Opinion
Case No. 3:05cv236/RV/MD.
September 6, 2005
ORDER
This cause is before the court upon plaintiff's civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (doc. 1) and motion to proceed in forma pauperis (doc. 5). Good cause having been shown, leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. However, from a review of the complaint, it is evident that it is deficient in several respects. The court will therefore allow the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the deficiencies in an amended complaint.
Plaintiff is an inmate of the Escambia County Jail ("the Jail"). He names one defendant in this action: the Escambia County Jail. Plaintiff complains of racial discrimination and overcrowding. He further indicates a desire to maintain this lawsuit as a class action. The nature of relief he seeks is unclear. Some of the more significant deficiencies in plaintiff's complaint are as follows.
First, plaintiff did not file his complaint on the court form. The rules of this court provide that "[n]o . . . civil action commenced by pro se litigants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . shall be considered by the court unless the appropriate forms have been properly completed and filed by the litigant." N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 5.1(J)(2). Thus, plaintiff must file his complaint on the form for use in section 1983 cases, even if he wants to attach separate pages explaining the facts that underlie the complaint. However, plaintiff should not file a memorandum of law or otherwise provide citations to statutes and cases, and he should not file exhibits as evidentiary support for his complaint. The court will notify plaintiff when memoranda and exhibits are necessary, such as prior to trial or in conjunction with a motion for summary judgment.
As instructed on the complaint form, however, plaintiff should attach all copies of grievances as are necessary to demonstrate that he has exhausted his available administrative remedies.
Second, plaintiff failed to attach proof that he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to commencing this lawsuit. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e provides in relevant part: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Thus, exhaustion of all available administrative remedies is mandatory, and is a pre-condition to suit. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 988, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001)); see also Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998). The exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. Porter v. Nussle, supra. Exhaustion is required whether the plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, or both. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S.Ct. at 1825; see also Zolicoffer v. Scott, 55 F.Supp.2d 1372, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 1999), aff'd, 252 F.3d 440 (11th Cir. 2001). The requirement is not subject to either waiver by a court or futility or inadequacy exceptions. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n. 6; McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) ("Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required."); Alexander v. Hawk, supra. Based on the foregoing, this court must dismiss a claim if it determines that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to that claim prior to filing suit. Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d at 1325-26.
The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. at 524, 122 S.Ct. 983. In Alexander, the Eleventh Circuit noted the following seven policy reasons favoring exhaustion:
(1) to avoid premature interruption of the administrative process;
(2) to let the agency develop the necessary factual background upon which decisions should be based;
(3) to permit the agency to exercise its discretion or apply its expertise;
(4) to improve the efficiency of the administrative process;
(5) to conserve scarce judicial resources;
(6) to give the agency a chance to discover and correct its own errors; and
(7) to avoid the possibility that "frequent and deliberate flouting of the administrative processes could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its proc edures."Id. at 1327 (quoting Kobleur v. Group Hospitalization and Medical Services, Inc., 954 F.2d 705, 712 (11th Cir. 1992)). These sound reasons are certainly applicable to the instant case.
Additionally, although plaintiff states his desire to maintain this lawsuit as a class action, the allegations of his complaint fail to address the prerequisites for certification as a class action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23; N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 23.1. Also, the complaint fails to set forth the relief plaintiff seeks. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (the complaint shall contain "a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks").
Finally, in any section 1983 action, the initial inquiry must focus on whether two essential elements are present:
1. whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and
2. whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420, 428 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1403 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Parratt).
The Escambia County Jail is not a proper party to this action. See Eddy v. City of Miami, 715 F.Supp. 1553, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F.Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Rather, the proper defendant would be the county that operates the jail. The law is clear that a county or other local government cannot be held liable under section 1983 for the actions of its employees based on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 663, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2022, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Rather, only deprivations undertaken pursuant to governmental "custom" or "policy" may lead to the imposition of governmental liability. Id., 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36; Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 793 (11th Cir. 1998)). Thus, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 must identify a particular municipal "policy" or "custom" that caused the constitutional injury. Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). "A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the municipality, or created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the municipality. . . . A custom is a practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law." Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1105 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075, 118 S.Ct. 852, 139 L.Ed.2d 753 (1998)); see also Griffin, supra. Plaintiff must show that a county policy or custom was the "moving force" that caused the alleged constitutional violations to establish the county's § 1983 liability. McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 1999); Young v. City of Augusta, GA., 59 F.3d 1160, 1171 (11th Cir. 1995)
In his complaint, plaintiff neither claims, nor alleges facts to suggest that an official policy or custom is responsible for the alleged constitutional violation. A single incident alleged in a complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policymaking level, generally will not suffice to raise an inference of the existence of a custom or policy that resulted in a constitutional violation and will not state a claim. See Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2nd Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2436, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985)).
As to the substance of plaintiff's claim, it is noted plaintiff does not claim that the conditions of which he complains violate any rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Rather, he claims they violate the Florida Model Jail Standards. A violation of the Florida Model Jail Standards does not equate to a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires prison officials to provide "humane conditions of confinement," ensuring that "inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. . . ." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). In assessing a claim of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the court must consider "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Cruel and unusual punishment, however, consists only of a level of punishment that involves "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1999). Claims challenging conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment must demonstrate an infliction of pain "without any penological purpose" or an "unquestioned and serious deprivation of basic human needs" such as medical care, exercise, food, warmth, clothing, shelter, or safety. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981); see also Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096, 106 S.Ct. 1492, 89 L.Ed.2d 894 (1986). As the Supreme Court stated in Rhodes, "the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . which house persons convicted of serious crimes, can not be free of discomfort." Id. at 349, 101 S.Ct. at 2400. Moreover, "[t]o the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Id. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399.
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: a substantial risk of serious harm, defendants' deliberate indifference to that risk, and causation. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, supra, and LeMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993)). Thus, there is both an objective and subjective component of a viable claim.
The first requirement, the objective component of Eighth Amendment analysis, requires "conduct by public officials 'sufficiently serious' to constitute a cruel or unusual deprivation — one 'denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981))), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 774, 148 L.Ed.2d 673 (2001).
The second requirement, the subjective component of Eighth Amendment analysis, requires "a subjective intent by the public officials involved to use the sufficiently serious deprivation in order to punish." Taylor at 1258 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. at 300, 111 S.Ct. at 2325) ("The source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of this Court, but in the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify." (emphasis in original)). "To show the required subjective intent to punish, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the public official acted with an attitude of 'deliberate indifference.'" Taylor at 1258 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 291). Deliberate indifference is not established "unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.
In amending, plaintiff should carefully review the foregoing to determine whether he can present allegations sufficient to state a cause of action under the relevant law. If plaintiff determines that he cannot state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, he should file with the court a notice of voluntary dismissal of this action. If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must completely fill out a new civil rights complaint form, marking it " Amended Complaint." Plaintiff must limit his allegations to claims related to the same basic incident or issue and name as defendants only those persons who are responsible for the alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff must place their names in the style of the case on the first page of the civil rights complaint form, and include their addresses and employment positions in the "Parties" section of the form. In the statement of facts, plaintiff should clearly describe how each named defendant is involved in each alleged constitutional violation, alleging the claims as to each defendant in separately numbered paragraphs and including specific dates and times of the alleged unconstitutional acts. If plaintiff cannot state exactly how a particular defendant harmed him, he should delete or drop that person as a defendant from his complaint. In the statement of claims, plaintiff must identify what rights under the Constitution or laws of the United states he claims have been violated. In the statement of relief requested, plaintiff must identify what he wants this court to do for him, whether it be in the form of injunctive or declaratory relief, monetary damages, or some other relief. Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must contain all of his allegations because once an amended complaint is filed, all earlier complaints and filings are disregarded. N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 15.1. Plaintiff shall file the amended complaint with an original signature and keep an identical copy for himself. He should not submit service copies of his complaint unless and until the court directs him to do so. Finally, plaintiff is advised that discovery is premature at this stage of the case and plaintiff should not do any discovery without leave of court.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (doc. 5) is GRANTED to the extent that the case may proceed without theprepayment of the entire filing fee.
2. The clerk of court shall assess plaintiff $0.00 as an initial partial filing fee as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A). The total filing fee in this case is $250.00.
3. As funds become available in plaintiff's prison account, he shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income (that is, all funds deposited into the account) for each case he has filed in this court. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner's account to the clerk of court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00 until the filing fee of $250.00 is paid. A check from a penal institution, a cashier's check, or a money order should be made payable to "Clerk, U.S. District Court." Personal checks directly from prisoners will not be accepted. The following information shall either be included on the face of the check or money order or attached thereto:
Thus, prisoners who have filed more than one case may be required to make payments totaling 40%, 60%, 80% or even 100% of their monthly deposits.
(1) the full name of the prisoner;
(2) the prisoner's inmate number; and
(3) Northern District of Florida Case Number ( i.e., 3:05cv236/RV/MD).
Checks or money orders which do not have this information will be returned to the penal institution or to plaintiff.
4. The clerk of court shall MAIL a copy of this order, with the appropriate cover letter, to: Escambia County Jail, P.O. Box. 17789, Pensacola, FL, 32522, Attention: Inmate Account Administrator.
5. Plaintiff is warned that he is ultimately responsible for payment of the filing fee should the agency with custody over him lapse in its duty to make payments on his behalf. If plaintiff spends funds that should have been forwarded to the court as per the payment formula above, this case may be dismissed for non-payment. Furthermore, if plaintiff is transferred to another correctional institution, he should ensure that the new institution is informed about this lawsuit and the required monthly payments as set out herein. Plaintiff is advised to retain a copy of this order for this purpose. Finally, plaintiff is advised that dismissal or other disposition of this action will NOT relieve him of the obligation to pay the full filing fee in this case.
6. The clerk of court is directed to forward to the plaintiff a civil rights complaint form for use in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case number should be written on the form.
7. The plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to file an amended civil rights complaint, which shall be typed or clearly written and submitted on the court form as instructed above.
8. Failure to submit an amended complaint as instructed will result in a recommendation of dismissal of this action.
DONE AND ORDERED.