Opinion
No. 14-07-00246-CV
Opinion filed February 24, 2009.
On Appeal from the 56th District Court, Galveston County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 05CV0046.
Panel consists of Justices ANDERSON, FROST, and GUZMAN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this real estate dispute, Robert M. Hytken appeals a summary judgment in favor of the Schaefer Family Trust and Frank G. Schaefer and Noeleen J. Schaefer, Co-Trustees. Hytken asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the appellees' declaratory judgment action and contends that the trial court's judgment does not conform to the appellees' pleadings. Because we conclude that appellees sought affirmative relief beyond that of Hytken's non-suited claims and the trial court's judgment conforms to their pleadings, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This dispute arises from an alleged oral agreement involving the development of two tracts of land in Galveston County, Texas. One of these tracts was originally owned by Beach Development, L.P., which declared bankruptcy in 2003. Beach Development was the successor by conversion to Hytken's Partnership, Inc. The Schaefer Family Trust (the "Trust") purchased this tract of land through a sale approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas-Galveston Division "free and clear of liens and claims" in August 2004. The Trust purchased the other tract from Galveston Land, LP in July 2004.
In January 2005, Robert M. Hytken filed suit against the Schaefer Family Trust, and Frank G. Schaefer and Noeleen J. Schaefer, Co-Trustees (collectively, the "Schaefer defendants") alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, detrimental reliance, fraud, and economic duress arising from the Schaefer defendants' purchase of the two tracts of land. The Schaefer defendants filed a general denial and counterclaim. In their counterclaim, they sought declarations that (a) Hytken's claims to the property were "void"; (b) the current owner of the property owned it free and clear of Hytken's claims; (c) and Hytken's attempts to cloud the title to the property were invalid. They further asked the trial court to quiet title. Finally, they requested attorneys' fees and costs and "such other and further relief" to which they showed themselves entitled. In November 2005, the trial court granted Hytken's motion to non-suit his claims against the Schaefer defendants without prejudice.
Hytken's son, Kent Hytken, acting as Hytken's attorney-in-fact, filed the lawsuit pro se against the Trust and its trustees. At some point, however, Hytken apparently retained counsel, and by the time this lawsuit proceeded to the summary judgment stage, Hytken was represented by retained counsel. Kent Hytken, again operating as Hytken's attorney-in-fact, filed the notice of appeal in this case. The appeal was subsequently abated in June 2007, due to a suggestion of Robert Hytken's death. The appeal was later reinstated after counsel was retained. See TEX. R. APP. P. 7.1(a)(1) ("If a party to a civil case dies after the trial court renders judgment but before the case has been finally disposed of on appeal, the appeal may be perfected, and the appellate court will proceed to adjudicate the appeal as if all parties were alive.").
Another entity, Hytken Family Limited, a Nevada corporation, filed suit against the Schaefer defendants and Galveston Shores, L.P. in October 2005. This lawsuit involved essentially the same operative facts as the instant suit filed by Hytken. See Hytken Family Ltd. v. Schaefer, 431 F. Supp. 2d 696, 697-98 (S.D. Tex. 2006). The federal district court dismissed the case without prejudice after determining that the assignment of Robert Hytken's "rights, claims title, interest and choses in action" in his 96 acres of "Galveston Beach Land" was undertaken solely to create diversity jurisdiction in violation of Title 28 of the United States Code, section 1359. See id. at 700.
In January 2007, the Schaefer defendants filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, seeking a declaratory judgment on their claims and attorneys' fees. Hytken subsequently filed an out-of-time response to the Schaefer defendants' motion on February 16, 2007, along with a motion for leave to file the response, but no order on this motion is included in the record. The trial court granted the Schaefer defendants' motion for summary judgment, and in its final judgment, the trial court declared that:
Our record contains no filings between the November 2005 non-suit and the January 2007 summary judgment motion.
$ Hytken holds no ownership interest in the property at issue;
$ Hytken has never held any ownership interest in the property at issue and was never involved in any contract involving this land;
$ Hytken never entered into any agreement with the Schaefer defendants forming a joint venture or partnership relating to the property;
$ Hytken never entered into any agreement entitling him to 50% of the property or profits derived from the property;
$ Hytken wrongfully asserted ownership over the property;
$ Hytken holds no title to the property and all claims made by him regarding this propertyhave been invalid attempts to cloud title to the property;
$ Any deeds of trust or lis pendens filed by or on behalf of Hytken as grantor or grantee of the propertyare null and void;
Specifically, two deeds of trust recorded in Galveston County signed by Kent Hytken were declared null and void by the trial court in its judgment. The first deed purportedly transferred 24.416 acres of Reserve "I" of the Grand Beach subdivision from Kent B. Hytken and Hytken's Partnership Inc. to Robert M. Hytken. This deed was identified by filing number GAC 2006044645 and was recorded on July 5, 2006. The second deed, identified by filing number GAC 2006041478, was executed on June 3, 2003.
$ The Schaefer defendants own the property free and clear of any claims asserted by Hytken; and
$ The Schaefer defendants are entitled to attorneys' fees of $15,000 for services rendered in this case, as well as an additional $25,000 in the event of an unsuccessful appeal by Hytken to the court of appeals and another $25,000 in the event of an unsuccessful appeal by Hytken to the Texas Supreme Court.
The trial court also awarded the Schaefer defendants post-judgment interest and costs.
Our record contains no post-judgment motions. This appeal timely ensued on March 14, 2007.
II. ISSUE PRESENTED
In a single issue, Hytken claims that the trial court erred by granting the Schaefer defendants summary judgment because it (a) lacked subject matter jurisdiction and (b) rendered judgment that did not conform to the pleadings.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
As a preliminary matter, we must address Hytken's jurisdictional argument. Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Hytken contends that because he non-suited his claims against the Schaefer defendants, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over their counterclaims. We disagree.
In this case, the trial court dismissed Hytken's claims without prejudice but did not dismiss the counterclaims raised by the Schaefer defendants. "Parties have an absolute right to nonsuit their own claims, but not someone else's claims they are trying to avoid." Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ledbetter, 251 S.W.3d 31, 37 (Tex. 2008); BHP Petroleum Co. Inc. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 841-42 (Tex. 1990). Although the Declaratory Judgments Act is "`not available to settle disputes already pending before a court,'" a defensive declaratory judgment may present issues beyond those raised by the plaintiff. BHP Petroleum, 800 S.W.2d at 841-42 (quoting Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Group Holding Corp., 751 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (op. on reh'g)). For example, in BHP Petroleum, the defendant requested declaratory relief in response to a plaintiff's breach of contract claims. Id. at 839 n. 3. Before the commencement of discovery, the plaintiff nonsuited its claims. Id. at 840. The trial court dismissed the claims brought by the plaintiff, but retained the defendant's counterclaim as "a pending claim for affirmative relief . . . not affected by the [nonsuit] order." Id. The plaintiff then sought a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to dismiss the defendant's claims. Id. at 839. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's request for mandamus relief because the defendant's counterclaim for a declaratory judgment presented "issues beyond those raised by the plaintiff." Id. at 841-42. The Court concluded that the counterclaim had "greater ramifications" than the original suit. Id. at 842.
Here, Hytken filed suit for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, detrimental reliance, fraud, and economic duress arising from the Schaefer defendants' purchase of the two tracts of land. In response, the Schaefer defendants sought various declarations, including a declaration that Hytken has no ownership interest in the property at issue. Thus, the Schaefer defendants sought a declaratory judgment that, although responsive to Hytken's claims, did not depend on them. Like the counterclaim of the defendant in BHP, the Schaefer defendants' counterclaim had "greater ramifications" than Hytken's original suit.
For example, the Schaefer defendants did not simply seek declarations mirroring Hytken's claims, such as declarations that they had not breached a contract with or defrauded Hytken. Further, Hytken's reliance on Taliaferro v. Smith is misplaced. 804 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ). In Taliaferro, the defendants sought cancellation of a lis pendens, which this court concluded is not a claim for affirmative relief that would prevent a plaintiff from taking a non-suit. Id. We determined that the trial court erred in failing to grant the plaintiff's non-suit. Id. In contrast, here, the trial court granted Hytken's non-suit.
In sum, the Schaefer defendants' declaratory judgment claims presented issues beyond those raised by Hytken. Thus, the trial court did not lose jurisdiction over them when Hytken nonsuited his own claims. See id.; see also Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 251 S.W.3d at 38; cf. Town of Flower Mound, Tex. v. Upper Trinity Reg'l Water Dist., 178 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) ("A request for attorney's fees made in accordance with [the Declaratory Judgments Act] is a claim for affirmative relief authorizing a party to be heard. . . . Therefore, . . . [a]ppellee's claim for attorney's fees was not affected by the dismissal [of the plaintiff's claims], and the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to determine the Chapter 37 attorney's fees claims."). We therefore conclude the trial court maintained jurisdiction over the Schaefer defendants' counterclaims when Hytken non-suited his claims.
B. Summary Judgment
Hytken also asserts that the Schaefer defendants only sought a declaration of title free and clear of Hytken's claims. He contends the trial court's judgment "declares all manner of other unproven and unpled relief, for instance; [sic] [Hytken] was never party to a contract or joint venture involving the property."
In making this argument, however, Hytken ignores the fact that the Schaefer defendants not only sought such a declaration of title, but also pleaded for "such other and further relief to which [they] may show themselves . . . justly entitled." And, although a trial court's judgment must conform to the pleadings, it "shall be so framed as to give the party all the relief to which he may be entitled either in law or equity." TEX. R. CIV. P. 301. Thus, the Schaefer defendants were not required to itemize every declaration that would afford them the relief to which they were entitled. See, e.g., Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 897 (Tex. 2000) ("`A petition is sufficient if it gives fair and adequate notice of the facts upon which the pleader bases his claim.'" (quoting Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Tex. 1982)). Finally, even if we construe Hytken's argument as a complaint that the judgment was based on claims that were not pleaded, rather than relief that was not specifically described, this argument also must fail inasmuch as Hytken failed to object to the motion on that basis. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 67 (governing trial by consent); Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 756 n. 1 (Tex. 2007) (noting that parties may try an issue by consent in summary judgment proceedings).
Hytken relies on Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., but this case is easily distinguishable. 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. 1983) (per curiam). In Chessher, the appellate complaint was that the grounds for the trial court's summary judgment were not included in the summary-judgment motion. Id. To the contrary, here, the Schaefer defendants sought declarations in their motion for summary judgment that (1) Hytken has never held any ownership interest in the property and was never involved in any contract involving this land; (2) Hytken has made a wrongful assertion of ownership over this property and holds no ownership interest or title claim in the property; (3) all claims made by Hytken involving this property are invalid attempts to cloud their title to the property; and (4) they own the property free and clear of any claim asserted by Hytken. Thus, the grounds for the summary judgment were enumerated in the summary-judgment motion, and Hytken's reliance on Chessher is misplaced.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Schaefer defendants' pleadings sufficiently support the trial court's judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
First, we have concluded that the trial court did not lose jurisdiction over the Schaefer defendants' counterclaims when Hytken non-suited his claims for affirmative relief. Second, the Schaefer defendants' pleadings support the trial court's judgment. We therefore overrule Hytken's sole issue on appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court.