Summary
concluding factual disputes precluded summary judgment on discrimination claims even when there were no white operations managers similarly situated to plaintiff because arguably their disciplinary records differed on account of the race discrimination and there was record evidence that other employees were treated differently
Summary of this case from Mudrich v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.Opinion
Civil File No. 02-4161 (PAM/RLE)
June 5, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the Motion in part and grants it in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ron Robertson ("Robertson") began working at Defendant FedEx in 1989. He was eventually promoted to the position of operations manager, and it was this position from which he was terminated in July 2001. He is an African-American, and he contends that his termination was discriminatory and was in retaliation for his complaints about the discrimination he suffered at the hands of his supervisor, Defendant Julie Reeves ("Reeves").
Reeves became Robertson's supervisor in October 2000. Prior to this time, Robertson had received a warning from his supervisor regarding inappropriate conduct at a staff meeting, and Robertson had been disciplined for an e-mail Robertson sent to a co-worker. According to Defendants, after Reeves was promoted to be Robertson's supervisor, his behavior deteriorated. Reeves disciplined Robertson for insubordination on three separate occasions in 2001, and ultimately terminated him for insubordination on July 19, 2001.
Robertson tells a different story. He alleges that Reeves treated him differently than she treated white operations managers, and that Reeves invented his alleged insubordination in an effort to terminate his employment. He contends that Reeves singled him out for discipline for minor offenses, and then treated him poorly when he attempted to discuss the discipline with her. He raises claims of race discrimination in violation of Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000eet seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; retaliation in violation of Title VII and § 1981; and the common-law claims of battery, defamation, and tortious interference with contract.
Defendants argue in their Motion that Robertson also raises claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). However, the Complaint does not mention the MHRA and none of the Counts of the Complaint are based on alleged violations of the MHRA.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik v. Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). In employment discrimination cases, the Eighth Circuit has cautioned that summary judgment should be granted sparingly. Crawford v. Runyoa, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994).
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to provide that a plaintiff claiming race discrimination in employment succeeds in establishing an unlawful employment practice if the plaintiff "demonstrates that race . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." Id. § 2000e-2(m). The Act goes on to provide that, once a plaintiff establishes an unlawful employment practice pursuant to § 2000e-2(m), the employer is liable for damages unless the employer demonstrates that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor." Id. § 2000e 5(g)(2)(B).
This analytical framework supplants the traditional direct/indirect evidence distinction of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 269-70 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003) (noting that Civil Rights Act of 1991 makes no distinction between direct and indirect evidence). Thus, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff claiming Title VII or § 1981 race discrimination or retaliation must first establish that genuine issues of material fact remain to be resolved on the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp.2d 987 (D. Minn. 2003) (Magnuson, J.); see also Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310, 315 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 1981 and Title VII claims are subject to the same analysis). Once a plaintiff establishes those elements, the defendant must prove that it would have made the same decision absent consideration of the illegal factor. Such a showing is not a defense to liability, however, but is merely a defense to damages. A plaintiff who is successful at establishing that genuine questions of material fact exist as to the elements of a prima facie case thereby avoids summary judgment on those claims.
The Eighth Circuit has yet to acknowledge that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm was invalidated by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Cherry v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., 361 F.3d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 2004) (using McDonnell Douglas to analyze Title VII claims). Thus, some courts in this Circuit continue to use McDonnell Douglas when evaluating federal discrimination and retaliation claims. See, e.g., Rollins v. Mo. Dep't of Conservation, No. 02-4271-CV-C-NKL, 2004 WL 944811, at *9 (W.D. Mo. April 14, 2004) (evaluating Title VII claims using McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. Should the plaintiff succeed in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action it took. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered reason is a pretext for illegal discrimination.
As a practical matter, for the purposes of summary judgment there is often little difference in the outcome under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and McDonnell Douglas. When determining whether there are questions of material fact that preclude judgment as a matter of law, the Court must examine whether there is causation, that is, whether any evidence in the record supports an inference of illegal discrimination or of illegal retaliation. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Court makes this inquiry during the examination of the elements of a prima facie case. Under McDonnell Douglas, the Court typically examines causation when determining whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for the adverse employment action is false and is merely a pretext for illegal discrimination. In either case, however, the plaintiff's claims turn on whether there is any evidence of causation in the record.
C. Discrimination Claims
As noted above, to avoid summary judgment on his Title VII and § 1981 claims, Robertson must first establish that genuine issues of material fact exist on each element of his prima facie case of discrimination. To establish a prima facie case, Robertson must show that:
1. he was a member of a protected group;
2. he was meeting his employer's legitimate performance expectations;
3. he suffered an adverse employment action; and
4. circumstances exist that give rise to an inference of discrimination.Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1994). There is no dispute that Robertson is a member of a protected group or that he suffered an adverse employment action. Although there may ultimately be a question as to whether Robertson was meeting FedEx's legitimate performance expectations, Defendants concede for the purposes of their Motion that he can also establish this element.
Thus, the dispute in this case centers on whether there is any evidence that indicates that Robertson's race played a role in the adverse employment action. The most common way for a plaintiff to establish causation is evidence that similarly situated white employees were treated differently. Defendants contend that Robertson has no evidence that white operations managers who were insubordinate were not subject to the discipline Robertson received. Robertson argues that there were no white operations managers subject to the harassment he was subjected to, and thus no white operations managers were similarly situated to him. As Robertson puts it, "the reason white managers did not have disciplinary records like Robertson was because they were white and because they did not claim of race discrimination." (PL's Opp'n Mem. at 25.) Robertson contends that Defendants cannot rely on his disciplinary record as a legitimate reason for terminating him, because the discipline he received was racially motivated.
The documents submitted by the parties make clear that there are many disputes of material facts in this matter. For example, Robertson and his witnesses say that he was never belligerent with Reeves, while Reeves and her witnesses describe Robertson as loud and threatening. Reeves contends that she enforced the uniform and back-belt directives as to all employees, but Robertson's witnesses describe numerous employees who did not comply with these directives and who were not disciplined. These and other factual disputes preclude summary judgment on Robertson's discrimination claims. See Jackson v. Catholic Charities, Civ. No. 02-1222, 2003 WL 22533330, at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2003) (Magnuson, J.).
B. Retaliation
Robertson also claims that his termination was in retaliation for his complaints of discrimination, in violation of Title VII, and § 1981. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title [ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title [ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII or § 1981, Robertson must demonstrate that he engaged in a statutorily protected activity, that he suffered an adverse employment action, and that there was a causal connection between the adverse employment action and the protected activity. Stevens v. St. Louis Univ. Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 268, 270 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Coffman, 141 F.3d at 1245. If Robertson establishes a prima facie case, then with respect to the federal claims, the burden shifts to Defendants to prove that they would have made terminated Robertson even if he had not engaged in the protected activity. See Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that retaliation claims are analyzed under the same framework as disparate treatment claims under Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(2)(B).
Robertson filed an internal complaint about Reeves' alleged discrimination in March 2001. At this time, Reeves had already disciplined Robertson twice for alleged insubordination. Defendants argue that Robertson cannot show that there is a causal connection between the his discrimination complaint and his termination.
Defendants contend that Robertson cannot establish the requisite causal connection between his protected activity and termination because he had been disciplined twice prior to the complaint, and the decision to terminate him was based in part on these prior incidences of insubordination. In response, Robertson relies solely on the temporal proximity between his complaint in March 2001 and his termination in July 2001. However, temporal proximity alone is almost never enough to establish a causal connection between protected activity and termination. Kipp v. Mo. Highway Transp. Comm'n, 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2002). Absent some other evidence that his termination was in retaliation for his March complaint of discrimination, Robertson's retaliation claims fail as a matter of law.
C. Common-Law Claims
Robertson raises claims against Reeves for tortious interference with contract, defamation, and battery.
1. Tortious Interference with Contract
The elements of a claim for tortious interference with contract are: (1) a contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) the defendant's intentional procurement of the breach of this contract; (4) the defendant's actions were without justification; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages. Kiesbo v. Ricks, 517 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. 1984). In this case, the parties agree that Reeves cannot be liable for tortiously interfering with Robertson's employment contract with FedEx unless her actions were "motivated by malice and bad faith, that is, by personal ill-will, spite, hostility or a deliberate intent to harm" Robertson.Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 507 (Minn. 1991).
Because Robertson has succeeded in raising a genuine issue of fact as to whether Reeves discriminated against him, he has likewise succeeded in raising a genuine question as to whether Reeves was motivated by malice and bad faith. Racial discrimination is, by its nature, malicious and in bad faith. Thus, Robertson's tortious interference claim survives summary judgment.
2. Defamation
Count VI of the Complaint alleges that Reeves defamed Robertson by telling others that Robertson violated FedEx's conduct policy, and that Robertson made physical threats "and other untoward actions" against Reeves. (Compl. ¶ 106.) In order to prove a defamation claim under Minnesota law, Robertson must show that: (1) Defendants published or communicated a statement about him to a third person; (2) the statement was false; and (3) the statement tended to harm his reputation and lower him in the estimation of the community. Stuempges v. Parke, Davis Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980).
Neither party specifies for the Court the precise statements alleged to be defamatory, to allow the Court to determine whether genuine issues of fact exist as to whether these statements were indeed defamatory. Defendants contend that "the sole basis" for Robertson's defamation claim is "that another (unidentified) manager told him that Reeves said [Robertson] threatened her." (Defs.' Supp. Mem. at 24-25.) However, Defendants' memorandum does not cite to any evidence in the record to support this assertion. The Complaint alleges more than this single statement, and Robertson's opposition memorandum appears to challenge statements that Reeves made about Robertson in the various disciplinary charges she brought against him. Again, however, neither Robertson's Complaint nor his opposition memorandum specifically reference any particular defamatory statement, when that statement was allegedly made, or to whom the alleged defamatory statement was made.
To evaluate whether a statement is defamatory, the Court must determine whether the statement is true or false and whether the statement is a statement of fact or of opinion. This determination requires the Court to evaluate four factors: (1) the precision and specificity of the statement; (2) the verifiability of the statement; (3) the social and literary context in which the statement was made; and (4) the public context in which the statement was made. Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (8th Cir. 1986).
Absent some indication of what Reeves allegedly said, to whom, and when, the Court cannot evaluate those statements. It is not the role of the Court to search the record for facts that might create a genuine issue for trial. See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Baltes, 15 F.3d 660, 662-63 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook. J.) ("District judges are not archaeologists."); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs"); Nicholas Acoustics Specialty Co. v. H M Constr, Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 839, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Judges are not ferrets!"). Because Defendants seek summary judgment on Robertson's defamation claim, it is Robertson's burden to show that there is some evidence in the record to support that claim. The Court must presume from his failure to specifically outline the alleged defamation that there is no such evidence in the record. Robertson's defamation claim is therefore dismissed.
3. Battery
Robertson's claim for battery is based on one incident in which Reeves allegedly grabbed Robertson's arm. "A battery occurs when a person intentionally causes harmful or offensive contact with another, or causes an imminent apprehension of such contact." Taylor v. R N Mfg., Civ. No. 99-1086, 2002 WL 187506, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2002) (Tunheim, J.) (citing Schumann v. McGinn, 240 N.W.2d 525, 529 n. 4 (Minn. 1976)). Even if the incident occurred as Robertson described it, Reeves' actions simply do not amount to a battery. There is no evidence that she intended to harm Robertson or to offend him, nor is there any indication that Robertson was in any way harmed by Reeves grabbing his arm. Robertson's battery claim fails.
CONCLUSION
Robertson has raised a genuine issue of fact on his discrimination claims, but has failed to do so on his retaliation claims. Similarly, Robertson has established that genuine factual disputes remain on his tortious interference claim, but has failed to make out a claim for defamation or for battery.
Accordingly, based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 18) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
2. Plaintiffs claims of retaliation, defamation, and battery are DISMISSED with prejudice.