Opinion
2:22-cv-03578-RMG-MGB
12-08-2022
Emory W. Roberts, Jr., #373393, Petitioner, v. Warden Kendall, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Emory W. Roberts, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. No. 1.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review the petition and submit a recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the petition be summarily dismissed without prejudice at this time.
BACKGROUND
In April 2016, Roberts was indicted on seven charges stemming from his involvement in a drug trafficking ring operating in Berkeley and Dorchester Counties.(Indictment Nos. 2016-GS-47-02, -03.) On February 15, 2017, while awaiting trial, Roberts filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the length and legality of his pretrial detention at the Hill Finklea Detention Center and seeking release from the same. (See Case No. 2:17-cv-453-RMG-MGB.) On July 28, 2017, a Berkeley County jury convicted Roberts on all seven counts in his underlying criminal case, resulting in an aggregate sentence of twenty five years' imprisonment. Consequently, Roberts' federal habeas petition was dismissed without prejudice as moot on October 20, 2017. (Case No. 453, Dkt. No. 57.)
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the records filed in Roberts' underlying state proceedings and related federal actions. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those public records of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites). In particular, the undersigned refers to Case No. 2:17-cv-453-RMG-MGB (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017) (Dkt. Nos. 15-1 through 15-12; Dkt. No. 49; and Dkt. Nos. 49-1 through 49-3) for copies of various state court documents.
Following a timely notice of appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Roberts' criminal convictions and sentence on January 29, 2020, and denied his subsequent petition for rehearing on March 27, 2020. (See App. Case No. 2017-1676.) On April 24, 2020, Roberts filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the South Carolina Supreme Court, which was likewise denied on October 16, 2020. (See App. Case No. 2020-646.) Roberts then filed an application for postconviction relief (“PCR”), which is currently pending before the Berkeley County Court of Common Pleas. (See Case No. 2020-CP-08-01349.)
On January 24, 2022, Roberts filed another federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, this time challenging the constitutionality of his convictions. (See Case No. 2:22-cv-220-RMG-MGB.) On February 4, 2022, the undersigned issued a report and recommendation finding that Roberts' petition was subject to summary dismissal, as he had not yet exhausted his state court remedies pursuant to § 2254(b)(1). (See Case No. 220, Dkt. No. 4 at 4, noting that Roberts' PCR application was still pending before the state court.) The assigned United States District Judge adopted the undersigned's recommendation and dismissed Roberts' petition without prejudice on March 28, 2022, explaining that he could “seek federal habeas review, if necessary, once the highest state court [] reached its decision on his pending PCR application.” (Case No. 220, Dkt. No. 11 at 3.)
It is against this background that Roberts brings yet another § 2254 petition, renewing many of the same grounds raised in his preceding habeas action, including judicial impartiality; prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective assistance of counsel; insufficient evidence; and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, among other claims. (Case No. 2:22-cv-3578-RMG-MGB, Dkt. No. 1 at 5-4; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 15-21.) In addition to reasserting the merits of these claims, however, Roberts' petition also now argues that-while his PCR application remains pending-certain “extraordinary circumstances” warrant “federal intervention” in his state court proceedings. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 14.) More specifically, Roberts claims that he was the target of a “collusive scheme” to secure an unlawful conviction, as perpetrated by his defense attorneys, the state court trial judge, the State Grand Jury, the South Carolina Attorney General and his agents, the South Carolina Court of Appeals, the South Carolina Supreme Court, and the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (“SLED”). (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 14-20; see also Dkt. No. 1-1 at 14.)
Based on the above, Roberts argues that it would be futile to continue with his PCR proceedings in the “same court” that allegedly conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights:
Since state courts are accused of having exercised the coercion and conspiracy to deprive petitioner from the exercise of constitutional rights, a remedy in the courts of South Carolina state hardly seems adequate. This is a case in which there has been manifest bad faith on the part of the state, both in the inception of the prosecution against plaintiff and the manner in which it was handled. It is respectfully submitted that this is a case for federal injunctive relief to cure. . . .(Dkt. No. 1-2 at 14-15.) Roberts therefore asks for the “[dismissal of [his] indictment with prejudice for outrageous government misconduct shocking to the universal sense of justice and violating fundamental fairness.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 15.) He also requests “a permanent injunction against prosecution” by the State. (Id.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Roberts' pro se petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (“AEDPA”); and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
The narrow question before the Court is whether it “plainly appears” that Roberts is not entitled to any relief. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. If so, his petition must be dismissed; if not, the Warden must respond. Id. Because Roberts is a pro se litigant, his petition is accorded liberal construction. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Court cannot ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Although not entirely clear, the instant petition appears to make two primary requests for relief: (1) that the Court issue an injunction that effectively terminates Roberts' current PCR action and prohibits any further state proceedings in relation to Roberts' criminal convictions; and (2) that the Court waive the exhaustion requirement so that Roberts may proceed with his federal habeas action here. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 15.)
It is well-established that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or there is an absence of available State court corrective process; or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Thus, as the Court previously warned Roberts in Case No. 220, a state prisoner generally cannot seek habeas relief in federal court until he has fairly presented his claims to each appropriate state court. See Stewart v. Warden of Lieber Corr. Inst., 701 F.Supp.2d 785, 790 (D.S.C. 2010). To satisfy this burden, the state prisoner must show that both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles were presented to the highest state court. Gordon v. Braxton, 780 F.3d 196, 201 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 447-48 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding that exhaustion requires state prisoners to complete at least one complete round of the state's established appellate review process).
The exhaustion requirement is “grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) (noting that it would be “unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation”). The United States Supreme Court further articulated this principal in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), holding that a federal court must not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 42-45; see also Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc., v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining that “federal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, whenever the federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, Roberts argues that “the present case represents extraordinary circumstances” because the state forum no longer affords him “an adequate remedy at law” for the purported violations of his constitutional rights. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 20.) As discussed above, Roberts contends that his criminal convictions were the result of a grand conspiracy orchestrated against him by the South Carolina judiciary, such that any further proceedings in state court would be tainted by the same. (See id. at 14.) In other words, Roberts assumes that the PCR court-as part of the state judicial system-will not afford him a legitimate, impartial opportunity to argue his constitutional claims, and any attempts at exhaustion are therefore futile. (See id., asserting that the PCR court is “fully cognizant of the interest of the [South Carolina] Supreme Court in the charges” against Roberts; see also id. at 19, suggesting that the PCR court is likewise “engaged in a constitutionally illegitimate procedure.”) The undersigned disagrees for several reasons.
At the outset, the statutory exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply “only if there is no opportunity to obtain redress in state court or if the corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain relief.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981). To that end, “the mere possibility of erroneous application of constitutional standards will usually not amount to the irreparable injury necessary to justify” federal intervention in state court proceedings. Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 462 F.Supp.3d 635, 648 (E.D. Va. 2020). Such is the situation here, as Roberts alleges only the mere possibility that the PCR court will act in bad faith during the course of his proceedings. Beyond this bare speculation, however, there is nothing to suggest that Roberts will be deprived of a fair corrective process at this time.
To the contrary, the record indicates that the PCR court has been fairly accommodating to Roberts, granting both his request to proceed pro se and his most recent motion for discovery of certain sensitive “impanelment documents,” despite a prior protective order that prohibited Roberts' from reviewing the impanelment materials without the supervision of counsel. Indeed, the PCR court coordinated limited “standby counsel” in response to Roberts' subsequent discovery requests, enabling him to “obtain and review any necessary materials” without violating the protective order, but “still allowing [him] to proceed pro se as he wishe[d] to do.” (See Case No. 2020-CP-08-01349, Order Granting Limited Discovery dated February 9, 2022.)
Based on the above, the undersigned finds Roberts' conclusory allegations regarding the purported state-wide conspiracy insufficient to demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances required to waive the exhaustion requirement under § 2254 and invoke federal intervention in this case. See, e.g., Griffin v. W. Virginia, No. 5:17-cv-3111, 2017 WL 6947868, at *9 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 21, 2017) (finding that “petitioner's prediction that she [would] be unsuccessful on the merits of her unexhausted claims in State court [did] not satisfy the futility exception,” despite petitioner's allegations that the state court had consistently failed to protect her rights “by making arbitrary decisions and engaging in egregious acts”), adopted, 2018 WL 443461 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 16, 2018); Castro v. Warden of Lieber Corr. Inst., No. 0:08-cv-157-RBH, 2008 WL 5082718, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 1, 2008) (finding that petitioner could not “escape the exhaustion requirement with vague allegations of a conspiracy”-i.e., that the state court “would have conspired to kill the case”); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 610 (1975) (noting that “the considerations of comity and federalism which underlie Younger permit no truncation of the exhaustion requirement merely because the losing party in the state court of general jurisdiction believes that his chances of success on appeal are not auspicious”).
Moreover, even if there was some indication that Roberts' ongoing PCR proceedings may be influenced by the alleged conspiracy, the undersigned notes that the Court simply cannot grant Roberts' blanket request for “injunctive relief” against the entire South Carolina judicial system. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 15.) Indeed, it is well-established that “federal courts have no general power to compel action by state officials.” See Dais v. Huggins, No. 8:08-cv-3629-JFA-BH, 2008 WL 5062329, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 20, 2008) (referencing Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 74 (2nd Cir. 1988)); see also Bell v. South Carolina, No. 2:17-cv-2176-TMC-MGB, 2017 WL 6767385, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 24, 2017) (“Federal courts generally may not issue a writ of mandamus to compel state officials to perform a duty allegedly owed to a petitioner.”), adopted, 2018 WL 263817 (D.S.C. Jan. 2, 2018), aff'd, 724 Fed.Appx. 204 (4th Cir. 2018). Consequently, to the extent Roberts is asking this Court to unilaterally terminate his pending PCR proceedings and/or any other state court proceedings involving his criminal convictions, such relief is not available here. See, e.g., Bell v. Stirling, No. 1:22-cv-1319-TMC-MGB, 2022 WL 5236739, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2022) (finding that federal district court could not order state court to take certain actions in plaintiff's post-conviction proceedings), adopted, 2022 WL 4462951 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 2022); Bell v. Reynolds, No. 8:08-cv-3799-GRA-BHH, 2009 WL 152586, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 6, 2009) (explaining that relief was unavailable where plaintiff asked federal district court to order circuit court to rule in a certain way), adopted, 2009 WL 152589 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2009), aff'd, 335 Fed.Appx. 318 (4th Cir. 2009).
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Roberts' federal habeas claims remain premature at this stage and therefore recommends that the Court dismiss this action so that Roberts may fully exhaust all available state court remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). See Roberts v. Warden, McCormick Corr. Inst., No. 8:06-cv-2724-MBS-BHH, 2006 WL 4017752, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 5, 2006) (“Since Petitioner still has at least two viable state court remedies which have not been fully utilized (the pending PCR case and a petition for writ of certiorari in the South Carolina Supreme Court if the PCR case is unsuccessful), this Court should not keep this case on its docket while Petitioner is exhausting his state remedies.”), adopted, 2007 WL 397370 (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2007).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that Roberts cannot cure the defects in his petition by mere amendment. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily dismiss Roberts' petition, without prejudice and without requiring the Warden to respond.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).