Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-0710, Section: "R" (1)
January 24, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is granted.
I. Background
Captain James Rivers sues American River Transport Company ("ARTCO") because it fired him in April 1998 after Rivers had worked for ARTCO since 1985. At the time he was fired, Rivers was the captain of an ARTCO vessel, and he asked the company to relieve him so that he could obtain medical attention for pain in wrists. Rivers had experienced pain of this type since the late 1980's. In response, Martha Floyd, ARTCO's personnel manager, told Rivers to stop when he reached Greenville, Mississippi and certain individuals would relieve him.
River's condition was later diagnosed as carpel tunnel syndrome.
The next day, Rivers asked Floyd f or a short-term disability form because he was allegedly concerned that getting his wrist attended to would cause him to miss more work than his allotted time off. Meanwhile, Floyd expected a work stop-page by an organization called "Pilots Agree." Floyd warned Rivers of the consequences if a captain or pilot stops a boat without the appropriate justification.
Before Rivers arrived at Greenville, he learned that his relief would not arrive as scheduled. He informed Raymond Hopkins, the port captain for ARTCO, that he intended to stop the boat and wait for his relief to arrive. Hopkins did not respond. Later that afternoon, Floyd sent another warning to Rivers stating:
Captains are expected to continue operating their boats. Your boat is directed to be underway by 6:00 p.m. central standard time tonight. If your boat is not underway at that time, the captain will be ordered to leave the vessel and shall be terminated.
Two hours later, Rivers responded that "due to sleep deprivation caused by discomforts of carpal tunnel syndrome" and dizziness caused by fluid in the inner ear it would be unsafe for him to pilot the boat until he received medical attention and rest.
Rivers then received a call from Charlotte Hanks of ARTCO's personnel department who allegedly asked Rivers if he was observing the "Pilots Agree" work stoppage. Rivers says that he told Hanks that he stopped the boat because he needed to take care of his medical problem, not because he was observing the strike. Rivers alleges that Hanks responded, "I've heard all I need to hear" and hung up the phone. At 11:00 p.m., the port captain asked Rivers if intended to get the vessel underway. Rivers said that he would not move the vessel, and the port captain responded that ARTCO would fire him if he did not get underway. Rivers continued to refuse to move the boat, and ARTCO terminated him.
Rivers brings this action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 966, et seq., and the general maritime law. He alleges that he was wrongfully discharged in retaliation for what defendant believed was his participation in the "Pilots Agree" strike. He also asserts a claim for maintenance and cure as a result of his carpal tunnel syndrome that he allegedly developed during his employment as a seaman on defendant's vessel. Defendant asserts this motion for summary judgment against only the wrongful termination claim.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) ( citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996).
B. Wrongful Discharge
Without a contract of employment for a specified term or voyage, a "seaman's employment is `terminable at will.'" Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc., 633 F.2d 1057, 1060 (5th Cir. 1981) ( quoting Findley v. Red Top Super Markets, 188 F.2d 834, 837, n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 870, 72 S.Ct. 112 (1951)). A maritime employer may discharge a seaman for good cause, for no cause, or even, in most circumstances, for a morally reprehensible cause. Id. at 1063. The Fifth Circuit recognizes, however, that public policy exceptions may override the employment-at-will doctrine. See Feemster v. BJ-Titan Services Co., 873 F.2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1989). In Feemster, the court indicated that the employment-at-will doctrine may be overridden when an employee is fired for: (1) refusal to commit an unlawful act, (2) performance of an important public obligation, or (3) exercise of a statutory right or privilege. Id.
In Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that a maritime employer committed a maritime tort when it discharged a seaman for exercising his legal right to file a personal injury action against the employer. 653 F.2d at 1063. The court required the seaman to prove that the pending or intended personal injury lawsuit was a substantial motivation for the employer's decision:
In order to prevail on a retalitory discharge claim, the seaman must affirmatively establish that the employer's decision was motivated in substantial part by the knowledge that the seaman either intends to file, or has already filed a personal injury action against the employer. The employer may, on the other hand, defeat the seaman's action by demonstrating that the personal injury action was not a substantial motivating factor for the discharge. Id. at 1063-64.
Here, plaintiff does not contest that he was an at-will employee. He alleges that his employer mistakenly believed that he was participating in the "Pilots Agee" strike and fired him in retaliation. Regardless of whether there are sufficient facts to establish a genuine issue as to defendant's reason for firing plaintiff, plaintiff points to no statutory right or privilege to participate in the strike that would fit the public policy exception to at-will termination under Feemster. The statutory right to strike is contained in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). See 29 U.S.C. § 157 ("Employees shall have the right . . . to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."); see also National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 795, 110 S.Ct. 1542, 1553-54 (1990). Ship captains, however, are "supervisors" under the NLRA and are excluded from the Act's protections. See Empress Casino Joilet Corporation v. NLRB, 204 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 2000); Spentonbush/Red Star Companies v. NLRB, 106 F.3d 484, 492 (2d Cir. 1997) (overruling NLRB determination that captains are not supervisors). Accordingly, in the absence of a statutory right, there is no issue of material fact whether plaintiff was fired in retaliation for exercising a statutory right. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff's claim for retalitory discharge for defendant's allegedly mistaken belief that he was participating in a strike is without merit.
For the first time in his responsive pleadings, plaintiff alleges two additional grounds for his wrongful discharge claim. He alleges that he was wrongfully discharged because his medical condition provided him grounds for filing a maintenance and cure claim against defendant and because he refused to commit an unlawful act. See Pl.'s Opp. to Summ. J. at 7-12. The Court finds that plaintiff presents no evidence to establish a genuine issue that he was fired because he could have filed a maintenance and cure claim. In Smith, the court held that a plaintiff must demonstrate that "the employer's decision was motivated in substantial part by the knowledge that the seaman either intends to file, or has already filed a personal injury action against the employer." 653 F.2d at 1063-64. Here, there is no evidence that plaintiff intended to file a personal injury action against defendant. In fact, plaintiff testified that he is not seeking damages with respect to the cause of his carpal tunnel syndrome. See Def.'s Ex. 1, Rivers Deposition at 28. Plaintiff nevertheless insists that the Court should read Smith expansively to authorize a cause of action in admiralty if a seaman is discharged in retaliation for a maintenance and cure claim. See Pl.'s Opp. to Summ. J. at 9. Even if Smith could be so extended, plaintiff's evidence falls short of creating an issue of fact that defendant's decision to fire him was "motivated in substantial part" by the possibility that he would file a maintenance and cure claim. All that plaintiff shows is that he made requests for medical relief to see a doctor about the pain in his wrists and that he made a request for a short-term disability form because he was concerned that his treatment could exceed the time he was allotted for relief. See Pl "s Ex. A, Rivers Deposition at 33-36. At no point did plaintiff give any indication that he planned to file a maintenance and cure claim against defendant. Further, there is nothing in the exchanges between plaintiff and ARTCO to support the theory that the company terminated him for this reason. The final telephone discussion between plaintiff and the port captain indicates that the substantial motivating factor in plaintiff's discharge was his refusal to move the vessel after he was ordered to do so by the port captain. See Pl.'s Ex. A, Rivers Deposition at 44. Therefore, the Court finds that there is no issue of material fact regarding plaintiff's claim that he was wrongfully discharged because he had grounds to bring a maintenance and cure claim against defendant.
Plaintiff's claim that he was wrongfully discharged for refusing to commit an unlawful act is also without merit. Plaintiff maintains that it would have been unlawful for him to have continued to pilot the vessel because he had not slept the night before. See Pl.'s Opp. to Summ. J. at 10-11. Under these conditions, argues plaintiff, he was so impaired that the vessel was rendered unseaworthy. See id. In Feemster v. BJ-Titan Services Co., the Fifth Circuit refused to find an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when a tugboat captain was fired for refusing to perform a job assignment that would have violated a federal statute that limits the number of hours that an individual can operate a towing vessel. See Feemster, 873 F.2d at 92-94. The court distinguished the case from Smith because it found that public policy considerations were not clearly implicated when, as in Feemster, a plaintiff was not discharged for exercising a statutory right. See id. at 93. The Feemster court emphasized that plaintiff had no statutory right to refuse management's directive even if it violated a safety statute. Rivers argues that the public policy concerns in this case are more akin to the considerations in Smith because this case involves the safety of the vessel's crew and the general public. This argument is unavailing because the Feemster court explicitly acknowledged that the legislation at issue was designed to promote maritime safety, and the court still held that plaintiff had no claim for retalitory discharge. As the court noted in Feemster, it might be different if plaintiff had complained to the Coast Guard about his safety concerns and was fired for complaining. Id. at 94-95.
Further, there was no clear requirement by management that Rivers violate a federal safety statute. In these circumstances, as in Feemster, "it is difficult to characterize this as a retaliation that offends public policy." Id.; see also Carrie v. James L. Cray, Inc., 912 F.2d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff "simply interposed his judgment against that of management"). Rivers merely disagreed with management about whether his lack of sleep made it unsafe for him to pilot the vessel. Nor is this case anything close to Borden v. Amoco Coastwise Trading Company, 985 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Tex. 1997), in which plaintiff was fired for refusing to sail a leaky vessel into a storm while it was carrying toxic chemicals. Therefore, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to whether defendant committed a retalitory discharge in contravention of public policy.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim.