Opinion
Civil No. 04-650 ADM/AJB.
August 30, 2004
Eric D. Satre, Esq., Connor, Satre Schaff, Minneapolis, MN, appeared for and on behalf of Plaintiff.
Timothy R. Thornton, Esq., and Elizabeth M. Brama, Esq., Briggs Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, appeared for and on behalf of Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment of Defendants Northwest Airlines, Inc ("NWA") and John D. Nelson ("Nelson"), (collectively "Defendants"), was argued before the undersigned United States District Judge on July 2, 2004. [Docket No. 8]. Defendants argue that the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") preempts Plaintiff John A. Robinson, Jr.'s ("Plaintiff") defamation claim, and additionally state that the statute of limitations bars the action against Nelson. Alternatively, Defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For the reasons explained below, Defendants' Motion is granted and Plaintiff's claim is dismissed with prejudice.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a former pilot who flew for NWA from 1991 until his voluntary retirement in 2003. Compl. ¶ 1. NWA is an air carrier as defined by the RLA. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164, 181-188. The Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA"), a union that represents pilots employed by NWA, has adopted a collective bargaining agreement ("Pilots Agreement") that governs the terms and conditions of pilots' employment. See Pilots Agreement (Brama Aff. Ex. 2). The Pilots Agreement is governed by the RLA, which requires arbitration for disputes "growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of [collective bargaining] agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994). Section fifteen of the Pilots Agreement addresses pilot fitness, and states the following:
Relevant provisions of the Pilots Agreement will be considered as "necessarily embraced by the pleadings." Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999); Compl. ¶¶ 7-9; see also Jenisio v. Ozark Airlines, Inc., 187 F.3d 970, 972 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the court could properly review a collective bargaining agreement referenced in but not attached to the complaint). A plaintiff "cannot defeat a motion to dismiss by choosing not to attach [pertinent documents] to the complaint." Silver v. HR Block, Inc., 105 F.3d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 1997). Further, "[s]ome materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint may be considered by a court in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 1999). Consequently, in reviewing the present Motion the Court will also consider John D. Nelson's January 18, 2002 letter to Dr. Garrett O'Connor, the transcript from arbitration proceedings inRobinson v. Northwest Airlines, 2003-AIR-22, Brian Romer's October 4, 2000 letter to Jack Balliet, and Plaintiff's June 25, 2001 letter to the FAA. See Brama Aff. Exs. 1-5 [Docket No. 11]. The Decision and Order in Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, 2003-AIR-22, will be considered as well. (Brama Aff. Ex. 10).
If the Company has reasonable cause to believe that a pilot has developed a medical impairment to his ability to perform his duties between the routine medical examinations required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Company may require said pilot to submit to a medical examination from a non-AME medical doctor chosen by the Company. The Company will be entitled to: (1) submit to the medical doctor a written explanation of the circumstances giving rise to the request for examination. . . .
See id. § 15 B (emphasis added).
If the pilot fails a § 15 B examination, he may obtain a second opinion from a "qualified medical examiner of his own choosing and at his own expense." Id. § 15 D.1. Further, if the opinions conflict, the two issuing physicians appoint a disinterested third examiner whose diagnosis is controlling. Id. § 15 D.3-D.4. However, when the pilot does not seek a second opinion, the findings from the first examination determine whether he is deemed safe to fly an airplane.
NWA ordered Plaintiff to undergo a fitness for duty examination after a series of incidents which caused NWA to question Plaintiff's mental health. During an arbitration proceeding in 1999, Plaintiff disputed the denial of a living allowance given to pilots whose primary residence was Hawaii or Alaska. See Tr. from Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, 2003-AIR-22 at 360-61. NWA denied Plaintiff the living allowance because Plaintiff either stayed at a hostel or camped outside in a nature park instead of establishing a residence. Id. NWA found this behavior odd given Plaintiff's six figure income, but did not intervene at that time. Id.
In mid-September 2000, Plaintiff demanded that FAA personnel give him a copy of an air traffic control tape of one of his flights. See Letter from Romer to Balliet of 10/04/00 (Brama Aff. Ex. 4). Plaintiff first called FAA staff about the tape, but later confronted them in person when he did not receive it. Id. FAA Assistant Air Traffic Manager Brian Romer ("Romer") reported the incident to Jack Balliet ("Balliet"), NWA's Director of Flying in Detroit, and noted that Plaintiff's "belligerent and high-handed tactics" had frightened employees. Id. Balliet referred the matter to ALPA's Professional Standards Committee, a group of pilots that informally addresses performance concerns. Tr. from Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, 2003-AIR-22 at 221-23.
On October 25, 2000, Plaintiff again engaged in arbitration proceedings with NWA. The dispute concerned Plaintiff's insistence that NWA reimburse him for vaccinations he received after a monkey bit him when he visited the Taj Mahal. Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, 2003-AIR-22 at 10 (Brama Aff. Ex. 10). Gary Skinner ("Skinner"), who was then NWA's Chief Pilot and had observed Plaintiff at the hearing, was concerned about Plaintiff's inability to rationally assemble or convey his thoughts. Id. While Skinner recommended that Plaintiff undergo a § 15 B evaluation at that time, NWA declined to pursue this option. Id.; see also Tr. fromRobinson v. Northwest Airlines, 2003-AIR-22 at 348-49.
NWA became further concerned about Plaintiff's mental stability in Fall 2001, based on a letter dated June 25, 2001 that Plaintiff sent to the FAA. See Letter from Robinson to Hatmaker of 06/25/01 (Brama Aff. Ex. 5). In the letter, Plaintiff objected to NWA's passenger luggage security procedures. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff complained of an incident where NWA had not de-planed luggage that belonged to passengers who were detained by customs officials just before boarding the aircraft.Id. The letter closed with statements saying that the letter was being sent to Osama bin Laden. See Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, 2003-AIR-22 at 10.
The letter was forwarded to Balliet, who found the references to Osama bin Laden disturbing. Tr. from Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, 2003-AIR-22 at 224-29. When Balliet questioned Plaintiff about his intent in writing the letter, Plaintiff did not provide a coherent response. Id. at 228-29. Balliet found Plaintiff's behavior "bizarre," but did not recommend that he receive a § 15 B examination. Id.
NWA eventually required Plaintiff to undergo a § 15 B examination in January 2002, following an incident which occurred on December 23, 2001. See Compl. ¶ 5; Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, 2003-AIR-22 at 4. On that day, Plaintiff was somehow locked in a pilot luggage storage room in the Detroit airport. Compl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff could not get the door open, and called NWA's Pilot Scheduling Department for assistance. Id. ¶ 6. He then requested that the fire department come and rescue him, and suggested that the door be blown away with a bazooka. Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, 2003-AIR-22 at 11.
NWA, troubled by Plaintiff's response to being locked in the luggage room and the previous incidents involving odd behavior, determined there was reasonable cause to believe that Plaintiff had developed a medical impairment and should not fly. See Letter from Balliet to Robinson of 01/16/02 (Brama Aff. Ex. 6); Letter from Nelson to O'Connor of 01/18/02 (Brama Aff. Ex. 1). Consequently, NWA informed Plaintiff that psychiatrist Dr. Garrett O'Connor ("O'Connor") would be examining him pursuant to § 15 B. See Letter from Balliet to Robinson of 01/16/02. NWA attorney Nelson then wrote a letter to O'Connor explaining the basis of Plaintiff's § 15 B examination. See Letter from Nelson to O'Connor of 01/18/02. Nelson, who submitted the letter as a "written explanation of the circumstances giving rise" to the § 15 B request, outlined the baggage room incident and stated that Plaintiff had "locked himself in a pilot bag storage room. . . ."Id.; see also Pilots Agreement § 15 B.
O'Connor examined Plaintiff twice in early 2002 and concluded that Plaintiff was "not currently fit for duty as a Commercial Aviator." See Letter from Zanick to Nelson of 04/05/02 (Brama Aff. Ex. 8); Letter from O'Connor to Zanick of 12/10/02 (Brama Aff. Ex. 7); see also Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, 2003-AIR-22 at 11-12. Plaintiff did not seek a second opinion, and NWA prohibited him from flying. Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, 2003-AIR-22 at 11-12. Plaintiff voluntarily retired in June 2003. Id. at 12.
Plaintiff filed a defamation claim in state court against NWA and Nelson on January 4, 2004. He alleges that the statement "[Plainitff] locked himself . . . [in the] bag room," contained in Nelson's January 18, 2002 letter to O'Connor, is defamatory because Plaintiff believes he became locked in the room due to a faulty lock. Compl. ¶ 8. This statement alone constitutes the basis of Plaintiff's present lawsuit. On February 4, 2004, Defendants removed the action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings, or alternatively, for summary judgment.
A. Standard of Review
Defendants' Motion will be treated as one for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and view the facts alleged in the complaint as true. See Hamm v. Groose, 15 F.3d 110, 112 (8th Cir. 1994). Courts must also draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. See United States v. Stoltz, 327 F.3d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 2003). A claim should be dismissed only if it is clear that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1996); Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
B. Complete Preemption under the RLA
Defendants argue that the RLA preempts Plaintiff's defamation claim under the complete preemption doctrine and provides federal question jurisdiction. Claims that arise under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States may be removed to federal court even if originally filed in state court.See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003). In determining whether a claim arises under federal law, courts normally "examine the `well pleaded' allegations of the complaint and ignore defenses." Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 539 U.S. at 6. Consequently, cases are generally not removeable unless the complaint states a federal claim on its face. Id.
However, the complete preemption doctrine is an independent corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987); Gore v. Trans World Airlines, 210 F.3d 944, 949 (8th Cir. 1999). The complete preemption doctrine provides that when the "pre-emptive force of a statute is so extraordinary," it "converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." Caterpiller, Inc., 482 U.S. at 393 (internal quotation omitted). Determining whether a state law claim is completely preempted turns on Congressional intent, and includes analysis of possible defenses.See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc, 512 U.S. at 252; Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 1989). After courts have established that a federal statute completely preempts an area of state law, "any claim purportedly based on the pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, [to be] a federal claim. . . ." Caterpiller, Inc., 482 U.S. at 393.
The language of the RLA reveals that Congress intended to "promote stability in labormanagement relations [in the airline industry] by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes." Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 512 U.S. at 252. The RLA mandates arbitration for two classes of disputes designated as either major or minor. Id. Major disputes concern the formation of collective bargaining agreements or "efforts to secure them," while minor disputes involve "the interpretation or application" of collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 252-53 (internal quotation omitted); see also Deford v. Soo Line R.R., 867 F.2d 1080, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 1989). Therefore, under the complete preemption doctrine, the RLA preempts state law claims that require an interpretation of, or involve rights and duties created or defined by, collective bargaining agreements. Gore, 210 F.3d at 949.
The RLA System Board, not federal courts, adjudicates minor disputes concerning airlines' collective bargaining agreements.See McCormick v. Aircraft Mechs. Fraternal Ass'n, 340 F.3d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978). Consequently, federal courts must dismiss such claims for lack of jurisdiction upon finding that the complete preemption doctrine applies. Id.
Defendants contend that the RLA preempts Plaintiff's defamation action because the claim involves rights and obligations arising from the Pilots Agreement and not independent state law rights. Additionally, Defendants argue that evaluation of Plaintiff's claim is "inextricably intertwined" with § 15 B, a provision which entitles NWA to give an examining doctor a written explanation for requesting a medical examination of a pilot.See Pilots Agreement § 15 B.
The Eighth Circuit addressed similar issues in Gore v. Trans World Airlines. 210 F.3d at 949-952. In Gore, a co-worker overheard the plaintiff, Andrew Gore, say he wanted to kill himself and other TWA employees. Id. at 947-48. The co-worker reported Gore's statements to management and Gore was arrested and searched. Id. TWA suspended Gore pending a termination hearing, warned other employees about Gore, and told employees not to allow Gore onto the premises. Id. Gore disputed that he made the statements and was reinstated after passing a psychological examination. He then sued TWA alleging false arrest, negligence, libel, slander, and invasion of privacy. Id. at 949.
TWA argued that its actions were justified under its collective bargaining agreement which barred violence, threatening conduct and firearms from company facilities. Id. The collective bargaining agreement also required that TWA maintain safe working conditions and promptly address complaints involving workplace safety. Id.
The Eighth Circuit held that the complete preemption doctrine barred Gore's claims because they were "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract," and did not involve "non-negotiable, independent state-law rights." Id. at 949. Further, Gore could not establish liability "without demonstrating that the defendants' actions were wrongful" under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 952. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of Gore's claims. Id.
Dismissal is also required here because Plaintiff's defamation claim is inextricably intertwined with § 15 B, a provision that Defendants argue justifies Nelson's letter expressing to the examining physician that Plaintiff "locked himself in the bag room." Id. at 949-950. To establish a defamation claim under Minnesota law, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the alleged statements were made and communicated to someone other than himself; (2) the statements were false; and (3) that his reputation was harmed as a result. See Ferrell v. Cross, 557 N.W.2d 560, 565. However, the defendant may invoke qualified privilege and avoid liability even when the plaintiff proves the requisite elements of defamation. Id. To be privileged, the communication must be: (1) made upon a proper occasion; (2) from a proper motive; and (3) be based on reasonable or probable cause. Id.
Defendants have asserted qualified privilege in this case. Determining whether § 15 B permitted NWA, acting through Nelson, to publish its understanding of the bag room incident, thus illustrating whether Nelson's statement was made upon a proper occasion and with a proper motive, necessarily requires interpretation of the Pilots Agreement. Id. at 566; see also Gore, 210 F.3d at 949-50. Consequently, the Pilots Agreement is inextricably intertwined with resolution of Plaintiff's claim. Gore, 210 F.3d at 949-50. Therefore, the defamation claim is preempted by the RLA and must be dismissed.Id.
C. The Statute of Limitations
Defendants argue additionally that the claims against Nelson are time-barred under state law. When cases are removed from state to federal court, state law governs the applicable statute of limitations and the commencement of litigation. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51 (1980); Marshall v. Warwick, 155 F.3d 1027, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 1998); Hajjiri v. First Minn. Sav. Bank, 25 F.3d 677, 678 (8th Cir. 1989). In Minnesota, a civil action is commenced only when the summons is served on the defendant. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01; Mellett v. Fairview Health Servs., 634 N.W.2d 423-24 (Minn. 2001). Additionally, Minnesota has a two year statute of limitations for defamation claims. See Minn. Stat. § 541.07, subd. 1. Thus, to withstand dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, Plaintiff's defamation claim must have been served upon Nelson within two years after the allegedly defamatory statement was made. See Wallin v. Minn. Dep't of Corrections, 598 N.W.2d 393, 400 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999); see also Hajjiri, 25 F.3d at 678.
The statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's claim against Nelson. According to the Complaint, the sole allegedly defamatory statement in this case was contained in Nelson's letter to Dr. O'Connor of January 18, 2002. See Compl. ¶ 8. Consequently, Plaintiff should have served Nelson with notice of this lawsuit by Jan. 18, 2004. See Minn. Stat. § 541.07, subd. 1; Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01. However, as Plaintiff conceded at oral argument, Nelson has never been served. Therefore, Plaintiff's defamation claim against Nelson is time-barred and must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 8] is GRANTED and,
2. Plaintiff's Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.