination by the district judge of any finding of fact or conclusion of law and shall bar such party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the district court.