Opinion
No. 26886.
Heard November 30, 2009.
Decided October 25, 2010.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Charleston County, R. Markley Dennis, Jr., J.
Donald Higgins Howe, of Howe Wyndham, LLP, of Charleston; George J. Morris and Walter Bilbro, Jr., both of Charleston, for Petitioners.
Louis H. Lang, of Callison Tighe Robinson, LLP, of Columbia, for Respondent.
Charles M. Feeley, of Summerville, for Guardian Ad Litem.
In Petitioners' quiet title action, they allege the foreclosure of Kathleen and Bobbie Brown's property in 2000 should be set aside for lack of service of process. Since the foreclosure, the property has been transferred several times: in 2002, at a judicial sale to Robert L. Tuttle and Christl Gehring; Gehring later transferred her interest to Tuttle; and in 2003, Tuttle transferred his interest to Respondent Daniel Duggan. In 2005, Petitioners filed a complaint and lis pendens, seeking to quiet title to 28.6 acres of heirs' property, including the approximately .54 acre lot in question. Duggan moved for summary judgment, asserting as an affirmative defense under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-39-870 (2005 Supp. 2008) his status as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. In response, Petitioners claimed lack of service of process in the 2000 foreclosure action, arguing the foreclosure was void for lack of personal jurisdiction over the necessary parties because: (1) they were never personally served with process; (2) they were both incompetent at the time of the alleged service; and (3) the alleged substituted service upon a relative never occurred. The trial judge found such "irregularities in the proceedings" could not defeat Duggan's status as a bona fide purchaser under the statute and granted Duggan summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. Sara Mae Robinson v. Duggan, 378 S.C. 140, 662 S.E.2d 420 (Ct.App. 2008). We affirm the court of appeals, pursuant to the following authority: Sara Mae Robinson v. The Converse Co., LLC, 389 S.C. 360, 698 S.E.2d 801 (2010) and Sara Mae Robinson v. Hutton, 388 S.C. 645, 698 S.E.2d 229 (2010) (holding that while a judgment to quiet title may be set aside for extrinsic fraud, notwithstanding the three-year statute of limitations in S.C. Code Ann. § 15-67-90, laches may bar such a claim).
Section 15-39-870 provides:
Upon the execution and delivery by the proper officer of the court of a deed for any property sold at a judicial sale under a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction the proceedings under which such sale is made shall be deemed res judicata as to any and all bona fide purchasers for value without notice, notwithstanding such sale may not subsequently be confirmed by the court.
TOAL, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, JJ., and Acting Justices JAMES E. MOORE and JOHN H. WALLER, JR., concur.