Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. BLC004155. Sarah Adams Christian, Judge. Affirmed.
Willie Laky Roberts, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer A. Neill and Jennifer L. Dolan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
MILLER, J.
Willie Laky Roberts (Roberts), a state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for a writ of mandate directing the California Department of Corrections Inmate Appeals Branch (the Appeals Branch) to address the merits of his administrative appeal. Roberts makes two contentions. First, Roberts essentially contends the trial court erred by finding that a writ of mandate was not the appropriate remedy for compelling the Appeals Branch to consider his third level appeal. Second, Roberts asserts the Appeals Branch abused its discretion by finding that his appeal was untimely; Roberts contends that the trial court should have granted a writ of mandate to correct the Appeals Branch’s abuse of discretion. We affirm the denial of the writ petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 29, 2006, inmate manufactured alcohol was found in Roberts’s prison cell at Ironwood State Prison. In a disciplinary proceeding, Roberts pled guilty to possessing inmate manufactured alcohol. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3016, subd. (a).) As part of Roberts’s punishment, he was assessed a forfeiture of 120 days behavior credits.
All further statutory references are to Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, unless otherwise indicated.
On January 10, 2007, Roberts submitted a level one appeal requesting restoration of his behavior credits. Roberts argued that section 3290, subdivision (e), authorized the forfeiture of behavior credits only if a laboratory confirmed that a suspected controlled substance was indeed a controlled substance, or if the inmate waived laboratory testing. Roberts alleged that neither occurred in his case. In a written letter, a correctional sergeant and an associate warden at Ironwood State Prison informed Roberts that his level one appeal was denied because alcohol was not included in the definition of “controlled substance,” and therefore Roberts’s argument regarding laboratory testing failed.
On February 20, 2007, Roberts filed a second level appeal. Roberts argued that alcohol was a controlled substance. In a written letter, a correctional lieutenant and the warden at Ironwood State Prison informed Roberts that his appeal was denied because alcohol was not classified as a controlled substance. Enclosed with the letter was a copy of Health and Safety Code section 11007, defining the term “controlled substance.”
On June 6, 2007, the Appeals Branch sent Roberts a letter informing him that his paperwork for his third level appeal was incomplete; Roberts had not included his rule violation report or supplements to the rule violation report. On September 11, 2007, Roberts resubmitted his third level appeal. Roberts argued that his appeal would have been screened-out at the first and second levels if it were missing supporting documents. On November 7, 2007, the Appeals Branch screened-out Roberts’s resubmitted third level appeal, because a third level appeal must be submitted within 15 working days of receiving a lower level decision. (§ 3084.6, subd. (c).)
Roberts’s third level appeal is not included in the record with this appeal.
On January 8, 2008, Roberts filed a petition for writ of mandate with the trial court. Roberts essentially requested that the Appeals Branch be directed to address the merits of his third level appeal. A minute order from the hearing on Roberts’s writ petition reflected that the trial court took under submission the issue of whether “this [was] a proper writ of mandate.” On April 7, 2008, the trial court denied Roberts’s petition. The trial court’s reason for denying the petition was not included in the minute order.
DISCUSSION
A. Proper Remedy
Roberts essentially contends the trial court erred by finding that a writ of mandate is not the appropriate remedy for compelling the Appeals Branch to consider Roberts’s third level appeal. We disagree.
A reviewing court exercises its independent judgment when reviewing a ruling on a petition for writ of mandate, where the facts are undisputed and a question of law is involved. (Riverside Sheriff’s Assn. v. County of Riverside (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1289.)
“‘Mandamus is issued to “to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) Two requirements are essential: [(1)] a clear, present and usually ministerial duty upon the part of the respondent, and [(2)] a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to performance of that duty. [Citation.] Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel the exercise of discretion by a government officer, but does not lie to control the exercise of discretion unless under the facts, discretion can be exercised in only one way. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Thorning v. Hollister School Dist. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1603 (Thorning).)
An inmate must appeal an unacceptable lower level decision within 15 working days of the decision being appealed. (§ 3084.6, subd. (c).) An inmate’s appeal may be rejected if the time limits for submitting the appeal have been exceeded. (§ 3084.3, subd. (c)(6).)
On June 6, 2007, Roberts was notified that his third level appeal was missing necessary documents. Roberts resubmitted his third level appeal on September 11, 2007. More than three months elapsed between the notice letter and the resubmitted appeal. The Appeals Branch screened-out Roberts appeal because he had exceeded the allotted 15-day time period. Section 3084.3, subdivision (c)(6), provides that an inmate’s appeal may be rejected if the 15-day time period is exceeded. Accordingly, the Appeals Branch had the discretion to accept or reject Roberts’s untimely appeal, i.e., its discretion could legitimately be exercised in two ways. Mandamus cannot be used to direct the Appeals Branch to accept Roberts’s appeal, because mandamus “‘does not lie to control the exercise of discretion unless under the facts, discretion can be exercised in only one way.’...” (Thorning, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1603.) The trial court could not properly direct the Appeals Branch to accept Roberts’s appeal; therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err by denying Roberts’s writ petition.
Roberts essentially contends the trial court erred because the 15-day filing deadline cannot be interpreted to include the days needed to obtain additional documents after an inmate is notified that he failed to include necessary documentation; therefore, the Appeals Branch should be directed to accept his appeal. Contrary to Roberts’s position, the 15-day deadline must be interpreted to include the time needed to amend a deficient appeal, otherwise inmates could circumvent the 15-day deadline by filing appeals without the necessary documents. In sum, a failure to meet the filing requirements does not mean that the filing deadline must be extended.
Moreover, even if we were to interpret the regulatory scheme as granting an additional 15 days for filing an amended appeal upon receipt of notice that an appeal is missing necessary documents, then Roberts’s appeal would still be deemed untimely because he waited three months to resubmit his appeal.
B. Abuse of Discretion
Roberts asserts the Appeals Branch abused its discretion by denying his appeal as untimely; Roberts contends that the trial court should have granted a writ of mandamus to correct that abuse of discretion. We disagree.
“Although a writ of mandate ordinarily cannot compel the exercise of discretion in a particular manner, a writ of mandate can compel a particular act if the failure to act in that manner was a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Helliker (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1181.) An abuse of discretion is established if a decision is arbitrary and capricious. (Simi Valley Adventist Hosp. v. Bonta (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 346, 352.)
As noted ante, the Appeals Branch had the authority to accept or reject Roberts’s untimely appeal. Roberts resubmitted his third level appeal more than three months after he was notified that his appeal was missing necessary documents. Accordingly, the decision to reject Roberts’s untimely appeal was reasonable. Consequently, a writ of mandate was not required to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by the Appeals Branch, because an abuse of discretion did not occur. In sum, we conclude the trial court did not err.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the writ petition is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT, Acting P. J., KING, J.