Summary
denying motion to dismiss pursuant to § 13.01, observing that while the statute had been repealed after the filing of the motion, the statute would nevertheless not foreclose the plaintiff's § 1983 claims against defendant for alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
Summary of this case from Baker v. BowlesOpinion
2:02-CV-0166
March 1, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND PARTIAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL REGARDING SOME CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS GUY AND HOUSE
Plaintiff JOE DON ROACH, while a prisoner incarcerated in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, has filed suit pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 complaining against the above-named defendants and was permitted to proceed pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, section 1915(b). On July 9, 2003, defendant GUY filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and, on January 15, 2004, defendant HOUSE filed a Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed his responses, entitled Objections on July 16, 2003 and January 23, 2004, respectively.
By their motions, defendants argue that, to the extent plaintiff seeks monetary damages from them in their officials, defendants GUY and HOUSE are shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Defendant HOUSE also argues plaintiff's claims against her in her individual capacity should be dismissed based on plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirement that he submit an expert report as requirement by Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated art. 459Oi, section 13.01(d). Plaintiff responds that defendant GUY knew of his serious medical need and responded with "calloused indifference." He contends his suit against defendant HOUSE is an attempt to vindicate a federal right and article 459Oi does not apply. As to both defendants GUY and HOUSE, plaintiff further argues he only needs to provide a short and plain statement of his claim in compliance with Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not prove his case at this point. Lastly, he argues even if defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, a claim still lies against each of them in their individual capacities.
Defendants have not based their motions on any lack of factual specificity in plaintiff's pleadings. Consequently, plaintiff argument that he need only comply with Rule 8 pleading requirements is not relevant. However, in passing, the Court notes factual specificity in pleadings is required to surmount a Rule 12(b)(6) motion arguing that basis.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law. While all well-plead facts are accepted as true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1401 (5th Cir. 1996); nevertheless, conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact need not be accepted as true, Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it clearly appears that the complainant can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). However, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the action "must be pleaded with factual detail and particularity, not mere conclusional allegations." Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999).
THE LAW AND ANALYSIS
Initially, the Court notes that the only relief requested by plaintiff is monetary damages.
Eleventh Amendment immunity is an explicit constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power. Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98, 104 S.Ct. 900, 907, 79 L.Ed.2d 67, 77 (1984). The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or a state official unless the State has waived its immunity, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2309, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), and grants the States an immunity from retroactive monetary relief, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). A suit against an official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 361-62, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1158 (5th Cir. 1992). Consequently, any claim for monetary relief against defendants in their official capacities is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Since the only relief plaintiff has requested is monetary damages, plaintiff's claims against defendants in their official capacities fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
An exception to this general principle was created in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), in which the Supreme Court held that a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action in enforcing state law is not one against the State. Id., at 159-160, 28 S.Ct., at 453-54. See, also, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (the Eleventh Amendment grants the States an immunity from retroactive monetary relief, but state officers are not immune from prospective injunctive relief).
Defendant HOUSE bases her motion to dismiss her individual capacity claims on article 459Oi, section 13.01(d), Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated. The Court will not opine whether this statute would have had dismissive effect on any state law claims possibly asserted by plaintiff because the statute was repealed after the filing of plaintiff HOUSE'S motion. Even were it still in force, it would not foreclose plaintiff's federal civil rights claims against HOUSE in her individual capacity.
CONCLUSION
Accepting all well-plead facts as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the District Judge FINDS plaintiff's claims for monetary damages asserted against defendants GUY and HOUSE in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and, therefore, fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2), as well as Title 42, United States Code, section 1997e(c)(1), the Civil Rights Claims filed pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, against defendants GUY and HOUSE in their official capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
This Order of Dismissal does not address plaintiff's claims against defendants GUY and HOUSE in their individual capacities.
The Clerk will mail a copy of this Order to the plaintiff and to any attorney of record by first class mail.
IT IS SO ORDERED.