Opinion
NNHCV166066290S
10-22-2018
Gloria RISPOLI v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEAL OF the TOWN OF EAST HAVEN
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Wahla, J.
The plaintiff, Gloria Rispoli, is the record owner of 12 Smith Street, East Haven, Connecticut. The plaintiff contends that she is statutorily aggrieved by the Zoning Board of Appeal of the Town of East Haven’s (ZBA) decision pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8(a)(1). The issues raised by this appeal are: (1) Was the interpretation of the variance granted in 1986 in accordance with the plain language of said variance? (2) Was the decision of the ZBA unsupported by substantial evidence, such that the ZBA acted illegally, arbitrarily, and in an abuse of its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s appeal? (3) Is the dwelling structure in question a pre-existing nonconformity pursuant to General Statutes § 8-13a? (4) And were the Zoning Enforcement Officer (ZEO) and ZBA barred from ordering the removal of the dwelling structure by the doctrine of municipal estoppel?
The court will address these issues in turn.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT
The record reveals the following factual and procedural context. The plaintiff is the owner of 12 Smith Street, East Haven, Connecticut (property). On/or about December 18, 1986, Andrew DeBenedet, the title owner of the property at the time, applied and was granted a variance from the ZBA to permit him to redevelop the property along with the adjacent lot also owned by him. At the time the variance was granted, there was an existing dwelling structure (it has been referred to by, various names such as a little house, old house, and other house) built in 1920 that was located on the property.
After the variance was granted, DeBenedet built a new home on the property. Subsequent to the construction of the new home, the Town of East Haven (town), through its various agencies and officials, issued various permits, such as zoning permits, building permits, and a certificate of occupancy to DeBenedet. During this entire period of time, and for the past thirty years, the dwelling structure has remained on the property.
In 2007, the plaintiff and her husband purchased the property. The dwelling structure was in existence at the time of the purchase. At oral argument, the plaintiff presented to the court and emphasized that the dwelling structure was occupied by tenants and was an additional source of income for the plaintiff. The record shows that in July 2016, ZEO Soto received a complaint about the illegal unit and work being done on the property Soto inspected the property and found an illegal floating deck being constructed on the property without a permit and within the required 10 feet setback. Soto’s investigation revealed a violation of variance and the dwelling structure. Soto spoke with the plaintiff who confirmed that she had rented the rooms in her house to a college baseball team and that she would be moving to the dwelling structure. Soto contends that, according to his investigation, the dwelling structure currently existing on the property was a structure that was to be removed as a part of the site plan and variance application filed by DeBenedet back in 1986.
Soto issued two notices of violation. The first notice of violation was about operating a rooming house without a special exception, and the second was for the failure to remove the dwelling structure, which was a condition of the variance according to the approved site plan. The only issue on appeal concerns Soto’s enforcement of the condition that the dwelling structure has to be removed pursuant to the variance application and map submitted therewith.
The plaintiff appealed ZEO Soto’s actions to the ZBA. On October 20, 2016, the ZBA held a hearing on the plaintiff’s appeal. After the hearing, the ZBA denied the plaintiff’s appeal. The plaintiff brought this matter to the Superior Court as a matter of right. The court heard oral argument on May 25, 2018.
II
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Connecticut Supreme Court stated in Anatra v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 307 Conn. 728, 737, 59 A.3d 772 (2013) that "[g]enerally, it is the function of a zoning board ... to decide within prescribed limits and consistent with the exercise of [its] legal discretion, whether a particular section of the zoning regulations applies to a given situation and the manner in which it does apply. The trial court ha[s] to decide whether the board correctly interpreted the section [of the regulations] and applied it with reasonable discretion to the facts ... In applying the law to the facts of a particular case, the board is endowed with ... liberal discretion, and its action is subject to review ... only to determine whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal ... Moreover, the plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that the board acted improperly." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
"Ordinarily, this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute’s purposes ... [A]n agency’s factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight ... Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion ... Furthermore, when [an] agency’s determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny ... the agency is not entitled to special deference ... [I]t is for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law ... These principles apply equally to regulations as well as to statutes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 737-38.
"[P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of an administrative appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 402, 409, 788 A.2d 1239 (2002).
"A nonconforming use is merely an ‘existing use’ the continuance of which is authorized by the zoning regulations." Melody v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Conn. 516, 519, 264 A.2d 572 (1969); Pleasant View Farms Development, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. 265, 272, 588 A.2d 1372 (1991). Such a use is permitted because its existence predates the adoption of the zoning regulations. Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn. 703, 710, 535 A.2d 799 (1988). It is well established that "[t]o be a nonconforming use the use must be actual. It is not enough that it be a contemplated use [or] that the property was bought for the particular use. The property must be so utilized as to be irrevocably committed to that use." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 197, 215 A.2d 112 (1965); see also Helicopter Associates, Inc. v. Stamford, 201 Conn. 700, 713, 519 A.2d 49 (1986); Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299, 308, 170 A.2d 267 (1961). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of a nonconforming use. Pleasant View Farms Development, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 272. See also Francini v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 228 Conn. 785, 789, 639 A.2d 519 (1994).
III
DISCUSSION
1. The 1986 Variance
The first issue the court will address is the 1986 variance. The plaintiff argues that a plain reading of the certificate of the variance reveals that it contains no requirements or conditions that the existing dwelling structure has to be removed. The plaintiff contends that the variance was recorded on the land records and she purchased the property with the knowledge of the variance having been granted. The plaintiff also argues that the variance does not, on its face, require the removal of the dwelling structure.
The plaintiff emphasizes that, at the time that she purchased the property, the dwelling structure was still located on the property and was being assessed and taxed by the defendant. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, she had no notice that she was purchasing the property in violation of the terms of the 1986 variance, as it is now claimed by the ZEO. The plaintiff contends that this court should reverse the ZBA’s decision as a matter of law.
The defendant counters that the failure of the recorded variance to contain any reference to the condition does not make the condition invalid. In support of its argument, the defendant cites to General Statutes § 8-3d, which provides: "No variance, special permit or special exception granted pursuant to this chapter, chapter 126 or any special act, and no special exemption granted under section 8-2g, shall be effective until a copy thereof, certified by a zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals, containing a description of the premises to which it relates and specifying the nature of such variance, special permit, special exception or special exemption, including the zoning bylaw, ordinance or regulation which is varied in its application or to which a special exception or special exemption is granted, and stating the name of the owner of record, is recorded in the land records of the town in which such premises are located. The town clerk shall index the same in the grantor’s index under the name of the then record owner and the record owner shall pay for such recording."
The defendant argues that the variance in this matter meets all of the requirements of § 8-3d. The defendant points out that there is no requirement in § 8-3d that the recorded variance should contain any conditions associated with the variance or any other information other than what is recited in the statute. The defendant further argues that the variance is the starting point. It gives notice to the public that the variance was granted relative to the property and a brief explanation of the nature of the variance as required by the statute. It directs the public to review the zoning file and the details of the variance that was granted.
At oral argument, the defendant emphasized, stressed, and highlighted for the court to note that the "zoning file" in this case contains a site plan, which clearly indicates that the house was to be removed. Defendant’s Appendix # 3. The defendant further emphasized that the zoning application signed by the chairman of the ZBA contained a notation on the bottom that the barn was to be removed as a condition of the variance application. Furthermore, the defendant contends that the East Haven Zoning Regulations (regulations) do not allow two houses to be built on a lot. In support of its position, it cites § 25.2 of the regulations, which provides that if there are two or more dwelling units on a property, that the lot shall have at least the minimum area per dwelling unit as specified in Schedule B. Schedule B provides for 20,000 square feet in this zone, amounting to 40,000 square feet here, which the plaintiff’s lot does not have. The defendant also points out that, pursuant to Schedule A Permitted Uses, which is set forth in § 24 of the regulations, only one dwelling is allowed per lot. The defendant argues that for the dwelling structure to remain, the owner would have had to seek variances in addition to those that were applied for in the application. According to the defendant, there was no reason to condition the variance on the removal of the dwelling structure, as the construction of the new house made the dwelling structure illegal and the failure to remove it enforceable by the defendant.
Our Supreme Court, in Anatra v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 307 Conn. 736, framed this issue as follows: "whether conditions attached to the granting of a variance must be explicitly described in the certificate of variance or whether they may be construed in light of the entire public record, including the variance application, exhibits, hearing transcripts and decision of record."
The Supreme Court goes on to state: "We first consider whether a condition attached to the granting of a variance must be construed solely on the basis of the language contained in the certificate of variance. The starting point for our discussion is General Statutes § 8-3d, which provides for the granting of variances." Id., 739. "Although § 8-3d provides that a certified copy of an approved variance ‘specifying the nature of such variance’ shall be recorded in the land records, neither the text of the statute nor any related statute refers to the conditions or limitations that may be attached to the granting of a variance. Moreover, in the very brief legislative debate on § 8-3d, the only relevant comments were that the recording of the certificate in the land records would provide interested parties with legal notice of the fact that a variance had been granted ... We thus seek guidance from our case law in determining how the conditions of a variance should be construed." (Citations omitted.) Id., 740.
"[A] zoning board of appeals may, without express authorization, attach reasonable conditions to the grant[ing] of a variance ... [A] variance is authority extended to the owner to use his property in a manner forbidden by the zoning enactment ... The right to attach reasonable conditions to the grant[ing] of a variance is not dependent upon express authorization from the lawmaking body ... Were this not so, the board, for lack of such right, might be forced, at times, to deny a variance and thus to perpetuate an owner’s plight crying for relief. Since variances allow uses forbidden by the regulations, the attachment of conditions to the granting of a variance alleviates the harm which might otherwise result ... Were it not for the conditions imposed by a board ... variances might not be supportable as being in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the zoning ordinance ... Thus the variance and the attached conditions are inextricably linked, the viability of the variance being contingent upon the satisfaction of the conditions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 740-41.
"In L&G Associates, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 40 Conn.App. 784, 787, 673 A.2d 1146 (1996), the Appellate Court expressly held that the trial court properly had considered the entire public record, rather than considering [only] the plain language of the variance certificate, in concluding that the variance did not allow the plaintiff to construct a building not indicated in the original application and site plan. The court cited Raymond [v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 164 Conn. 85, 318 A.2d 119 (1972) ] for the fact that this court had considered not only the language of the certificate of variance but the proposed use of the property in the variance application when determining the use of the property permitted under the variance." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anatra v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 307 Conn. 742-43.
In light of the foregoing, and based upon the entire record, the court concludes that the ZBA’s interpretation of the variance was justified.
2. Substantial Evidence Rule
The plaintiff next argues that the ZBA’s denial of her appeal of the ZEO’s decision should be reversed by this court because it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record and, as such, it is illegal, arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. The plaintiff contends that, although the substantial evidence rule is somewhat deferential to the decision of the rule making process of the agency, it goes beyond a mere rubber stamping of the agency’s decision. The plaintiff cites Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. DPUC, 216 Conn. 627, 637, 583 A.2d 906 (1990).
The plaintiff asserts that the ZEO’s notice claims that the dwelling structure is in violation of the 1986 variance, violates the building setbacks, and was being constructed or altered without receiving a zoning permit. The plaintiff appealed that determination because the dwelling structure had existed on the site since approximately 1920 and, more importantly for the sake of this argument, for the past thirty years since the variance was granted. The plaintiff argues that the plain reading of the variance is at odds with the ZEO’s determination, and that those facts immediately subsequent to the granting of the variance, and those facts in existence up to and including August 4, 2016, support the argument that the variance did not require the removal of the dwelling structure. In support of this argument, the plaintiff advocates that, to understand the issues, a history of the variance and the facts subsequent to its granting is important.
As noted above, the former owner sought variances to relocate the boundary lines on two abutting lots that it owned. One on Montauk and Smith Street (referred to therein as Parcel A) and the other on Morgan Avenue (referred to therein as Parcel B). In order to do so, Parcel A required a lot frontage variance. Parcel B required a lot area variance, side yard variance, and lot frontage variance. The map submitted in support of that request is part of the record compiled by the ZEO. Those variances were unanimously approved on December 18, 1986. The plaintiff argues that the minutes of the meeting, which are contained in RR# 9, make no mention of the removal of the dwelling structure. The plaintiff does concede that, although not noted on the variance filed on the land records or the minutes of the meeting, a notation in the ZBA’s records does indicate that the variances were granted "with stipulation that Barn to be remove[d] according to plan before permit issues." See RR# 9, Exhibit E. This is a crucial piece of evidence contained in the Record.
The plaintiff contends that the only "barns" on either lot were the two located on Parcel B. The larger of the two barns was subsequently removed. Thereafter, in October 1987 a zoning permit was applied for and issued for 12 Smith Street, the subject property. See RR# 9, Exhibit G. The plaintiff asserts that a certificate of occupancy for the new house was issued later that year. The plaintiff argues that during and throughout this entire time period, the dwelling structure remained in existence on the property. The only structure that was actually removed was one of the barns on Parcel B. The plaintiff argues that, based on all of the facts and evidence presented, the continued existence of the dwelling structure on the plaintiff’s property is not a violation of the variance because, if it were, the zoning permit and certificate of occupancy would not have been issued. As a result, the plaintiff asserts that its continued existence today is not a violation, and the ZBA’s decision upholding the ZEO’s notice should be reversed.
The defendant counters that there was substantial evidence in the record and there were reasons stated on the record for the denial of the appeal by the ZBA. The defendant argues that the ZEO presented his record relative to the enforcement notice issued by him to the ZBA. The ZEO’s notes in his file indicate that he presented for an inspection of the property pursuant to a complaint he received from neighbors that the house was being used as a rooming or frat house. The defendant argues that the ZEO reviewed the zoning file and discovered that a deck was being constructed without a building permit or zoning permit, and that the dwelling structure was to be removed when the new house was constructed pursuant to the application. See Defendant’s Appendix # 5. The defendant further argues that this court should focus on the decision of the ZBA and the record before the board, rather than the ZEO.
"[F]ollowing an appeal from the action of a zoning enforcement officer to a zoning board of appeals, a court reviewing the decision of the zoning board of appeals must focus, not on the decision of the zoning enforcement officer, but on the decision of the board and the record before the board." Caserta v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 226 Conn. 80, 82, 626 A.2d 744 (1993). "It is well settled that courts are not to substitute their judgment for that of the board, and that the decisions of local boards will not be disturbed as long as honest judgment has been reasonably and fairly made after a full hearing ... as the credibility of witnesses and the determination of factual issues are matters within the province of the administrative agency ... The court’s function is to determine on the basis of the record whether substantial evidence has been presented to the board to support its findings." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conetta v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 42 Conn.App. 133, 137-38, 677 A.2d 987 (1996). "Upon an appeal from the judgment of the trial court, we review the record to see if there is factual support for the board’s decision, not for the contentions of the applicant ... to determine whether the judgment was clearly erroneous or contrary to law." (Citation omitted.) Wing v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 61 Conn.App. 639, 644, 767 A.2d 131, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 908, 772 A.2d 602 (2001).
The ZEO’s record was complete and he acted properly within the scope of his duties. The record contains a site plan associated with the variance application that made it clear that the dwelling structure had to be removed. Additionally, the transcripts and the exhibits submitted at the hearing supported the ZBA’s denial of the plaintiff’s appeal. At the hearing before the ZBA, there was testimony from neighbors that the dwelling structure was to be removed once the new house was built. More importantly, the site plan approved as part of the variance indicated that the dwelling structure was to be removed. A review of the transcripts and the record clearly shows that the ZBA had more than sufficient evidence to deny the appeal and that the actions of the ZEO were appropriate based on his record and existing law.
3. Legally Existing Nonconformity Pursuant to General Statutes § 8-13a
The plaintiff argues that, because the dwelling structure has been in existence on the property for the past thirty years, the defendant is precluded from requiring its removal now. According to the plaintiff, under General Statutes § 8-13a, structures existing on property in violation of zoning regulations for a period in excess of three years enjoy legally existing nonconforming use status. The defendant counters that § 8-13a is very limited in scope, and applies only to issues involving violations of zoning regulations relative to the location of a structure on a lot, which is not the case here. The defendant asserts that the property was subject to the requirement that the dwelling structure be removed as a part of its variance approval, as indicated in the approved site plan, and thus, § 8-13a is inapplicable.
Section 8-13a provides in relevant part: "(a)(1) When a building or other structure is so situated on a lot that it violates a zoning regulation of a municipality that prescribes the location of such a building or structure in relation to the boundaries of the lot or when a building or structure is situated on a lot that violates a zoning regulation of a municipality that prescribes the minimum area of the lot, and when such building or structure has been so situated for three years without the institution of an action to enforce such regulation, such building or structure shall be deemed a nonconforming building or structure in relation to such boundaries or to the area of such lot, as the case may be. For purposes of this section, ‘structure’ has the same meaning as in the zoning regulations for the municipality in which the structure is located or, if undefined by such regulations, ‘structure’ means any combination of materials, other than a building, that is affixed to the land, including, without limitation, signs, fences, walls, pools, patios, tennis courts and decks. (2) A property owner shall bear the burden of proving that a structure qualifies as a nonconforming structure pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection."
"Section 8-13a(a) amounts to a statute of limitations for [certain] non-conforming buildings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Benson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 89 Conn.App. 324, 330, 873 A.2d 1017 (2005). "The intended policies for which the statute was enacted were (1) to protect landowners and the public interest by requiring municipalities to act reasonably quickly on certain zoning violations, and (2) to protect innocent landowners from being unable to provide marketable title when a land survey uncovers an existing setback violation." (Emphasis added.) Id., 335.
In Norwalk v. Bateman, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-12-6014973-S (July 9, 2013, Karazin, J.T.R.), the defendant property owner appealed the Norwalk Zoning Board of Appeals’ upholding of an order to cease and desist. Id. The order concerned alleged violations of the regulations of the city of Norwalk regarding the conversion of a garage into living space without a permit, the failure to provide a parking space behind the 30-foot setback, and parking within the front setback. Id. The defendant claimed that the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth by § 8-13a(a) and that the action must be dismissed. Id. Citing Benson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 89 Conn.App. 324, the court rejected that argument and upheld the Norwalk Zoning Board of Appeals’ cease and desist order as "not barred by the three-year statute of limitations in ... § 8-13a(a) because there [wa]s no alleged setback violation." Id.
In light of the foregoing, and as set forth by our Supreme Court in Benson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 89 Conn.App. 330, § 8-13a only applies in situations concerning specific nonconforming uses. Section 8-13a, by its terms, encompasses situations where a building or structure "violates a zoning regulation of a municipality that prescribes the location of such a building or structure in relation to the boundaries of the lot or when a building or structure is situated on a lot that violates a zoning regulation of a municipality that prescribes the minimum area of the lot ..." General Statutes § 8-13a. Therefore, the applicability of § 8-13a is limited in its scope to buildings that violate setback or minimum area requirements.
In the present matter, the defendant’s action is not barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in § 8-13a(a). The dwelling structure located on the plaintiff’s property violates a provision of the regulations that prohibit the plaintiff from having more than one dwelling structure on her property. Therefore, similar to the court’s holding in Bateman, because the plaintiff’s property violates a provision of the regulations that does not relate to setback or minimum area requirements, § 8-13a does not allow for the dwelling structure to be deemed a valid, nonconforming use.
4. Municipal Estoppel
Next, the plaintiff argues that the defendant is precluded by the doctrine of "municipal estoppel" from attempting to enforce the condition of the variance against her, a subsequent property owner. The plaintiff cites, inter alia, West Hartford v. Rechel, 190 Conn. 114, 459 A.2d 1015 (1983).
In Rechel, our Supreme Court states that "[t]his court has recently restated the law of municipal estoppel. In Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724, 731-32, 453 A.2d 1144 (1982), we held that, in special circumstances, a municipality may be estopped from enforcing its zoning regulations. We recognized that estoppel always requires proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury ... In municipal zoning cases, however, estoppel may be invoked (1) only with great caution, (2) only when the resulting violation has been unjustifiably induced by an agent having authority in such matters, and (3) only when special circumstances make it highly inequitable or oppressive to enforce the regulations." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) West Hartford v. Rechel, supra, 190 Conn. 121.
In the present case, the plaintiff claims that, at the time when she purchased the property, the town had issued a notice of variance, a zoning permit, a building permit, and a certificate of occupancy for the new home constructed on the property, all while the dwelling structure existed there. The plaintiff contends that she was unjustifiably induced by the town in purchasing the property with the justifiable belief that both structures were legally existing. The plaintiff cites the record compiled by the ZEO, which states that permits were signed by both building and zoning officials. The plaintiff contends that her reliance on the record of approvals and permits issued prior to her purchase of the home was reasonable.
The plaintiff argues that she will suffer significant financial harm, in that the price she paid to purchase the property included the value of the dwelling structure (it was and continued to be a rent paying unit during her ownership), she has been taxed on the value of the dwelling structure for 20 years, and the property will lose value if the dwelling structure is eliminated. Furthermore, the plaintiff contends that on May 28, 2015, the town issued her a building permit to install new windows, insulation, and sheetrock in the dwelling structure, which will be lost if demolition of the dwelling structure is required. The plaintiff would also have to bear the burden of the cost to demolish the dwelling structure.
The defendant counters that the doctrine of municipal estoppel does not bar the ZEO’s action. The defendant’s reliance is based on Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, supra, 188 Conn. 731-32. In Lescynski, as previously discussed, the court lays down that municipal estoppel "may be invoked against the enforcement of zoning regulations (1) only with great caution, (2) only when the resulting violation has been unjustifiably induced by an agent having authority in such matters, and (3) only when special circumstances make it highly inequitable or oppressive to enforce the regulations." Id., 732. "Moreover, it is the burden of the person claiming the estoppel to show he exercised due diligence to ascertain the truth and that he not only lacked knowledge of the true state of things but had no convenient means of acquiring that knowledge." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dupuis v. Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc., 170 Conn. 344, 353, 365 A.2d 1093 (1976).
The defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the elements of municipal estoppel. The plaintiff was not present to testify; instead, her son appeared on her behalf. The plaintiff presented no evidence in the record that she was induced to believe that certain facts existed and that she acted on that belief when she purchased the property. There was no testimony setting forth that she would not have purchased the property if she had known that the dwelling structure had to be torn down.
The defendant also points out that the plaintiff presented no testimony that any due diligence was made to determine the nature and extent of the variance. The defendant emphasizes that, at the time of the plaintiff’s purchase of the property, there was a recorded variance on the land records and on the title of the property. No testimony or evidence was presented at the hearing that the plaintiff reviewed the zoning file to determine the nature of the variance and whether any conditions existed that would affect her.
Additionally, the defendant contends that the plaintiff presented no evidence that she changed her position in reliance on the recorded variance, and there was no evidence that she would be subjected to a substantial loss. The defendant emphasized at oral argument that the court should make note that the plaintiff put forward no evidence in any way, shape, or form to show "substantial monetary loss."
As to the issuing of various permits by the town to do work on the plaintiff’s property, the defendant argues and cites to the general rule that "a municipality is not precluded from enforcing a zoning or fire limit regulation by the fact that one or more of its officers or servants has exceeded his authority by issuing a permit contravening the terms of such regulation; and this notwithstanding that the holder of the permit has proceeded thereunder to his detriment before the municipality seeks to enforce the regulation against him." Annot., 119 A.L.R. 1512 (1939).
The plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirements of municipal estoppel as set forth in West Hartford v. Rechel, supra, 190 Conn. 121. The recorded variance on the land records directed the public to review the public file. The plaintiff did not put forth evidence demonstrating that she relied on the variance in her purchase of the house, or that she would not have bought the house had she known that the dwelling structure needed to be removed. Nor was there evidence relative to economic hardship. Furthermore, the issuance of building permits by a municipal employee, by itself, does not satisfy the requirements of municipal estoppel.
IV
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s appeal in this matter is hereby affirmed.