Opinion
1:02-CV-01635-JDT-TAB
June 25, 2003
ENTRY ON PRUDENTIAL'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
This Entry is a matter of public record and is being made available to the public on the court's web site, but it is not intended for commercial publication either electronically or in paper form. Although the ruling or rulings in this Entry will govern the case presently before this court, this court does not consider the discussion in this Entry to be sufficiently novel or instructive to justify commercial publication or the subsequent citation of it in other proceedings.
In this action brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., the Defendant the Prudential Insurance Company of America (Prudential) moves pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a protective order relieving it from having to further respond to the Plaintiffs written discovery requests. The Plaintiff Kevin Robbins opposes the motion.
I. The Plaintiff's Discovery Requests
A brief review of the discovery requests at issue is necessary. The Plaintiff propounded 14 requests for admissions to Prudential. The admissions are that: Prudential pays long term disability (LTD) benefits under the Plan from its assets; the source of funds from which such benefits are paid are Prudential's general assets; benefit determinations favorable to plan participants cause Prudential expense; Prudential incurs a direct and immediate expense as a result of benefit determinations favorable to plan participants; Prudential is a business with a profit-maximizing motive; Prudential's stock is publicly traded; Prudential is a subsidiary of a corporation whose stock is publicly traded; Prudential keeps for its own purposes every dollar not paid out to Plaintiff in disability benefits; payment of LTD benefits to claimants has an economic impact on Prudential; Prudential has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of LTD benefits decisions made by its employees; Prudential acted as claims administrator and claims payor in processing the Plaintiff's claim; and Prudential has employee compensation plans that are impacted by Prudential's profit levels and stock price.
The Plaintiff propounded to Prudential 8 interrogatories which are summarized below as covering the following:
1. Identification of the individual completing the interrogatories and identification (name, address, position and employer) of individuals who handled, investigated, processed or reviewed the Plaintiffs LTD benefits claim on behalf of Prudential, the number of Prudential shares of stock maintained by each, and their manner of compensation by Prudential, including incentive compensation plans tied to/affected by the results of LTD determinations;
2. The specific basis upon which the Plaintiffs LTD benefits claim was denied, if the denial was because of a failure to meet the policy definition of "disabled," the policy provision which the Plaintiff did not meet and why he did not meet the definition, and every fact (e.g., specific medical, vocational or other records) utilized in reaching that conclusion;
3. Prudential's role in processing the Plaintiffs claim and the name, address, and position of each individual who acted in a fiduciary capacity with regard to his claim, including but not limited to individuals on a claims review committee, appeals committee, the plan attorney, etc.;
4. The name, address, position, employer, qualifications and phone number of any doctor, nurse, vocational rehabilitation/occupational counsel and/or any other health or vocational professional except the Plaintiffs treating physicians who rendered a report or opinion to Prudential or examined records or the Plaintiff for Prudential at any time;
5. The name, address, position and role of any individual who participated in creation of the contract between Prudential and Milliman, including but not limited to any individual involved in determining pricing, commissions, benefit levels and other contract terms;
6. The name, address, position and role of any individual who participated in the creation of the terms and provisions of the LTD plan for Milliman employees including the policy, summary plan description (SPD), any draft, amendments, rider or endorsement to the plan, policy or SPD;
7. Explain what LTD policy/plan Prudential contends applies to this case, the definition of disability which Prudential contends applies, and the basis for those contentions; and
8. Describe the LTD benefits which the Plaintiff would be entitled to receive in the event he prevails.
The Plaintiff made several Requests for Production of Prudential which are summarized as follows:
1. Any/all insurance policies, draft policies, amendments, draft amendments, riders, draft riders, endorsements, draft endorsements, SPD's, draft SPD's, plan documents and draft plan documents related to Milliman's LTD plan.
2. Any/all correspondence, emails, messages or notes between Milliman and Prudential regarding documents requested in ¶ 1.
3. Any/all agreements/contracts between Milliman and Prudential.
4. Any/all correspondence, emails, messages or notes between Milliman and Prudential regarding documents requested in ¶ 3.
5. Any internal guidelines used in the processing or determination of LTD claims.
6. Any claim manual(s) used in the processing or determination of LTD claims.
7. Any action plan relevant to the Plaintiffs claim for benefits, specifically including any documents in whatever manner recorded which outline, set forth or describe any action plan on this file.
8. Records and minutes of any/all claims conferences or "roundtables" held relative to Plaintiff's claim for benefits.
9. Records and minutes of any appeal conferences, meetings or "roundtables" held relative to Plaintiffs claim for benefits.
10. Communications concerning the Plaintiff or his claim between any/all persons involved in processing his claim, including letters, memos, email and recorded voice mail.
11. All documents describing any discounted stock purchase plan(s) sponsored by Prudential or any of its parent/subsidiary entities and subscribed to by any of the Prudential employees who determined/participated in the determination of the Plaintiffs claim.
12. Any/all documents describing or setting forth the criteria for any performance awards given to claims personnel/supervisors who determined/participated in the determination of the Plaintiffs claim.
13. All documents reflecting incentives, commissions, contingencies and/or bonuses for any of Prudential's claims personnel/supervisors who determined/participated in the determination of the Plaintiffs claim.
14. Any document, manual, draft document or manual or other writing describing the administrative appeal procedures applicable to the Plaintiffs claim.
15. Any document, manual, draft document or manual or other writing describing or otherwise setting forth the criteria used in determining any administrative appeal used in this case.
Prudential objected to all the discovery requests on the basis of its motion for protective order and on the grounds that the requests are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and are unduly burdensome.
II. Analysis
Rule 26(c) allows for discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or defense of any party." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b). District courts have broad discretion with respect to defining the proper scope of discovery and settling discovery disputes. See Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 2002); Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc., 142 F.3d 1041, 1052 (7th Cir. 1998). Rule 26(c) authorizes district courts to issue protective orders upon motion by a party and "for good cause shown" to protect a party "from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]" Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c).Prudential contends that where an ERISA claim is based on an ERISA plan which gives the plan administrator discretion, then the scope of discovery against the administrator is limited to the claim file upon which the administrator based its decision. Prudential claims that the LTD plan applicable in this case gives it discretion and represents that it already has given Mr. Robbins the claim file. Mr. Robbins does not dispute that he has the claim file. However, he argues that his discovery requests are appropriate under ERISA and seek information needed for the court to reach a decision on the merits of this case, specifically: (1) what policy applies, (2) the parameters of the administrative record, and (3) the extent of Prudential's conflict of interest in this claim.
The scope of discovery in an ERISA denial of benefits case "turns on the standard of review applicable to the [plan administrator's] decision." Trombetta v. Cragin Fed. Bank for Sav. Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 102 F.3d 1435, 1438 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1996). In Firestone Tire Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), the Supreme Court held that a decision denying benefits under an ERISA plan is subject to de novo review, unless the plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe plan terms, in which case review is under the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. at 115; see also Carr v. Gates Health Care Plan, 195 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1068 (2000)
Prudential asserts that its LTD policy gives it discretion and quotes the policy's SPD which purportedly states that Prudential "as Claims Administrator has the sole discretion to interpret the terms of the Group Contract, to make factual findings, and to determine eligibility for benefits. The decision of the Claims Administrator shall not be overturned unless arbitrary and capricious." (Mem. Supp. Mot. Prot. Order at 2 n. 1.) Curiously, though, Prudential submits neither the policy it claims applies nor the SPD.
If the applicable policy says what Prudential claims it says, then the court's review of Prudential's denial of benefits to Mr. Robbins would be deferential. However, at this time the court cannot determine whether the applicable policy gives Prudential discretion because no one has submitted the policy to the court. Moreover, there appears to be some dispute over what policy applies in this case. Thus, before the court can determine the appropriate standard of review, the court has to decide what policy applies to Mr. Robbins' claim for LTD benefits.
Mr. Robbins states that his Requests for Production Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 and Interrogatory Nos. 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 seek information regarding the five policies which the Defendants have given him. He argues that he is entitled to discover why they produced so many different policies as well as which policy was used in denying him benefits. Prudential agrees with him in theory, but argues that additional discovery from Prudential is inappropriate since it has already provided Mr. Robbins with a copy of the contract documents it alleges control and the discovery requests go beyond the issue of what policy applies.
To support its position that this discovery is not appropriate from it, Prudential argues that the Plaintiff bases this discovery on alleged representations made to him by Milliman employees. It is not clear that the alleged representations were made only by Milliman, however. Prudential has admitted that it is the administrator of the policy it contends is at issue in this case. (Prudential's Answer ¶ 4; see also Case Mgmt. Plan ¶ B.1 at 3 ("Prudential, the Plan Administrator under terms of the Plan").) The Complaint alleges representations made by the Plan Administrator. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 40, 42.) Furthermore, Mr. Robbins states in his affidavit that after he exhausted his appeals for benefits "Milliman and Prudential have provided me with three additional Prudential policies which they asserted governed my claim," two of which were provided by "the Defendants" as part of their Rule 26 disclosures. (Robbins Aff. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Thus, the court finds that Mr. Robbins has sufficiently supported his allegation that Prudential produced more than one policy which it has asserted applied to the decision to deny him benefits. The court therefore finds that Mr. Robbins is entitled to discover from Prudential why numerous policies were produced and which policy applies in this case.
The Plaintiffs Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 and Request for Production Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 seek relevant information as they seem likely to uncover information regarding why Mr. Robbins was given many different policies and which of them applies. To the extent these requests go beyond the issue of which policy applies, they seem related to the reasons why Mr. Robbins was given several different policies. The court cannot find that the reasons why the Defendants gave the Plaintiff several different policies has no bearing on this case. Interrogatory No. 2, however, is geared toward the merits of Mr. Robbins' benefits claim.
Prudential represents that it has already given Mr. Robbins a copy of the contract documents it alleges control, has stated its position as to which policy applies, and thus, "in effect" already has responded to Request Nos. 1 and 3 and Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 8. (Reply at 3.) The "in effect" language is a qualifier; Prudential does not claim that it produced all documents responsive to these requests or that it has fully answered these interrogatories.
Therefore, to the extent it has not done so already, the court ORDERS Prudential to answer the Plaintiffs Interrogatory Nos. 5 (identifying individuals who participated in creating the contract between Prudential and Milliman), 6 (identifying individuals who participated in creating the terms and provisions of Milliman's LTD plan), 7 (identifying which policy applies) and 8 (describing LTD benefits available to Plaintiff should he prevail) and respond to the Plaintiff's Request for Production Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 no later than thirty (30) days from this date.
To the extent Interrogatory No. 2 and No. 8 overlap, Prudential is not relieved of its obligation to provide information sought in No. 8 just because such information also may be responsive to No. 2 for which no further answer is compelled.
As for the conflict of interest matter, even assuming that the applicable policy gives Prudential discretion, the scope of discovery is not as limited as Prudential suggests. The Seventh Circuit and district courts within it have said that when a denial of benefits is reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the scope of review is limited to the administrative record and additional discovery is not allowed. Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981-82 (7th Cir. 1999); Peltzer v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 01 C 2585, 2002 WL 1858786, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2002) (denying plaintiff's motion to compel defendant to produce for deposition the employees who made the decision to deny her benefits claim where the plan gave the administrator discretion); Hughes v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 112 F. Supp.2d 780, 782 (S.D. Ind. 2000). The Seventh Circuit said:
[D]iscovery may be appropriate to investigate a claim that the plan's administrator did not do what it said it did-that, for example, the application was thrown in the trash rather than evaluated on the merits. But when there can be no doubt that the application was given a genuine evaluation, judicial review is limited to the evidence that was submitted in support of the application for benefits, and the mental processes of the plan's administrator are not legitimate grounds of inquiry[.]Perlman, 195 F.3d at 982.
At first glance it may appear difficult to reconcile this language with the recognition by both the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit that a plan administrator's conflict of interest is a factor to be considered when reviewing an ERISA benefits decision under the deferential standard. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (concluding that even though a plan administrator's conflict of interest does not affect the standard of review, it "must be weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion") (quotation omitted); Carr, 195 F.3d at 295 (identifying "the impartiality of the decision making body" as one of several factors to be evaluated when reviewing an ERISA benefits decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard). It is not difficult, though, because the Perlman court found no conflict of interest existed. Perlman, 195 F.3d at 981. Thus, the court concludes that despite any contrary suggestion in Perlman, a plan administrator's conflict of interest remains a relevant factor to weigh in the determination of whether the denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious. See Hughes, 112 F. Supp.2d at 793-96 (concluding that courts should examine the impartiality of the decisionmaker when reviewing a benefits decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard despite the confusion created by Pearlman).
Though a plan administrator's conflict of interest does not affect the standard of review of the decision to deny benefits, see, e.g., O'Reilly v. Hartford Life Ace. Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 2001); Perlman, 195 F.3d at 981; it is unclear how much a conflict should weigh in the evaluation of the decision. Perlman, 195 F.3d at 981. The Seventh Circuit has suggested that a conflict should lead to an arbitrary and capricious review with "more bite," Chojnacki v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 815 (7th Cir. 1997), hinting that a closer judicial look should be taken in such cases. Implying a sliding scale of scrutiny, the Seventh Circuit notes that the more significant the conflict, the less deferential the review. Chojanacki, 108 F.3d at 815; Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987). Thus, if the arbitrary and capricious standard applies to Prudential's decision to deny Mr. Robbins LTD benefits and Mr. Robbins can prove a significant conflict of interest, then Prudential's decision may more easily be shown to have been arbitrary and capricious.
Yet, a significant conflict of interest does not exist simply because an insurer holds the dual roles of plan administrator and payor:
[I]t is a poor business decision to resist paying meritorious claims for benefits. . . . [C]onsistently den[ying] valid claims . . . would harm an insurer by inducing current customers to leave and by damaging its chances of acquiring new customers. Thus, no conflict of interest exists because paying meritorious claims is in [the insurer's] best interest.Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Perlman, 195 F.3d at 981 ("it is unsound for the judiciary automatically to impute the plan administrator's position to the person who decides on its behalf and agents of a corporate administrator "usually lack any stake in the outcome" of a benefits decision); Carr, 195 F.3d at 296 (court presumes a fiduciary acts neutrally unless there is specific evidence of actual bias or significant conflict of interest). Instead, a significant conflict of interest exists only when an actual decisionmaker has an interest in the outcome of the benefits decision. See, e.g., Perlman, 195 F.3d at 981 ("if the first-level decisionmaker has an interest in the outcome, this potential for bias is bound to affect the mind set of the reviewing court"); Mers, 144 F.3d at 1020.
Therefore, even if it is presumed that Prudential has a profitability interest in the benefits decision because it is both the plan administrator and insurer of benefits, this alone does not constitute a significant conflict so as to weigh in the review of the benefits decision. Rather, Mr. Robbins must show with specific evidence that an actual decisionmaker had a significant conflict of interest in the benefits decision. See, e.g., O'Reilly, 272 F.3d at 960; Mers, 144 F.3d at 1020. Because the Seventh Circuit recognizes that the potential conflict or bias of an actual decisionmaker is a relevant factor to be weighed in evaluating whether the denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious, under Rule 26(b) information regarding such a potential conflict or bias is discoverable. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) ("Unless otherwise limited by order of the court . . . [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim . . . of any party").
Mr. Robbins argues that Request for Production Nos. 1, 2, 3, 11, 12 and 13 and Interrogatory Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 6 and all requests for admissions are aimed at the extent of Prudential's conflict of interest. Prudential responds that this discovery is overly broad and premature.
The court finds the prematurity argument somewhat confusing and ultimately unpersuasive. While the presence of a conflict of interest does not change the appropriate standard of review, see, e.g., O'Reilly, 272 F.3d at 960, Prudential seems to suggest that a conflict of interest is relevant only if its decision is subject to the deferential standard or review. Why this should be so is unclear. A conflict of interest may have heightened relevance when a benefits decision is reviewed under a deferential standard, but it does not follow that a conflict becomes irrelevant when the decision is reviewed de novo. In the court's opinion, a conflict of interest is relevant regardless of the appropriate standard of review.
Courts have allowed discovery regarding a plan administrator's alleged conflict of interest in ERISA cases in which the benefits decision was reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Waggener v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 238 F. Supp.2d 1179, 1182-85, 1188 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (allowing discovery of information regarding plan administrator's alleged conflict of interest because conflict was relevant to whether the court should consider evidence outside the administrative record when conducting a de novo review); Sheehan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 01 CIV. 9182(CSH), 2002 WL 1424592, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002) ("[t]he presence or absence of a conflict of interest determines the scope of evidence that the Court can consider on factual issues in conducting a de novo review"). There are good reasons for this. If a plan administrator has a significant conflict of interest in the outcome of the benefits decision, then the administrator may fail to develop a complete administrative record or fail to follow applicable claim procedures in order to justify a denial of benefits. Additionally, though the administrator's decision carries no presumption of correctness through a de novo review, evidence of a conflict could aid the court in weighing evidence about the claim. The actions of a claims administrator may be viewed quite suspiciously if it is known that they were performed under the cloud of a conflict.
Prudential also contends that the discovery is premature because of an allegation in the Complaint that the plan at issue is an insurance contract issued to Milliman by Standard Insurance. (Compl. ¶ 5.) According to Prudential's argument, if the court determines that the Standard Insurance contract applies, then Prudential cannot be held liable. This argument is frivolous. Though there is a dispute over what policy applies to Mr. Robbins' claim for LTD benefits, there is no genuine dispute that Prudential is the plan administrator for the applicable policy. Prudential admits in its Answer both that it issued a group policy to Milliman which policy is applicable to Mr. Robbins' claim for LTD benefits and that Prudential is the administrator of that policy. (Answer ¶¶ 4, 5; see also Answer of Milliman USA Long Term Disability Insurance Plan ¶¶ 4, 5 (admitting that Prudential issued a group LTD policy to Milliman which is applicable to Mr. Robbins' claim and that Prudential is the claims administrator of the relevant policy)). The reference to a Standard Insurance policy in the Complaint is obviously a scrivener's error of some sort, and is recognized by all parties as such. Prudential comes to the brink of misleading the court to suggest in its reply brief that a policy issued by Standard Insurance may be at issue in this case. ( See Reply Br. at 7.)
For these reasons, the court finds unpersuasive the argument that discovery regarding a conflict is premature.
That brings the court to the argument that the discovery requests are overly broad because they relate to the relationship between Prudential and its employees. Perlman reveals that this argument is not persuasive. 195 F.3d at 981 ("if the first-level decisionmaker has an interest in the outcome, this potential for bias is bound to affect the mind set of the reviewing court"). More particularly, Perlman suggests that information regarding the terms on which the insurance was written and the compensation and promotion opportunities of the benefits staff are relevant to the determination of whether a significant conflict of interest exists. Id.; accord Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1098 (10th Cir. 1999) (identifying the plan administrator's performance reviews and level of compensation where linked to denial of benefits as relevant to consideration of whether a conflict of interest exists). So, the court next considers whether the discovery requests relate to a potential conflict of the actual decisionmakers.
The court finds that the Plaintiff's Interrogatory Nos. 1 (identification of individuals involved in Mr. Robbins' claim and their manner of compensation), 3 (Prudential's role in processing the claim and identification of individuals acting in fiduciary capacity) and Request for Production Nos. 12 (documents regarding performance awards given persons involved in the Plaintiffs claim) and No. 13 (documents reflecting incentives, commissions, etc. for persons involved in the Plaintiffs claim) seek discovery of relevant matters, namely the potential conflict of actual decisionmakers. Therefore, the court ORDERS Prudential to answer the Plaintiff's Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 3 and respond to the Plaintiffs Request for Production Nos. 12 and 13 no later than thirty (30) days from this date. The court, however, does not believe that Interrogatory Nos. 5 and 6 nor Request for Production Nos. 1, 2 and 3 relate to any potential conflict.
Surely, Prudential does not intend to object to the portion of Interrogatory No. 1 which seeks identification of the individual who completed the answers to the interrogatories. Though this information has nothing to do with any potential conflict of interest, the information is discoverable. Prudential has not argued otherwise.
The information sought by these interrogatories is nevertheless discoverable as discussed above, see supra at 7-9.
As for the requests for admission, all but one pertain to Prudential's financial interest in the benefits decision. Where the conflict of interest of a large corporate administrator is apparent, discovery as to the conflict is unnecessary as it would be a waste of time and resources. See Abromitis v. Cont'l Cas. Co./CNA Ins. Cos., No. 1:02CV165-C, 2003 WL 21058128, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2003); cf. Perlman, 195 F.3d at 981; Carr, 195 F.3d at 296; Mers, 144 F.3d at 1020. Mr. Robbins offers no realistic suggestion that payment of his LTD benefits, even if in the amount of $2,811,00.00, would seriously impact the bottom line or stock value of a multibillion dollar corporation such as Prudential. Thus, the court presumes that Prudential has a financial interest in the outcome of the benefits decision, but this interest was not a significant conflict of interest. See, e.g., Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[t]he impact on a company's welfare of granting or denying benefits under a plan will not be sufficiently significant as to threaten the administrator's partiality.").
The sole excepted request for admission, Request No. 11, relates to employee compensation plans impacted by profit levels and stock prices. Where the impact of paying benefits would not seriously affect the corporate administrator's bottom line or stock value, a decisionmaker's ownership of stock in the corporate administrator would not create a significant conflict of interest or bias either. Chojnacki v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 815 (7th Cir. 1997) (the decisionmaker owned 32,000 shares of stock, less than .036 percent of the available shares of common stock; was paid by Georgia-Pacific; served as an officer of some of its subsidiaries; and reported directly to Georgia-Pacific's CEO). Even if individuals involved in Mr. Robbins' claim participated in such employee compensation plans, information about the plans would not be relevant to the issues in this case because Mr. Robbins has not suggested any serious impact on Prudential's bottom line or stock value. Therefore, the court will not order Prudential to provide any further response to the Plaintiffs requests for admissions or Request for Production No. 11.
In responding to the motion for protective order, Mr. Robbins has not mentioned Interrogatory No. 4 or Request for Production Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 15. The court assumes that Mr. Robbins has limited the scope of his discovery requests to the requests he specifically mentioned. Thus, the court does not consider whether the discovery identified in this paragraph is appropriate and no further response to this discovery will be compelled.
III. Conclusion
The court finds that Mr. Robbins is entitled to conduct discovery regarding the many polices which were provided to him by the Defendants and the extent of a conflict of interest of the decisionmaker(s) in this case. This, however, does not enable him to conduct the expansive discovery which he seeks through the challenged discovery requests. The discovery must be tailored to these specific needs.Therefore, Prudential's motion for protective order is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART and Prudential, to the extent it has not done so already, is ORDERED to respond within thirty days of this date to the Plaintiffs following discovery requests: Interrogatory Nos. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 Request for Production Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 12 and 13. No further response is required to Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 4, Request for Production Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 and 15, and the Requests for Admissions.
In its discretion the court declines to award to either party expenses incurred in relation to the motion for protective order. These types of disputes are quite ordinary in ERISA litigation, and the maneuvering by the Plaintiff and Prudential is not exceptional or worthy of penalty. The establishment of this discovery framework is a necessary foundation for structuring the progress of this case, so no expenses will be awarded. Counsel for Prudential should be aware, though, that such tactics as discussed above in connection with the reference to a Standard Insurance policy in a reply brief will not play well in the future. Similarly, it would also benefit counsel for the Plaintiff to formally discard allegations that subsequent discovery reveals are unsubstantiated.
ALL OF WHICH IS ORDERED.