Opinion
35757.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 7, 1955.
Workmen's compensation. Before Judge Perryman. McDuffie Superior Court. April 21, 1955.
Randall Evans, Jr., for plaintiff in error.
Fulcher, Fulcher Hagler, contra.
1. The mere fact that the full board of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation does not set forth in its award the facts as found by it will not require another hearing of the case where they have concurred in the findings and award made by the single director.
2. The authority granted the State Board of Workmen's Compensation to appoint a disinterested physician to examine the claimant is discretionary, and is not subject to review by the courts unless there has been a manifest abuse of this discretion.
3. In the present case, where there was some evidence to support the findings and award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, such findings are conclusive and must be affirmed.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 7, 1955.
On May 29, 1952, Corsie Roberson was injured while employed by Thomson Oak Flooring Company, Inc. He was operating a rip saw, and a chip of wood flew up and hit him in the left eye. Thereafter, on June 10, 1952, Corsie Roberson, the claimant, Thomson Oak Flooring Company, Inc., the employer, and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, the insurer, entered into an agreement whereby the claimant, Roberson, was to receive $15 per week as compensation until terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law. This agreement was approved on June 20, 1952, by the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, so that it would continue during disability. The claimant received $36 under this agreement, and returned to work on June 23, 1952. The claimant through his attorney requested a hearing upon a change of condition on January 5, 1953, and a hearing was held on March 25, 1953, in Thomson, Georgia. It was stipulated by the parties that there had been an injury and that compensation had been paid through June 22, 1952. On the hearing Dr. Paul Wilson testified that he examined the claimant and found blood in the interior chamber of the left eye, that the claimant claimed he was hit by a chip of wood, and from the condition of the eye this could have happened. The claimant testified that he could see pretty well before the injury, but since the injury he could not see as well out of his left eye, the one that was injured; that he has had no injury except the one on May 29, 1952; and that the eye hurt him at times but not all the time. The hearing was continued and reset for July 28, 1953, in Augusta, Georgia, for the purpose of taking medical and other testimony. Dr. J. Victor Roule testified that he examined the claimant on February 23, 1953, and his vision in the right eye was normal, but that the claimant only admitted seeing 20/400 in his left eye, and did not admit seeing the print on the chart to check near vision. The examination of the eye did not show any reason for the loss of vision of which he complained. The patient was then checked for possible malingering, and it was determined by using the "Wagner" chart that the claimant's vision was a minimum of 20/50 in the left eye. There was an opacity in the left cornea which was perfectly clear and transparent. In answer to the question, "What causes an opacity?" Dr. Roule testified that it could be due to an old inflammation or due to some sort of injury. Dr. William O. White testified that he first examined the claimant on December 5, 1952, at which time the claimant gave a history of having been struck in the eye with a piece of wood. The claimant had a vision of 20/25 in the right eye and 20/200 in the left eye. He saw him several times thereafter and his vision in his left eye fluctuated from 20/200 to 20/100 to 20/400, and further examination showed definite signs of malingering on the part of the claimant. Nothing could be found that would show a direct relationship to the injury of May, 1952. It was possible that the claimant could have had a loss of vision over a period of time before the injury, but without noticing it until the injury, when it was called to his attention. He could not say positively that the injury did not cause the loss of vision in the left eye. There is a suggestion of glaucoma in both eyes, and if he had it when he was first examined, it was not picked up. The suggestion of glaucoma in the present case is in both eyes, not just the injured eye. A particular type of myodiopter is used to measure the pressure within the eye to diagnose glaucoma; normal pressure is around 18 to 20, and the claimant on one occasion showed a pressure of 27. It is very hard to make a diagnosis where the pressure is under 30. The claimant has a suggestion of glaucoma, and glaucoma drops were given to the claimant for diagnostic reasons only, but not for treatment. The witness stated that he did not think the glaucoma was connected with the injury. On the last examination on July 17, 1953, the claimant's vision in his right eye was 20/20 and in his left eye 20/80, and there was still a fluctuation of vision which indicated that there was still an element of malingering.
The single director hearing the case issued his finding of fact and award on August 25, 1953, which read in part as follows: "Based on this evidence I find as a matter of fact that the claimant has failed to carry the burden of proof to prove that he has had a change in condition or that he has any disability to the eye as a result of the alleged accident and injury. . . Wherefore, claimant having failed to carry the burden of proof to show a change in condition and that he has any disability as a result of the accident and injury of May 29, 1952, compensation in the within and foregoing case is herein denied." An appeal was made to the full board, and after considering the case they issued an order which read in part as follows: "After careful review of the entire record, along with the brief of claimant's attorney, the full board is of the opinion that the award and findings of the director are in keeping with the law and the evidence and that the same should be affirmed. . . Wherefore, it is the award of the full board that the award of director W. E. Buckner dated August 25, 1953, be and the same is hereby affirmed." The claimant appealed to the Superior Court of McDuffie County, where on April 21, 1955, the judge reviewing the case affirmed the award of the full board of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation. To this judgment the claimant excepts.
1. The claimant argues that the full board merely sustained the award of the single director, and did not decide that it was the decision of the full board, and that it is one thing to sustain a decision of a trior of facts, and quite another to render a judgment or verdict on those facts.
The award of the full board stated in part: "After careful review of the entire record, . . . the full board is of the opinion that the award and findings of the director are in keeping with the law and the evidence." It did not state that there was some evidence to support his findings and award and therefore it would not be reversed. When the full board issued their award stating that the findings and award of the single director were in accord with the law and evidence, it necessarily meant that the full board concurred in the award of the single director. "The fact that the commission failed to set forth in its award the facts as found by it does not require another hearing of the case." Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co., 41 Ga. App. 362 ( 153 S.E. 77). Accordingly, there is no merit in this contention of the claimant.
2. It is contended that the superior court reviewing the case could have remanded it to the State Board of Workmen's Compensation for an examination of the claimant by a physician paid by the board.
Code § 114-713 provides that the board or a director may appoint a disinterested physician, to be paid by the board, to examine a claimant on the motion of either of the parties, or on its own motion. Where, as here, no request for this to be done appears in the record, there could be no manifest abuse of discretion, given to the board under this Code section, which would require a reversal of the award made by the board and affirmed by the superior court. See Ingram v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 62 Ga. App. 789 ( 10 S.E.2d 99).
3. There was evidence to support the findings of the full board that the claimant had not carried the burden of proof that there had been a change in condition. Where there is any evidence to support the findings of the full board, neither the superior court nor this court will reverse such findings and award. See Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Jackson, 68 Ga. App. 447 ( 22 S.E.2d 191).
Judgment affirmed. Felton, C. J., and Quillian, J., concur.