Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:02-CV-110-R.
June 25, 2003.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before this Court is Defendant the City of Iowa Park's Motion for Attorney's Fees ("Defendant's Motion") (filed March 27, 2003). For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED and fees are awarded as specified herein.
I. AWARD OF FEES TO A PREVAILING DEFENDANT
A prevailing defendant is entitled to recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if the court rinds that "the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Dean v. Risar, 240 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)); see also U.S. v. Mississippi, 921 F.2d 604, 609 (5th Cir. 1991). Such fee awards "are presumptively unavailable unless a showing is made that the underlying civil rights suit was vexatious, frivolous, or otherwise without merit." Dean, 240 F.3d at 508. The factors analyzed to determine frivolity are: "(1) whether plaintiff established a prima facie case, (2) whether the defendant offered to settle, and (3) whether the district court dismissed the case or held a full-blown trial." U.S. v. Mississippi, 921 F.2d at 609. The judicial inquiry focuses on "whether the case was so lacking in merit that it was groundless, rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful." Id. The stringent standard applicable to defendants "is intended to ensure that plaintiffs with uncertain but arguably meritorious claims are not altogether deterred from initiating litigation by the threat of incurring onerous legal fees should their claims fail." Myers v. City of West Monroe, 211 F.2d 239, 292 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Aller v. New York Ed of Elections, 586 F. Supp. 603, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
In this case, Plaintiffs brought suit under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several employees of the City of Electra, Texas ("Electra") for violations of Plaintiffs' civil rights allegedly committed by those employees. Plaintiffs also named the City of Iowa Park ("Iowa Park") as a Defendant in this case alleging a number of possible liability theories arising from the fact that one of the Electra Defendants, Jack McGuinn, was formerly employed by Iowa Park. This Court subsequently dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against Iowa Park. Roach v. Schurze, 2003 WL 21210445 (N.D. Tex. Mar., 21 2003) (the "Opinion"). In the Opinion, this Court rejected both Plaintiffs' state law and § 1983 claims against Iowa Park. Specifically, this Court held that, under Texas law, Plaintiffs' state law claims were barred by sovereign immunity, and that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim failed because the alleged facts did not meet the "deliberate indifference" standard required for municipal liability. Id., at *2-5.
The case against the remainder of the Defendants is currently set for trial in the Fall of 2003.
Recognizing the need to "balance the concerns for encouraging vigorous enforcement of civil rights against discouraging frivolous litigation within the specific and unique context of each individual case," Dean, 240 F.3d at 511, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims against Iowa Park were frivolous and entirely without foundation. Plaintiffs failed to provide any caselaw for their position that a former employer of a police officer can be held liable for constitutional violations that allegedly occurred after the officer resigned from that department and was hired by another law enforcement agency. Opinion, 2003 WL 21210445, at *3. Plaintiffs also failed to provide any basis for their state law negligent retention claim. In short, Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case against the City of Iowa Par. Accordingly, the claims against Iowa Park were dismissed. Moreover, as a municipal defendant, Iowa Park was not required to make settlement offers in this case. See Myers v. City of West Monroe, 211 F.3d 289, 292 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2000). In short, Plaintiffs' claims against Iowa Park were frivolous.
A fee award, although it will penalize Plaintiffs for bringing unnecessary additional defendants into this civil rights action, is unlikely to have a "chilling effect on the enforcement of civil rights" more generally. Id., at 292 n. 1. Instead, it will serve as a reminder that there may be consequences for a plaintiff who fails to carefully consider the factual and legal link between each defendant and the plaintiff's claims.
II. LODESTAR ANALYSIS
Attorney's fees are calculated using the two-step lodestar method. Rutherford v. Harris County, 197 F.3d 173, 192 (5th Cir. 1999)). First, the district court multiplies the reasonable number of hours by the reasonable hourly rate for each attorney. After calculating the lodestar, the district court then examines the Johnson factors to determine if the lodestar amount should be adjusted either toward or downward. Id. The Johnson factors are:
(1) the time and labor required for the litigation; (2) the novelty and complication of the issues; (3) the skill required to properly litigate the case; (4) whether the attorney had to refuse other work to litigate the case; (5) the attorney's customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) whether the client or case circumstances imposed any time constraints; (8) the amount involved and results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) whether the case was `undesirable'; (11) the nature and length of the attorney-client relationship; and (12) awards in similar cases.Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974); see also, Rutherford, 197 F.3d at 193 (noting that the Supreme Court has prohibited any use of the sixth Johnson factor).
In his affidavit, Paul K. Pearce, Jr. ("Pearce") stated that he began practicing law in Texas in 1976, and has specialized in defense of government entities and officials since 1980. The affidavit states that Pearce billed 71.9 hours at $135 per hour, and his co-counsel, Robert J. Davis, billed .39.4 hours at $125 per hour. These figures correspond to the detailed billing statement provided as an exhibit to the Pearce Affidavit. Plaintiffs do not contest the reasonableness of the hourly rate or claimed hours. See Louisiana Power Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 1995) (if an attorney's customary billing rate is not contested "it is prima facie reasonable"). Based on the affidavit, as well as this Court's knowledge and experience in similar cases, this Court concludes that the hourly rates requested by Pearce and Davis are within the prevailing market range. Accordingly, this Court finds the hourly rates to be reasonable. Similarly, after conducting a review of Pearce's detailed billing statement, this Court concludes that the number of hours expended by Defendant's counsel was reasonable. Accordingly, this Court sets $9,706.50 and $4,925.00 as the lodestar amounts for Pearce and Davis, respectively.
See Defendant City of Iowa Park's Motion to Recover Its Attorney's Fees, Exhibit 2.
Id., at Exhibit A.
The former is equal to the hourly rate of $135.00 multiplied by the number of hours worked by Pearce (71.9). While the latter figure is equal to the hourly rate of $125.00 multiplied by the number of hours worked by Davis (39.4). The total sum is $14,631.50.
Turning to the second part of the lodestar analysis, this Court must, through application of the Johnson factors, determine if either an upward or downward modification must be made of the lodestar amount. After considering the Johnson factors, this Court concludes that a reduction of 15% in the lodestar amount is warranted. This reduction arises from the Court's view that several of the Johnson factors militate against payment of the full lodestar amount in this case. In particular, the claims between Plaintiffs and Iowa Park were not particularly novel or complicated (factor 2), did not require a particularly high level of skill to litigate (factor 3), there is no evidence that the attorneys had to decline other work in order to litigate the case (factor 4), and the case was not undesirable as municipalities are frequently involved in litigation and thus are likely to be highly-prized clients (factor 10). See, e.g., Botrs v. Pruitt, 1996 WL 671674, at *5-6 (N.D. Miss. Jul. 24, 1996) adjusting lodestar downward for similar reasons). Therefore, this Court reduces the lodestar amounts for each attorney by 15%, resulting in a total fee award of $12,43 6.78 (equal to $14,63 1.50 multiplied by 0.85).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant City of Iowa Park's Motion to Recover Its Attorney's Fees is GRANTED, and attorneys fees in the amount of $12,436.78 are hereby AWARDED to the City of Iowa Park.
It is so ORDERED.