Opinion
Case No. 3:20-CV-992
04-26-2021
Paula RITTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ARCADIA LOCAL SCHOOLS, Defendant.
Zachary J. Murry, Barkan & Robon, Maumee, OH, for Plaintiff. Benjamin D. Humphrey, Mark D. Landes, Isaac Wiles Burkholder & Teetor, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.
Zachary J. Murry, Barkan & Robon, Maumee, OH, for Plaintiff.
Benjamin D. Humphrey, Mark D. Landes, Isaac Wiles Burkholder & Teetor, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.
ORDER
James G. Carr, Sr. U.S. District Judge
This is a disability discrimination case. Plaintiff, Paula Ritter, alleges that the defendant, the Board of Education of Arcadia Local Schools (Arcadia), forced her to resign when it stopped providing her with accommodations for her mental health conditions.
Plaintiff brings claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). She also asserts claims for retaliation, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, breach of contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium.
Pending is defendant's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 19). For the following reasons, I grant defendant's motion.
Background
The Arcadia Local School District hired plaintiff Paula Ritter as a high school science teacher in 2001. She alleges that she worked at the school for approximately nine years without any accommodations.
Plaintiff alleges that throughout her adult life, she has struggled with "a number of chronic physical and mental health problems" including severe anxiety and depression. (Doc. 11-1, pgID 97). She claims that these conditions became so severe in 2010 that she could no longer perform her job without accommodations.
Accordingly, plaintiff alleges that she approached Arcadia administrators in 2010 and requested accommodations. Arcadia allegedly provided the following accommodations to plaintiff: advance notice of scheduled "crisis drills," permission to arrive up to ten minutes late to school in the morning, and advance notice of issues related to her performance or her students’ performance. She claims that she received these accommodations for approximately nine years.
In early 2019, plaintiff underwent a surgical procedure and alleges that after this procedure, Arcadia became suspicious of her need for accommodations. Plaintiff claims that Arcadia contacted her doctor without her consent and discussed plaintiff's medical condition with the office staff. Arcadia then allegedly refused to continue providing the accommodations that it had provided to plaintiff for nine years. Arcadia also allegedly threatened to revoke plaintiff's status an athletic coach, a role that provided her with supplemental income.
Plaintiff claims that her anxiety and depression worsened as a result of these events, and she resigned in October 2019 because she felt she had no other choice.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
The same standard applies to a Rule 12(c) motion as to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief. E.g. , Grindstaff v. Green , 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998). As with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget , 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007).
When ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, I consider all available pleadings and can also consider "any documents attached to, incorporated by, or referred to in the pleadings." Dudek v. Thomas & Thomas Attorneys & Counselors at Law, LLC , 702 F.Supp.2d 826, 832 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (O'Malley, J.).
Discussion
Defendant moves for partial judgment on the pleadings as to the following claims: constructive discharge, breach of contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. I will address these claims in turn.
1. Constructive Discharge
Defendant asks me to dismiss plaintiff's constructive discharge claim, arguing that constructive discharge is not an independent cause of action. Additionally, defendant argues that plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to constitute a constructive discharge.
Plaintiff responds that her claim of constructive discharge is derivative and thus, I should not dismiss it. She adds that she sufficiently has alleged a claim of constructive discharge.
I agree with defendant that constructive discharge is not an independent cause of action. This is the case under both Ohio and federal law. Lucarell v. Nationwide , 2015-Ohio-5286, ¶ 48, 44 N.E.3d 319 (rev'd on other grounds , 152 Ohio St. 3d 453, 97 N.E.3d 458 ); Cox v. Hausmann , No. 3:17-CV-02420, 2020 WL 5814476, at *5, n. 6 (N.D. Ohio) (Helmick, J.).
Rather, constructive discharge is "a method of proving a discharge forbidden by another source of law." O'Donnell v. Genzyme Corp. , No. 1:14-CV-01767, 2015 WL 1119719, at *8 (N.D. Ohio) (Gwin, J.) (dismissing constructive discharge claim because it is "not a standalone theory of relief").
In the employment context, plaintiffs may argue constructive discharge as a means to satisfy the "adverse employment action" prong of the prima facie case of discrimination. In this case, plaintiff's claim of constructive discharge is relevant to her disability discrimination claim. This is because she must show that she suffered an adverse employment action to succeed on that claim. See Nance v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. , 527 F.3d 539, 553 (6th Cir. 2008).
But as other judges in this district have explained, she cannot maintain constructive discharge as a separate cause of action. Since she has done so in Count 3 of her complaint, I must dismiss that claim.
However, I am dismissing the claim without prejudice to plaintiff arguing constructive discharge in support of her discrimination claims.
2. Breach of Contract
Defendant argues that a teacher cannot pursue breach of contract as an independent action in Ohio, and therefore, I must dismiss that claim.
Plaintiff responds that there is an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in every contract, and defendant has breached that duty by refusing to provide a reasonable accommodation to plaintiff.
As an initial matter, plaintiff has failed to identify the contract on which she bases her breach of contract claim. She generically refers to a "continuing contract," "employment contract," and "supplemental contract" but does not provide additional detail.
The Sixth Circuit has stated that "it is a basic tenet of contract law that a party can only advance a claim of breach of written contract by identifying and presenting the actual terms of the contract allegedly breached." Northampton Rest. Grp., Inc. v. FirstMerit Bank, N.A. , 492 F. App'x 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2012) ; see also Eberhard v. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. , No. 1:11 CV 834, 2014 WL 12758386, at *4 (N.D. Ohio) (Oliver, Jr., J.) (finding that to state a claim for breach of contract, "a plaintiff must attach the alleged contract to his complaint or at least set forth the language of the contractual provision allegedly breached."). Plaintiff has failed to do so here. While plaintiff has not identified the contract at issue, defendant has attached to its Answer a copy of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Arcadia teachers and the Arcadia Board of Education. (Doc. 16-1). Since plaintiff has not contended that her claim arises under a different agreement, the only contract on which she can base her claim is the CBA.
The CBA contains a grievance procedure applicable to teachers. It states that "[a]ny claim by [...] a teacher that there has been a violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of the terms of this Agreement shall be a grievance." (Id. , pgID 145). The contract outlines the steps of the grievance procedure, including a requirement that teachers file a grievance within fifteen days and proceed to arbitration if the parties cannot resolve the grievance internally. (Id. , pgID 145-46).
Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is a grievance under the CBA because it is a teacher's claim "that there has been a violation [...] of the terms of" the CBA. And as the CBA makes clear, plaintiff's sole means of redress for such a claim is through the grievance procedure outlined in the contract. She cannot pursue a breach of contract claim in this court. See Johnson v. Cleveland City Sch. Dist. , No. 1:07 CV 1610, 2008 WL 373444, at *3 (N.D. Ohio) (Nugent, J.) (dismissing the plaintiff's breach of contract claim in a disability discrimination case where the Collective Bargaining Agreement contained a grievance procedure).
Accordingly, I dismiss plaintiff's breach of contract claim with prejudice.
3. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendant asks that I dismiss plaintiff's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because under Ohio law, she must allege that she was a bystander to a serious accident.
Plaintiff does not directly respond to defendant's argument and instead states generally that the claim is permissible.
In Ohio, a plaintiff cannot state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress except in very narrow circumstances. Ault v. Medina Med. Invs., LLC , No. 1:06 CV 1113, 2007 WL 81853, at *5 (N.D. Ohio) (O'Malley, J.). Recovery is limited to situations where the plaintiff has "witnessed or experienced a dangerous accident or was subjected to an actual physical peril." Inskeep v. W. Res. Transit Auth. , 2013-Ohio-897, ¶ 25, 2013 WL 979054 (Ohio App. 7 Dist.).
Generally, a plaintiff cannot recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context. Tschantz v. Ferguson , 97 Ohio App. 3d 693, 714, 647 N.E.2d 507 (1994) ; see also Maxwell v. GTE Wireless Serv. Corp. , 121 F. Supp. 2d 649, 660 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (Aldrich, J.) (rejecting employee's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because he presented no evidence of actual physical peril).
Plaintiff has alleged neither that she witnessed or experienced a dangerous accident, nor that defendant placed her in actual physical peril. Thus, I must dismiss her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress with prejudice.
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendant argues that I should dismiss plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because she has failed to plead sufficient facts to sustain the claim.
Plaintiff responds that she has pled sufficient facts supporting her claim that defendant "maliciously sought to injure her and deny her the right to continued employment with provision of a reasonable accommodation for her disability." (Doc. 20, pgID 191).
Under Ohio law, a plaintiff alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress must show:
(1) the defendant intended to cause emotional distress or knew or should have known that its conduct would result in serious emotional distress to the plaintiff; (2) defendant's conduct was outrageous and extreme and beyond all possible bounds of decency and was such that it can be considered as utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of plaintiff's psychic injury; and (4) plaintiff's emotional distress was serious and of such a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
Talley v. Fam. Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc. , 542 F.3d 1099, 1110 (6th Cir. 2008).
"Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is initially a question of law for the court." Morrow v. Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A. , 2009-Ohio-2665, ¶ 48, 183 Ohio App.3d 40, 915 N.E.2d 696. It is not enough that a defendant "acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress." Id. (quoting Yeager v. Loc. Union 20 , 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 374, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983) ). The conduct at issue must be "atrocious" and "utterly intolerable." Id.
Considering this extremely high bar, plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. She principally relies on two of the defendant's alleged actions in support of her claim: denying her requested accommodations and contacting her physician without consent. Even when taken together, these actions are not extreme and outrageous under Ohio law.
Ohio courts place "a particularly high bar on ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct in the employer-employee relationship." Culler v. Exal Corp. , 193 F. Supp. 3d 850, 852 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (Pearson, J.). And the Sixth Circuit has held that terminating an employee is not extreme and outrageous conduct, even if discrimination motivated the decision. Talley, supra , 542 F.3d at 1111. There must be "something more." Id.
This means that even if plaintiff could prove she was discriminated against and forced to resign, that would not be sufficient to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress. And while plaintiff insists that she has alleged "something more," she relies on defendant's denial of her accommodation to make that argument. This is clearly legally insufficient.
Plaintiff could argue that defendant's alleged inappropriate contacting of her physician constitutes the "something more" that is necessary to sustain her claim. However, such conduct is similarly insufficient.
The Sixth Circuit considered an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in the context of a disability discrimination lawsuit in Talley v. Fam. Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc . That case is instructive here. The plaintiff in Talley provided her employer with a doctor's note, requesting that she be allowed to use a stool at her cashier job. Id. She alleged not only that her employer refused to discuss the requested accommodation with her, but also that her supervisor lied to her, delayed calling her back to work, threatened her with a loss of benefits, and contacted other stores to prevent her from using a stool there as well. Id. The Sixth Circuit found that none of those actions were severe enough to satisfy the "something more" that the law requires. Id.
If the conduct in that case cannot satisfy the requirement of "something more," then the less severe conduct plaintiff has alleged surely cannot.
Therefore, I dismiss plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress with prejudice.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED THAT defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 19) is granted in accordance with the following:
(1) Plaintiff's constructive discharge claim (Count 3) is dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff arguing constructive discharge in support of her discrimination claims;
(2) Plaintiff's breach of contract claim (Count 4) is dismissed with prejudice; and
(3) Plaintiff's negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims (Counts 5 and 6) are dismissed with prejudice.
So ordered.